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What does this legal research aim to achieve? 
Background  
The challenges of our century (climate change, increased and ageing population, shortage 
of natural resources, global food security, increasing competition from developing countries 
etc.) may require revolutionary changes in every aspect of our life. In the face of these 
challenges, European policy-makers consider that innovation is the key to maintain Europe’s 
economic leadership and to maintain the welfare of its citizens.1 Based on widely embraced 
economic theories, European policy-makers believe that innovation leads to increased 
productivity and to sustained economic growth. They moreover believe that innovation can 
ensure Europe the means to develop solutions for the above mentioned challenges.2  
In this context, the European policy-makers have since 2000 re-evaluated the innovation 
policy in the European Union (‘EU’). They realized that EU’s innovation policy did not target 
solutions to the above mentioned challenges, but stimulated economic competitiveness in 
general. They also noted that the employed innovation policy instruments (supply-side 
measures such as subsidies, tax measures etc.), which identified broad areas of interest and 
left the selection of specific research topics to the innovator, were unable to incentivize 
increased private research and development (‘R&D’) investments or to steer private R&D 
efforts towards the necessary innovations.
 3
 
Against this background, EU’s innovation policy shifted focus towards stimulating the creation 
of solutions to the above mentioned European challenges and introduced new demand-side 
instruments.4 Among the various demand-side instruments, public procurement of R&D 
services was identified as a useful mechanism for enhancing private innovators’ efforts 
towards publicly desirable solutions and for enhancing the global competitiveness of 
European companies.
5
   
Before introducing public procurement of R&D services into EU’s innovation policy, the 
European Commission hired experts to investigate whether the use of this instrument in the ICT 
sector can indeed contribute to the above mentioned objectives. The ICT sector was singled 
                                                          
1 Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council, 23 and 24 March 2000 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm> accessed 12 November 2012. 
2 Innovation is not a goal in itself, but broadly accepted by economists as one of the key potential inputs/driving forces for sustainable 
economic growth. See for example Gillian Hadfield, ‘Producing Law and Innovation’ in Robert E Litan, (Task Force organizer),’ Rules for 
Growth: Promoting Innovation and Growth Through Legal Reform’ (Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 2011); Michael Spence, ‘The next 
Convergence – The Future of Economic Growth in a Multispeed World’ (Farrar, Straus and Giroux 2011) 36. 
3 Jakob Edler, Luke Georghiou, ‘Public Procurement and innovation – Resurrecting the demand side’, Research Policy 36 (2007) 958. 
4 J Edler et al, ‘Evaluating the demand side: New challenges for evaluation’ (2012) 21 Research Evaluation 33 
5 For a description of the policy  documents which concluded on the need to use public procurement as innovation policy instrument, see 
Chapter 2, section 2.2.  
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out due to its perceived responsiveness to public demand and due to the already existent 
competitive advantages held by European ICT companies in international markets. 
6
 
The experts pointed out that other competing economies such as the United States (‘US’) 
succeed relatively better in ‘pulling’ R&D into the commercialization phase and in enhancing 
the international competitiveness of their domestic suppliers.7  The experts attributed this 
success to the use of public procurement of R&D, which was a strategic part of the US Small 
Business Innovation Research (‘SBIR’) programme.  According to the experts, high-risk R&D 
procurements performed by the US Department of Defense (‘DoD’) led to the creation of 
new industries (e.g. the semiconductors industry, the Internet etc.) in which US companies 
became world market leaders. In their opinion, the US had used procurement of R&D 
strategically, ‘to provide a strong home market for their domestic supplier base in well-
defined areas of desired international competitiveness’.8 Compared to the US, considerable 
less funds were dedicated in Europe to public procurement of R&D.9 
Based on the experts’ recommendations, the European Commission attempted in 2007 to 
emulate the success of the US SBIR. To this end, it drafted a dedicated procedure and called 




Problem and research questions 
According to the PCP Communication, PCP represents one approach to the procurement of 




The European Commission ‘translated’ the SBIR policies into the PCP instrument, without 
questioning the effectiveness of the US government intervention through the SBIR-type of 
action. It assumed that government action is needed to spur innovation. At the same time, 
the European Commission adapted PCP to the existing EU regulatory framework made of: 
- EU rules meant to maximize EU-wide competition in public contracts;  
- EU State aid legislation meant to minimize public aid to national businesses.  
                                                          
6 ISTAG, 'Shaping Europe's Future through ICT'’ (2006) <http://www.cordis.lu/ist/istag.htm> accessed 26 January 2012. Aho, E., Cornu, J., 
Georghiou, L. and Subira, A. ‘Creating an Innovative Europe’ (2006) (Aho Report) <http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/action/2006_ahogroup_en.htm> accessed 26 March 2013; ‘The EU Economy Yearly Review’ 70 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publ_page8701_en.htm> accessed 12 December 2012. 
7 National IST Research Directors Forum Working Group on Public Procurement in support of ICT Research and Innovation, ‘Pre-commercial 
Procurement of Innovation: A Missing Link in the European Innovation Cycle’ (March 2006) (PCP Expert Group (2006)) 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/pcp/precommercial-procurement-of-innovation_en.pdf>, accessed 12 November 2012. 
8 PCP Expert Group (2006). 
9 PCP Expert Group (2006). 
10 Commission, ’Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe’ COM (2007) 
799 final (PCP Communication (2007)). 
11 PCP Communication (2007) 2. 
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As a consequence, the resulting EU instrument embodies major differences when compared 
to its US counterprogram. Some of the more important differences include:  
- the non-binding implementation of PCP;  
- the obligation to share the risks and benefits of the performed R&D services between the 
contracting authority and the R&D service provider;
12
  
- the limited procedural flexibility;
13
 and  
- the obligation to purchase the PCP innovative results through a separate competitive 
procedure in compliance with the Procurement Directives.
14
  
The European Commission did not perform an extensive analysis on what impact these 
differences may have on the potential of PCP to achieve its envisaged policy objectives. 
Neither were the economic, political and sociological conditions in Europe considered when 
defining the PCP procedure. Yet, it is common knowledge that policies need to be tailored to 
the specific economic, political and sociological context of their implementation.15 
Nevertheless, the EU policy-makers simply assumed that PCP and SBIR would function equally 
well. 
Despite these political expectations, PCP has so far not achieved the desired results in 
practice. On the one side, PCP is not being widely deployed. According to evaluations,16 the 
PCP procedure does not appeal to individual contracting authorities who can potentially act 
as first customers of the innovative products/services. Despite efforts of the European 
Commission,17 mostly PCP-‘like’ initiatives have been implemented in the EU. Besides being 
                                                          
12 Art 16(f) of Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L134/114 (Public Sector Directive) and 
art 24(e) of Directive 2004/17/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement 
procedures of entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJ L134/1 (Utilities Directive). 
13 According to case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU, the TFEU remains applicable to PCP projects which present a ‘certain cross-border 
interest’. ‘Certain cross-border interest’ is present if a contract which is excluded from the application of the Procurement Directives would 
be of interest to economic operators from other Member States, due to its economic value, technical complexity or the location in a place 
which is likely to attract foreign operators etc. 
14 PCP Communication (2007) 9-10. 
15 For example David C Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg, ‘The US national innovation system’ in Richard R Nelson (ed), National Innovation 
Systems: A comparative analysis (OUP 1993) 29. They showed that new firms in the US have played a significant role in commercialising 
innovations, while new firms in Japan and Sweden had not taken that role upon themselves, partially due to the different characteristics of 
large firms (less inert and bureaucratic and less risk averse). 
16 Commission, Compilation of Results of the EC Survey on the Status of Implementation of Pre-Commercial procurement Across Europe 
(April 2011) < http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/pcp-survey.pdf> accessed 12 November 2012; Kincsö Izsak & Jakob Edler, ‘Trends and 
Challenges in Demand-Side Innovation Policies in Europe Thematic Report 2011 under Specific Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy 
Trend Chart with ERAWATCH (2011- 
2012)’ (26 October 2011) 22-3 <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7011> accessed 2 February 2013; 
Eva Camerer and Henriette van Eijl, ‘Demand-side innovation policies in the European Union’, in ‘Demand-side innovation policies’ (OECD 
2011) 177-86. 
17 The European Commission tried to provide legal certainty on the applicable legal rules to PCP (see the PCP Communication). Moreover, 




scarce, these PCP-‘like’ initiatives remain the specialty of centralized innovation agencies in a 
handful of Member States. They are run in a national environment, with marginal EU-wide 
competition and often with limited involvement of end-customers.  
Where PCP is (or has been) applied, no confirmation of its economic benefits in practice has 
become available. The few cases of deployed PCP-like initiatives have not yet proven their 
potential to trigger the benefits envisaged by EU policy-makers. The Innovation Union 
Scoreboard 2010
18
 indicates that the gap between Europe on the one side, and the United 
States and Japan on the other, is widening along several dimensions of innovation (such as 
education, private investment in R&D and successful commercialization of technological 
knowledge), while Brazil and China are quickly catching up and may overtake the EU in the 
next few years.19 Apparently, the EU has a problem with upholding its standards for 
innovation. Assuming that government action to spur innovation is needed and the SBIR-type 
of innovation policy measure is one of the best available measures, this problem – in so far it 
relates to regulatory conditions – is motivating my research project. 
Against this background, the following central research question arises: 
In how far do current legal and policy arrangements in the EU enable pre-commercial-
procurement, as innovation policy instrument, to achieve its objectives to stimulate the 
competitiveness of European companies and to find solutions to Europe’s public challenges ? 
This research question is addressed by means of 6 sub-questions: 
Q1: What is PCP and what are the gaps in PCP’s framework conditions ? 
Q2: What is the political context in which the PCP procurement was shaped and what are the 
economic prerequisites for its effective implementation ? 
Q3: How does PCP differ from the US SBIR and in how far can these differences impact PCP’s 
efficacy ?  
Q4: What is the state of implementation of PCP in the EU and how are the economic 
prerequisites for an effective deployment of PCP reflected into the available PCP(-like) 
initiatives ? 
Q5: How did the legal context shape and constrain the choices around the PCP features ? 
                                                          
18 The Innovation Scoreboard 2010 does not evaluate the impact of the PCP instrument, but it is considered by the EU as a reliable 
indication of the impact achieved by its innovation policy. 
19 UNU-MERIT, ‘Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010, The Innovation Union's performance scoreboard for Research and Innovation’ (1 
February 2011) < http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/pdf/iu-scoreboard-2010_en.pdf> accessed 8 August 2012.  
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Q6: How can the current legal and policy context be improved to stimulate the effective 
implementation of PCP ? 
Structure of the research  
Each of the sub-questions is addressed in one of the six chapters of this research. The 
chapters are structured as follows.  
Chapter 1 (Pre-commercial procurement)   
In order to answer  Q1, I will  analyze in Chapter 1 the objectives and features of PCP as 
described by the European Commission in its 2007 PCP Communication and the 
accompanying Staff Working Document. I will search complementary guidance on the 
interpretation of relevant concepts in documents endorsed by the European Commission 
(e.g. the Frascati Manual, the Expert Group report preceding the PCP Communication) and 
in other legislative areas of the EU (e.g. State aid). Finally, I will seek to identify how PCP differs 
from (and potentially complements) related innovation policy instruments. Based on this 
analysis, I will identify the ambiguities and the gaps in the guidance regarding the 
implementation of the PCP. 
Chapter 2 (Institutional and economic backgrounds to the European PCP policies in the 21st 
century – revival of the demand-side policy in support of innovation)  
In order to address Q2, I will study in Chapter 2 the policy documents emanating from the 
main actors involved in setting the EU innovation policy: the European Council, the European 
Commission and the European Parliament. The analysis goes back until 2000. Based on this 
documentary analysis, I will underline the rising interest in demand-side innovation policy 
instruments, followed by specific interest in public procurement, and eventually interest in 
PCP. I will also highlight how the perceived US success in deploying the SBIR programme 
influenced the policy choices around PCP.  
In the same context, I will analyse how the policy expectations and the policy choices 
related to PCP resonate with economic theories on the public intervention(s) embraced by 
the EU. To this end, I will describe the economic assumptions that underlie EU’s choices 
regarding PCP.  Subsequently, I will compare these economic assumptions which underlie 
policy-makers’ expectations that PCP is capable to achieve its objectives, against 
authoritative economic theories and empirical studies which are embraced by EU’s 
innovation policy. Based on the same analysis, I will conclude on the economic prerequisites 
for PCP to achieve its objectives and I will clarify under which circumstances PCP cannot be 
economically effective and should therefore not be applied.  
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Chapter 3 (PCP – a poor imitation of the US SBIR) 
I will address Q3 by comparing in Chapter 3 the PCP against its source of inspiration, the US 
SBIR. To this end, I will conduct a documentary analysis of relevant US legislation, policy 
guidelines and evaluation studies. 
Based on this analysis, I will identify the features of the US SBIR that relate to its efficacy and I 
will conclude whether these strengths are reflected into the PCP. Moreover, based on the 
economic prerequisites identified in Chapter 2, I will conclude whether the main differences 
between PCP and the US SBIR weaken the potential of the PCP to achieve its objectives. 
Chapter 4 (Implementation of PCP or PCP-like schemes in the EU – the current ‘state of play’) 
I will address Q4 by analysing in Chapter 4 the performed evaluations regarding the state of 
implementation of PCP within the EU. I will also analyse and discuss the recent EU support to 
the broad application of cross-border collaborative PCPs. I will highlight in this context the 
reasons for the limited appeal of the PCP or PCP/SBIR-‘like’ procedures to individual 
contracting authorities.  
I will subsequently analyse three of the most advanced national PCP/SBIR-like initiatives 
against the economic prerequisites identified in Chapter 2. To this end, I will conduct a 
documentary analysis of the guidelines and conditions for implementation of the PCP-/SBIR-
like initiatives in the Netherlands, UK and Belgium. The calls for proposals published within the 
framework of these initiatives will also be studied. Interviews with functionaries involved in 
deploying these initiatives will also be conducted.  
Based on this analysis, I will comment on the success of the current implementation of the 
PCP policy.  
Chapter 5 (Legal barriers to the implementation of the PCP procedure) 
In order to answer Q5, I will investigate in Chapter 5 how the EU and the WTO legal contexts 
shaped the choices around PCP. I will particularly focus on those choice that were identified 
in the previous chapters as being the most important barriers to the wide and effective 
implementation of PCP. 
On the one hand, I will address questions of EU competence to adopt legislation in the area 
of innovation, the constrains posed by the EU State aid rules as well as the role of the general 
EU procurement rules in imposing re-opening of competition when purchasing the PCP results. 
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The analysis is conducted both from the perspective of the current legal framework and from 
the perspective of the newly adopted Procurement Directives.20 
On the other hand, I will investigate how the choices made by the EU in the framework of the 
WTO’s GPA constrained the design of the PCP.  
Chapter 6 (Conclusions and Recommendations) 
In Chapter 6, I will answer the main research question. I will propose improvements  by way of 
legal interpretation as well as legislative amendments. I will also present legal and policy 
recommendations for necessary action to support the effective functioning of the PCP in line 
with the current policy goals.  
What does this legal research not aim to achieve? 
This research does not aim to evaluate the quantitative impacts of the PCP instrument on 
leveraging private R&D investments, on increasing the commercialization rate of R&D 
projects or on improving public service efficiency. Such measurements belong to the field of 
economics and are outside the scope of this legal research.  
This research will neither strive to find alternatives to the use of PCP or to indicate a 
combination of innovation policy instruments which can best enhance the innovative 
capability and capacity of private actors. This research focuses on one instrument from the 
innovation policy repository, namely pre-commercial procurement. The research 
acknowledges though that the proper functioning of pre-commercial procurement cannot 
be seen in isolation from other systemic conditions (such as availability of qualified 
researchers, availability of technological opportunities, entrepreneurial culture etc.). 
Moreover, this research focuses on the efficacy of legal instruments, not on the quality or the 
correctness of the economic theories that they implement. Consequently, this research is 
based on the conclusions of existing economic theories that have provided justification for EU 
intervention through PCP. By analyzing the current economic paradigm embraced by the EU-
institutions, the research identifies under which economic conditions PCP can be effective 
and in which cases PCP might do more harm than good.  
A short outline of the public procurement rules 
The public procurement rules contained in Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC 
(Procurement Directives) are procedural rules applicable whenever a contracting 
authority/entity awards a contract for the delivery of supplies or for the execution of services 
                                                          
20 The new Public Sector Directive restricts this provision to supply contract (thus prototypes). See art 30(3)(a) Directive 2014/24/EU of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014  on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC. 
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or works with a value above certain thresholds.
21
 The provisions of the Procurement Directives 
represent an interpretation of the principles of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU): equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency.  
Their purpose is to ensure fair and objective assessment of bids, free of any kind of 
favouritism.
22
 This should lead to a highly competitive European market for public contracts, 
which would result in important benefits for the EU citizens, such as efficient spending of 
public funds and qualitative public services.23 Despite these noble goals, direct cross-border 
procurement (public contracts awarded to suppliers that are located in a different country 
than the procurer) remains limited. In 2008, it accounted for only 1.5% of the number of 
published contracts above the EU thresholds, and for about 3.7% of their combined value.
24
   
Concretely the Procurement Directives regulate such aspects as: types of procedure which 
may be followed; the exceptional conditions under which competition may be limited or 
disregarded; the obligation to make available relevant information at different moments 
during a procurement procedure; time-limits; permitted criteria to evaluate the bidders or the 
bids; and exclusions from the scope of application of these directives etc.   
The Procurement Directives do not regulate what a contracting authority/entity may or must 
buy. Other EU or national legislation may contain such substantive obligations. They may 
regulate the characteristics of products or tasks of the contracting authority. One example of 
the first type of legislation is the Directive on the Promotion of Clean and Energy Efficient 
Road Transport Vehicles, which requires procuring authorities/entities to take energy and 
environmental impacts linked to the operation of vehicles over their whole lifetime into 
account in purchase decisions. An example of the second type of legislation is the Council 
Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July1975 on waste, which requires Member States to draw up plans 
for waste management and to adopt measures to encourage rationalisation of the 
collection, sorting and treatment of waste. One concrete measure, pursuant to Directive 
91/156/EEC of 18 March 1991, amending Directive 75/442 is to ensure that waste be treated 
                                                          
21 The thresholds are currently stipulated in Commission Regulation (EU) No 1336/2013/EC of 13 December 2013 amending Directives 
2004/17/EC, 2004/18/EC and 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council in respect of their application thresholds for the 
procedures for the award of contract. For procurements covered by the Utilities Directive and the Defence Directive the thresholds, 
exclusive of VAT, are: EUR 414.000 for supply and services contracts and EUR 5.186.000 for works contracts. For procurements covered by 
the Public Sector Directive the thresholds, exclusive of VAT, are: EUR 134.000 and EUR 5.186.000 for supply and services contracts 
respectively, for works contracts purchased by central government authorities mentioned in Annex IV of the Public Sector Directive and EUR 
207.000 and EUR 5.186.000 for supply and services contracts respectively, for works contracts purchased other public authorities than 
mentioned in Annex IV.  
22 Case C-19/00 SIAC Construction v Mayo CC [2001] ECR I-7725, para 32. 
23 Elisabeta Manunza, 'De markt voor overheidsopdrachten na Lissabon' (14 October 2010) 
<http://weblectures.leidenuniv.nl/mediasite/Viewer/?peid=3d0f8edaf287475db286d723252dd2df> accessed 12 November 2012. 
24 DG Enterprise and Industry, ‘Evaluation of SMEs access to public procurement markets in the EU’ (September 2010) 3 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/sme/business-
environment/files/smes_access_to_public_procurement_final_report_2010_en.pdf> accessed 12 November 2012. 
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in the nearest possible installation. However, there is no European legislation requiring the 
purchase of innovative products. 
Scope of application 
The scope of application of the procurement directives is determined by the qualification of 
an entity as a ‘contracting authority’ or a ‘contracting entity’, who awards a supply, service or 
work contract whose value is above the already mentioned thresholds. 
A contracting authority according to article 1 (9) of Directive 2004/18/EC means the State, 
regional or local authorities, bodies governed by public law, associations formed by one or 
several of such authorities or one or several of such bodies governed by public law. 
A ‘body governed by public law’ means any body: (a) established for the specific purpose of 
meeting needs in the general interest, not having an industrial or commercial character; (b) 
having legal personality; and (c) financed, for the most part, by the State, regional or local 
authorities, or other bodies governed by public law; or subject to management supervision by 
those bodies; or having an administrative, managerial or supervisory board, more than half of 
whose members are appointed by the State, regional or local authorities, or by other bodies 
governed by public law. 
A contracting entity according to article 2 (2) of Directive 2004/17/EC is either a contracting 
authority in the sense of article 1(9) of Directive 2004/18/EC or a public undertaking (this is any 
undertaking over which the contracting authorities may exercise directly or indirectly a 
dominant influence by virtue of their ownership of it, their financial participation therein, or 
the rules which govern it) which pursues certain activities in the following sectors: gas, heat 
and electricity, water, transport services, postal services or exploration for, or extraction of, oil, 
gas, coal or other solid fuels, as well as ports and airports.25 Any other entity active in the 
above mentioned sectors, which operates on the basis of special or exclusive rights granted 
by a competent authority of a Member State will also fall under the scope of application of 
Directive 2004/17/EC. 
The procurement legislation will only be applicable if the procuring authority/entity awards a 
supply, works or service contract. These are defined as contracts for pecuniary interest 
concluded in writing with one or more contractors, suppliers, or service providers. There won’t 
be the case of a contract in the sense of the procurement rules if the conditions mentioned 
above are not present (for example if the contracting authority does not have any pecuniary 
interest in the transaction). There will also not be a contract in the sense of the procurement 
                                                          
25 Public Sector Directive, arts 3-7. 
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directives when a contracting authority/entity may perform the public interest tasks or its 
other obligations or needs by using its own resources/departments or in cooperation with 
other public authorities.
26
  The Court of Justice of the European Union (hereafter: CJEU) 
developed in jurisprudence the ‘quasi in-house’ exception. A contracting authority/entity will 
not be mandated to apply the public procurement legislation if the contract is awarded to 
an entity on which it exercises a similar control as on its own departments and if the entity 
carries out the essential part of its activities with the controlling authority.
27
 However, even a 
minority of private capital in the entity means that the contracting authority does not control 
this entity as it does its own departments.
28
  
A  public contract is  subject to the public procurement directives when the contracting 
authority calls on outside entities, not forming part of its own departments, to fulfill the above 
mentioned tasks, obligations or needs.  The contracting authority will also need to apply the 
public procurement rules, when it assigns the performance of economic activities to third 
parties, such as mixed capital entities, also called public-private partnership (PPP). The public 
procurement rules will only be applicable in this case, if the set up of the PPP involves the 
award of a public contract.
29
 
The awarded contracts may be meant to fulfill a public task of general interest which has 
been attributed to the contracting authority by legislation, or may be meant to fulfill other 
obligations (such as the obligation in its role of employer towards its employees)
30
 or logistic 
needs (such as the purchase of cleaning services or office haberdashery). Public 
procurement may follow in addition secondary objectives such as stimulating innovation and 
sustainability, which arise from national or EU policy and from the public expectations that a 
contracting authority should act as a responsible and accountable buyer. The  new 
Procurement Directives mention expressly innovation and sustainability as objectives of the 




In this section I will give definitions of some of the concepts that recur throughout this 
research. Most of the definitions are adopted from official OECD and/or EU documents. 
                                                          
26 Case C-480/06, Commission v Germany [2009] ECR I-04747, para 45. 
27 Case C-107/98, Teckal SRL v Comune di Viano and Azienda Gas-Acqua Consorziale (AGAC) di Reggio Emilia, [1999] ECR I-08121, para 50. 
28 Case C-573/07 Sea SRL v Comune di Ponte Nossa, [2009] ECR I-8127, para46; and Case C-196/08 Acoset SpA v Conferenza Sincaci and 
others [2009] ECR I-9913, para 53. 
29 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the application of Community law on Public Procurement and Concessions to 
Institutionalised Public-Private Partnerships (IPPP)’ C (2007)6661. 
30 Case C-215/09, Mehiläinen Oy, Terveystalo Healthcare Oy v Oulun kaupunki [2010] ECR I-13749, para 30. 
31 Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014  on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014 on procurement by entities operating 
in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 2004/17/EC. 
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Innovation is defined in this research as a process ‘connecting knowledge and technology 
with the exploitation of market opportunities for new or improved products, services and 
business processes compared to those already available on the common market, and 
encompassing a certain degree of risk’.32 In other words, innovation means valorisation of 
R&D results into marketable new or improved products, services and business processes.33  
Depending on their capabilities to bring substantial economic change, innovations may be 
qualified as incremental (small improvements of an existent product), revolutionary (new 
products with major economic impact), or radical (a completely new product that creates 
whole new industries, such as the semiconductors, lasers, atom bombs or genetic 
engineering).34   
When qualifying the use of novel products as innovation, many economists consider that the 
novelty need not be absolute to the market, but to the economic actor itself.35 Unless stated 
expressly otherwise, the term ‘innovation’ throughout this research is meant to cover absolute 
novelty (when the novel product has not been used by any other public or private actor 
previously). 
Innovation in this research covers both technological innovation and services innovation.  
Innovation in services covers two types of innovation: process innovation and organizational 
innovation. Process innovation is defined as ‘the use of new or significantly improved methods 
for the production or supply of services’(such as greater flexibility, better quality and/or 
enhanced safety, reduced costs). Organizational innovation means ‘new organizing 
principles for using the existing knowledge-base to carry out combinations that are new to 
the firm and the industry’36, aimed at ‘step changes in internal efficiency or in approaching 
markets and customers’37. 
From a conceptual point of view, an important difference is made in this research between 
invention and innovation and between innovative activities (such as R&D) and innovation 
results. Invention entails the first occurrence of an idea for a new product or process, while 
                                                          
32 Commission, ‘Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation’ (30 December 2006) OJ C 323/1, 
para1.2. 
33 Lieve Bos and Stephan Corvers, ‘Pre-commercial Public Procurement A missing link in the European Innovation Cycle’, (2006) 6 Tijdschrift 
Aanbestedingsrecht 2. 
34 Paul A. Tawiah and Alan D. Russell, ‘Assessing Infrastructure Project Innovation Potential as a Function of Procurement Mode’ (2008) 24 
Journal of Management in Engineering 173. 
35 Chris Freeman, The economics of industrial innovation (MIT Press 1989); Andreas Pyka, Benjamin Schon, Paul Windrum, Lars Fuglsang 
and Koen Frenken, ‘Cooperation for Innovation in Services: An Economic Approach to the Theory of Innovation Networks in the Service 
Industries’, (ServPPIN 2009) 36. 
36 Examples of managerial and organization innovations are the direct delivery and self-assembly of Ikea, the approach of Honda 
(discouraging hierarchy, giving responsibility to young employees and supporting confrontation). 
37 Maria Abreua, Vadim Grinevich, Michael Kitson and Maria Savona, ‘Policies to enhance the ‘hidden innovation’ in services: evidence and 
lessons from the UK’, (2010) 30 The Service Industries Journal 99–118. 
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innovation means an attempt to turn the creative idea into a commercial product and 
diffuse it into the marketplace.38  
Innovation is meant in this research as a process of creating and implementing a novel 
product. Innovative products are the results of the innovation process. During the innovation 
process R&D activities39 as well as non-R&D activities are equally important.  
R&D activities are defined as ‘creative work undertaken on a systematic basis in order to 
increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society, and the 
use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications’.40 
Non-R&D activities are mainly targeted at creating a stimulating environment or at achieving 
a commercial outcome ( such as interaction with other firms and public research institutions, 
production, engineering, marketing of the novel product etc.). 41 
Other terminology used in this research: 
‘Public procurement of innovation’ is the adoption of innovation by public authorities through 
the purchase of existent innovative products (goods or services) which are new to the public 
sector (although they might be already commercialized on the private market). 
‘Public procurement for innovation’ refers to the use of public procurement in order to 
stimulate the creation of innovative products. One suitable procurement instrument to 
achieve this, is considered to be the PCP procedure. 
The knowledge-based economy is ‘an expression coined to describe trends in advanced 
economies towards greater dependence on knowledge, information and high skill levels, 
and the increasing need for ready access to all of these by the business and public sectors’.42  
The concept of product used throughout this thesis entails goods, services and works in a 
generic manner.  
The concept of contracting authority is understood as implied in the Directives 2004/18/EC. Its 
use throughout the research also encompasses the concept of contracting entity as defined 
in  Directive 2004/17/EC. 
                                                          
38 Ibid; OECD, ‘Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development (Frascati Manual (2002)),’ (OECD 
Publications Service 2002) 18. 
39 OECD, ‘Oslo Manual: Guidelines for Collecting and Interpreting Innovation Data’ (OECD Publications Services, 3rd Edition 2005)  (Oslo 
Manual (2005)) para 40. 
40 Frascati Manual (2002) 30. 
41 DTI, ‘Environmental innovation, Bridging the gap between environmental necessity and economic opportunity’, (November 2006) 10 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file34987.pdf> accessed 12 June 2012; Oslo Manual (2005) para 
71. 
42 Oslo Manual (2005) para 71. 
 
 21 
When reference is made to the Procurement Directives, Directives 2004/17/EC and 
2004/18/EC are meant. Directive 2004/17/EC is also referred to as the Utilities Directive while 
Directive 2004/18/EC is also referred to as the Public Sector Directive.  
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Chapter 1. Pre-commercial procurement 
1.1. Introduction 
The procurement of R&D services where risks and benefits are shared between the 
contracting authority and the supplier is exempted from the scope of application of the EU 
Procurement Directives.43 This would allow contracting authorities enhanced procedural 
flexibility in purchasing innovative solutions, as compared to the rules laid down by the 
Procurement Directives. Despite the fact that R&D services have been exempted since the 
adoption of the first public procurement directives in 1989, by 2005 the national procurement 
of R&D had barely started to show on the national and EU agendas.44  
The European Commission attributed this to the legal uncertainty around the applicable rules 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) to contracts exempted from 
the scope of the Procurement Directives.
45
  The Court of Justice of the European Union 
(‘CJEU’) had by that time pronounced the most important decisions on the applicability of 
the fundamental principles of the TFEU to contracts which were (partially) left outside the 
scope of application of the Procurement Directive (services concessions, IIB services and 
contracts under threshold for the application of the Procurement Directives).46 Procurement 
of R&D services outside the scope of the Procurement Directives had not been the subject of 
a case before the CJEU. 
The European Commission decided in 2007 to encourage contracting authorities to engage 
more often in procurements of R&D services wherein risks and benefits are shared, by drafting 
a procedure which complied with the fundamental principles of the TFEU and the EU State 
aid rules, on the one hand, and which was suitable to exploit the potential economic benefits 
of public procurement of R&D, on the other hand.47 The procedure was called pre-
commercial procurement (‘PCP’). 
This chapter describes the objectives and features of the PCP procedure, as drafted by the 
European Commission in its 2007 PCP Communication, as well as the particularities of PCP 
compared to other policy instruments that have been employed to stimulate innovation. This 
chapter distinguishes between the PCP features which have the status of recommendation 
from which a contracting authority may deviate and the legal obligations which constitute 
                                                          
43 See article 16(f) Directive 2004/18/EC; article 24(e) Directive 2004/17/EC. 
44 Wilkinson et al, ‘Public procurement for Research and Innovation’, Expert Group Report – Developing procurement practices favourable to 
R&D and innovation (Wilkinson Report)’, (September 2005)10 http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/download_en/edited_report_18112005_on_public_procurement_for_research_and_innovation.pdf accessed 26 January 
2013. 
45 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 9.5.2008 OJEU C 115/47. 
46 This case-law is discussed in section 1.5. 
47 Commission, ’Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe’ (PCP 
Communication) COM (2007) 799 final. 
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minimum requirements and must be complied with. Based on this analysis, this chapter 
identifies the ambiguities and the gaps in the EU’s guidance regarding the implementation of 
the PCP. 
The policy process which led to the adoption of the PCP and the economic assumptions 
which lie at its basis are described in the next chapter.  
1.2 Objectives 
The adoption of the 2007 PCP Communication was preceded by enhanced awareness 
among the EU policy-makers that the common and complex European problems (also called 
Grand Challenges), such as ageing, security threats, shortage of resources, climate change, 
increased global competition etc., required substantially improved solutions compared to 
those available on the market. Insufficient R&D investment in the economy was identified as 
one of the major reasons for EU’s incapacity to bring on the market the desired solutions and 
to gain global economic lead. The policy–makers realized that supply-side measures, which 
had been the focus of the EU innovation policy until 2000, were not sufficient to trigger the 
change Europe needed. As a consequence, demand-side measures, such as public 
procurement received since 2000 increased political support.
48
  
Against this background, the European Commission requested in 2006 a group of experts 
(‘PCP Expert Group’) to explore whether public procurement in support of R&D and 
innovation in the ICT sector was a desirable instrument in the EU innovation policy arena.
49
 The 
PCP Expert Group identified pre-commercial procurement as a suitable instrument to 
increase public demand of innovative solutions and to leverage private R&D investments in 
the ICT sector as well as elsewhere.
50
 This motivated the Commission to draft the PCP 
Communication and an accompanying PCP Staff Working Document
51
 in order to support 
the implementation of PCP as innovation policy instrument.  
PCP was defined in the PCP Communication as one approach to procuring R&D services, in 
compliance with the EU public procurement and State aid rules.
52
  
According to the PCP Communication, the objectives of the PCP were threefold:
 53
 
- reinforce the innovation capabilities of EU businesses, which will eventually lead to an 
                                                          
48 For a description of the policy process which preceded the adoption of the PCP procedure, see Chapter 2. 
49 National IST Research Directors Forum Working Group on Public Procurement in support of ICT Research and Innovation, Pre-commercial 
Procurement of Innovation: A Missing Link in the European Innovation Cycle (PCP Expert Group) (March 2006). For a detailed outline of the 
policy process that preceded the adoption of the PCP procedure, see Chapter 2, section 2.2. 
50 PCP Communication 4-5. 
51 Commission, ’Example of a possible approach for procuring R&D services applying risk-benefit sharing at market conditions, i.e. pre-
commercial procurement’(PCP Staff Working Document) SEC(2007) 1668. 
52 PCP Communication 2. 
53 PCP Communication 1, 4. 
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improved competitive position in the global economy; 
- develop innovative solutions to the above mentioned Grand Challenges;  
- improve the quality and efficiency of public services. 
The European Commission intended to ‘explor[e] the extent to which pre-commercial 
procurement could indeed contribute to more R&D and innovation in the EU and, hence, 
bring tangible benefits to society and economy’.
54
  
The European Commission did not question the need for government intervention in support 
of innovation. It embraced the view that public procurement of R&D incentivized innovation 
in competing economies such as the US and Japan and that it may yield similar results in the 
EU.
55
 The Commission did not pay any further attention to the conditions for successful 
deployment of the R&D procurement in the model economies or in the EU. It simply decided 
to experiment with this instrument within the EU framework. 
56
 As a consequence, neither the 
PCP Communication, nor the accompanying PCP Staff Working Document define concrete 
targets regarding the deployment of PCP or pre-conditions for its effective implementation in 
the EU. 
1.3 Form and conditions 
1.3.1 Non-mandatory implementation 
PCP is not a mandatory procedure, but a recommendation introduced through a soft-law 
instrument, the so-called Interpretative Communication. The role of an Interpretative 
Communication is not to create legal obligations, but to interpret and provide legal clarity on 
existent legal obligations.  
The European Commission did not propose legislation to mandate the specific procedural 
steps of the PCP or to mandate minimum budgets being dedicated to R&D procurement. This 
is due to the fact that EU lacks competence to harmonize Member States’ laws in the 
innovation policy area,
57
 or to regulate Member States’ financial obligations in the public 
procurement area.58 
Arguably, the European Commission also believed that R&D procurement requires sufficient 
                                                          
54 PCP Communication 3. 
55 The Commission observed that US and Japan successfully used public procurement of R&D to support the emergence of life-changing 
innovative solutions that can solve important environmental problems, can  improve the quality of the public service and can create new 
global markets for national companies. Moreover, the Commission observed that the US is spending 20 times more than the EU on public 
procurement of R&D. Although the difference in R&D expenditure is mainly due to the substantial US defence/space budget, US still invests 
4 times more than the EU in public procurement of R&D in non-defence/space sectors. See PCP Communication 5 
56 Conditions for the successful deployment of PCP are further discussed in Chapter 2. 
57 Art 173 TFEU. 
58 The EU’s competence in financial matters is limited to the EU's competence is limited to taxing approximately 2-3 % of national and local 
government spending (1,3 percent of the GDP) which funds may only be disbursed towards a few specific policy areas, conditioned by the 
unanimous consent of the Member States. See A. Moravcsik, 'In Defence of the "Democratic Deficit": Reassessing Legitimacy in the 
European Union'(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603. 
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flexibility to adapt the procedure to each specific situation. Contracting authorities who 
decide to procure R&D and to share the entailing risks and benefits are free to follow a 
different procedure, as long as they comply with the applicable EU public procurement and 
State aid rules. The analysis in sections 1.4 and 1.5 below will show however, that the legal 
obligations deriving from the procurement principles and from the EU State aid rules, allow 
contracting authorities limited procedural flexibility.  
The Commission expected that enhancing legal certainty through the PCP Communication 
would suffice to boost the wide deployment of PCP. Later, it became obvious that a 
‘recommendation’ status did not adequately enhance contracting authorities’ trust in the 
legality or necessity of the PCP procedure and consequently did not lead to its wide 
implementation.59  
According to the recommendations of the PCP Expert Group, PCP was tailored by the 
European Commission to the situation wherein a group of European procurers concludes to 
have a shared need for solutions which are not yet commercially available. In order to learn 
about the existent solutions and about ongoing research projects, contracting authorities 
may organize an open dialogue with suppliers. Subsequently, they collaborate in the 
definition of a set of shared requirements.60  
The PCP Expert Group underlined that the pre-condition for the successful application of PCP, 
is that contracting authorities themselves identify and formulate their future development 
needs.61 This could be interpreted as a recommendation to implement PCP only in areas 
where the contracting authority is the main or even the only end-user, although the 
innovation may have beneficial spill-overs for the private market. Nevertheless, PCP was 
drafted by the Commission to cover problems of public interest, irrespective of whether the 
contracting authority is (one of the) end-user(s) or not.62  
PCP may thus be used in three distinct situations. The innovative solution may be desired to 
fulfill a need the government has as exclusive end-user (direct procurement), or it can be 
intended to develop a solution that contributes to the achievement of a public goal the 
contracting authority strives for (catalytic procurement). In the second case, the public 
authority/entity helps an innovative technology/service to reach the market, by organizing 
the private procurement, but the solution is exclusively  intended for private end-users. In 
between, there is cooperative procurement, which is intended to provide an innovative 
                                                          
59 For an overview of the state of implementation of PCP, see Chapter 4. 
60 PCP Staff Working Document 3, 5.  
61 PCP Expert Group 27. 
62 PCP Staff Working Document 5: ‘A key characteristic of the approach presented is to solicit multiple companies in competition to come up 
with alternative solution proposals to address a particular problem of public interest’ (emphasis added by the author). 
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In section 1.7.3 below, as well as in Chapters 4 and 5 further on, I will show that this broad 
definition leads to confusion on the distinction between PCP as demand-side instrument and 
subsidies as supply-side instruments. Moreover, it allows innovation agencies in EU Member 
States to provide financial support to national companies in breach of the EU State aid rules. 
This raises questions of efficacy in achieving EU’s innovation policy goals. A potential solution 
will be outlined in Chapter 5. 
1.3.2 Phases 
PCP as formulated in the 2007 PCP Communication and accompanying PCP Staff Working 
Document, provides  in one tender the conditions for competitive R&D during three phases, 
with evaluation moments after phase 1 and phase 2 (see Fig.1 below).64  
 




Fig.1 COM/2007/799 & SEC/2007/1668 
                                                          
63 The theoretical foundation of these concepts was for the first time laid down in Charles Edquist and Leif Hommen ‘Public technology 
procurement and innovation theory’ in Edquist et al (eds), Public Technology Procurement and Innovation (Kluwer 2000) 22-23. 
64 PCP Communication 8. 
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Phase 1 involves  solution exploration. The scope of the solution exploration phase – which 
takes about 6 month - is to ‘verify the technical, economic and organisational feasibility of 
the proposal against the pros and cons of potential alternative solutions, as well as its ability 
to solve the problem of public interest’. The output of this phase should be a technology 
evaluation, a plan of how R&D will subsequently be conducted and an evaluation of the 
economic value of the technology.  
After selecting the best suppliers based on the R&D results achieved during phase 1, a 
prototyping phase follows (phase 2). This phase lasts around 2 years, and covers R&D 
activities performed up to a prototype. The outputs should be product specifications, a 
tested prototype, a production plan and a business plan.  
Finally, phase 3 covers test series conducted by the best two suppliers, selected at the end of 
phase 2.  Phase 3 lasts 2-3 years and covers the production of a first batch of pre-
products/services, their testing in relevant environments and the incorporation of the results of 
the field testing in a limited series of products, meant to demonstrate the suitability for full-
scale quantity production. The outputs are refined production and business plans.65  
The final solution should thus be ready for commercialisation within 4,5 - 5,5 years from the 
start of the PCP.66 
The PCP Communication clarifies that PCP is not meant for fundamental research (or 
‘curiosity driven research’), but for R&D with certain applications in sight. In Chapters 2 and 3 I 
will check whether the timeline of 4,5-5,5 years is in line with the US approach to R&D 
procurement or with the economic theories regarding the pre-requisites for effective public 
R&D investments.  
PCP does not include commercial development activities such as ‘quantity production, or 
supply to establish commercial viability or to recover R&D costs, integration, customisation, 
incremental adaptations and improvements to existing products or processes’.67 The field test 
phase where a first batch of products/services is produced and tested is the last PCP phase. 
The subsequent commercialization of the innovation developed through PCP remains the 
responsibility of the supplier. If the contracting authority desires to purchase the innovation, it 
needs to open the award to competition according to the Procurement Directives.
68
 The PCP 
Staff Working Document clarifies that this approach was determined by previous choices 
made by the EU within the framework of the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) Government 
                                                          
65 PCP Expert Group 23 
66 PCP Expert Group 21. 
67 PCP Communication 2. 
68 PCP Communication 4. 
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Procurement Agreement (‘GPA’). Separating the R&D procurement from the procurement of 
the developed innovation will allow the contracting authority to restrict participation in the 
PCP to EU businesses only. The commercial procurement will however need to grant access 
to suppliers from the GPA partners.
69
 
The PCP Staff Working Document further praises this approach for its potential to identify 
superior innovations developed outside the framework of the PCP as well as to put 
competitive pressure on the offered prices. 
70
     
The PCP guidance is brief on the description of the R&D activities which qualify for funding 
under a PCP contract. This is further discussed in section 1.6 below.   
The PCP Communication does not recommend specific amounts of funding for the different 
phases. Member States wishing to implement national PCP programmes, or contracting 
authorities desiring to conduct specific PCP procedures are free to decide the amounts of 
funding. 
The first phase of the PCP commences with multiple different solutions, which are successively 
eliminated to yield at least 2 suppliers after the final PCP phase. Maintaining competition up 
to the final phase is meant to avoid the creation of monopolists. The precise number of R&D 
projects to be funded in parallel should be decided based on a comparison between the 




1.3.3 Eligibility and award criteria  
PCP was formulated as a transparent and competitive procedure, which allows participation 
of all interested EU businesses as well as businesses from signatory countries of the GPA. The 
R&D and operational activities required by the PCP call need though to be performed within 
the EU.72 However, the PCP Communication recognizes that a case-by-case analysis 
regarding the presence of sensitive issues (such as aspects related to national security) may 
justify restricting participation to EU businesses.73  
The PCP Expert Group proposed two similar eligibility criteria to the US SBIR:
74
 
- only for-profit organizations can participate,  
                                                          
69 PCP Staff Working Document 10. 
70 PCP Staff Working Document 9. 
71 PCP Staff Working Document 5. 
72 PCP Staff Working Document 10. 
73 PCP Communication 6. 
74 PCP Expert Group 22.  
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- main researcher is employed by the proposing firm for at least 50% of his time. 
Three diverging criteria from the US SBIR were also proposed:  
- companies which locate their R&D and operational activities related to the PCP call 
within the EU, without being European or European-owned, are admissible;75  
- no double funding of the same R&D activities is allowed;76  
- open to both large, medium and small companies.77  
These criteria were not explicitly adopted by the official Commission’s guidance, but may 
serve as inspiration for the set-up of concrete PCPs.  
The Commission recommended in the PCP Communication and the PCP Staff Working 
Document the use of specific award criteria:78 
- ability to address the problem posed in the tender;  
- technological quality & innovativeness of the proposal; 
- added value for society/economy of the proposal. 
The official Commission’s guidance on the set-up of PCP procedures does not recommend 
any selection criteria.  
1.3.4 Summarizing remarks 
I have analysed in this section the approach proposed by the European Commission to the 
procurement of R&D services. I showed that due to limited competences in the area of R&D 
and innovation, the European Commission defined PCP as a voluntary recommendation. This 
entails that contracting authorities are not mandated to set-aside budgets for conducting 
PCPs and are neither bound by the procedural steps recommended by the Commission.  
More concretely, the Commission recommends: 
-  to conduct PCPs in collaboration by contracting authorities (from different Member States); 
- to set the PCP up as a three-staged competition, gradually selecting the suppliers who 
deliver the best R&D results after each R&D stage; 
- to focus on innovations that find themselves within 4,5-5,5 years from commercialisation; 
                                                          
75 Companies do not need to have their head offices located in Europe or to have European shareholders. 
76 In the US a firm may receive funding via SBIR, as well as other funding programs. 
77 Nevertheless, subcontracting to SMEs should be required and encouraged.  
78 PCP Staff Working Document 10. 
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- to allow suppliers from GPA countries to participate as long as they perform their R&D within 
the EU; 
- to apply award criteria that focus on quality and degree of innovativeness. 
A contracting authority may deviate from all these recommendations. The Commission did 
not recommend any amount of funding per R&D phase, leaving this to the discretion of 
implementing contracting authorities. 
In the following section I will focus on the minimum legal conditions for the applicability of a 
PCP, as interpreted by the European Commission in the PCP Communication. I will clarify in 
how far contracting authorities retain the choice to deviate from the Commission’s 
interpretation of these legal requirements. 
1.4 Legal limits to PCP 
As already mentioned, the PCP procedure was drafted by the European Commission in 
compliance with the relevant EU rules: the Procurement Directives, the TFEU principles (non-
discrimination, equal treatment and transparency) and the State aid rules. In this section, I will 
highlight the PCP features which stem out of these legal rules. I will point out in how far 
contracting authorities can deviate from these obligations. I will also identify the gaps in the 
provided guidance on some of these legal conditions.  
1.4.1 Compliance with the Procurement Directives 
1.4.1.1  Minimum applicability conditions 
The European Commission designed the PCP procedure to fall within the exemption from the 




These articles exempt from the application of the strict rules of the Procurement Directives the 
purchase of R&D services whose risks and/or benefits are shared between the contracting 
authority and the service provider.80 A PCP procedure may thus be applied when the 
following three minimum requirements are fulfilled.  
Firstly, the procured contract covers in majority R&D activities. Which activities qualify as R&D 
is not defined in the Procurement Directives or in the PCP Communication or accompanying 
                                                          
79 Article 16(f) Directive 2004/18 provides: The Directive shall not apply to public service contracts for: (f) research and development services 
other than those where the benefits accrue exclusively to the contracting authority for its use in the conduct of its own affairs, on condition 
that the service provided is wholly remunerated by the contracting authority.’ 
80 Article 16(f) Directive 2004/18/EC.  
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PCP Staff Working Document, although this is a crucial pre-condition for reliance on the PCP 
exemption. Whether the development of a solution entails R&D activities can be a complex 
and often uncertain undertaking. A  contracting authority may refer for guidance to the 
OECD publication, the Frascati Manual,81 whose analysis of the meaning of R&D has been 
embraced by the EU. A detailed discussion on the concept of R&D as provided in the Frascati 
Manual can be found in section 1.6 below.  
Secondly, the procured contract should be an R&D service contract and not an R&D supplies 
or an R&D works contract. The latter two types of contract are not exempted from the 
application of the Procurement Directives.82 A public contract is qualified as an R&D service 
contract if the total value of the services over all the R&D phases exceeds the value of R&D 
products (such as prototypes) or R&D works covered by the contract. Where for example the 
value of the R&D products or R&D works covered by the contract is higher than that of the 
R&D services, the respective contract would constitute an R&D supply or an R&D works 
contract which needs to be procured according to the Procurement Directives.83 
The PCP guidance does not provide a description of R&D service activities as compared to 
R&D works or R&D supplies. Based on an analysis of the definition of ‘public supply contracts’ 
in article 1(1)(c) of the Public Sector Directive, I can conclude that R&D supplies cover a 
physical product, which corresponds within the R&D cycle to a prototype. Based on an 
analysis of the definition of ‘public works contracts’ in article 1(1)(b) of the Public Sector 
Directive, I can conclude that R&D works entail the delivery of the physical outcome of 
building or civil engineering activities. This could for example entail building a prototype 
installation. The analysis of the definition of ‘public service contract’ in article 1(1)(d) reveals 
that R&D services cover other activities than the delivery of works or supplies. The list of 
services in Annex II to the Public Sector Directive shows that service contracts cover the 
delivery of intangible results, such as knowledge. By targeting R&D service contracts, PCP 
focuses thus on R&D projects which entail a large share of knowledge creation and are not 
very close to commercialisation. When the value of the prototype or of the 
building/installation of the test object (prototype) is larger than the value of the R&D services, 
the contract will not qualify for a PCP procedure. 
Thirdly, the contracting authority should share either the risks or the benefits of the R&D 
services with the participating business or both. If the contracting authority retains all the 
benefits (such as intellectual property rights (IPR)) and pays the exclusive costs of 
development, the procurement of R&D services will fall within the scope of the Procurement 
                                                          
81 OECD, ‘Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Development,’ (OECD Publications Service 2002) (Frascati 
Manual (2002)). 
82 See article 30(1)(d) and 31(2)(a) Directive 2004/18/EC and 40(3)(b) of Directive 2004/17/EC. 
83 See footnotes 5 and 6 of the PCP Communication. 
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Directives and one of the therein described procurement procedures will need to be 
followed.84 It is interesting to notice that the PCP Communication narrows these applicability 
conditions for PCP by requiring that both risks and benefits be shared.85  
1.4.1.2 Sharing risks and benefits  
The sharing of risks and benefits is a crucial element of PCP. Apportioning risks and benefits 
between the contracting authority and the private company provides incentives to both the 
contracting authorities to engage in PCPs and to the private company to partly invest itself in 
R&D and commercialise the resulting solutions. On the one side, sharing risks between 
collaborating contracting authorities and between the contracting authorities and the 
private company, provides incentives for each individual contracting authority to assume the 
inherent risks of R&D and enhances the chances of wide commercialization of the new 
solutions. On the other side, sharing benefits with the wider public through publication of the 
results and participation of the PCP participant in standardization activities ensures spill-over 
of knowledge.86 
The PCP Communication and the attached PCP Staff Working Document clarify that 
compliance with the public procurement principles of transparency and equal treatment 
entail prior agreement on the concrete sharing of risks and benefits with the supplier, 
publication of these terms in the PCP call and absence of any subsequent negotiations.87 
Sharing risks 
The Commission enumerates in the PCP Communication and accompanying PCP Staff 
Working Document, by way of example, several risks which could be assumed by the 
supplier: the risk that additional funding beyond the PCP budget will be needed for the 
development, the litigation/filing costs for IPR emerging during the PCP procedure and the 
exploitation risks.88 The main risk which could be assumed by the contracting authority(ies) is 
that the developed technology/service will not be developed in conformity with the 
expected quality levels and the investment through PCP would be lost.89  
A later study supported by the Commission concludes that risk aversion is for contracting 
authorities a serious barrier to engaging in PCPs and provides additional guidance on the 
types of risks which may arise in the procurement of innovation (technological risks, 
organisational and societal risks, market risks, financial risks and turbulence risks) and the risk 
                                                          
84 Article 16(f) Directive 2004/18/EC. 
85 PCP Staff Working Document 8. 
86 PCP Communication 6-7; PCP Staff Working Document 6-7. 
87 PCP Staff Working Document 9. 
88 PCP Staff Working Document 7. 
89 PCP Staff Working Document. 
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management actions which may be suitable depending on the nature or type of risk, the 
likelihood to occur, the extent of the consequences if it occurs, the potential benefits if it does 
not occur and the different stakeholders it might affect and their degree of tolerance to risk.90 
Risk is defined therein, as ‘measureable uncertainty (likelihood) for something to occur that 
lets projects fail, decreases their utility or increases their costs and duration’.91  
Sharing benefits 
The guidance offered by the Commission in the PCP Communication and accompanying 
Staff Working Document on the sharing of benefits is not detailed. Moreover, it is restricted to 
situations when patentable inventions emerge from the PCP procedure. 
The Commission recommends to assign to the supplier the IPR generated by himself during 
the PCP procedure, with due protection of each contracting authority’s rights as an end-user 
in the form of (either royalty-bearing or) royalty-free licenses and the right to require suppliers 
to license IPRs to third parties under fair and reasonable (FRAND)92 conditions.93  
This IPR sharing strategy is based on the assumption that the contracting authority is not well-
suited to pursue commercialization of the solutions developed within an R&D contract. By 
retaining (royalty-free) usage-rights, the contracting authority will be able to obtain direct 
benefits in terms of improved quality and lower costs of its public tasks/services. This approach 
can, according to the Commission, also enable the contracting authority to obtain access to 
existing technologies which are protected by IPR but were developed prior to the PCP 
procedure (also called ‘background’ IPR).94  
By granting the IPR to the participating business in the PCP and retaining a call-back option, 
the contracting authority will ensure that the developed innovation is widely used on the 
market and that it will form the basis of follow-on innovation activities.95 The main benefit 
retained by the supplier under these conditions, regards the possibility to commercialise the 
results of PCP and to obtain the resulting profits. Moreover, the contracting authority can 
expect that the supplier bares a share of the funding, which ‘can (be) consider(ed) … to be 
                                                          
90 Expert Group Report, ‘Risk management in the procurement of innovation, Concepts and empirical evidence in the European Union’ 
(2010) <http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/risk_management.pdf> accessed 20 August 2012.  
91 Ibid 24. 
92 FRAND means 'Fair, Reasonable and Non Discriminatory' licensing terms. The concept has been developed in the context of IPR in the 
standard-setting context. See OJ 2011/C11/01, Draft Communication from the Commission, Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, recital 289.  
93 PCP Communication 7. 
94 PCP Staff Working Document 8. 
95 PCP Staff Working Document 8. 
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an investment in intellectual property, which could be re-applied later as a building block for 
other projects’.96  
Although the PCP Communication recommends the above mentioned distribution of IP 
rights, a contracting authority is free to choose for a different IP strategy,97 to the extent to 
which there is no national legislation regarding the division of IPR in government-funded 
projects. If no mandatory regulations restrict its discretion, the contracting authority may 
choose to contractually  gain the ownership of the IP or leave it to the supplier. Licenses may 
be free, for a symbolic, modest or a larger fee, depending on the market value of the IPRs 
and the strategy of the procurer and may be exclusive,98 partially exclusive or nonexclusive.  
However, the contracting authority should keep in mind that when the innovation has 
potential applications on the private market, the private actor is in a better position than the 
government to commercialise the novel product, to decide in which jurisdictions patents 
should be applied for, or to enforce the patents in case on infringement. Moreover, the 
supplier should be incentivized to invest in the commercialization of the novel product 
without concerns that licenses are also made available to its competitors. As a consequence, 
the supplier should at a minimum obtain an exclusive license (when ownership is retained by 
the procurer). When IP ownership is granted to the supplier, the procurer should at a minimum 
have the right to use the IP (on exclusive or non-exclusive terms) in order to ensure continuity 
of its internal operations as well as the possibility to grant a license to another firm when 
practical application of the invention is not fulfilled or not done to the agreed extent (either 
through commercialization, internal implementation or licensing).99  
The Commission does not provide detailed guidance on the specific contractual clauses 
which could be applied in PCP contracts but leaves this to the discretion of the implementing 
contracting authorities. The Commission’s guidance does not go into detail on the choice 
between royalty-bearing or royalty-free licenses, impossibility of a supplier to grant a license 
to the contracting authority on the ‘background’ IPR resting on the underlying existing 
technology,100 the need to request the PCP participant to disclose all background IPR he may 
                                                          
96 Ibid; Wilkinson Report 39. 
97 Ecorys, ‘Study on pre-commercial procurement in the field of security’ (November 2011) 64 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/pcp_sec_finalreport_en.pdf accessed 29 January 2013. 
98 An exclusive license to use the IP means that the licensee is the sole beneficiary of the licensed  rights to exploit and commercialise the 
IP. 
99 Rambøll Management A/S, ‘Opportunities for Public Technology Procurement in the ICT-related sectors in Europe’ (Rambøll Report) 
(June 2008) ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/pcp/pcp-final-ramboll-report-js2_en.pdf accessed 29 January 2013. 
100 It could be envisaged that the PCP participant is prevented by pre-PCP agreements to transfer or grant a license on the background IPR. 
In such case, the contracting authority may need to include obligations for eventual sub-contracting. 
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be aware of101 or to require licensing of background IPR to third parties when the invention 
cannot be practiced without such license etc.   
Moreover, the Commission does not seem to have had in mind the division of other IP rights 
than patent rights when it drafted the PCP Communication and accompanying Staff Working 
Document. When copyrighted products (such as a book, software etc.) are the result of the 
PCP, the following sharing of risks and benefits could be envisaged: the PCP-participant may 
retain the moral right to be indicated as the author of the expression of his/her ideas, while 
the contracting authority obtains permission (equivalent to a royalty-free license) to 
reproduce and re-distribute the copyrighted expression of ideas (it could be a book, a study 
or software etc.) within and/or outside its organisation.  
Scenario’s for sharing benefits through license-contract design will directly affect the 
incentives perceived by both contracting authorities and R&D providers involved. Current IP 
laws support the design of almost any benefit-sharing scenario imaginable. Yet experience 
has learned that this freedom does not always induce the emergence of efficient solutions.   
Research into mechanism design for IP licensing must remain outside the scope of this 
research.     
Inspiration on public quidance for dealing contractually with benefit sharing through IPR 
could be found in the Bayh-Dole Act, however.  The Bayh-Dole Act was adopted in 1980 in 
the US, at a time when the US government owned 28.000 patents, but licensed less than 5% to 
businesses, due to their reluctance to invest in the production of innovations which could also 
be licensed to competitors.  The government became aware that public spending on R&D 
would be far more effective if small businesses would retain ownership on the inventions 
funded with public money.102 
The Bayh-Dole Act, which governs since 1980 the division of rights to inventions made by small 
businesses under government grants, contracts and cooperative agreements, brought about 
the needed change.  It imposes the following standard division of IPR: supplier obtains the 
ownership and the government a  ‘nonexclusive, nontransferable, irrevocable, paid-up 
license to practice or have practiced for or on behalf of the United States the subject 
invention throughout the world’. A government agency may deviate from this standard 
clause (such as national security reasons or due to the location of the business outside the US) 
upon motivation and subject to appeal possibilities.  
                                                          
101 Rebeca Lucas, Antonella Vulcano and Borinka Jacobsen, ‘Draft PCP Manual – A practical guide to PCP Implementation for PROGR-EAST 
WP4 Pilots’ (13 May 2012) 45-6 (PROGR-EAST Draft PCP Manual) 
<http://www.progreast.eu/files/Deliverable%202.1.%20Draft%20PCP%20Manual.pdf> accessed 29 January 2013. 
102 Diane M. Sidebottom, ‘Updating the Bayh-Dole Act:  Keeping the Federal Government on the Cutting Edge’ 30 Pub. Cont. L.J. 225 (2001). 
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The Bayh-Dole Act provides detailed contractual clauses for different IPR strategies as well as 
detailed guidance on contractual enforcement clauses. For example, the supplier needs to 
disclose the invention to the government agency in order to obtain ownership and is 
therefore mandated to keep records of the background IPR  in order to be able to retain IPR 
outside the SBIR clauses.103 
The Commission’s guidance neither clarifies whether other benefits than IPR (such as for 
example profits gained with commercialization of the innovative solution developed during 
the PCP procedure) may be shared in order to be able to rely on the exception provided by 
articles 16(f) of Directive 2004/18 and 24(e) of Directive 2004/17. The only benefits beyond IPR 
mentioned by the PCP Communication regard the input obtained by the supplier from 
potential public buyers on the desired functionalities and disadvantages of the envisaged 
solution, and the potential savings achieved through early tailoring of the solution to the 
customer’s needs.104 In Chapter 3 I will investigate how national PCP-like initiatives have 
picked up the challenge of dealing with IPR sharing and I will conclude whether there is a 
need for the European Commission to provide additional guidance. 
1.4.2 Compliance with the TFEU fundamental principles  
The PCP Communication was based on the premise that although PCP falls outside the 
scope of application of the Procurement Directives, the TFEU principles of equal treatment, 
non-discrimination, transparency remain applicable.  The PCP Communication interpreted 
the TFEU principles as implying an obligation to organize a fully-fledged competitive award. 
Compliance with the transparency and equal treatment principles entails according to the 
European Commission that a PCP call is published EU-wide and that sufficient information is 
provided in the PCP call (on design of the competition, eligibility, sharing of risks and benefits 
etc.) to allow the objective comparison of the received proposals. All the 
requirements/criteria applied throughout the PCP procedure need to be ‘understandable, 
quantifiable and verifiable’.105  
The initial functional and performance requirements, as well as the award criteria and risk-
benefit sharing arrangements are not subject to change or negotiation during the PCP 
procedure.106 However, the Commission considers that there is some flexibility to progressively 
                                                          
103 W. Jay DeVecchio, ‘Patent Rights Under Government Contracts’, 07-7 Briefing Papers 1 (2007). 
104 PCP Communication 8. 
105 PCP Communication 10-1. 
106 PCP Staff Working Document 3-4, 10. 
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specify the tender specifications (technical/scientific minimum requirements) with each PCP 
phase.107  
Section 1.5 investigates whether the approach embraced by the European Commission in 
the PCP Communication is in line with the currently available EU case-law on the applicability 
of the TFEU to contracts falling outside the scope of application of the Procurement 
Directives. It concludes on the degree of procedural flexibility in conducting a PCP, 
compared to a procurement procedure governed by the Procurement Directives.  
1.4.3 Compliance with the EU State aid rules (the market price criterion)  
PCP is designed to avoid a State aid element in the sense of the EU State aid rules. According 
to the PCP Communication, this entails that the contracting authority needs to pay a market 
price, which ought to reflect the pre-defined division of risks and benefits. The market price 
and the risk-benefit sharing conditions lead automatically to the requirement for the 
contracting authority(ies) to pay less than the full costs of the R&D.  
Normally, a tender procedure conducted in accordance with the Procurement Directives is 
an indication that the purchase was done at market conditions,108 but other aspects 
particular to the case (use of environmental or social criteria, intellectual property rights, 
negotiations etc.) could weaken the conclusion that the least cost for the community was 
achieved.109  
Despite the fact that PCP was designed as a competitive procedure in compliance with the 
fundamental principles of public procurement, the Commission didn’t consider it a sufficient 
guarantee that PCP would not be used as a screen for illegal State aid. The PCP 
Communication included therefore an explicit requirement that a market price be paid for 
the purchased R&D services. This was arguably a reaction to the national initiatives in the 
Netherlands and the UK, where programs similar to the US SBIR were employed by innovation 
agencies, as a means to bypass the EU State aid rules, and to provide 100% funding of R&D 
project costs. For a more detailed discussion on this topic see Chapter 5.  
A market price in the context of PCP means that less than the total cost of the R&D should be 
paid by the contracting authority, reflecting the market value of the risks assumed by the 
participating company (such as costs for maintaining the IPR and commercializing the 
developed products/services) and benefits received by the participating company (such as 
                                                          
107 PCP Staff Working Document 9. 
108 Commission, ‘Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation’ (Framework for State aid for R&D&I) 
2006/C 323/01, para.2.1. 
109 Commission, ‘Application of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general 
economic interest’ paras 65-6 (2012/C 8/02). 
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the IPRs and the corresponding commercialization opportunities).110 According to the 
European Commission, the contracting authority needs to determine in advance how risks 
and benefits (such as IPR) related to the R&D activities are shared with the R&D service 
provider and what maximum price it is disposed to pay in a PCP. The maximum price should 
be calculated by deducting from the total cost of R&D111 plus a reasonable profit margin, the 
market ‘present’ value of the commercialization opportunities left to the participating 
company (this value will need to reflect also the risks assumed by the participating company, 
such as the cost carried by the company for maintaining the IPRs and commercializing the 
products).112 Bidding companies are invited to compete by offering an equal or lower price. 
It is, of course, extremely difficult to value to the commercialization opportunities of products 
which are not yet developed and the European Commission does not recommend a specific 
methodology which could be used to this end. 
A workable alternative accepted by the Commission, is to ask bidding companies (1) to 
supply the calculation of the price reduction they can offer in return for the IPR benefits (this 
calculation should be related to their business cases analysis in their PCP offer) and (2) to 
include a financial expert in the PCP tender evaluation committee who is charged with 
assessing whether the business-case and associated price reductions for the IPRs offered by 
different companies are indeed in line with normal market conditions in that sector.113   
In Chapter 5 I will provide a critical analysis of the market price criterion, and I will define 
alternative approaches to ensure a clear distinction between PCP and subsidies, which takes 
into account the need to comply with the EU State aid rules.  
1.4.4 Compliance with the GPA 
As already mentioned in section 1.3.2, the purchase of the innovation developed during the 
PCP should be re-opened to competition in compliance with to the Procurement 
                                                          
110 The risk-benefit sharing should try to balance two aspects: on the one hand, the procurement must be interesting enough for relevant 
suppliers from a financial point of view; on the other hand, the procurer should not carry all financial, technical or operational risks. See 
Rambøll Report. 
111 This is made of all the costs incurred by the company - for example the market value of the salaries of researchers/developers in a 
certain sector and the costs of R&D material required to perform the work. Commission, ‘Policy related Frequently Asked Questions on Pre-
Commercial Procurement (PCP) and the link with Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions (PPI)’ (FAQ PCP) question nr 8 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/docs/faq-v9.pdf> accessed 30 January 2013. 
112 PCP Staff Working Document 9. 
113 FAQ PCP question nr 8: ‘one way used by patent traders to calculate the price reduction for IPR ownership rights uses the so-called 
present value method. It is normal practice that companies make a business case, and thus estimate the potential market over the years to 
come, when deciding to start investing in a new development or not. The price reduction on the PCP bid towards the procurer can be 
calculated as a portion of the 'present' value of projected profits for the company (the 'present' value is the value discounted back in time 
to the day of the bid), that is proportional to the investment/risks taken by the government (PCP price paid to the company) compared to 
the total investments required to turn the R&D efforts into a commercially viable product (this includes the projected investment/risks that 
will be carried by the company e.g. costs of maintaining IPR projection, further production, marketing and commercialisation investments). 





 According to the PCP Staff Working Document, this approach was determined 
by previous choices made by the EU within the framework of the World Trade Organisation 
(‘WTO’) Government Procurement Agreement (‘GPA’). Separating the R&D procurement 
from the procurement of the developed innovation will allow the contracting authority to 
restrict participation in the PCP to EU businesses only. The commercial procurement will 
however need to grant access to suppliers from the GPA partners.
115
  
1.4.5 Summarizing remarks 
I have analysed in this section the minimum legal requirements for the application of a PCP, 
as interpreted by the European Commission in the PCP Communication. I provided an 
overview of the obligations deriving from the applicable public procurement rules and 
principles (sharing risks and IPR, opening the PCP award to competition, no possibility to 
modify the award criteria and the risk-benefit sharing arrangements or the tender 
specifications) and the EU State aid rules (the market price criterion), and the GPA (the 
obligation to reopen the tender to competition when purchasing the innovation resulting 
from a PCP). 
A contracting authority may deviate from the market price criterion and conduct a 
procurement of R&D services which entails granting State aid, provided that the applicable 
EU State aid rules are followed. A contracting authority may also deviate from the 
recommended sharing of risks and benefits, as long as there is an element of ‘sharing’ 
present.  
However, a contracting authority may not deviate from the following obligations: 
- the prohibition to change during the PCP phases the pre-established sharing of risks and 
benefits, the award criteria or the tender specifications; 
- the obligation to open the PCP award to competition from the EU companies and 
optionally from GPA companies who are willing to perform the respective R&D services within 
the EU. 
- the prohibition of a direct award to a PCP finalist for the purchase of the developed 
innovation. 
I can conclude that  the PCP Communication and the accompanying PCP Staff Working 
Document define an obligation to conduct a fully-fledged competitive procedure for the 
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award of the PCP contracts, with limited procedural flexibility following the award. In the 
following section I will test the Commission’s interpretation of the obligations deriving from the 
fundamental public procurement principles (non-discrimination, equal treatment and 
transparency) against the available jurisprudence from the EU courts. Later in this research I 
will analyse the origin of the prohibition to directly purchase the developed innovation from 
(one of) the PCP participants (see Chapter 5). 
I can also conclude that the European Commission missed the opportunity to establish a 
clear distinction between State aid (or subsidies) as supply-side instrument and PCP as 
demand-side instrument. In Chapter 4 I will provide proof of the problematic implementation 
of this criterion in practice and in Chapter 5 I will comment on more suitable alternatives. 
The European Commission also missed the opportunity to clarify the concept of R&D and to 
define clear mechanisms to deal with the exploitation of the emerging IPR. In this section I 
indicated the IPR aspects which could benefit from additional guidance. In section 1.6 
below, I will search for additional guidance on the R&D concept. 
1.5 Procedural flexibility through PCP 
As already mentioned in section 1.4.2, the PCP Communication holds that PCPs conducted in 
collaboration between contracting authorities from different Member States need to comply 
with the TFEU fundamental principles of equal treatment, non-discrimination and 
transparency. The Commission derives from these principle extensive procedural obligations.  
When the PCP Communication was published, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) had decided in a series of cases on the applicability of the TFEU and had explained 
the extent of the applicable TFEU obligations for contracts which are (partially) excluded from 
the scope of the Procurement Directives (such as services concessions, IIB services and 
contracts under the threshold of the Procurement Directives). The CJEU has, however, not yet 
judged in matters of PCP contracts. 
Despite inconsistencies and controversies in the interpretation provided by the European 
judges (as I will illustrate below), the case-law suggests that the CJEU adopts the same 
approach to the whole range of contracts that (partially) fall outside the application of the 
Procurement Directives, irrespective of contract type (whether concession, II B service or 
contracts whose value is under the thresholds) and of contract value.116 This allows me to 
assume that the CJEU will adopt the very same line of reasoning when considering PCP 
contracts.  
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This section analyses the case-law of the CJEU and concludes on the circumstances that 
determine the applicability of the TFEU to PCPs. It also deals with the extent of the obligations 
flowing from the applicability of the TFEU principles as compared with procedures falling 
within the Procurement Directives. Based on this analyses, this section will clarify the degree of 
procedural flexibility a PCP offers as compared to procedures regulated by the Procurement 
Directives.  
To achieve this, subsection 1.5.1 outlines the Court’s different interpretations of the Treaty’s 
applicability outside the scope of the Procurement Directives (depending on the existence of 
cross-border interest or irrespective thereof) and describes the dispute regarding the 
applicability of the principle of equal treatment. Section 1.5.2 outlines the dispute regarding 
the concrete obligations flowing from the transparency principle. The discussion in 
subsections 1.5.1 and 1.5.2 covers case-law up to 2010. Based on case-law from 2010 
onwards, subsection 1.5.3 presents the resolution of the dispute on the concrete obligations 
flowing from the applicable Treaty provisions and principles. 
1.5.1 Rebuttable presumption of cross-border interest and applicability of Treaty 
principles  
The CJEU has pronounced several decisions on the applicability of the TFEU principles to 
contracts (partially) falling outside the Procurement Directives. I consider these decisions to 
show inconsistencies. Firstly, the decisions are inconsistent regarding the question whether the 
TFEU is automatically applicable to contracts excluded from the Procurement Directives or 
whether it is only applicable when a contract presents cross-border interest (when companies 
from other Member States are/may be interested in obtaining the contract). Secondly, the 
decisions are inconsistent regarding the question whether the principle of equal treatment of 
tenderers applies only when it was established that the award discriminates against tenderers 
from other Member States or whether it is an independent principle that applies even in 
purely internal situations (when all the facts of the case are linked to one Member State). 
Thirdly, the decisions are inconsistent regarding the obligation to organize a competitive 
award in all cases, or only when the contract is relevant for the Internal Market. 
RISAN case 
In the RISAN case of 1999,
117
 regarding a service concession awarded on a non-competitive 
basis, the Court hastily dismissed the question of the referring Italian judge regarding the 
applicability of the free movement rights established by the Treaty.  The European judge 
underlined that the complainant was an Italian company and that the whole situation in 
                                                          
117 Case C-108/98, RI.SAN. Srl v Commune di Ischia and Others [1999] ECR I-5238 (RISAN case). 
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question was purely internal to one Member State. This did not justify the application of the 




Unitron Scandinavia case 
In the Unitron Scandinavia case
119
 of the same year, the Court was equally expeditious when 
asked by the Danish judge to interpret the obligations for a contracting authority flowing from 
the now obsolete article 2(2) in the old Directive 93/36 coordinating procedures for the 
award of public supply contracts. The Court ruled that a contracting authority who grants a 
body special or exclusive rights to engage in a public service activity, is mandated to oblige 
that body to comply with the non-discrimination principle on the ground of nationality when 
awarding public supply contracts. However, the non-discrimination article does not require 
compliance with the tendering procedures laid down by Directive 93/36.
120
 The Court did not 
mention the refer though to the question whether the Treaty would be applicable. 
Telaustria case 
In the Telaustria case of 2000,121 the European judge changed course. It decided that, 
despite the explicit exemption of service concessions from the Procurement Directives, the 
TFEU remains directly applicable to such contracts.122 The Court adopted this approach 
despite the fact that all the parties involved in the case belonged to the same Member State 
(Italy).123 The Court seemed to establish a non-rebuttable presumption that any service 
concession contract is potentially of interest to companies from other Member States.  
The Court singled out the non-discrimination principle on the ground of nationality as the key 
principle that needs to be complied with outside the scope of application of the 
Procurement Directives.
124
 The Court considered that the principle of non-discrimination 
‘implies, in particular, an obligation of transparency in order to enable the contracting 
authority to satisfy itself that the principle has been complied with’.
125
 In other words, only by 
advertising the contract, the contracting authority could prove that the non-discrimination 
                                                          
118 RISAN case para 21-3. 
119 Case C-275/98, Unitron Scandinavia A/S and 3-S A/S, Danske Svineproducenters Serviceselskab v Ministeriet for Fodevarer, Landbrug og 
Fiskeri I-8305 (Unitron Scandinavia case). 
120 Unitron Scandinavia case para 29-32. 
121 Case C-324/98, Telaustria [2000] ECR I-10745 (Telaustria case). In this case, Telekom Austria, a contracting authority endowed by the 
Austrian legislation with operating a telecommunication service had awarded a contract for the production and publication of lists of 
telephone subscribers to a private undertaking, without competition. 
122 Telaustria case para 60.   
123 In the area of the four fundamental freedoms, EU case-law states that the EU law (including the Treaty) is not applicable if the elements 
of a case are confined to the borders of one Member State and there is no factor connecting the case to any of the situations envisaged by 
[EU] law. In other words, a cross-border element is the necessary condition to justify the application of EU law. See for example, Case C-
98/86 Mathot [1987] ECR 809; and Case C-286/81 Oosthoek [1982] ECR 4575; Case C-204/87 Bekaert [1988] ECR 2029. 
124 Telaustria case para 60. 
125 Telaustria case para 61. 
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principle was not breached.
126
 The approach of the Court to import the transparency 
obligation into the TFEU, after it had been considered as a necessary consequence of the 
non-discrimination principle within the scope of the Procurement Directives, was criticized in 
the literature. Arrowsmith and Kunzlik concluded that the Court derived positive obligations 
from the non-discrimination principle, although this principle had been defined within the 
context of the Treaty as implying only negative obligations.127  
The Court was also criticized for giving the same interpretation to the obligation of 
transparency as within the scope of the Procurement Directives and for suggesting an 
obligation to organize a competitive award procedure.128 According to the Court the 
contracting authority should ensure ‘for the benefit of any potential tenderer, a degree of 
advertising sufficient to enable the services market to be opened up to competition and the 
impartiality of procurement procedures to be reviewed’.129   
Coname case 
In the Coname case,130 the second case concerning a strictly national situation in the context 
of a non-competitive award of a service concession,131 the Court nuanced the position taken 
in Telaustria towards the applicability of the TFEU and towards the interpretation of the 
transparency obligations.  
The Court introduced the possibility to rebut the presumption that a contract excluded from 
the scope of application of the Procurement Directives automatically falls under the scope of 
the TFEU. In this case, the Court decided that the TFEU will not be applicable, when it can be 
proven that undertakings from other Member States would not be interested in the contract. 
In such cases, the impact on the fundamental freedoms of the TFEU would be too uncertain 
and indirect to justify the applicability of the TFEU.
132
  
However, the presumption of applicability can only be rebutted when special circumstances 
such as the ‘very limited economic value’ of the contract can be brought as proof.133 The 
Court did not explain when a contract has very limited economic value (for example, 
whether only the monetary value of the contract should be considered or whether additional 
                                                          
126 Telaustria case para 61-2. 
127 The free movement provisions of the TFEU prohibit unjustified discrimination. Sue Arrowsmith and Peter Kunzlik, ‘Social and 
Environmental Policies in EC Procurement Law – New Directives and New Directions’ (CUP 2009) 
128 E.P. Hordijk, G.W van der Bend, J.F. van Nouhuys, ‘Aanbestedingsrecht – Handboek van het Europese en het Nederlandse 
aanbestedingsrecht’ (4th edition Sdu Uitgevers 2011) 151; Arrowsmith & Kunzlik (2009) 82-83.  
129 Telaustria case para 62. 
130 Case C-231/03 Coname [2005] ECR I-7287. In this case, the company Coname has been entrusted for one year the maintenance, 
operation and monitoring of the methane gas network by the municipality Cingia de’ Botti. When the municipality subsequently directly 
awarded the same contract to Padania, Coname complained that the contract had to be tendered in compliance with the Treaty. 
131 All parties to the case were Italian.  
132 Coname case para 20. 
133 Coname case para 17-20. 
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circumstances may also be relevant). However, the position adopted by the Court seems to 
imply that there are only restrictive possibilities to rebut the presumption that companies from 
other Member States may be interested in the contract.134 Moreover, the Court did not spell 
out whether lack of interest means that the Treaty provisions are not applicable, but 
(considering transaction-cost related arguments) this would be the logical conclusion.  
Regarding which TFEU obligations specifically apply in case a certain cross-border interest 
could not on forehand be excluded, the Court referred again to the same non-discrimination 
principle, that would be breached in the absence of transparency.
135
 The Court took a step 
back compared to the Telaustria case and stated that the transparency principle does not 
entail an obligation to organize a procurement procedure, but only obliges contracting 
authorities to allow access to appropriate information regarding the contract before it is 
awarded, ‘so that, if an undertaking from another Member State had so wished, it would 
have been able to express its interest in obtaining the contract’. This suggests that the 
contracting authority gets a second chance to conclude that the contract is not of interest 
to the Internal Market and can be awarded without consideration of the Treaty principles. It 
could be concluded that when no foreign company expresses interest following the 




On the other hand, the Court did not clarify which concrete obligations rest on a contracting 
authority if an undertaking from another Member State would express its interest in the 
contract, following the publication of the information regarding the respective contract. If no 
procurement procedure needs to be organized, it could be concluded that the contracting 
authority should be able to award the contract by inviting the undertaking of its choice as 
well as the interested foreign undertakings to submit an offer.137 This conclusion has however 
categorically been rejected by the Court in the subsequent case-law.  
Parking Brixen case 
The Parking Brixen case
138
 came next, the third case in a row concerning service concessions. 
It confirmed the inconsistent approach of the European judges to the possibility to rebut the 
presumption that a contract (partially) excluded from the Procurement Directives is of interest 
to companies from other Member States. In this case, the Court ignored the Coname 
judgment and suggested that service concession contracts should always be awarded in 
                                                          
134 Hordijk (2011) 154. 
135 Coname case para 19. 
136 Conclusie Advocaat-Generaal Keus, HR 18 januari 2013, LJN: BY0543 
137 Hordijk (2011) 155. 
138 Case C-458/03 Parking Brixen [2005] ECR I-8612. 
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compliance with the TFEU. The Court explicitly stated: ‘Notwithstanding the fact that public 
service concession contracts are, as Community law stands at present, excluded from the 
scope of Directive 92/50 [former public procurement directive, added by the author], the 
public authorities concluding them are, none the less, bound to comply with the 
fundamental rules of the EC Treaty (…).’139  
When confronted by the defendant party with the argument that a cross-border element 
was missing, as all the parties involved in the main proceedings resided in one Member State 
(Italy again), the Court stated that in the absence of advertising and opening to competition, 
it is not possible to prove that undertakings of other Member States would not be interested to 
provide the same services.
140
  
Regarding the applicable Treaty obligations, the Court went even a step further than in the 
Telaustria case. It stated that the equal treatment principle applies as an independent 
principle, even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality. 141 The Court used 
the following reasoning: equal treatment is a general principle of EU law and articles 43 and 
49 of the old Treaty as well as the non-discrimination principle on the basis of nationality set 
out in article 12 TEC are expressions of the equal treatment principle. 
This marks a change compared to the previous Coname case, where the Court left the door 
open to the interpretation that after publicizing the contract, a contracting authority may 
conclude that the contract had not attracted the attention of foreign companies and 
consequently the non-competitive award would not amount to discrimination on the basis of 
nationality. The conclusion in Parking Brixen - that the equal treatment principle applies 
irrespective of discrimination on the basis of nationality - provided the Court with a solid basis 
to scrutinize procurement decisions taken in ‘purely internal’ situations, when all the parties 
belonged to the same awarding Member State, and potentially no undertakings from other 
Member States were interested in the contract. In other words, even when after advertising 
the contract no foreign companies show interest to participate, the contracting authority 
would still be mandated to give equal access to all interested national companies to the 
contract, which amounts to an obligation to organize a competitive award procedure. The 
Court clearly stated that ‘a complete lack of any call for competition in the case of the 
award of a public service concession such as that at issue in the main proceedings does not 
comply with the requirements of articles 43 EC and 49 EC any more than with the principles of 
equal treatment, non-discrimination and transparency’.142 
                                                          
139 Parking Brixen case paras 46-9. 
140 Parking Brixen case paras 54-5. 
141 Parking Brixen case para 48. 
142 Parking Brixen case paras 49-50. 
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The interpretation of the Court was disputed in the literature.143 Some authors criticized the 
tendency of the Court to import obligations into the Treaty which had previously been 
created within the context of the secondary procurement legislation.144 Arrowsmith145 has 
pointed out that the application of the equal treatment principle146 would open the door to 
judicial scrutiny of non-discriminatory procurement decisions under the Treaty, which would 
conflict with the interpretation of the Court in Keck147 as well as with the principles of legal 
certainty, subsidiarity and proportionality. 
ANAV case 
The Parking Brixen approach to public services concessions was confirmed in the ANAV 
case.148 It looked like the Court had made up its mind on the fact that public service 
concessions imply a non-rebuttable presumption of potential cross-border interest, that the 
equal treatment principle is an independent principle applicable irrespective of the 
existence of discrimination on the ground of nationality and that a contracting authority 
should always organize a competitive award procedure.149 
An Post case 
And yet, in the An Post case,
150
 which concerned the non-transparent award of a IIB service, 
the Court returned to the Coname interpretation regarding the applicability of the TFEU and 
made no reference to the Parking Brixen case. The Court considered that the TFEU is not 
applicable unless a ‘certain cross-border interest’ in the contract is present.
151
 The Court 
underlined that there was a legislative assumption that IIB service contracts are not, in light of 
their specific nature, of cross-border interest.
152
 The Court decided that the Commission could 
not just rely on an assumption that a IIB service contract necessarily is of certain cross-border 
                                                          
143 E.R. Manunza, ‘Alle aanbestedingen zijn interstatelijk’ in Elizabetta Manunza en Linda Senden (red) ‘De EU: de interstatelijkheid voorbij ?’ 
(Blaeu, Willem Jansz, Amsterdam 2006); Hordijk (2011)158; M. Krugner, ‘The Principles of Equal Treatment and Transparency and the 
Commission Interpretative Communication on Concessions’ (2003) 12 PPLR 181; the contrary view is argued by T. Tridimas, ‘The General 
Principles of EU Law’, (2nd edn Oxford University Press, 2006). 
144 Arrowsmith & Kunzlik (2009) 85.  
145 Arrowsmith & Kunzlik (2009) 87. 
146 The equal treatment principle has been defined in the Fabricom case as requiring that comparable situations must not be treated 
differently and that different situations must not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is objectively justified’. See Case C-
21/03 Fabricom v Etat belge [2005] E.C.R. I-1559 para 27. 
147 In the Keck case, the Court decided that under article 28 TEC, only measures relating to the characteristics of the products in question 
would be covered when non-discriminatory, while ‘selling arrangements’ such as rules on opening hours of retail outlets will only become 
subject of scrutiny if discriminatory. Joined cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 ECR I-06097. 
148 Case C-410/04 ANAV [2006] ECR I-3303 paras 18-23. 
149 ANAV case paras 18-20. 
150 Case C-507/03 Commission v Ireland [2007] ECR I-9777 (An Post case).   
151 An Post case para 29. 





 A mere statement by the Commission that a complaint was made to it in relation 
to the contract in question was not considered by the Court to be sufficient proof.154  
The Court did not go into the question whether the equal treatment principle is a general 
principle independent of discrimination on the ground of nationality. It only decided that, 
when cross-border interest exists, lack of transparency would amount to a difference in 
treatment in the disadvantage of interested undertakings from other Member States.155   
APERMC case 
In the subsequent APERMC case the Court bounced back to the Parking Brixen approach, 
this time in the context of a public service contract with a value below the threshold. The 
case did not make any reference to the An Post case.156 The Court concluded that the Treaty 
is automatically applicable and that ‘the principle of equal treatment of tenderers is also to 
be applied […] even in the absence of discrimination on grounds of nationality’. 157 
Commission v Italy case 
In the Commission v Italy case,158 the following case regarding a non-competitive award of a 
contract with a value below the threshold, the Court chose the An Post line of argumentation 
again and dismissed the APERMC approach. The Court decided that a Member State is not 
mandated to adopt legislation regarding compliance with the TFEU for the award of 
contracts under the threshold, but a case-by-case evaluation of the relevance of the 
contract for the Internal Market should be made, in order to conclude whether the TFEU 
fundamental principles are applicable.159 The Court reiterated that when a cross-border 
interest is present, the absence of transparency will lead to ‘a difference in treatment to the 




Moreover, the Court expressly stated that articles 43 and 49 TEC ‘do not lay down a general 
obligation of equal treatment but contain (…) a prohibition on discrimination on the basis of 
                                                          
153 An Post case para 33. 
154 The Commission brought as an argument the fact that it had received a complaint from an undertaking from another Member State. See 
An Post case paras 29, 32-4. 
155 An Post case para 30. 
156 Case C-220/06 Asociation Profesional de Empresas de Reparto y Manipulado de Correspondencia [2007] ECR I-12175 (APERMC case), 
para 70-75. 
157 APERMC case paras 71-4. 
158 Case C-412/04 Commission v Italy [2008] ECR I-619. 
159 Commission v Italy case paras 65-8. 
160 Commission v Italy case para 66. 
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nationality’.161 The Commission had failed to demonstrate the existence of such 
discrimination. 
SECAP cases 
The subsequent SECAP cases
162
 dealt with the discriminatory nature of a national legislation 
imposing the automatic exclusion of abnormally low tenders in contracts with a value below 
the threshold, without granting the opportunity to tenderers to prove that their offer is genuine 
and viable. Tenders were qualified as abnormally low according to a pre-set mathematical 
formula.
163
 The Court underlined that the fundamental rules and general principles of the 
Treaty apply only when the contracts in question are potentially of certain cross-border 
interest.
164
 The Court stated that the application of the formula to contracts excluded from 
the scope of the Procurement Directives, but nevertheless presenting a cross-border interest, 
amounted to indirect discrimination, since it created disadvantages for undertakings from 
other Member State that may be able to offer a genuine and viable solution at a much lower 
prices as a result of concrete competitive advantages.
165
  
In the SECAP cases, the Court also provided examples of circumstances which should be 
taken into account when deciding whether cross-border interest is present or not: the 
monetary value of the contract in question, in conjunction with its place of execution and its 
technical complexity.
166
 The Court made clear that a cross-border interest is absent when the 
economic interest at stake in the contract in question is very modest. However, even low-
value contracts may be of certain cross-border interest when the execution of the contract is 
situated in a place that is likely to attract foreign companies (for example in the vicinity of 
borders with other Member States).167 The Court clarified that it is the duty of the contracting 
authority to assess whether a contract whose value is below the threshold is of cross-border 
interest.
168
   
Regarding the applicability of the equal treatment principle, the Court followed the same 
approach as in the An Post and Commission v Italy cases. It decided that not allowing the 
tenderers to prove that their bids are genuine and viable breaches the non-discrimination 
principle when cross-border interest is present.
169
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163 SECAP cases para 23-4. 
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In the following Wall case,170 the question arose whether change of a subcontractor in a 
service concession contract requires reopening the contract to competition. In this case, the 
existence of a cross-border interest was not disputed and the contract had been awarded in 
competition. The Court embraced the view that the principle of equal treatment applies
171
 
and interpreted it by reference to case-law regarding contracts falling within the scope of 
application of the Procurement Directives. The Court stated that substantial amendments of 
a service concession contract falling within the scope of application of the Treaty, amounts 
to a breach of equal treatment when they demonstrate the intention of the parties to 




I conclude from the above case-law that there are two diverging approaches regarding the 
applicability of the TFEU principles to contracts (partially) excluded from the Procurement 
Directives. It is unclear whether the reasons for these inconsistencies lie in the principled 
opinions of the different European judges or other circumstances peculiar to the facts of the 
case.  
According to the approach established in the Parking Brixen  case, the potential interest of 
companies from other Member States in contracts falling outside the Procurement Directives 
cannot on forehand be excluded. Moreover, the equal treatment principle is a general 
principle that applies independent from the determination of a link to the Internal market and 
entails an obligation to advertise and to organize a competitive award procedure.  
According to the approach established in the Coname and An Post cases, a case-by-case 
evaluation should be made whether companies from other Member States may be 
interested in the respective contract. The potential interest of companies from other Member 
States in the contract depends not only on its monetary value, but also on its technical 
complexity and/or on the place of execution of the contract. When no cross-border interest is 
present, the respective contract may be awarded without consideration of the TFEU. When 
potential cross-border is present, an award in the absence of transparency breaches the 
non-discrimination principle. Transparency entails an obligation to advertise the contract. 
When following advertisement no foreign company expresses interest in obtaining the 
contract, the contracting authority may still conclude that no competitive award procedure 
in line with the Treaty principles needs to be set in motion. 
                                                          
170 Case C-91/08 Wall AG v Stadt Frankfurt am Main [2010] ECR I-0000 (Wall case) para 37. 
171 Wall case para 37. 
172 Wall case. 
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1.5.2 The 2010 case-law - resolution of the disputes ? 
In 2006, the European Commission decided to intervene in the dispute by codifying the EU 
case law in its Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract 
awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement Directives.173 The 
Communication does not mention R&D service contracts excluded from the scope of the 
Procurement Directives. This is arguably due to the fact that the Commission wanted to 
restrict its Communication to the existing case-law. It follows the case-law up to just before 
the An Post case174 on important points discussed in the previous sections of this chapter:  
 Firstly, it embraces a rebuttable assumption that a contract falling outside the 
Procurement Directives presents cross-border interest and lays the burden of proof 
regarding the irrelevance of the contract for the Internal market on the contracting 
authority.  
 Secondly, it adopts the view that when a cross-border interest cannot be excluded, a 
contracting authority needs to organize a competitive award procedure. The 
Communication outlines the obligation to publish a call for competition, which should 
contain the essential information related to the contract as well as the award 
procedure.  
The Communication does not follow the Coname approach regarding the second possibility 
to rebut the TFEU applicability  if foreign companies do not express interest following the 
advertisement of the contract. It seems to have chosen a middle way between the Coname 
and the Parking Brixen approaches. 
The Commission also goes further than the case-law in detailing the procedural steps that 
would comply with the TFEU principle. Summarized, the following obligations flow from the 
TFEU principles, according to the Commission: 
1. Prior assessment of the cross-border interest in the respective public contract; And in 
case of positive conclusion regarding the existence of cross-border interest: 
2. Prior publication of an advertisement of the public contract through a sufficiently 
wide coverage medium, including a description of the award procedure;175  
3. Non-discriminatory description of the subject-matter of the contract.176 Concretely this 
obligation entails that ‘the description of the characteristics required of a product or 
service should not refer to a specific make or source, or a particular process, or to 
                                                          
173 Commission, ‘Interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the 
provisions of the Public Procurement Directives’ 2006/C 179/02. 
174 The Communication dates from before the An Post case. 
175 Germany v Commission case para 79. 
176 Germany v Commission case paras 113-5. 
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trade marks, patents, types or a specific origin or production unless such reference is 
justified by the subject-matter of the contract and accompanied by the words ‘or 
equivalent’.177 
4. Use of non-discriminatory selection criteria.178 
5. Recognition of equivalent diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal 
qualifications from other member States – flows out of the principle of mutual 
recognition.179 
6. Time-limits for expressions of interest and submission of offers should allow sufficient 
time to undertakings from other Member States to formulate meaningful offers.180 
7. The award needs to take place according to the prior laid down rules and avoid de 
facto unjustified advantages to a specific tenderer (for example by providing the 
same amount of information). This is particularly important in negotiated procedures. 
8. The negotiated procedure without prior announcement of the contract, is allowed 
under the same conditions as provided within the Procurement Directives for the 
same procedure, but not limited to these situations.181 This ensures that the prior 
publication obligations is not imposed where the Procurement Directives expressly 
allow for a derogation.182 Additional grounds for the application of direct negotiations 
may be based on exemptions from the applicability of the TFEU, such as 106(2) TFEU or 
one of the justificatory grounds expressly provided for in the Treaty applies (for 
example, public policy or public health, under Articles 46 EC and 55 EC, or official 
authority, under articles 45 EC and 55 EC), or on overriding reason relating to the 
general interest,183 or on an ‘in-house’ exception.184  
Germany disputed the Communication before the Court of First Instance (‘CFI’), for allegedly 
creating new obligations for the procurement of contracts expressly excluded by the 
legislator from the scope of application of the Procurement Directives. The case concerns in 
particular the extent of the obligations the Commission interprets from the applicable Treaty 
principles. 
In May 2010, the CFI considered the case and concluded that the 2006 Communication limits 
itself to explaining the obligations arising from the fundamental principles of the Treaty and 
does not create new obligations for contracting authorities/entities.185 It could be that a 
                                                          
177 Communication on the Community law applicable to contract awards not or not fully subject to the provisions of the Public Procurement 
Directives 7; Germany v Commission case. 
178 Germany v Commission case para 128.  
179 Germany v Commission case para 119-120. 
180 Germany v Commission case paras 122-3. 
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steady course is adopted in the case-law on these issues, according to which a contract 
falling (partially) outside the scope of the Procurement Directives needs to be awarded in 
competition whenever the assumption that foreign companies are not interested in the 
contract cannot be rebutted.  
A few months later, in the most recent case-law regarding a contract falling partially outside 
the scope of application of the Procurement Directives, the CJEU followed the tendency to 
interpret the Treaty principle in line with case-law relating to contracts fully covered by the 
Procurement Directives. The case regarded a complaint of the European Commission against 
Ireland concerning the procurement of II B services. Ireland had allocated the award criteria 
weights after the deadline for the submission of bids and amended these weights after a first 
investigation of the submitted bids.186 In this case, the existence of a cross-border interest was 
not disputed, as Ireland had voluntarily advertised the contract and the conditions for a 
competitive award procedure.   
The Court decided, that the obligation to publicize the weights of the award criteria before 
the deadline for the submission of bids does not follow from the principle of equal treatment 
or from the transparency principle. The Advocate-General had noticed in this context that 
the same outcome had been reached by the Court in the context of a procurement falling 
under the scope of the Procurement Directives. The Court had judged that assigning scores 
to the award sub-criteria after the deadline for submission of bids but before the opening of 
the bids was allowed.187  
Of importance to the decision in the discussed case was that the award criteria did not lend 
themselves to multiple interpretations and could thus not be used to disadvantage bidders 
from other Member States.188 Moreover, the award criteria had not been published in the 
order of relevance and knowledge of the scores before the deadline for submission would 
not have substantially influenced the formulation of the bids.189 
Changing the scores of the award criteria after the opening of the bids, on the other side, 
breaches the equal treatment and transparency principles.190 It is not necessary to 
demonstrate the discriminatory effect of the change or show that damages derived 
thereof.191   
                                                          
186 Case C-226/09 Commission v Ireland [2010] ECR I-11807 (Commission v Ireland case). 
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In this section I analyzed the case-law of the CJEU on the applicability of the TFEU obligations 
to contracts (partially) excluded from the scope of the Procurement Directives. I also 
analyzed the extent of the concrete obligations deriving from the TFEU. This analysis was 
meant to check the Commission’s interpretation of the obligations deriving from the TFEU 
fundamental principles in the context of a PCP procedure. It was also meant to conclude on 
the degree of procedural flexibility a contracting authority has when awarding an R&D 
service contract that falls outside the scope of the Procurement Directive. Although CJEU has 
not decided on matters related to PCP yet, I considered that its interpretation in other cases 
excluded from the scope of application of the Procurement Directives is relevant for PCP.   
CJEU’s case-law before 2010 shows inconsistencies in interpreting the applicability of the TFEU 
to contracts (partially) excluded from the scope of the Procurement Directives. The Court is 
also inconsistent in interpreting which concrete obligations derive from the fundamental 
principles of the Treaty.  
Regarding the applicability of the TFEU, it can be concluded from the case-law, that the 
award of a contract (partially) falling outside the scope of the Procurement Directives may 
disregard the fundamental principles of TFEU only if special circumstances are present. Such 
special circumstances may regard the lack of economic interest of the contract for 
companies from other Member States (for example due to the low monetary value, distance 
from the border etc.).   
This implies that the procurement of R&D services when risks and benefits are shared may 
present a certain cross-border interest or not, depending on the circumstances of the case. 
However, the PCP as defined in the PCP Communication is meant to address problems that 
are common to more than one Member State and would in most cases be of interest to 
companies from different Member States.  
Regarding the concrete obligations flowing from the TFEU, the same case-law before 2010 is 
inconsistent regarding the obligation to publicize the contract details and to organize a 
competitive award procedure. The case-law after 2010 confirms the approach adopted by 
the Commission: whenever a cross-border interest cannot be excluded, a competitive award 
procedure should be conducted following advertisement through sufficiently wide-coverage 
means. 
In addition, the Court has confirmed that extensive obligations flow from the general Treaty 
principles. The consequence of this approach is that the flexibility left to the contracting 
authority when awarding contracts falling outside the Procurement Directives is limited. In 
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practice, it amounts to a minimum obligation to conduct a negotiated procedure with prior 
notice, with the following additional flexibility as compared to the provisions of the 
Procurement Directives: 
1. It is not necessary to prove the applicability grounds imposed by the Public 
Procurement Directive for the applicability of the negotiated procedure with prior 
notice. 
2. Different time-limits for expressions of interest or submission of bids than prescribed by 
the Procurement Directives could be applied. 
3. Scores could be assigned to the award criteria after the deadline for the submission of 
bids, but should be assigned before the opening of the bids. 
4. The exclusion and selection criteria may entail other requirements than those 
enumerated within the Directive. 
If the Court adopts the same approach to R&D services contracts, there is arguably little 
incentive for contracting authorities to choose for the PCP procedure as opposed to an open 
procedure, for example. Due to the applicability of the equal treatment principle to 
contracts outside the scope of application of the Procurement Directives, there is limited 
room for changing the technical specifications during the subsequent PCP Phases. Moreover, 
conducting a PCP procedure would not legitimately cover the purchase of the resulting 
innovative products.  
1.6 Concept of R&D  
PCP may only be applied for the funding of R&D services, so it is important to know what 
‘R&D’ means. The R&D activities that constitute the focus of the three PCP phases are barely 
outlined in the PCP Communication and the accompanying PCP Staff Working Document. 
The European Commission thus did not clarify a crucial concept for the applicability of PCP. 
When the concept of ‘R&D’ is not interpreted properly,the pre-commercial procurement may 
breach the Procurement Directives and, consequently, may lead to a waste of public funds. 
A more comprehensive analysis of the meaning of R&D, concrete examples and guidance 
on the borderline between R&D and other innovative non-R&D activities can be found in the 
Frascati Manual. Although the Frascati Manual was developed for the purpose of measuring 
R&D investments in national contexts, its interpretation of the R&D concept is to a large extent 
relevant to PCP. Yet, the PCP Communication does not recommend the use of the Frascati 
Manual as leading authority in deciding what is R&D and what not.  
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However, the Frascati Manual has officially been endorsed by the European Commission and 
it is expressly mentioned as a source of inspiration for the definition of different categories of 
R&D activities in the area of State aid for R&D and innovation.
192
 Moreover, definitions of R&D 
in line with the Frascati Manual can be found in the recent Defence Directive.
193
  
The available definitions often use different terms and different degrees of detail. They mirror 
the legislator’s effort to provide guidance to the interpretation of a complex concept. They 
also reflect the different purposes of the respective legislative or policy instruments. 
In this section I outline the coverage of the R&D concept as defined in the Frascati Manual 
and in other EU legislative or policy documents. I subsequently point out the relevance of this 
guidance for the PCP procedure and I underline the remaining conceptual difficulties and 
the remaining gaps in the PCP policy guidance on the R&D concept. To this end, subsection 
1.6.1 focuses on the R&D concept in technological innovation. Subsection 1.6.2 describes the 
concept of R&D in the area of software development.  Finally, subsection 1.6.3 describes the 
concept of R&D in services innovations.  
1.6.1 R&D that leads to technological innovation 
1.6.1.1 Frascati Manual guidance on the concept of R&D 
Definitions 
According to the latest version of the Frascati Manual, R&D can be defined as ‘creative work 
undertaken on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including 
knowledge of man, culture and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new 
applications’.194 
Three categories of R&D can be distinguished: basic research, applied research and 
experimental development. The Frascati Manual provides the following definitions for each of 
these categories.195 
Basic research is ‘experimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to acquire new 
knowledge of the underlying foundation of phenomena and observable facts, without any 
particular application or use in view’.  
Applied research is ‘also original investigation undertaken in order to acquire new 
                                                          
192 Framework for State aid for R&D&I art 2.2 (e-g). 
193 Recital (13) of Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for 
the award of certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence 
and security, and amending Directives 2004/17/EC and 2004/18/EC [2009] OJ L216/76.  
194 Frascati Manual 30. 
195 Frascati Manual 64. 
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knowledge. It is, however, directed primarily towards a specific practical aim or objective’. 
Experimental development is ‘systematic work, drawing on existing knowledge gained from 
research and/or practical experience, which is directed to producing new materials, 
products or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving 
substantially those already produced or installed’. 
Borderline between R&D and other innovative non-R&D activities  
Besides R&D, the innovation process requires the performance of innovative activities, which 
are linked to R&D activities but are not themselves R&D. These innovative activities relate to 
the implementation of technologically new or improved products and processes (for 
example, production/construction, distribution, marketing etc.). 
The Frascati Manual recognizes the difficulties in locating the cut-off point between R&D and 
the innovative non-R&D activities particularly when the innovative non-R&D activities have a 
scientific and technological basis and are ‘very closely linked to R&D both through flows of 
information and in terms of operations, institutions and personnel’.196 The difficulty is also 
increased when the costs of preparing for production are higher than the costs of the R&D 
itself.197 R&D is often carried out at different phases of the innovation process up to the 
implementation stage. R&D is often not only ‘the original source of inventive ideas but also as 
a means of problem solving which can be called upon at any point up to implementation’.198 
The Frascati Manual distinguishes between innovative activities that can never be qualified as 
R&D, but may occasionally entangle ‘feedback’ R&D, and innovative activities that may be 
qualified as R&D or non-R&D depending on whether they are ‘carried out solely or primarily 
for the purpose of an R&D project’.199 
Innovative activities which can never qualify as R&D are, for example: ‘acquisition of 
technology (embodied and disembodied), tooling up and industrial engineering,(...) other 
capital acquisition (...) and marketing for new or improved products’,200 pre-production, 
production and distribution, business services, market research.201 
Innovative activities which may qualify as R&D or non-R&D are, for example: scientific and 
technical information services (such as the provision of library or computer services),202 
                                                          
196 Frascati Manual para 65. 
197 Frascati Manual para 24. 
198 Frascati Manual para 21. 
199 Frascati Manual para 69. 
200 Frascati Manual paras 21-2, 79. 
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management, administration and clerical activities,203 general purpose data collection, 
testing and standardization, feasibility studies, specialized health care, personal education of 
academic staff, patent and license work, policy-related studies, industrial design.204 
Within this context, particular difficulties are identified by the Frascati Manual in finding the 
cut-off line between experimental development which is R&D and pre-production 
development which is not R&D. According to the Manual, technical demonstrations, which 
are intended ‘to make further technical improvements on the product or process’ constitute 
R&D activities.205 The successful testing of the original prototype marks the end of the 
experimental development stage. Only when the testing does not yield the expected results 
and changes to the prototype are brought, the repeated test will continue to constitute 
R&D.206  
A user demonstration which involves that the innovation is ‘operated at or near full scale in a 
realistic environment’ for purposes of supporting policy or promoting the innovation does not 
constitute R&D. The pre-production planning or getting a production or control system 
working well, after the product, process or approach has been set, does not constitute R&D 
either.207  
The initial manufacturing stage may, according to the Frascati Manual, constitute R&D if it 
‘implies further design and engineering’.208  
Generic criteria to identify R&D 
For situations of uncertainty on whether an activity is R&D or not, the Manual defines generic 
criteria. These criteria may be applied whenever it is not clear whether an activity is R&D or 
not. The most important criterion is the ‘presence of an appreciable element of novelty and 
the resolution of scientific and/or technological uncertainty, e.g. when the solution to a 
problem is not readily apparent to someone familiar with the basic stock of common 
knowledge and techniques for the area concerned’.209 
Other supplementary criteria which are listed by the Frascati Manual as indicators of R&D 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
technical personnel or by bibliographic services, patent services, scientific conference and scientific and technical information, extension 
and advisory service. See Frascati Manual para 70. 
203 Frascati Manual para 132. 
204 Frascati Manual paras 71-7,110. 
205 Frascati Manual Annex 10 and paras 8-9. 
206 Frascati Manual para 115. 
207 Frascati Manual para 111. 
208 Frascati Manual para 120. 
209 Frascati Manual para 2.3.1. The components of this definition of R&D match to a large extent with those of patentability according to the 
European Patent Convention, Arts 52-56. However, purely ‘scientific’ advances would rarely meet the patentability test, whereas according 
to the Frascati Manual, they fall within the concept of R&D. See R. Apostol & C. Mair, ‘The Pre-commercial procurement of FLOSS: quirks, 
conflicts and legal complexities’, paper presented at the UNDERPINN Conference, Manchester, (22-23 March 2012). 
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include: the scope of the project to seek previously undiscovered phenomena, structures or 
relationships, the application of knowledge or techniques in a new way within the project, 
the significant chance that the project will result in new (extended or deeper) understanding 
of phenomena, relationships or manipulative principles of interest to more than one 
organization, the potential patentability of the results, the involvement of academic staff in 
the project.210 These criteria are more useful when attempting to retrospectively identify R&D 
activities and are not relevant in the context of a PCP.  
The Frascati Manual makes clear that in some blurry situations, the distinction between 
experimental development and pre-production development ‘requires engineering 
judgement as to when the element of novelty ceases and the work changes to routine 
development’.211  
PCP does not use the terms of applied research or experimental development, but simply 
refers to feasibility studies, prototyping and test series. It is though clear that PCP covers the 
stages of applied research and experimental development. 
The PCP guidance misses detailed guidance and examples on the activities that  qualify as 
R&D under the 3 phases, particularly in situations of uncertainty. Although the Frascati Manual 
has not officially been acknowledged as the authoritative guidance on the interpretation of 
the R&D concept in the context of a PCP, it provides useful complementary guidance. 
However, the Frascati Manual also lacks clarity on the concept of R&D as part of the 
innovation process in services (see section 1.6.3 below).  
1.6.1.2 EU guidance on the concept of R&D 
Some additional guidance on the interpretation of the R&D concept can be found in other 
areas of EU law. I hereunder provide an overview of the most useful guidance.  
Area of defence procurement 
The Defence Directive
212
 adopts almost literally the R&D definitions provided by the Frascati 
Manual. This confirms that the guidance provided by the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) on the R&D concept constitutes the leading authority 
on the interpretation of this concept in the area of public procurement.  
                                                          
210 Frascati Manual para.2.3.2. 
211 Frascati Manual Annex 10 and para 39. 
212 Directive 2009/81/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 on the coordination of procedures for the award of 
certain works contracts, supply contracts and service contracts by contracting authorities or entities in the fields of defence and security, 
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The Defence Directive also attempts to clarify the borderline between R&D and non-R&D 
activities.  In line with the Frascati Manual, it clarifies that technological demonstrators (i.e. 
devices demonstrating the performance of a new concept or a new technology in a 
relevant or representative environment) fall within the concept of experimental 
development. A less clear overview is given of activities that fall outside the R&D concept: 
‘the making and qualification of pre-production prototypes, tools and industrial engineering, 
industrial design or manufacture’.213  
Area of state aid 
The Framework for State aid for R&D&I, European Commission’s guidance on the conditions 
for exempting R&D national subsidies from a detailed scrutiny of their negative impact on EU-
wide competition, expressly mentions the Frascati Manual as one source of inspiration for the 
classification of various R&D activities.
214
  
The Framework defines three categories of R&D activities: fundamental research, applied 
research and experimental development which largely correspond to the Manual’s 
definitions of basic research, industrial research and experimental development.215 The 
Framework  pays more attention than the Frascati Manual to drawing a clear line between 
different categories of R&D activities. The Frascati Manual is less preoccupied with defining 
the cut-off line between the different R&D categories and is more interested in distinguishing 
between R&D and non-R&D activities.  
Distinguishing between different categories of R&D activities is important in the area of State 
aid, due to the fact that maximum percentages of the R&D costs per R&D category may be 
subsidized by a public authority. The closer the R&D activity finds itself to commercialization, 
the more distortive the subsidy is considered for the good functioning of the private market 
and as a consequence, the less substantial the subsidy may be.
216
 
The Framework clarifies thus that the aim of industrial research is to acquire new knowledge 
and skills needed to develop new, or significantly improved products, processes or services. 
The creation of components may also fall under industrial research, but fully-fledged 
prototypes are included into the category of experimental development.217  Experimental 
                                                          
213 Recital (13) Directive 2009/81. 
214 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 5.1.1. 
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notably for generic technology validation, to the exclusion of prototypes as covered by point(g); 
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development, on the other side, covers the creation of new or improved products, processes 
or services, based on knowledge previously acquired during industrial research.218 The aim of 
the R&D activities at the experimental development stage should not be to produce 
something for commercial use, whether it is drafts, drawings, plans or other documentation. 
However, commercially usable prototypes and pilot projects are considered experimental 
development activities, ‘where the prototype is necessarily the final commercial product and 
where it is too expensive to produce for it to be used only for demonstration and validation 
purposes’. 
Besides drawing a strict line between the different categories of R&D activities, the 
Framework restrictively defines the R&D costs which qualify for a subsidy at the later stage of 
experimental development. This is arguably due to the objective of the Framework to 
minimize distortions to competition at the end of the R&D trajectory.   
According to the Framework, subsequent revenues gained by the private recipient of the 
subsidy through commercial use of the prototype must be deducted from the eligible costs 
for the R&D subsidy.
219
 For example, if a new or significantly improved water purifying 
installation is built to demonstrate its viability in a real environment, not only the costs of the 
demonstration activities, but also the cost of building the installation will be eligible for an R&D 
subsidy under the EU rules (namely reimbursement of 25% of the eligible costs). However, if the 
pilot water purifying installation is subsequently used in the operational activities of the private 
water company (that is the recipient of the R&D subsidy) and revenues are obtained from 
consumers for the purified water, these revenues should be deducted from the R&D costs 
which qualify for the subsidy.  
Furthermore, the Framework stresses that experimental production and testing of products, 
processes and services do not qualify for reimbursement of R&D costs, if the resulting 
products, processes and services can be used or can be transformed to be used in industrial 
applications or commercially. In other words, if a company can subsequently sell the tested 
                                                          
218 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para.2.2(g): ‘Experimental development means the acquiring, combining, shaping and using of 
existing scientific, technological, business and other relevant knowledge and skills for the purpose of producing plans and arrangements or 
designs for new, altered or improved products, processes or services. These may also include, for example, other activities aiming at the 
conceptual definition, planning and documentation of new products, processes and services. The activities may comprise producing drafts, 
drawings, plans and other documentation, provided that they are not intended for commercial use.  
The development of commercially usable prototypes and pilot projects is also included where the prototype is necessarily the final 
commercial product and where it is too expensive to produce for it to be used only for demonstration and validation purposes. In case of a 
subsequent commercial use of demonstration or pilot projects, any revenue generated from such use must be deducted from the eligible 
costs.  
The experimental production and testing of products, processes and services are also eligible, provided that these cannot be used or 
transformed to be used in industrial applications or commercially. 
Experimental development does not include the routine or periodic changes made to products, production lines, manufacturing processes, 
existing services and other operations in progress, even if such changes may represent improvements’. 
219 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para.2.2(g). 
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products, processes or services, it cannot obtain an R&D subsidy for the costs of the 
experimental production or of the testing. 
The question arises whether the same restrictive approach to the interpretation of eligible 
R&D costs should be applied in the area of PCP.  
The PCP guidance does not detail the meaning of eligible R&D costs under a PCP contract 
and does not mention a similar restriction to the Framework regarding the subsequent 
commercial use of the resulting products by the supplier.  
However, the PCP guidance refers to the market price criterion, which may constitute an 
indirect limitation on the eligible R&D costs under a PCP. When the maximum price to be paid 
by a contracting authority for a PCP project is decided by taking into account the 
commercialization potential of the resulting solution, the estimated (share of the) revenues 
from subsequent commercial use should be detracted from the price to be paid for a PCP 
contract. However, as already mentioned in section 1.4.3, such a fictive calculation is very 
difficult to apply in practice. More suitable alternative to the market price criterion are 
discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.5.4.  
Important to mention is that there is no limitation on the subsequent commercial use of the 
prototype/tested product by the funding contracting authority, besides the fact that PCP 
may only cover R&D service contracts. If the cost of the resulting tested product for use in its 
operational activities outweighs the cost of the R&D services, the contract cannot be 
qualified as a PCP.  
1.6.2 R&D in software development 
The Frascati Manual contains specific guidance on identifying R&D in software development.  
Because PCP was initially envisaged as a suitable instrument to leverage private R&D efforts 
in the ICT sector, and because innovative ICT solutions are still promoted by EU policy-makers 
as crucial for the global competitiveness of the European economy,  it is important to be able 
to identify when software development can be qualified as R&D. 
The Frascati Manual is concise on this matter. The main conditions to qualify software 
development as R&D are the following:  
- the completion of the development must be dependent on a scientific and/or 
technological advance (advance in the area of computer software); AND  
- the aim of the project must be the systematic resolution of a scientific and/or 
technological uncertainty.  
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These conditions practically reiterate the generic criteria for identification of R&D. The Manual 
further specifies that an upgrade, addition or change to an existing program or system will, 
according to the Frascati Manual qualify as R&D when ‘it embodies scientific and/or 
technological advances that result in an increase in the stock of knowledge’.220  
1.6.3 R&D which leads to services innovation  
The 2007 PCP Communication and the accompanying PCP Staff Working Document are not 
clear on whether PCP is a suitable instrument for the development of innovative services 
which are not built around an innovative technology. On the one hand, the policy 
documents talk about the role of PCP to assure the development of technological solutions 
to meet challenging societal needs.221 On the other hand, the same policy documents 
indicate that the result of a PCP can be either an innovative product or service.222  
The same lack of clarity is evident in the Frascati Manual. Initially, the basic definitions in the 
Frascati Manual were developed for the manufacturing industry and research in the natural 
sciences and engineering. Subsequently, these were extended to service activities.  
The Frascati Manual acknowledges the remaining difficulties in identifying R&D in services. 
According to the Manual, these difficulties are mainly due to the fact that R&D in services is 
not specialised, but covers several areas: ‘technology-related R&D, R&D in the social 
sciences and humanities, including R&D relating to the knowledge of behaviour and 
organisations’.223 When software-related, R&D in services will be present even when the 
software is not by itself innovative, ‘but innovates by virtue of the functions that it performs’.224 
The Frascati Manual proposes the use of the same above mentioned generic criteria to 
identify R&D in services.225 
Policy-makers’ difficulty to clarify the relevancy of PCP to be applied in the services area is 
also due to the incipient stage of economic theories on the importance of traditional R&D 
activities in services innovation. Some economists consider that the reality of service 
development activities is not fully reflected into the current R&D definition of the Frascati 
Manual. However, very few practical solutions have so far been brought up.226  
                                                          
220 Frascati Manual paras 135-8. 
221 PCP Communication 4, 9, 10; PCP Staff Working Document 2-3, 10-1. 
222 PCP Communication 2-3, 8; PCP Staff Working Document 3-4, 8. 
223 Frascati Manual para 147. 
224 Frascati Manual para 147. 
225 Frascati Manual para 149. 
226 CREST R&D in Services Working Group, ‘R&D in Services – review and case studies’ (1 February 2008) 31 (CREST Working Group) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/service_rd080129.pdf> accessed 2 February 2013. For a discussion on the 
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According to the economic literature, examples of R&D activities in the services sector 
include: socio-economic research, insurance and financial mathematics (in the banking and 
insurance industry), IT systems development for the back office and delivery, service scripts 
development for the front desk personnel, ICT research and development, logistics simulation, 
management research, marketing research, environmental research, consumer behaviour, 
nutritional research, demographics research, religion-oriented research, medical research, 
law etc.227 
An interesting solution for the difficulty to identify R&D in services has been advanced in the 
EU State aid area. The Framework for State aid for R&D&I expressly enumerates several 
cumulative conditions for exempting national funding of organisational and process 
innovative activities from the obligation to pre-notify the aid (R&D subsidy) to the European 
Commission:228  
- the organisational innovation in services needs to be related to the use and 
exploitation of ICT (this limitation does not hold for process innovations);  
- both organisational and process innovations need to be conducted within a proper 
R&D project with an identified and qualified project manager and with identified 
project costs;  
- the project needs to entail a clear degree of risk;  
- the result of the innovation projects needs to be new or substantially improved 
compared to the state of the art in its industry; and 
- the result of the innovation project has to be in the form of ‘a standard, a business 
model, methodology or concept which can be systematically reproduced, possibly 
certified and possibly patented’.229  
Interesting to notice is that the maximum aid intensities are lower than for traditional R&D 
technology projects230 (15% of the cost of the project for large enterprises, 25% for medium 
enterprises and 35 % for small enterprises). 
Organisational and process innovation activities are treated within the Framework for State 
aid for R&D&I differently from the rest of the R&D activities. The European Commission finds 
the justification for this different treatment in the fact that innovation in services does not 
always conform to the definition of R&D, but is ‘typically less systematic and stems frequently 
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from customer interaction, market demand, adoption of businesses and organisational 
models and practices from more innovative sectors or from other sources’.231 
In the case of organizational innovations, the Framework for State aid for R&D&I limits the 
scope of the exemption to those innovations related to the use and implementation of ICT. 
This is in line with the approach to patentability of business methods within the European 
patent law, which requires, inter alia, computer-implementation for patentability and which 
does not consider pure or “naked” business methods patentable.
232
 Pure business method 
patents (non-technical/non-computer implemented) are not recognized, due to a history of 
limiting patentability to technical inventions.
233
 In distinguishing between patentable, 
innovative computer-implemented inventions and unpatentable software and business 
methods, the Board of Appeal applies the technical character test. The test requires the 
examiner to determine whether the claim's contribution to prior art lies in a technical area.
234
 
The Frascati Manual does not bring a similar restriction to ICT-related R&D activities within 
organizational innovations. Advancing knowledge in scientific areas may also qualify as R&D 
in services.  
1.6.4 Conclusions 
By limiting PCP to R&D services contracts, the EU legislator and the EU policy-maker sought to 
provide public funding to those cutting-edge, knowledge-creating activities, which promise 
significant benefits, but do not easily attract the necessary private investments. The EU sought 
to ensure that public funding is not wasted on funding trivial innovative activities performed 
by national champions. A correct interpretation of the concept of R&D services is thus 
important in order to ensure that PCP achieves its objectives as innovation policy instrument. 
However, the PCP Communication does not provide a clear definition of R&D services or 
clear guidelines on the types of activities that qualify as R&D services.  
Although the Frascati Manual has not officially been acknowledged as the authoritative 
guidance on the interpretation of the R&D concept in the context of a PCP, it provides useful 
complementary guidance. The Frascati Manual has already been embraced by the 
European Commission in the area of defence procurement and State aid. 
In this section I outlined the most important guidance that may be relevant for the 
interpretation of the R&D concept in the context of a PCP procedure. I distinguished 
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232 Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on the patentability of computer-implemented inventions’ 5 COM(2002) 92 final. 
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between R&D in technological innovation (including software development) and R&D in 
service innovation. 
Regarding R&D in technological innovation, the Frascati Manual provides generic criteria for 
identifying R&D in situations of uncertainty, particularly at the border between experimental 
development and pre-production development (before the commercial roll-out of the 
innovation). According to the Frascati Manual, successful testing of a prototype marks the 
end of the last phase in the R&D trajectory, namely experimental development. When the 
borderline is not clear, the key characteristics of R&D activities in software and technological 
fields are: 
- ‘presence of an appreciable element of novelty’; and  
- ‘the resolution of scientific and/or technological uncertainty’.  
In other words, the solution to a problem should not be readily apparent to ‘someone familiar 
with the basic stock of common knowledge and techniques for the area concerned’. The 
Manual admits though the sometimes distinction between R&D and non-R&D activities 
requires ‘engineering judgment as to when the element of novelty ceases and the work 
changes to routine development’.  
Useful additional guidance is also provided by the Framework for State aid for R&D&I. 
Particularly relevant for the question whether an innovation developed during a PCP may be 
subsequently used by the funding contracting authority is the approach in the State aid area 
to commercially usable prototypes and pilot projects. These are considered experimental 
development activities, ‘where the prototype is necessarily the final commercial product and 
where it is too expensive to produce for it to be used only for demonstration and validation 
purposes’. The Framework underlines that subsequent revenues gained by the private 
recipient of the subsidy through commercial use of the prototype must be deducted from the 
eligible costs for the R&D subsidy. There is however no restriction for the contracting authority 
who grants the subsidy to subsequently use the commercial prototype for its own benefit, 
besides the condition that the value of the R&D services covered by the PCP contract must 
outweigh the value of making the prototype.  
Clarity on the concept of R&D as part of the innovation process in services sectors is more 
difficult to find. 
The Frascati Manual acknowledges the difficulties in defining R&D in services. These difficulties 
are due to the unspecialized nature of the R&D activities in services. The Manual makes 
though clear that, when software related, R&D in services will be present even when the 
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software is not by itself innovative, but innovative by the functions it performs. The Frascati 
Manual proposes the use of the same above mentioned generic criteria to identify R&D in 
services. 
In the EU State aid area, subsidies for organisational and process innovative activities (or in 
other words R&D activities in services) benefit of a light supervision regime when the following 
cumulative conditions are present: 
- they are related to the use and exploitation of ICT (this limitation only applies to 
organisational innovations),  
- are organised in a systematic manner (with an identified and qualified project manager 
and with identified project costs),  
- entail a clear degree of risk and  
- yield new or substantially improved results compared to the state of the art, which can be 
systematically reproduced, possibly certified and possibly patented. 
Concerning the clarity of the ‘R&D’ concept I conclude three things:  
 first, that it is essential to distinctinguish between legitimate and illegal application of 
PCP exceptions; 
 second, that clear interpretation is available when considering R&D for innovation of 
products (yet is not always understood in that way by contracting authorities); 
 third, that clear interpretation is not available when considering R&D for innovation of 
services (resulting in uncertainty about legitimate application of PCP for innovative 
services).  
1.7 Distinction from other available instruments to stimulate innovation 
Other (procurement) tools for stimulating increased private R&D investments have been 
developed in public policy. Some of these tools have a design that comes close to the 
mechanisms of PCP. Questions may arise whether these tools are able to perform the same 
functions and reach the same results as PCP.  
This section outlines the main differences between the PCP instrument and the instruments 
which may come close to the working and effects of the PCP procedure. These instruments 
are: (1) functional/performance specifications; (2) competitive dialogue; (3) R&D subsidies; 
and (4) Forward Commitment Procurement (FCP). 
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1.7.1 PCP and Functional and/or performance specifications 
Directives 2004/18/EC and 2004/17/EC allow contracting authorities/entities to formulate their 
technical specifications in terms of performance levels and/or functions.235  
The formulation of ambitious functions and/or performance levels in procurement procedures 
governed by the Procurement Directives is thus allowed and even recommended. However, 
they are not always an interchangeable instrument with PCP in terms of outcome. For 
example, if commercially available products cannot comply with the required functions 
and/or performance levels and the timeline for the purchase is too short to allow the further 
improvement of the existent products, the procurement will fail. In such a case, the 
contracting authority will either need to start a new procurement procedure with less 
ambitious requirements in terms of functions and/or performance, or procure a public R&D 
contract for the development of a solution with the desired functionalities and performance 
levels.  
If the development of the desired solution requires R&D services, the contracting authority will 
be able to choose to organize the procurement outside the Procurement Directives and in 
line with the Commission’s guidance, provided that the minimum legal conditions discussed 
in section 1.5.1 are fulfilled. As shown in the section 1.6, this choice does not provide 
significantly increased procedural flexibility as compared to a procedure falling within the 
scope of the Procurement Directives, while preventing the contracting authority from 
purchasing and using the end-result. Alternatively, the contracting authority may purchase 
both the R&D services and the end-result thereof in one procedure in compliance with the 
Procurement Directives. 
When innovative products are available, but are not yet commercialized (for example 
products which have just completed phase 3 of the PCP), ambitious performance and 
functional specifications combined with qualitative award criteria may lead to their 
purchase. Through such a use of performance and functional specifications, contracting 
authorities act as leading customers and stimulate, according to some economists, private 
actors to invest in future innovation efforts.236 However, this is a different role compared to 
PCP. PCP is intended to steer private R&D efforts and investments at a much earlier stage in 
the innovation process, towards socially beneficial solutions which would otherwise not be 
developed or would be developed at a much slower pace. 
                                                          
235 See articles 23(3)(b) of Directive 2004/18/EC and 34(3)(b) of Directive 2004/17/EC. 
236 Luke Georgiou, ‘Demanding Innovation Lead markets, public procurement and innovation’ (London NESTA 2007). 
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From an efficiency point of view, it is recommendable that a contracting authority learns 
about the available solutions in the market and about the stage of development of 
innovative products before deciding on the level of required performance and/or functions. 
Of course, performance and functional specifications may also be used in award procedures 
that fall outside the Procurement Directives. The use of functional and performance 
specifications is even recommendable in the context of a PCP, in order to avoid restricting 
the choice of a specific solution by the suppliers.237 This entails that functional and/or 
performance specifications reinforce the functioning of the PCP instrument. 
In conclusion, formulating functional and/or performance specifications is not in conflict with 
PCP, it will often be a part of it. 
1.7.2 Competitive dialogue 
The competitive dialogue is a flexible procedure introduced in 2004 into the Directive 
2004/18/EC, in order to allow increased flexibility in the communication between the 
procuring authority and a private participant. The competitive dialogue may only be used in 
complex projects, such as infrastructure/IT projects wherein legal and financial make-up are 
uncertain.238 This can also apply to R&D projects falling within the Procurement Directives, but 
the procedure has not been developed specifically for this type of project. 
Thus, the competitive dialog is not designed to tackle technological uncertainties in the 
framework of R&D projects. It is designed to limit the contractual and financial uncertainties in 
complex projects.239 In addition, the competitive dialog contains a potential disincentives for 
the bidders to propose highly innovative solutions (when such a procedure invites them to 
inform competitors of new approaches to innovative solutions). 
The contracting authority, in the quest for the best solution for its own need, may 
communicate during the dialogue about the proposed solutions and other confidential 
information to the other bidders without the agreement of the bidder.240 Moreover, at the 
end of the dialogue, the unique features of the best solution will be inevitably communicated 
to the other candidates, when they are invited to submit their final tenders on the basis of this 
solution. In this case, the participant who proposed that solution is not even sure that he will 
be the winning bidder.241 
                                                          
237 PCP Staff Working Document 10. 
238 See articles 1(11)(c) and 29 of Directive 2004/18/EC. 
239 PCP Working Group 14-5. 
240 Article 29(3) of Directive 2004/18/EC. 
241 Commission, ‘Green Paper on the modernisation of EU public procurement policy - Towards a more efficient European Procurement 
Market’ COM (2011) 15 final 46. 
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Compared with the competitive dialogue, PCP has been developed specifically for R&D 
contracts. PCP expressly recognizes the need to protect the confidentiality of the developed 
solutions and allows parallel development trajectories. 
1.7.3 PCP and R&D subsidies 
Edquist and Zabala have recently expressed doubts regarding the nature of PCP as demand-
side innovation policy instrument. They have signaled the need to rethink the rationale 
behind PCP.242 Based on a study of 3 PCP cases deployed in the Netherlands, UK and 
Australia, they argue that PCP should not be qualified as procurement of innovation at all, as 
it does not involve any real purchase of the envisaged innovative product. Neither is any 
commitment or guarantee to such a purchase given.243 According to the authors, PCP ‘is a 
supply-side policy instrument in relation to innovation’ and ‘a demand-side policy instrument 
in relation to R&D, as it only intends to influence the production of R&D outputs’.244 They 
conclude that PCP is a pre-competitive R&D programme that stimulates innovation from the 
supply-side.  
The unclear conceptualization surrounding the PCP has not only puzzled policy researchers, 
but has also discouraged risk-averse contracting authorities from engaging in PCPs that may 
result in illegal subsidies.245 In this section I clarify the distinction made in the policy research 
field between demand-side and supply-side instruments. I also clarify the criteria use in EU 
public procurement and State aid legal fields to distinguish between ‘public contracts’, 
which are subject to the mandatory application of the EU public procurement rules and 
subsidies, which are subject to the voluntary application of the public procurement rules, but 
are subject to the mandatory application of the EU State aid rules. 
I agree with the above mentioned authors on the point that PCP was not drafted as a 
demand-side innovation policy instrument. As already mentioned in section 1.3.1 above, PCP 
was intended to incentivize the creation of solutions to problems of public interest, 
irrespective of whether the contracting authority is (one of the) end-customer(s) of the future 
innovation, or not. The contracting authority may be, next to the supplier, the end-user of the 
outcome of the R&D service contract (e.g. the emerging IPRs). This does not make PCP an 
policy instrument that stimulates innovation from the demand-side. It may be considered a 
demand-side instrument in respect of the R&D/knowledge outputs, but it remains a supply-
side instrument in respect of the intended innovation. 
                                                          
242 Charles Edquist, Jon Mikel Zabala-Iturriagagoitia, ‘Pre-Commercial Procurement: a demand or supply policy instrument in relation to 
innovation ?’, CIRCLE Paper Series, Paper no. 2012/11 (October 2013). 
243 Edquist & Zabala (2013) 13. 
244 Edquist & Zabala (2013) 18. 
245 Legal uncertainty regarding compliance with EU State aid rules has been invoked by contracting authorities for not engaging in PCPs. See 
Commission, ‘Compilation of Results of the EC Survey on the Status of Implementation of Pre-Commercial procurement Across Europe’ 5 
(April 2011) (PCP Survey (2011)) < http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/pcp-survey.pdf> accessed 12 November 2012. 
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PCP may not incorporate the purchase of the resulting innovations due to legal constraints 
deriving from previously made choices within the context of the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement. This is outlined in detail in Chapter 5 below. However, the legal rules 
do not prevent a contracting authority who conducts a PCP to commit or guarantee that a 
subsequent procurement procedure in compliance with the Procurement Directives will be 
organised for the purchase of the developed innovation. This approach is not recommended 
by the PCP Communication or the accompanying Staff Woking Document and it is neither 
adopted in practice. As a consequence, according to the ‘end-customer’ criterion used by 
Edquist and fellow policy researchers,246 PCP does not qualify as a demand-side innovation 
policy instrument. However, the qualification of PCP as demand-side policy instrument in 
respect of R&D rather than in respect of the resulting innovation, does not necessarily diminish 
its importance as part of a comprehensive EU innovation policy.  
More worrying is that the unclear conceptualisation of the PCP may either lead to its 
implementation as illegal subsidy or to a scarcee implementation due to concerns of 
compliance with the EU State aid rules. 
Compliance with the EU State aid rules is translated into the PCP Communication as the 
obligation for the contracting authority to pay a market price for the benefits gained from 
the awarded contract. Provided this condition is complied with, no subsidy is granted.  
The market price criterion is a variant of the market economy investor principle, that has long 
been used in the EU State aid area to identify subsidies that need to be scrutinised by the 
EU.247  
The PCP Communication uses the market price criterion as a substitute for the public 
procurement procedures as prescribed by the Procurement Directives. The application of the 
latter procedures in the EU state aid area normally creates a presumption that the award of 
the contract was made in accordance with the market conditions and no subsidy has been 
granted.248 However, R&D services with shared risks and benefits, which form the subject-
matter of the PCP are exempted from the mandatory application of the Procurement 
Directives. Moreover, the Court of Justice of the EU has clarified that following the respective 
procurement procedures would not prevent the qualification as a subsidy if the contractual 
conditions were not the market conditions or if the quantities purchased would not 
                                                          
246 See also Jakob Edler, la (2013) 18.Innovation Policy - Concept, Application, Critiquetiquth European Innovation Summit (2013), 
http://joint-institute.eu/files/2013/10/Edler-JIIP-Sep30-final2.pdf> accessed 4 March 2014. 
247 Ben Slocock, March 2014.u/files/2013/10/Edler-JIIP-S 2 Competition Policy Newsletter  (2002). 
248 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 2.1. 
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correspond to the real needs felt by the private end-users.249 For these reasons, the European 
Commission chose to formulate the market price criterion.  
A few years after the PCP Communication was released, the EU judge introduced the more 
useful and simple criterion of ‘direct economic interest’ to qualify a contract as a public 
contract, subject to the mandatory application of the EU public procurement rules. Although 
the Court did not seek to distinguish between public contracts and subsidies, this criterion is 
obviously useful to this end.250 
In 2010, the Court of Justice of the EU clarified in the Helmut Muller case,251 that the key 
criterion to define a public contract is the afferent pecuniary interest. According to the Court, 
a pecuniary interest entails that the contracting authority obtains a ‘direct economic interest’ 
in return for the consideration paid. This would be the case when the contracting authority 
gained the ownership on the contract results or retained a legal right on the use of the results 
of the activities deployed as part of the contract.252  
As a matter of contract law, a subsidy may also qualify as a contract and may have strings 
attached (e.g. for the grantee to deliver concrete results). It may, however, not yield a direct 
economic interest for the contracting authority. For example, when a private customer 
received funds to purchase an innovative solution, the funding agreement may qualify as a 
contract, but not as a public contract according to the ‘direct economic interest’ criterion. 
The contracting authority will have an economic interest in the diffusion of the innovation 
onto the market. The diffusion may for example lead to decreased environmental costs or 
increased tax revenues for the state. But such an economic interest is for the contracting 
authority, indirect.   
In the current context, PCP can be applied even when the contracting authority is not the 
end-user of the final innovative solution. For reasons of clarity, this conceptual distinction 
should be made by the EU policy-maker. It should be stated that PCP is an instrument that 
can be employed to award public contracts as well as subsidies. A public contract will be 
awarded when the contracting authority is the end-user, a subsidy when the private 
consumer is the end-user. In the second case, the subsidy should be subject to mandatory 
compliance with the EU State aid rules. What the current State aid rules for R&D and 
innovation encompass is further discussed in Chapter 5 below.  
                                                          
249 Case C-342/96, Tubacex [1999] ECR I-02459; Joined cases T-116/01 and T-118/01, PּטO European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputaci D 
Foral di Vizcaya v Commission [2003] ECR II-2956. 
250 K.P.E. Lasok QC, ‘Contracts and Grants in Public Procurement Law’, 
file:///C:/Users/Ramona/Downloads/Paul%20Lasok%20QC,%20Monckton%20Chambers%20(1).pdf> accessed 4 March 2014. 
251 Case C-451/08, Helmut Muller GmbH v Bundesanstalt fur Immobilienaufgaben [2010] ECR I-02673. 
252 Helmut Muller case paras 50-1. 
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Whether the PCP leads to the award of a public contract or to granting a subsidy, in both 
cases, PCP could be employed as a demand-side innovation policy instrument. According to 
the end-customer criterion used in the policy research field, this would require that the 
contracting authority should commit or should guarantee to organize a subsequent 
procurement procedure in accordance with the EU Procurement Directives to purchase the 
resulting solution. In the case of a subsidy, the contracting authority should commit or 
guarantee to coordinate the private end-users and to conduct the procurement in  their 
name.   
The dividing line between public contract and subsidies on the one side, and demand-side 
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For reasons of comprehensiveness, I can add that R&D subsidies and PCP public contracts 
may also be used as complementary instruments, at different stages in the innovation 
process: an R&D subsidy may be used to push exploratory research, while PCP public 
contracts may be used to pull applied research into commercialisation.   
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1.7.4 Forward Commitment Procurement  
Another instrument which is sometimes advertised as an efficient and suitable instrument to 
leverage private R&D investments is Forward Commitment Procurement (FCP). 
FCP is a procurement approach used in the UK, which involves alerting the private market to 
the future procurement needs of a contracting authority and allowing the private market a 
certain period of time to develop a solution at an agreed price and at an agreed level of 
performance. FCP was inspired from the automotive industry, where companies actively 
engage with their supply chains to provide information on future requirements and 
procurements in order to stimulate investment in innovation.253 
FCP can be defined as ‘a commitment to purchase at a point in the future, a product that 
may not yet exist commercially, against a specification that current products do not meet, on 
a scale sufficient to make it worthwhile for suppliers to tool up and manufacture’.  
FCP was initially meant to stimulate the leap to commercialization of environmental 
innovations, as it was observed that an unaided market rarely provides the incentives 
needed for environmental innovation. Environmental products are only being developed due 
to the value society puts on the environment and due to the public policies which create a 
value which justifies investing in environmental innovations. As environmental innovation 
becomes a necessity, the economic opportunities for businesses become increasingly visible. 
FCP was proposed, based on the analysis of how over 100 companies in the environmental 
sector innovate and of which difficulties they encounter. 
FCP is thus considered suitable for environmental innovations which find themselves at the 
demonstration and scaling-up stage.254 FCP is now used in other sectors (such as sustainability 
and health care) to provide a first market to innovative products. FCP is considered an 
effective public instrument for situation in which the private actor does not have sufficient 
certainty on the size and nature of the future markets, in order to invest in the innovation 
process. 255 
Through the FCP approach, contracting authorities can articulate credible demand and 
provide important information about the nature and scale of the demand. This may provide 
                                                          
253 Environmental innovations Advisory Group, ‘Environmental Innovation: Bridging the gap between environmental necessity and economic 
opportunity’ (November 2006) (EIAG Report) <http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file34987.pdf> accessed 24 December 2013. 
254 EIAG Report 4. 
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the necessary incentive to unlock private investment in such innovations.256 Moreover, FCP is 
profiled as a low risk enterprise from the part of the contracting authorities, which are risk 
averse when it comes to new products with no track record. FCP addresses thus the 
investment risks, not the investment costs.257 In other words, through FCP, a contracting 
authority does not invest in R&D, but leaves it to the private supplier.  
FCP is thus suitable individually or in combination with PCP or other fiscal incentives, 
depending on whether the private market fails to invest sufficiently in desirable R&D projects 
due to lack of information regarding the nature and extent of demand or depending on 
whether the private innovator has difficulties in accessing private funding for the respective 
R&D projects. FCP is most suitable to situations when the desired solution involves incremental 
improvements and when it will suffice to signal the intention to buy the developed solution to 
determine the private supplier to invest in the development of the respective product. PCP is 
meant to be applied in situations when the private actor is not ready to invest or does not 
have the potential to invest in the solution without the direct financial incentive of the public 
procurer. 
1.8 Conclusions  
In 2005, the Commission set-up an expert group to investigate the need to support in the EU 
the procurement of R&D, in order to emulate the greater success of competitors such as the 
US in bringing valuable innovation onto the market and gain global competitive positions for 
their national businesses. Based on the positive conclusions of the experts, the European 
Commission embraced PCP as an important instrument capable to bring about the following 
benefits for Europe:  
1.  improvements of public services; 
2. solutions to important societal problems (such as global warming, shortage of 
resources, ageing etc.); 
3. enhanced innovation and commercialisation capabilities of EU businesses, which 
would lead to improved competitive positions in global markets and would indirectly 
bring long-term benefits to the economy. 
Based on these convictions, the European Commission decided to further incentivize 
contracting authorities in Europe to engage in PCPs and turn themselves into technology 
                                                          
256 Environmental Innovations Advisory Group, ‘Forward Commitment Procurement and the HMPS Demonstration project’ (2006) 
<http://www.bis.gov.uk/files/file35312.pdf> accessed 1 February 2013. 
257 See <http://www.bis.gov.uk/policies/innovation/procurement/forward-commitment> accessed 11 March 2011.  
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demanding first buyers, when these technological solutions have important social benefits, 
have the potential to improve public service and to support EU innovative companies in 
developing new capabilities and new market opportunities. The Commission attempted to 
achieve this by providing guidance on the legally compliant ways to apply PCPs. The 
European Commission drafted its guidance on PCP from an EU-perspective and focused on 
the improved efficiency of PCP if EU-wide competition is ensured and common European 
problems are addressed.  
This chapter outlined the features of the PCP procedure as drafted by the Commission in its 
2007 Communication. It concluded that important guidance on IPR sharing, on defining a 
market price or on the interpretation of the concept of R&D is missing. Based on an analysis of 
the current case-law regarding contracts (partially) exempted from the scope of the 
Procurement Directives, this chapter concluded that PCP offers a limited degree of 
procedural flexibility as compared to the provisions of the Procurement Directives.  
This chapter also outlined the conceptual differences between PCP and other innovation 
procurement instruments, such as technical specifications, competitive dialogue, R&D 
subsidies and Forward Commitment Procurement. It concluded that no guidance was 
provided on certain conditions which should be present for PCPs to be more effective than 
other instruments or on objective grounds for choosing for a PCP instead of other innovation 
policy instruments. I particularly underlined the current confusion between PCP as demand-
side innovation policy instrument and R&D subsidies as supply-side innovation policy 
instrument. I concluded that the EU policy-maker missed the opportunity to clarify that PCP 
may be used as a means to award a public contract as well as to grant a subsidy. Whenever 
the contracting authority commits or guarantees to purchase the innovative end-solution for 
itself as end-user  or for private end-users, PCP will function as a demand-side innovation 
policy instrument.  
Finally, this chapter underlined that the Commission did not performed an extended 
economic analysis of whether government intervention through PCP - as drafted in the 2007 
Communication - is suitable to achieve the expected results within the EU. In the next 
chapter, I will outline the policy process which led to the current support for PCP as innovation 
policy instrument and I will investigate whether the policy expectations find support in the 
economic theories and empirical studies which are embraced by the EU or in alternative 
economic approaches. Moreover, I will identify the conditions under which public 
intervention to stimulate innovation through PCP can be most effective, as well as the 




CHAPTER 2. Institutional and economic backgrounds to the European 
PCP policies in the 21st century – revival of the demand-side policy in 
support of innovation 
2.1 Introduction 
By 2000, political consensus held that innovation is the key to Europe’s advancement in the 
face of competitive pressure from emerging economies and in the face of global threats of a 
different kind (climate change, shortage of natural resources, ageing etc.). This was 
acknowledged in 2000 by the European Council during its meeting in Lisbon. Since 2000, EU 
and national policy-makers have considered (combinations of) policy instruments that would 
incentivize private actors to bring those types of innovations to the market that are capable 
to adequately face the above mentioned challenges. 
In this context, demand-side policy instruments were rediscovered by the policy-makers as 
important tools to achieve more, faster and socially desirable innovation. Particularly public 
procurement was brought to the fore. In 2005, the Commission decided to exploit the 
potential of public procurement as source for investment in additional R&D efforts in order to 
contribute to the political goals outlined in Lisbon.258 This eventually led to the adoption of the 
PCP Communication in 2007.  
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the PCP Communication focuses on legal compliance 
with the state aid rules and legal compliance with the fundamental principles of the Treaty 
regarding the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). No guidance is provided on the 
economic pre-conditions that justify the use of PCP or plead against its application, and 
neither are practices explained that would increase PCP’s effectiveness. Nevertheless, the 
policy decision to include PCP within the EU innovation policy toolbox is based on a number 
of economic assumptions regarding the role of government intervention in support of 
innovation and the role of public R&D funding from the demand-side to incentivize private 
companies to increase their investments in desirable R&D projects.  
This chapter describes first the policy processes that preceded the adoption of the PCP. It 
outlines the political support and the relevant public policy actions adopted in this context by 
the different EU institutions which have a say in the innovation policy arena: the European 
Council (which gives the political impetus and support for certain action to stimulate 
innovation), the European Commission (which translates the European Council´s guidance 
into concrete activities) and the European Parliament (which has a say as co-legislator, in 
case legislation needs to be adopted).  
                                                          
258 Commission, ‘Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme: More Research and Innovation - Investing for Growth and Employment: 
A Common Approach’ 8, COM(2005) 488 final. 
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In the second part of this chapter, the economic assumptions that lie at the basis of the PCP 
policy are listed. Subsequently, this chapter analyses whether the economic assumptions and 
the policy expectations resonate with the economic theories and studies on public 
economic-policy intervention(s) in the form envisaged by PCP (namely public funding of R&D 
with involvement and purchasing prospects from the side of the end-customer/user).  
The economic theories and studies used in this chapter are those employed by EU institutions 
when deciding on their policies. This chapter also  identifies, by looking at these theories and 
studies, under which economic conditions PCP can be expected to be  effective and in 
which situations PCP can be expected to be counterproductive and should better not be 
employed.  
2.2 Policy background to PCP, an institutional approach  
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section discusses both the policy steps that precede the adoption of PCP and the policy 
actions that have been subsequently adopted in order to boost the implementation of PCPs 
in practice.  
It describes the European Council political support for the development of public policy in 
support of increased investments in R&D (section 2.2.2). It subsequently describes the actions 
undertaken by the European Commission to design and subsequently encourage the 
deployment of pre-commercial procurement (section 2.2.3). The description of the policy 
background continues with an outline of the European Parliament’s endorsement of PCP 
(section 2.2.4) and ends with concluding remarks (section 2.2.5). 
2.2.2 European Council’s guidance 
In 2000, the European Council259 laid the basis for the current policy expectations related to 
PCP. The European Council gave in the ‘Lisbon Strategy’ the political impetus to renew EU’s 
objectives in the face of the challenges brought by economic globalization (such as 
increased competition from developing countries, climate change, ageing, scarcity of 
natural resources etc.). The European Council set the ambitious goal for Europe to become 
the most competitive and dynamic economy in the world within a decade. To reach this 
goal, increased research and technology intensive production of goods and services and 
improved innovative capabilities for European businesses were considered necessary 
requirements.    
                                                          
259 The European Council is the organ which gives the political impetus to the Union’s economic, social and environmental action. It is 
formed of the heads of the Member States. 
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In the Lisbon Strategy, the European Council expressed its view that both (i) coordinating 
research efforts at EU level and (ii) ensuring a substantial demand for the resulting innovations 
would diminish inefficiencies in the European innovation policy.260 Moreover, the European 
Council stressed the importance of redirecting public expenditure towards research and 
development, innovation and towards information technologies.  
In Lisbon 2000, the European Council concurrently decided to introduce the concept of 
‘open method of coordination’ (OMC). OMC is a decentralized approach which entails that 
the European Council provides annual political guidance on the policy measures which are 
necessary to achieve the Lisbon agenda in employment, innovation, economic reform and 
social cohesion. Based on the conclusions of the European Council, the European 
Commission drafts European guidelines on the needed actions, with specific timetables. The 
implementation of the actions identified by the European Commission is left to the Member 
States.  
Yet the European Commission monitors the implementation by each Member State against 
quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks. It draws up annual reports on the 
progress made in each area. For the comparative assessment of the research and innovation 
performance of the 27 Member States and the relative strengths and weaknesses of their 
research and innovation systems, the Commission uses the innovation indicators of the 
Innovation Union Scoreboard. These Scoreboards are used as justification for policy choices. 
This method leaves the European Commission with no direct enforcement mechanisms, yet it 
allows for evidence-based arguments to persuade and leverage peer pressure.  
Since 2000, the European Council re-endorsed and fine-tuned the Lisbon Strategy on 
innovation each and every year. Different measures meant to create favourable conditions 
for businesses to invest in R&D and innovation were proposed. Hereafter, I will highlight 
European Council’s most important decisions related to increasing the amount of public 
investments in R&D and to increasing the efficiency of public policy in incentivizing increased 
private R&D investments.  
In 2001 in Göteborg, the European Council added an environmental dimension to the Lisbon 
Strategy and underlined the importance of triggering increased private investments in the 
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development of technological innovation.261 It also identified priority areas for policy action: 
climate change, transport, public health and natural resources.262 
Another important step was taken in 2002 during the Barcelona European Council, when it 
was agreed that investment in R&D and innovation in the Union should be increased to 3% of 
the GDP by 2010, of which two-thirds should come from the private sector.263 The Barcelona 
European Council laid a particular emphasis on priority areas in frontier technologies such as 
life sciences and biotechnology, considered instrumental for closing the gap between the EU 
and its major competitors. It also added the energy sector to the priority list.264  
In 2003, the Spring European Council265 reiterated that innovation is an insufficiently tapped 
source of growth for the EU. Increased public and private investments in R&D and innovation 
are the key to increasing the competitiveness of EU businesses and enhance growth. The 
2003 Council mentioned improved access to finance among the various policy actions 
needed to incentivize businesses to increase their R&D investments and recognized the 
important role defence R&D procurement has in promoting leading-edge technologies.266 
The 2003 European Council also indicated that environmental innovations must be treated as 
a priority in EU’s public research and innovation strategy.267 In 2004, the European Council 
remarked that the EU had not booked sufficient progress towards reaching the 3% investment 
target, but reiterated its political commitment therefore. It also called upon Member States to 
use among a variety of measures, targeted public R&D investments in order to enhance 
greater private investments in R&D.268  
In 2005, the European Council explicitly added public procurement to the array of innovation 
policy instruments needed to deploy innovative products and services and particularly eco-
technologies.269 This happened against the background of a negative mid-term evaluation of 
the achievement of the Lisbon Strategy targets for 2010.270 This addition was triggered by the 
request of the French, German and UK governments to surge the use of public procurement 
                                                          
261 Presidency Conclusions, ‘Goteborg European Council, 15 and 16 June 2001’, paras19-21 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/00200-r1.en1.pdf> accessed 26 March 2013. 
262 Presidency Conclusions June 2001 para 27. 
263 Presidency Conclusions, ‘Barcelona European Council 15-16 March 2002’ paras 47-8 
<http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/71025.pdf> accessed 26 March 2013. 
264 Presidency Conclusions March 2002 para 12. 
265 Presidency Conclusions, ‘Brussels European Council of 20 and 21 March 2003’ 14-526 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/75136.pdf> accessed at 27 July 2011. 
266 Ibid 4. 
267 Ibid 25. 
268 Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council 25-26 March 2004’ 2 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/79696.pdf> accessed 11 April 2013. 
269 Presidency conclusions, ‘Brussels European Council, 22 and 23 March 2005’ paras 13, 19 
<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/84335.pdf> accessed 27 June 2011. 
270 Spring European Council, ´Working together for growth and jobs, A new start for the Lisbon Strategy´ COM(2005) 24 final.  
 
 81 
in support of innovation.271 Investments in eco-technologies in the energy and transport 
sectors were considered particularly suitable to be stimulated through public procurement.272  
The European Council renewed each year its support for the commitments made in Lisbon 
towards investment in innovation and R&D in areas of European strategic interest, such as the 
energy sector (energy efficiency, sustainable energies and low emission technologies),273 
waste management and climate (technologies for environmentally safe carbon capture and 
sequestration and for new fossil-fuel power plant),274 construction, food and drink, energy-
efficient water-technologies, transport, recycling and waste water.275 
In 2007, at the dawn of the economic crisis, the European Council signaled the need to make 
public spending on R&D and innovation effective and to increase the rate of R&D 
transformation into innovative products and services.276 In 2008, after the economic crisis had 
hit Europe, the Spring European Council made clear that the long-term global challenges got 
bigger and that innovation was more than ever needed to deal with these challenges, 
especially in the context of restricted financial resources. Based on the 2007 Innovation Union 
Scoreboard, which concluded that EU’s performance is significantly weaker than competing 
economies in areas such as availability of early stage venture capital and public R&D 
expenditure,277 the European Council reinforced the commitment to invest more, but also 
more effectively, in research, creativity, innovation and to achieve the 3% R&D investment 
target. Public procurement was again mentioned as one of the instruments capable to 
contribute to deployment of desired innovations.278 
The European Council of 2009 called on the Commission to consider in its proposal for a post-
2010 Lisbon Strategy, among others, the need to step up and improve the quality of 
investment in research.279 
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In 2010, the European Council endorsed the new Europe 2020 Strategy and reconfirmed its 
political commitment to the same R&D investment target of 3% of GDP, which had been set 
within the framework of the Lisbon Strategy.280  
The European Council of February 2011281 underlined the importance of creating synergies 
and coherence between actions undertaken by the EU and the Member States in fostering 
private R&D investments and commercialization of innovations with societal benefits. 
Concurrently, the Council acknowledged the importance to lift remaining obstacles to the 
cross-border operation of venture capital and to this end, it  invited the Commission to 
explore the feasibility of a Small Business Innovation Research Scheme.282 
The European Council of March 2012 praised the Commission for being on time with its 
measures to improve the conditions for innovation in the EU. This reflected the fact that all six 
legislative proposals announced in the new innovation strategy283 were adopted by the 
Commission in 2011.284 Concurrently, the European Council acknowledged for the first time 
the need to put demand-led innovation at the core of Europe’s research and development 
policy and expressly mentioned the need to make more efficient use of pre-commercial 
procurement.285 
In conclusion, the European Council provided since 2000 broad guidance on the policy 
action needed to improve EU’s innovative capabilities and transform Europe into the most 
competitive and dynamic economy in the world. It underlined the need for an integrated 
and coordinated approach between EU’s and Member States’ actions in support of research 
and innovation. Among the various conditions needed to leverage private  investments in 
research and innovation, the European Council mentioned the need to increase not only the 
amount but also the efficiency of public R&D investments. It also explicitly pointed at the 
need for public authorities to purchase those innovations which present social benefits. 
Following the successful lead of competing economies such as the US, the European Council 
proposed to increase public R&D and innovation investments up to 1% of the GDP. The 
European Commission was asked to guide Member States and monitor the amount and 
impact of their investments. The aim was to deploy public R&D investments in such a way as 
to leverage increased private R&D and innovation investments up to an additional 2% of 
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GDP. The Innovation Union Scoreboards was designated to monitor the achievement of 
these targets. 
Public procurement of R&D (or pre-commercial procurement) was not mentioned as a 
distinct policy instrument before 2012. However, the guidance offered before 2012 left 
sufficient leeway for the European Commission to promote and finance public procurement 
of R&D. The express reference to pre-commercial procurement in 2012 seems to indicate 
further increased political support for the deployment of pre-commercial procurement as 
distinct innovation policy instrument.  
2.2.3 European Commission’s actions  
2.2.3.1 Actions to promote public procurement as innovation policy instrument  
Since 2000, the European Commission gave concrete form to the political guidance offered 
by the European Council. In 2002, it started to pay attention to the potential of public 
procurement as an important instrument to stimulate private actors to invest in R&D and 
innovation. The Commission underlined in a number of communications the importance of 
public procurement as funding source particularly for some industries (such as transport, 
communications and defence) as well as the need to overcome fragmentation of EU 
procurement markets in areas where scale is necessary to incentivize innovators to take risks 
and invest in R&D.286 In 2003, the Commission included public demand in its Research 
Investment Action Plan, as an instrument to raise R&D expenditure to the 3% Barcelona 
target.287 
Besides explicitly identifying public procurement as a suitable policy instrument to leverage 
private R&D investments, the Commission introduced new possibilities to procure innovative 
products into the 2004 Procurement Directives, by creating an equal footing for formal 
standards and functional specifications, and by introducing the competitive dialogue.288 
Subsequently, the European Commission provided clarity regarding the possibilities to procure 
innovative solutions in compliance with the legal framework.289  
The Commission concluded that public procurement may incentivize private investment in 
R&D, based on a number of funded studies (outlined below). The commissioned studies 
underlined the importance of customers‘ needs and risk-taking attitudes in influencing private 
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firms’ decisions to invest in R&D and innovation, and warned that the lack of focus on public 
technology procurement constituted a missed opportunity towards achieving the 3% target. 
Experts advised the European Commission, among others, to set targets for Member States 
regarding public procurement of R&D and to stimulate the establishment of analogues to the 
US SBIR.290 The same conclusions were validated by yearly EU surveys among private actors. 
These surveys repeatedly reported that businesses who had the opportunity to offer 
innovations in publicly tendered contracts, were the most likely to increase their innovation 
budgets. At the same time, public procurement tenders reportedly did not offer sufficient 
opportunities to bid innovative solutions, while in the few cases where they did, large 
companies had a higher chance to sell such innovative solutions.291  
Some of the most representative studies contracted by the Commission on this topic were the 
Kok Report which pointed out the possibility to use public procurement to offer lead markets 
to innovative products292 and the Wilkinson Report which re-confirmed the need for demand-
side innovation policy.293 But the Aho Group Report, which was commissioned by the EU 
leaders in the aftermath of their Spring Summit in 2006294 provided the most important input 
for the EU broad-based innovation strategy formulated by the European Commission in the 
same year.295 The Aho Group underlined that the demand-side was concomitantly the most 
promising and the most under-represented approach in the EU innovation policy. The Group 
argued for 4 priority actions: creating innovation friendly markets, strengthening R&D 
resources, increasing structural mobility and fostering a culture that celebrates innovation. 
The EU Council endorsed the conclusions of the Aho Group and the possibility of using public 
procurement to stimulate demand for innovation was reiterated at the Ministerial Meeting 
organized during the Finnish Presidency in 2006.296  
The EU broad-based innovation strategy adopted by the European Commission In September 
2006, proposed to improve access to finance in support of innovation, to create an 
innovation friendly regulatory environment and to create demand for innovation as well as to 
reinforce the activities of institutions relevant for innovation, including the links between 
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research institutions and industry.297 Amongst the instruments to achieve these goals, public 
procurement was singled out. By purchasing innovation, the public sector may stimulate the 
dissemination of innovations onto the private market through the power of example, while at 
the same time improving the quality and productivity of the public services. The Commission 
considered that, in order to achieve a significant impact, the focus should lie on the 
purchase of innovative products that have the potential to improve public service and for 
which the public sector is an important customer (such as ICT). Moreover, the need to 
stimulate all forms of innovation (technological, organizational and innovation in services) 
was underscored.298  
The Commission contracted subsequently a broad study to review the focus on innovation in 
the public procurement practice in EU countries. On the basis of this study, the Commission 
drafted in the spring of 2007 the Handbook on Public Procurement for Innovation, to provide 
legal certainty on the possibilities offered by the procurement directives to procure innovative 
products.299  
The Commission had thus by 2007 formulated guidance for Member States to uptake 
demand-side measures within their innovation policies, improved the legal framework for 
public procurement and increased legal certainty around the room for procurement of 
innovative products within the EU Procurement Directives. The guidance was by then focused 
on the procurement of commercially available innovative products, not on the procurement 
of R&D services.  
In 2007, the Commission went a step further and decided to bring policy-makers from 
different Member States together to deploy in a coordinated manner demand-side policies 
and disseminate the resulting best practice. This was the aim of the Lead Market Initiative 
(‘LMI’). The LMI identified and employed a set of demand-based measures such as public 
procurement networks, standardization and regulation, in support of particular technologies 
and sectors (eHealth, protective textiles, sustainable construction, recycling, bio-based 
products and renewable energies). These concrete demand-side instruments were meant to 
complement supply-side instruments already being employed in these areas. In addition, 
Member States involved in the LMI were supported in the development of public 
procurement policies favorable to innovation.300  
Following the adoption of demand-side instruments by several Member States in their 
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innovation policies, the Commission contracted in 2011 a study to investigate the trends and 
challenges in demand-side innovation policies in Europe. The study concluded that there was 
a tendency in the EU Member State to focus on public procurrement and pre-commercial 
procurement in their innovation policies, but that it was ‘still too early to say whether 
demand-side type of activities meet the expectations’.301 The study signalled the importance 
of ‘intelligent learning’ as compared to ‘policy copying’ as well as the importance of 
experimentation with demand-side policies, before their positive effects are proven. Based on 
these results, the EU commissioned the first systematic conceptualisation of an evaluation of 
demand-side policy (described in section 2.3.2 below).302 
Another recently commissioned report warns for the necessary improvement in the quality of 
the spending on R&D and innovation in order to close the innovation gap between Europe 
and its major competitors. According to this study, two issues that need further exploration 
are the demand-side policy and the innovation of services. The report also underlines that a 
successful innovation policy requires supranational coordination and governance.303 Among 
other solutions, the Report pleads for ‘the use of pre-commercial and early-commercialization 
procurement’ and for extended competences of the European Commission, beyond sharing 
practices and granting funds.304  
2.2.3.2 Actions to promote PCP within the EU innovation policy 
Until 2005, the European Commission had focused mainly on the use of commercial public 
procurement as a demand-side instrument to encourage private actors to invest more in 
R&D. The procurement of innovative products (whether new to the market or to the public 
purchaser) was expected to give private actors the trust that follow-up innovations would find 
a market in the public sector. This would potentially nudge them towards assuming more risks 
and investing more in R&D.  
In 2005, the European Commission decided to add a new dimension to the use of public 
procurement as innovation policy instrument. In a Communication of 2005 the Commission 
announced its intention ‘to raise awareness of the benefits of re-orienting public procurement 
towards stimulating research’.305 In 2006, the European Commission put together a group of 
                                                          
301 Technopolis, ‘Trends and Challenges in Demand-side Innovation Policies in Europe’ (2011) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7011> accessed 26 March 2013. 
302 J. Edler, L. Georghiou, K. Blind and E. Uyarra, ‘Evaluating the demand side: New challenges for evaluation’ Research Evaluation 21 (2012) 
33–47. 
303 Ernst&Young and Centre for European Policy, ‘Next generation innovation policy, The future of EU innovation policy to support market 
growth’ (2011) 14 
<http://www.google.nl/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CEMQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.siliconrepubli
c.com%2Fdownload%2Ffs%2Fdoc%2Freports%2Finnovation-20report-
lr.pdf&ei=uj4NUb7ECcHs0gXftIDABw&usg=AFQjCNE20kBwzEgEf_ryTG90zL4vBk6ODA&sig2=j0Xz_TvF_v3KJFyUYCvWyw> accessed 2 
February 2013. 
304 Ernst&Young study (2011) 17. 
305 COM (2005) 488 final 8. 
 
 87 
experts who committed themselves to investigate whether there was a need in the EU to 
stimulate R&D activities in the ICT sector through demand-side policies.306  
The ICT sector was singled out as a dynamic and innovative sector that is responsive to public 
demand, that is of common European interest and that can generate spill-over effects and 
enable innovative capabilities into other sectors of the economy.307 It was also considered 
that the competitive advantages Europe held in certain ICT markets, could be leveraged, if 
private and public R&D investments were increased to levels comparable to those of 
competing economies such as the US.308 Although the scope of PCP was later broadened 
beyond its initial focus, ICT remains an important target area for PCP as it is considered to 
hold the capacity to provide revolutionary solutions for the sustainable economy of the 
future,309 but needs public steering towards environmentally friendly choices.310 In the context 
of the economic slowdown since 2008, innovative ICT solutions were also seen as a source of 
potential efficiency gains and cost cuts related to energy and the environment in the public 
sector.311 
The expert group reported that PCP is a suitable instrument to pull innovative solutions from 
the R&D phase into the commercialization phase in the ICT sector as well as elsewhere.312 The 
conclusion reached by the experts motivated the Commission to support the implementation 
of PCP as innovation policy instrument.313      
The PCP Expert Group mentioned several reasons why use of public procurement of R&D was 
considered necessary. 
1. Firstly, Europe’s major competitor, the United States (US) succeeded more often to pull 
technological R&D into the commercialisation phase.314 The European experts 
attributed this success to (i) the strategic use of procurement procedures for R&D 
(design contests with considerable prizes, the SBIR competitions for high-tech solutions, 
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value engineering, risk and IPR sharing in R&D procurement etc.) and to (ii) the 
restriction of procurement of R&D to domestic suppliers. The US deployed these 
instruments in well-defined areas in which they aspired to gain international 
competitiveness. Through these actions the US succeeded to offer a strong home 
market to their domestic suppliers. This strengthened their competitive capabilities on 
the global market.  
2. Secondly, the EU spent 20 times less (2,5 Bn euro) compared to the US federal 
government agencies (49 Bn dollar)315 on demand of R&D. This investment gap was 
most obvious in public procurement of R&D (and not in other financial instruments 
such as R&D subsidies, loans or fiscal measures).  
3. Thirdly, due to the increasing opening of the Internal Market, the practice in the EU 
Member States to share the risks of R&D between state monopolies and private 
suppliers disappeared and left European companies without an important source of 
funding for risky R&D projects.316  
4. Fourthly, the private market in the EU had not stepped in to fill the funding gap. In the 
case of projects focused on the public market, this was due to the limited upside 
commercialisation potential.317 This situation was mainly observed in the case of 
products destined to meet intrinsic needs of the public organisation, but it was also 
present in cooperative procurement (when the innovative product addresses needs 
of both the public sector and the private customer) and in catalytic procurement 
(when the innovative product is destined to meet extrinsic needs to the procuring 
organization). Consequently, the experts concluded that the private market failed to 
fund risky R&D in general and R&D oriented towards solutions to public needs, in 
particular. Such market failures justified, according to the experts, the intervention of 
the government. 318 
5. Fifthly, the supply-side instruments such as subsidies, were considered insufficient to 
stimulate the creation of ICT solutions for the public sector. Unlike subsidies, 
procurement of R&D was not meant to co-finance firms to carry out R&D in line with 
company plans, but to steer R&D towards the needs of the public sector.319  
6. Sixthly, the experts concluded that, in the context of increased global competition, 
the underutilization of pre-commercial public procurement as an instrument for 
boosting research and innovation in ICT, as well as the fragmented national public 
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policy objectives were Europe’s most important weaknesses compared to its 
competitors.320  
The PCP Expert Group recommended a concerted European approach to the procurement 
of R&D which involves pooling together resources, demand and competencies of 
contracting authorities and which allows competition from all GPA countries, provided that 
the research centre of the company is situated in the EU. According to the experts, this 
approach had the advantage to lower for each contracting authority the risks of 
participating in procurements of R&D and to ensure more efficient spending of public money. 
From an EU perspective, a transparent and competitive procedure would increase 
interoperability and coherence of solutions in different Member States and would strengthen 
the Internal market with all its related benefits for EU citizens.321 
The experts’ conclusion that procurement of R&D in the EU was desirable was based on a 
comparison with the set of instruments in the US innovation policy. The experts did not 
question the effectiveness of government intervention in support of innovation. Moreover, no 
evaluation methodology of the impact of PCP was suggested322 and no need was signalled 
to check on a case-by-case basis whether PCP is a suitable instrument and is capable of 
bringing more benefits than harm in the context of competitive markets. The policy 
recommendation to implement PCPs was in concert with the desire of both the policy-makers 
and the expert group to explore whether PCP could reproduce the success of the US SBIR 
and ‘bring tangible benefits to society and economy’.323  
The PCP Expert Group concluded that PCP could be a suitable instrument to develop ICT 
solutions for recognized European challenges and recommended priority areas for its 
deployment: healthcare, social inclusion, e-government, security and transportation. Within 
these areas, the PCP Expert Group provided examples of broad topics which contain suitable 
challenges for cross-border collaborative PCPs.324 In the health area, the following specific 
topics are mentioned: electronic patient records supported by smart electronic health cards 
and e-prescriptions based on health information exchange networks. Within the area of 
social inclusion, the Study mentions the following topics: ambient assisted living for elderly, 
children, etc., design for all workplaces, total conversation communication technologies, 
multi-platform information society access for groups at risk of exclusion e.g. in remote or 
deprived areas. In the area of e-government the following topics are considered to present 
                                                          
320 PCP Expert Group 11. 
321 PCP Expert Group 6.  
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suitable challenges for cross-border collaborative PCP procedures: digital identities, workflows 
for inter-administration business processes (distributed secure software tools) and interactive 
multi-channel multimedia government to consumer/business architectures. In the security 
and transportation areas, PCP could be used to solve challenges within the following topics: 
border security, risk management systems e.g. for large scale bioterrorism attacks, attacks on 
utility resources etc., automatic inspection in electronic customs/taxation systems, traffic 
control systems for freight (for secure cargo tracking and managing freight movements), 
integration of traffic control systems over different transport modes, communication between 
car and road infrastructure, advanced driver assistance systems ADAS, automatic 
emergency call from vehicles. 
The European Commission embraced the policy recommendations of the PCP Expert Group 
in the PCP Communication and in the accompanying PCP Staff Working Document.325  
Subsequently, the European Commission set in its 2009 ICT Strategy the target to triple the use 
of pre-commercial procurement in ICT by 2020 and announced upcoming actions to 
incentivize cross-border implementations of PCP.326 At the same time, the Commission 
underlined that socially desirable technologies, such as environmental technologies, should 
be given priority.327 
In order to achieve the above mentioned target, the Commission started in 2009 to fund 
under different funding programmes (in RFEC, FP7 and CIP programmes)328 the establishment 
of networks of public authorities. The Commission made more than EUR 1,2 million available.  
These networks were intended to raise awareness on the PCP instrument, to facilitate 
exchanges of experiences and to eventually facilitate cross-border collaborations for 
implementation of pre-commercial procurement procedures. 
In 2010 it became clear that the goals and targets formulated within the framework of the 
Lisbon Strategy had not been reached. The data published by the European Commission in 
the Innovation Union Scoreboards between 2001-2010 confirmed that the gap between 
Europe on the one side, and the United States and Japan on the other side, has consistently 
been widening along several dimensions of innovation. At the same time, the BRIC 
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economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) were quickly catching up and may overtake the 
EU in the next few years in terms of key indicators of innovation performance, such as 
education, patents and investment in R&D. 329 Moreover, despite the fact that Europe 
features similar levels of public R&D spending on GDP to the US, Japan and China, the 
difference is substantial in private spending. The effect is less innovation brought to the 
market.330  
In response to this negative evaluation, the Commission adopted the new innovation strategy 
as one of the seven flagships (Innovation Union Flagship)331 which form the general strategy 
for the development of Europe up to 2020.332 The Innovation Union Flagship considers 
demand-side instruments such as standardisation, public procurement and regulation crucial. 
The fact that the current low level of investment in R&D in Europe (below 2% of GDP) 
compared to the US (2.6% of the GDP) and Japan (3.4% of the GDP) is mainly due to lower 
levels of private investment, led the Commission to conclude that the public investment in 
R&D in Europe does not trigger the desired incentive effect. As a solution the Commission 
proposes to improve the impact and composition of public research spending. It also 
proposes to improve the conditions for private sector R&D in the EU.333 The new Strategy 
maintains the focus on the great challenges Europe is facing in the fields of climate change, 
energy and resource efficiency, health and demographic change.  
PCP is expressly up-taken in the new Strategy as innovation policy instrument. The Commission 
announces the initiative to support Member States to set aside dedicated budgets for PCPs. 
The use of PCP is considered to contribute to the creation of procurement markets for 
innovation of at least €10 billion a year across the EU.334 The Strategy makes clear that PCPs 
are suitable when used for innovations which at the same time improve the efficiency and 
quality of public services, while addressing the major societal challenges. According to the 
2020 Innovation Union Flagship Initiative, suitable areas where PCP can play a role are the six 
Lead market Initiative areas (e-Health, sustainable construction, protective textiles, bio-based 
products, recycling and renewable energies) or the areas identified for European Innovation 
Partnerships (energy security, transport, climate change and resource efficiency, health and 
ageing, environmentally-friendly production methods and land management). 
It is interesting to notice that the Innovation Union Flagship specifically refers to direct PCPs 
(and not to catalytic PCPs). It is unclear whether this means that the European Commission 
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considers PCP exclusively suitable when used for intrinsic/operational needs of contracting 
authorities.335 The European Commission announces its intention to provide guidance and 
support mechanisms to contracting authorities and to stimulate joint procurements.336  
The Innovation Union Flagship of 2010 also introduces the new concept of European 
Innovation Partnerships (not to be understood as synonimous with the ‘Innovation Partnership’ 
procedure introduced through the new draft Procurement Directives). European Innovation 
Partnerships are a complex combination of supply- and demand-side instruments which 
should mobilise key actors at both national and EU levels to develop and bring on the market 
innovations with potential social benefits. From the scant and vague description of the 
European Innovation Partnership, it could be concluded that its aim is to coordinate and 
integrate the existing instruments and existing initiatives beyond the existing Joint Technology 
Instruments (JTIs). The Partnerships would therefore act across the whole research and 
innovation chain (from R&D efforts to demonstration and pilots, all the way to the market). 
PCP is one of the available instruments to be used within the Partnerships. The Commission 
intends to launch innovation partnerships in key areas which represent major societal 
challenges: energy security, transport, climate change and resource efficiency, health and 
ageing, environmentally-friendly production methods and land management.337 
Besides the "Innovation Union Flagship Initiative",338 other flagships announce Commission’s 
actions related to PCP, flagships such as "Industrial Policy",339 and "Digital agenda"340 as well 
as the communication "Regional Policy contributing to smart growth".341 The PCP-related 
actions are: co-finance between 2011-2013 five PCP projects involving contracting authorities 
from different Member States, employ PCP to create a vibrant Single Market for innovative 
goods and services, encourage Member States (through guidance and improved legal 
framework for cross-border collaboration in procurements) to include pre-commercial type of 
procurement into their procurement budgets. 
As already mentioned in the previous section, the European Council of February 2011342 
endorsed the innovation strategy proposed by the Commission and invited the Commission 
to explore the feasibility of a Small Business Innovation Research Scheme. A recent study on 
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the feasibility of a Small Business Innovation Research Scheme has been finalised in 2012.343 
Based on interviews with contracting authorities and policy-makers accross Europe, the study 
argues that EU suport is key in coordination of cross-border procurement projects, in learning 
activities and in drafting procurement specifications, while defining the needs and assessing 
the bids should be left to the Member States. The topic of the procurement initiatives could 
both fall within the broad common-EU policy objectives, as well as be driven by the concrete 
needs of the contracting authorities. 
The new Public Procurement Directives represent the most recent initiative of the Commission 
to modernize the public procurement rules.344 The most important changes supposed to 
encourage the innovation supportive practices regard the simplification of the grounds for 
application of the competitive dialogue procedure and the competitive procedure with 
negotiation and the legal guidance on the applicable rules in case of cross-border 
procurements. The new proposed directives introduce also the procedure of Innovation 
Partnerships, which is meant to stimulate contracting authorities to engage in procurements 
of R&D. For a critical analysis of the legislative choices regarding this instrument and its 
relation to PCP, see Chapter 5.  
Since 2011, the Commission has also made funding available for consortia of contracting 
authorities from different Member States which decide to conduct PCPs for the development 
of innovative solutions on topics of common European interest. The funding is available for up 
to 100% of the preparation, management and coordination costs of joint PCPs, plus 50% of 
the development cost of the new solutions within the PCP.345 The targeted areas are health, 
ageing well, photonics. But funding has also been made available for PCP proposals 
addressing any area of public interest.346 The Commission’s support for PCP is further discussed 
in Chapter 4. 
In conclusion, the Commission engaged since 2005 to stimulate public authorities to act as 
demanding customers of highly innovative solutions. In the Commission’s view, demanding 
public authorities could steer private innovative efforts towards desirable innovations and 
could incentivize increased private R&D investments. To this end, the European Commission 
drafted the PCP Communication. Initially, it hoped that the case for PCP was so compelling 
that contracting authorities throughout the EU would recognize its importance and would 
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widely implement it. When this proved not to be the case, the European Commission first 
funded the set-up of networks and subsequently funded the organization of collaborative 
cross-border PCPs. Furthermore, PCP features strongly in the new innovation strategy for 2020. 
The Commission even investigates the possibilities to extend its competences for deploying 
PCP, beyond providing guidance and funding. 
2.2.4 European Parliament’s support  
The European Parliament has also engaged in the debate around PCP. In a resolution of 
2007, it identified pre-commercial procurement as an ‘untapped opportunity in Europe to use 
public needs as a driver for innovation’ and encouraged Member States to use PCP to 
develop innovative solutions for specific problems of public interest.347  
In a later report of 2009, the Parliament endorsed the adopted PCP Communication and the 
Commission’s efforts to fund exchanges of good practices and training on pre-commercial 
procurement, but expressed concerns that pre-commercial procurement remained little 
understood by SMEs and largely underutilized by public authorities particularly at the regional 
and local levels.348 It called on the European Commission to take further steps to encourage 
public authorities to deploy this instrument through financial incentives, improved guidance 
and the set-up of a European pilot project.349 The report also underscored the role of the 
Commission and of the Member States in identifying and prioritizing medium and long-term 
public challenges that could be tackled through PCP.350  It also stressed the importance of 
the EU Technology Platforms and of continuous knowledge transfer between technologically 
innovative universities, institutes and contracting authorities for the successful deployment of 
PCPs.351  
In 2010, the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy on 
Innovation Union352 reiterated its support for PCP and urged Member States to strategically 
use public procurement in order to develop innovative, sustainable and eco-efficient 
solutions to important public challenges. It reiterated its call to the Commission to review the 
opportunities for pre-commercial procurement within the current legislative proposals, to 
financially incentivize regional and local public authorities to engage in PCPs and to draft 
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best-practice guidelines and training programmes to developed the skills needed to deploy 
PCPs.353 
In another more recent resolution, the European Parliament expressed again its support for 
PCP and listed the important objectives PCP may potentially achieve: creating new markets 
for innovative and green technologies, improving the quality and effectiveness of public 
services and creating competitive advantages for small European businesses.354 
In conclusion, the Parliament has joined the group of EU institutions that support PCP. The 
Parliament simply reiterates support for the already undertaken initiatives. However, its 
political support offers the Commission the additional justification to stimulate the use of PCP.  
2.2.5 Summing-up policy support for PCP 
The EU is trying to catalyze a technological revolution in order to cope with the numerous and 
enormous challenges of the not so far-away future. Increased R&D investments were 
identified as a necessary pre-condition. At the same time, the EU noticed that despite similar 
amounts of public R&D investments, it is less successful than the US in incentivizing private 
actors to scale up their own R&D investments. The EU policy-makers sought the explanation 
for these different levels of private R&D investment into the US SBIR-type of measures. As a 
consequence, they decided to explore whether pre-commercial public procurement could 
be beneficial to the EU economy. Pre-commercial procurement has not found its way into 
legislation, but has been anchored in public policy. All main EU institutions (European Council, 
European Commission and the European parliament) have expressed their support for PCP. 
PCP is viewed by the EU policy-makers as a suitable instrument (i)  to increase both public 
and private investments in R&D, (ii) to steer private R&D efforts towards innovative solutions for 
important and complex public problems and (iii) to indirectly enhance the innovative 
capabilities of (small) European businesses.  
The initial focus on the implementation of PCP procedures in the ICT sector was justified by 
the beneficial effects the ICT sector has on economic growth and social welfare and by the 
innovative and dynamic character of this sector, which makes it responsive to innovation 
policy measures. Moreover, Europe holds competitive advantages in global ICT markets and 
increased private and public R&D investments have the potential to boost these advantages. 
Subsequently, the Commission broadened the scope of PCP into all areas wherein the 
government plays an important role in funding R&D, such as transport and defence, as well 
as in the field of environmental technologies. Most recently, the focus has broadened 
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towards solutions to the major societal challenges: climate change, energy and resource 
efficiency, health and demographic change. 
In the most recent innovation policy for 2020, the EU proposes to adopt a comprehensive 
approach to innovation policy.355 PCP and commercial procurement are two important 
instruments within the innovation policy toolbox. According to the 2020 Innovation Union 
Flagship Initiative, suitable areas where PCP can play a role are: e-Health, sustainable 
construction, protective textiles, bio-based products, recycling and renewable energies, 
energy security, transport, climate change and resource efficiency, health and ageing, 
environmentally-friendly production methods and land management. 
The main EU institutions have expressed their expectations that the application of the PCP 
can contribute to the achievement of the EU innovation goals in the above mentioned 
sectors. The expectations from the performance of PCP are thus high. 
These policy expectations are based on research papers commissioned by the EU with a 
handful of experts. It is difficult to conclude whether these studies are objective or rather 
serve the purpose of confirming the political decisions which they underpin. In addition, the 
question arises whether the policy deployment follows the recommendations of these studies 
regarding the pre-conditions for efficient implementation of PCP.  
In the next section, I will outline the evolution of the economic approach that underlines the 
current EU innovation policy and I will compare the PCP approach against relevant 
economic studies beyond those commissioned by the EU. 
2.3 The economic foundations of PCP 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In the previous section I have outlined the policy process which led to the broad support for 
the implementation of PCP in the EU. The policy documents promoting PCP do not pay 
attention to the economic preconditions for the efficient implementation of PCP. They leave 
it to contracting authorities to make important value-judgments regarding such efficient 
implementation. However, policy documents explain the rationale behind the support for 
PCP.  
According to the PCP Communication and to the preceding PCP Expert Group, innovation 
can bring tangible benefits to the society and to the economy and increased R&D 
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investments represent the path towards innovation.356 However, Europe copes with a situation 
of underinvestment in R&D and with underperformance in converting new inventions into 
new products and jobs.357 The privatization process driven by the creation of the European 
Internal market has created a funding gap, particularly for risky R&D projects. This gap has not 
been filled by the European private financial market.
358
 This negatively influences the 
economic performance of Europe and the perspective of finding solutions to important 
collective problems such as climate change, qualitative and affordable health care in the 
face of an ageing population, security threats etc.359  
PCP is considered to be a policy instrument that can address the above mentioned 
shortcomings. When used strategically, public procurement of R&D would drive forward 
innovations that address public/collective needs and would concomitantly improve the 
competitive position of EU businesses in the global market.360 
Based on the above, I can conclude that several economic assumptions underlie the policy 
choices for PCP. The most important are: 
1. Innovation leads to (social) welfare; 
2. R&D investment is a necessary pre-condition of innovation; 
3. Venture capitalists underinvest in risky R&D projects;  
4. Public needs can influence firms’ strategies for creativity and innovation; 
5. PCPs is a suitable instrument to develop technological, as well as services 
innovations. 
In this section I will compare these economic assumptions against the most authoritative 
economic theories and studies. I will  analyse a broad array of economic theories and studies, 
encompassing but going beyond those embraced by the European Commission. Based on 
this analysis, I will identify criteria for the effective application of the PCP procedure and 
delineate those situations when PCP is not a suitable instrument.  
Before doing that, I will reflect on the problematic nature of the economic methodologies 
used to measure the impacts of public intervention on innovation or to predict the influence 
of certain conditions/factors on innovation (sub-section 2.3.2 below).  
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I will  subsequently test in 2.3.3, the first two assumptions against relevant economic theories. 
To this end, I will outline the evolution of the economic thought regarding the role of 
innovation in the economy and the role of (private and public) R&D investment among the 
various determinants of innovation. I will also elaborate the economic rationale advanced by 
different economic theories, for public intervention in the innovation area.  
In section 2.3.4, I will analyse the economic theories regarding the role of venture capital 
markets in support of innovation and I will reflect on the role of the government as risk-taking 
venture capitalist.  
In section 2.3.5, I will compare the fourth assumption that public needs can influence firms’ 
strategies for creativity and innovation against the economic theories on the role of demand 
in the innovation process. I will conclude on the pre-conditions for effectively employing 
public demand in support of innovation. In this section, I will also highlight the divergent 
approach as compared to the supply-side EU policy in the area of R&D subsidies. 
In section 2.3.6, I will outline the restrictive EU intervention in supporting R&D directed towards 
services innovations and I will provide an overview of the limited economic theories on the 
dynamics of the innovation process in services. This will shed light on the relevance of PCP for 
services innovation.  
Finally, I will conclude in section 2.4 on the pre-requisites for a successful implementation of 
PCP. 
As this is primarily a legal research, I will not provide a critical analysis of the concerned 
economic literature, but purely an overview of some of the most important economic 
theories and empirical studies. The analysis is largely limited to economic literature on 
innovative technologies and covers only to a limited extent economic theories on innovation 
in services.   
2.3.2 Innovation policy as decision-making under uncertainty 
The challenge to provide the policy-makers with a sound analytical framework to predict 
whether an envisaged policy does more good than harm has not (yet) been met by 
economics.361 Economics are limited in predicting or even determining in hindsight with 
scientific exactness whether a certain public policy has triggered technological evolution,362 
for the reasons presented below. 
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The ideal measurement method is to identify the likely evolution of a certain industry in the 
absence of the public innovation policy and to determine whether the industry would have 
innovated as rapidly and in the same way.363 For obvious practical reasons, this is an 
impossible approach to apply.  
A method considered manageable by economists, is to compare the evolution and 
innovative efforts of an industry following the public intervention against the expectations of 
how the respective public policy would impact/(create incentives for) innovation.364 To this 
end, economists use a series of indicators to measure/determine the effects (or outputs) of 
certain policies on innovation, such as changes in the innovation strategies, number of 
patents, number of patent citations, sales, firm growth, R&D expenditure etc. There are 
numerous problems in using such indicators and I will enumerate some of the most important 
of these below.365  
Firstly, it is difficult to find pure indicators, which establish exclusively the effects on innovation 
of the public policy under study, and do not (partly) capture the effect of other types of 
public interventions.  
Secondly, factors such as R&D spending regard an input to the innovation process, not an 
output of innovation while the knowledge spill-overs are impossible to measure. When 
economists seek to measure the benefits of public R&D spending on the increase in 
productivity of the private beneficiary, these appear to be lower than the equivalent benefits 
of private R&D spending and sometimes economists do not find any measurable effect at all. 
Scotchmer finds the cause of this, in the lack of suitable markers to measure the social value 
of the outputs of public R&D funding.366 
Thirdly, patents are problematic, for being only weakly related to actual innovation 
performance. Not all innovations are patented and not all patents regard qualitative 
innovations (or R&D), or the (social) value of an invention may be greater than the value of a 
patent indicates.367  
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Fourthly, the problem with using the national gross domestic product (GDP) as indicator is that 
the positive effects of innovative products may show long after their introduction.368 
Moreover, GDP as an indicator does not sufficiently reflect the value of investment in R&D, as 
innovation may in many cases lower the price or may not create value for the private actor 
at all (particularly when the innovation is made publicly available).369 
Regarding the capability to predict the best policy choices, Lipsey remarks that ‘there does 
not exist a unique set of formally determined, optimum public policies with respect to 
technological change’.370 By looking at the technological evolution throughout the history of 
mankind, Lipsey concludes that the economic development of the Western part of the world 
should in large proportion be attributed to historical accidents and not to intentional public 
intervention. In the Western world, pluralism and separation of powers (science from religion) 
were major factors in stimulating the advancement of the society, together with the re-
discovery of the Greek science, at a moment when it could escape the censorship of 
religion. He underlines in this context the important role of independent knowledge institutions 
which provided an ‘effective memory’, essential for ‘cumulative scientific advances’.  
As a consequence, when attempting to trigger technological change through public policy, 
Lipsey proposes to use a ‘mixture of theory, measurement and subjective judgment’.371 Due 
to the limitation of science to predict whether and which type of intervention is the most 
effective, other economists consider that the use of political decision and participatory 
decision-making (which involves large parts of the population and those most affected by 
the consequences of a certain policy) offer as good of an option as any.372 
Taleb373 finds that the current economic models used to predict economic outcomes are 
inherently flawed for being based on limited samples of past information, insufficient to 
capture rare events (such as the 2008 financial crisis) that can trigger extreme/catastrophic 
impacts. The economic models tend to qualify such rare events (so-called Black Swans) as 
improbable, although they can be envisaged. Taleb warns for the danger in relying decision-
making on such economic models and draws the attention to the potential extreme impact 
that large variations in random economic variables may have in the context of the global 
society characterized by increased interdependencies and nonlinearity.  
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Taleb develops the ‘theory of the fourth quadrant’, an area characterized by high 
uncertainty and extreme variations in certain atypical variables (which are rare and have an 
exponential impact on the end outcome), as well as by potential complex payoffs (whether 
positive or negative). Instead of trying to predict the probability of occurrence of Black 
Swans, Taleb advices to rather focus on precautionary measures in the eventuality of such 
events. He particularly advices to avoid decision-making driven by short-term profit, and he 
supports the idea to build-in necessary redundancy (as opposed to optimization/efficiency).  
Taleb’s argument is not new. Already in 1945, Frederick von Hayek, the Austrian policy 
philosopher reflected on decision-making under uncertainty.374 He argued that no policy-
maker can possibly possess the necessary knowledge on the political, social, technological 
and economic variables which can potentially influence the working of their policies in the 
real world, particularly on a long-term. However, this does not absolve the policy-maker 
(legislator) from evaluating the costs of the policy or its long-term value. Hayek criticised 
mathematical economics, which over-simplified things by often not taking into consideration 
the equally important ‘knowledge of people, of local conditions, and of special 
circumstances’. In his view, economics often disregard change in some variables and overly 
rely on ‘statistical aggregates, which show a very much greater stability than the movement 
of the detail’. Hayek used his observations as an argument against the central planning of an 
economy and as a praise of the price mechanism as one available conveyor of necessary 
relevant knowledge, which although not completely understandable or controllable, 
performs better than any known alternatives. 
However, his reflections underline the limited predictive capabilities of economic models and 
the limited capacity of a human to process enormous amounts of information in decision-
making (even if all the necessary information would be available). He concluded that 
economic theories can only provide ‘very general statements or “pattern predictions”’, but 
no predictions of individual events.375 While economists/statisticians can observe certain 
regularities in investments, price levels etc, such regularities do not always apply, while 
economics cannot name the preconditions for such regularities. Theorems of macrotheory 
are certainly valuable in order to generate predictions in the presence of insufficient 
information. But they are not more than assumptions which may be proven wrong.376 
Complexity economist Beinhocker eloquently summarizes it: 
‘The economy is too complex, too nonlinear, too dynamic, and too sensitive to the twists and 
turns of chance to be amenable to prediction over anything but the very shortest of terms. 
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Even if we were as rational as possible and had all the information we could want, the 
computational complexity of the economy is such that the future would happen before we 
would have time to predict it’.
377
 
Behavioural economists confirm that individuals perform poorly at computing large amounts 
of information, while they are good at interpreting ambiguous information and at learning.
378
 
These theories are backed by psychologists who demonstrate that rational models for 
decision-making (such as logics or statistics) are in situations of uncertainty (when not all the 
determinants of a certain outcome can be known or calculated) less reliable than simple 
heuristics.379 They confirm the view that the application of rational models to situations 
characterised by imperfect information may lead to disaster, as even small deviations from 
the model conditions may have an impact.380 Although the theory is not as developed as to 
identify the generic conditions under which heuristics always work better than rational 
models, Gigerenzer suggests that beyond a certain point, more information may be harmful 
to making a correct decision. Beyond this point, experience plays a crucial role in selecting 
the proper heuristics from the adaptive toolbox of an individual (such as recognition heuristic, 
fluency heuristic, hiatus heuristics etc.).381  
Complexity economists suggest another solution to policy-making in the context of insufficient 
information and uncertainty. They argue that public policy should focus on supporting 
institutions and societies to adapt quicker to changing complex situations (through 
infrastructure, network etc.), while leaving the selection of the successful innovations to the 
market forces.
382
 Moreover, public policy should focus on setting ambitious goals and defining 
a portofolio of alternative trajectories/policies to work towards those goals. This entails though 
that the government should be prepared to ‘experiment, collect feedback and change 
course, none of which is ever politically easy’.
383
 Scotchmer adds that, because results of  
R&D projects are inherently uncertain, assessments of the success and efficiency of public 
investments schemes in R&D should not be focused on the failed projects or comparison to 
better ideas developed after the investment decision. According to her, it is important to use 
mechanisms that can lead to good decision-making and to adopt a failure-tolerant 
approach.384 
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Solutions for decision-making in case of uncertainty are also provided by the precautionary 
principle, which has made its way into many international agreements, particularly in the field 
of environmental protection.385 The precautionary principle advices the adoption of 
precautionary measures in case of uncertainty or risks with irreversible or catastrophic 
consequences. Uncertainty in the context of the precautionary principle entails that the 
outcome can be envisaged with a certain degree of plausibility, but it cannot be attributed 
any probabilities. In the case of risks, the outcomes can be identified and probabilities can be 
assigned.386 The precautionary principle in its stronger forms, entails a low threshold for the 
plausibility of an uncertain outcome.387   
The adopted precautionary action should be sufficient to protect flexibility of decision-
making in the future, when more knowledge on the harm becomes available and should 
reflect the magnitude of the irreversible or catastrophic harm if precautionary action is not 
taken. However, action should be based on a cost-benefit analysis of the various options 
(including inaction).388  
Economists also agree that it is not possible to take precautions against all uncertain 
outcomes or risks, as these are present in almost any human activity and precautionary 
measures may themselves create new uncertainty or new risks.389 Whenever precautionary 
measures may create new uncertainty with catastrophic or irreversible outcomes, the 
precautionary measures should not be taken in the first place (such as a preventive war on 
terrorism that may increase terrorism).
390
 
Actions adopted within the framework of innovation policy can often be regarded as 
precautionary measures intended to address uncertain outcomes or risks with catastrophic 
and/or irreversible consequences (such as climate change, loss of resources etc.). However, 
innovation policy may create itself new uncertainty or risks. For example, public intervention in 
the form of funding of R&D from the demand side (such as envisaged by PCP) may, on the 
one side, solve the problem of insufficient funding of innovative firms, but may on the other 
side, deter rather than encourage competitive investments in R&D (when public funding of 
R&D strengthens the market position of a certain undertaking and reduces the profit 
perspectives for other undertakings and implicitly their incentives to invest in R&D). Public R&D 
funding may also encourage inefficient companies and distort competition (by enhancing 
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the market power of some companies which will discourage their competitors to invest in 
R&D themselves) and may divert needed funds from real needs (when their impact on 
stimulating private actors to become more entrepreneurial and invest more in R&D is low or 
non-existent). These outcomes are uncertain, but their consequences can hardly be qualified 
as catastrophic or irreversible. Therefore, there is no ground to argue that innovation policy 
should not be undertaken, particularly because the striven objective justifies action. 
In conclusion, innovation policy-making is a form of decision-making under uncertainty. It 
cannot rely on economic mathematical models for answers, due to the fact that these do 
not and cannot compute all relevant information. Economists propose to employ experience 
and learning besides available information and to retain needed redundancy as well as 
avoid distortions to judgments by short-term pay-offs.  
2.3.3 Economic approach to public innovation policy 
The fact that economic models are not capable to determine with scientific exactness what 
triggers innovation poses difficulties to policy-makers. In this section, I will analyse what 
relevant lessons can be drawn by the policy-maker from the current economic knowledge 
on the role of public R&D funding.  
This section will also test the first two economic assumptions mentioned in section 2.3.1: 
- innovation leads to (social) welfare;  
- R&D investment is a necessary pre-condition of innovation; 
To this end, I will describe how the economic thought on the role and on the determinants of 
innovation evolved with a particular focus on R&D investments. I will also highlight the 
economic thinking on the role of government R&D investments in support of innovation. In the 
second part, I will describe the economic rationale advanced by different economic 
theories, to justify public intervention in the innovation area.  
2.3.3.1 Evolution of economic thought 
Already in 1776 economist Adam Smith391 observed that innovation contributes to wealth 
creation (or economic growth). He saw innovation as exogenous, an external random 
phenomenon that is not determined by economic factors and cannot be predicted more 
accurately than weather. It was in 1934 that a more in-depth economic theory was 
developed by Schumpeter regarding the role of innovation in the economic system, based 
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on a historical analysis of large, sweeping changes that fundamentally restructure industries 
and markets.  
He concluded that innovation had a dual role: creating new wealth-generating structures 
and destroying the old ones.392 He saw economy as an equilibrium system. He considered 
that introduction of an innovation in a static economy creates a disequilibrium. This starts as a 
period of prosperity but changes gradually into a recession, as the economy adapts to the 
changed situation, the innovation weakens and the forces of competition and self-interest 
trigger increased production. This second wave of changes turns into a period of depression 
when inefficiencies and false expectations transform into unfavourable expectations. 
Depression is however accompanied by two favourable effects: the wide spread of the 
benefits of the innovation and the elimination of inefficient enterprises. Among the negative 
effects is that wages and prices, production and consumption fall far beyond the equilibrium 
values. A period of recovery follows under the effects of the forces of equilibrium (these are 
forces in the market which absorb the destructive effects triggered by innovation and adapt 
to them), which eventually leads to a new equilibrium.393 Later, he admitted that other 
causes besides innovation may trigger the cyclicality of the economy.394  
Schumpeter saw innovation as endogenous to the economic system and considered the 
entrepreneur to be its main driver. Moreover, he saw innovation as evolutionary. In 
Schumpeter’s view, the evolutionary character is related to the selection of the viable 
innovations through competition and the cumulative character of knowledge which leads to 
innovation (innovations being often the result of efforts of many inventors and developers).  
As classical economist, Schumpeter believed that ‘technical progress is a simple time trend’ 
that cannot be influenced by intentional action such as government intervention.395 He 
believed that non-intervention was more advantageous on a long term for the level and 
speed of performance.396 Schumpeter also did not believe there was a linear process 
between invention and innovation. He thought that ‘innovation is possible without anything 
we could identify as invention and invention does not necessarily induce innovation’.
397
  
In an article of 1957, the Nobel Prize winner economist Robert Solow added the 
mathematical dimension to Schumpeter’s theory on innovation and renewed interest in the 
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economic study of innovation.
398
 He considered that growth was a function of physical 
capital and human labour and he believed that shifts in the function were caused by 
technological change.
399
 He argued thus that technological progress is the key driver of 
growth. However, he considered technical progress to be an exogenous variable (as a time 
trend similar to population growth) to which the economy continuously adjusts and is driven 
in a state of dynamic equilibrium. His theory became known as the exogenous growth theory. 
Schumpeter and Solow concluded on the important role innovation plays in the economy, 
but were not preoccupied with the origins of innovation. W. Ruper Maclaurin was the first 
economist who studied how innovation processes take place. He developed in the 1940s the 
linear model of innovation at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
400
 According to his 
model, the innovation process can be divided into the following subsequent phases: basic 
science, invention, innovation, finance, acceptance/diffusion.
401
  
The linear model of innovation was generally accepted at the time and was mainly based on 
the belief that massive public investments in R&D during and after the Second World War had 
led to breakthrough innovations.
402
 Moreover, the belief that basic science (or basic 
research) was the source of inventions and discoveries was driven by the observation that 
throughout history, innovation efforts had increasingly concentrated in specialized public or 
private research and development laboratories. These specialized R&D efforts were made 
necessary by the increased complexity of technology and by its increased amount of 
scientific content.403  
In the 1960s, Friedmann´s and Arrow’s neo-classical theories404 gained tremendous prestige 
and the costs and benefits of public R&D investments were increasingly being scrutinized.405 
Neo-classical theories argued that the market mechanism, although often wasteful and 
inefficient in the choice of the winning innovation, had been a viable mode of bringing 
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remarkable technological advances406 and that the government should intervene only in 
case of market failures through investment in basic research, education and infrastructure. 
Market failures occurred when the results of research (and particularly of basic/fundamental 
research) could only be appropriated to a limited extent. In such cases, neo-classical 
economists believed that a free market underinvests in invention (or creation of new 
knowledge).407 Moreover, neo-classics argued that only scientists have the necessary 
information to make correct decisions in which research to invest and public funding should 
not restrict in any way their choice of the R&D project.408  
During the same period, different US Federal agencies commissioned studies to measure the 
role of basic research as source of innovation and reached diverging conclusions.
409
  These 
studies took into consideration other drivers of innovation besides investments in R&D. 
Demand of customers was advanced as an important driver. This was interpreted to mean 
that investment by the government in applied research may lead to more innovation than 
investments in basic research.
410
 
The linear model of innovation was thus being increasingly questioned. This also happened 
under the influence of Schmookler’s book ‘Invention and Economic Growth’, in which he 
argues that market demand (or extent of the market potential) is the most important driver of 
the inventive activity.
411
 In the 1990s economists paid more attention to the role of users  and 
market demand in driving innovation. These theories are discussed in section 2.3.4. 
OECD also contributed to the debate. Studies on what factors contribute to a strong 
technological base of the more advanced economies, concluded that other factors besides 
scientific and technological capabilities were crucial: capital availability, management, 




As a consequence, public innovation policy moved from an initial exclusive focus on 
increasing national R&D capabilities towards a more integrated approach which recognizes 
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the influence of the whole economic environment on technical change, and supports the 
innovation process beyond the R&D stage.413   
In the 1970s, innovation groups were set-up in the US and Europe to systematically study how 
innovation emerges. The most prominent representative of such groups in Europe is Chris 
Freeman who led the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at University of Sussex for sixteen 
years. At SPRU, the economic theory of systems of innovation was developed.   
Freeman argued that neither R&D, nor market demand is the main driving factor behind 
innovation activity. He believed that innovation was a ‘coupling process’ between supply 
(technological knowledge) and demand, that takes place in an evolving environment with 
imperfect information where uncertainty prevails and ‘chance plays a much greater role in 
competitive survival and in growth than it is comfortable to admit’.
414
  
Later, the theory was refined and innovation was depicted as a non-linear process that is 
influenced by interdependent interactions between firms and other organizations. The 
emphasis was laid on the role of institutions (such as firms, public laboratories, universities, 
financial institutions, government bodies etc.) in a national innovation system. Systems of 
innovation were defined as ‘the network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose 
activities and interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies’.
415
 Innovation 
is thus not only influenced by the independent elements of the systems, but also by the 
relations between these elements.
416
  
The innovation system economists also paid attention to the role of public policy. In their view, 
innovation policy should be more detailed and comprehensive than required by neo-classics. 
They argued that ‘system failures’ explain the suboptimal results in innovation and advocated 
a broader justification for government intervention than under the ‘market failure’ approach. 
Innovation policy should be about facilitating interactions and identifying technological 
opportunities.
417
 They also underlined the narrow and vertical focus of public institutions 
involved in stimulating innovation and their fragmented approach.418  
In terms of choices of areas for public support, Freeman proposes to prioritize public support 
based on the contribution of science and technology to social welfare.
419
 A few years later 
(in 1982), Freeman argued that as a consequence of the increased knowledge on the drivers 
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of innovation, public innovation policies shifted in focus from enhancing the competitive 
advantage of the national firms and achieving economic growth towards improving the 
quality of innovations and ‘contribut[ing] to social welfare, conceived in a wider sense’.420 
Economic historian Godin identifies the industrialist Carty in 1924, followed by the policy-
maker V. Bush in 1945 to be among the first ones who supported the idea that public funding 
of basic research (science) was supposed to bring social benefits. They believed that public 
funding of basic research was ‘the seed of future great inventions which will increase the 
comfort and convenience and alleviate the sufferings of mankind’.
421
 In the 1960-70s, there 
was increasing attention to the social impact of technology.
422
 However, social innovation as 
reaction/adjustment to the undesired effects of technical innovations, intended to meet 
social/public needs has become of more interest to researchers and particularly to policy-
makers in the twenty-first century.
423
  
In the 1980s, neo-classics have started to show interest in the black box of innovation. Paul 
Romer was the first neo-classical economist to model innovation as an endogenous factor to 
the economy and he put the basis of the endogenous growth theory.
424 He attributed the 
source of growth not to the entrepreneur, but to the nature of the technology. Technology 
has a cumulative, accelerating feature. The more knowledge is accumulated, the higher are 
the payoffs. This was coined as the ‘increasing return’ phenomenon. The endogenous growth 
theory also found support in the perceived success of massive public spending in R&D in the 
aircraft, nuclear, space and security sectors during and after the Second World War. Public 
R&D spending was considered the source of remarkable innovations,425 as well as the source 
of broader economic growth.426  
In 1986, Stanford mechanical engineering professor Kline and Stanford economy professor 
Rosenberg theorized the chain-linked model of innovation. The chain-linked model suggests 
that innovation is triggered by either research or the existence of a potential market and 
goes through the following stages: invent and/or produce analytic design, detailed design 
and test, redesign and produce and distribute and market. Important feedback loops are 
created between these stages.
427
 When science does not provide the necessary knowledge, 
                                                          
420 Freeman (1982) 198-201. 
421 Quoted from Benoit Godin, ‘The Making of Science, Technology and Innovation Policy: Conceptual Frameworks as Narratives, 1945-2005’ 
(Montreal 2009) 18. 
422 Quoted from Benoit Godin, ‘Social Innovation: Utopias of Innovation from c.1830 to the Present’ Project on the Intellectual History of 
Innovation Working Paper No. 11 (2012); E.G. Mesthene, ‘Foreword’, in R.S. Rosenbloom, R. S., and R. Marris (eds.), ‘Social innovation in the 
City: New Enterprises for Community Development’ (Harvard University Press 1969); OECD, ‘Science, Growth and Society’ (OECD 
Publications Service 1972). 
423 Godin (2012) 36-7.  
424 P. M. Romer, ‘Endogenous Technological Change’ 98 Journal of Political Economy (1990). 
425 During the Second World War, government funded R&D successfully led to the development of weapons and of medical treatment for 
infectious diseases. Nelson (1990) 209. 
426 Davidson (2009) 13-8. 
427 Stephen J. Kline and Nathan Rosenberg, ‘An Overview of Innovation’, in Ralph Landau and Nathan Rosemberg (eds), ‘The Positive Sum 
 
 110 
an innovator starts with a repetitive process of trial and error of several combinations of 
existing knowledge. This process follows the following steps: the first best estimate of a 
workable design, build it, test it, incorporate learning, redesign, retest, incorporate learning 
and so on. This process is costly and justifies continuous investment in basic research.428 
The same view of innovation models is shared by complexity economist Brian Arthur. He 
explains that innovations occur sometimes when the scientific phenomena are not 
understood (for example, the bicycle was invented when the physical laws of equilibrium 
were not understood); other innovations emerge as applications of the scientific knowledge 
(for example the synthetic dyestuffs industry that emerged in Germany at the end of the 19th 
century as a direct result of knowledge advances in organic industry
429
). Moreover, in the 
context of increasingly complex technologies, science and technologies co-evolve. Arthur 
uses the concept of ‘combinatorial evolution’ to capture the idea that technologies are 
often made of numerous sub-technologies that emerge from existing knowledge, while new 
knowledge is also created during the development process. Certain major innovations 
require decades of sequential innovations (little fixes and advancements) before they can 
compete with incumbent competitors.
430
  
By now economists have not succeeded to empirically prove that R&D investments are 
essential to growth.
431
 However, economists broadly embraced the idea that R&D is one of 
the key determinants of economic growth.
432
 OECD has also confirmed there is a correlation 
between amount of investment in R&D and the economic performance of nations.
433
 It was 
also the OECD who admitted that attempting ‘to attribute so much economic growth to 
technical advance, so much to capital formation, and so much to increased educational 
attainments of the work force, is like trying to distribute the credit for the flavour of a cake 




This has in recent history led to calls for ‘knowledge economies’ such as the EU (which rely on 
innovation to drive growth) to invest more than 2 percent of GDP annually in R&D, in order to 
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increase the stock of new knowledge and ensure a sufficient flow of innovations.435 This is the 
rationale behind the call of the European Council in Barcelona to reach the 3% of GDP 
investment in R&D (out of which 2% should come from the private market).436 
Economists conclude thus that innovation (technological advance) leads to economic 
growth and that R&D investments constitute an essential, but not sufficient condition to 
support innovation. Other economic factors (such as institutions and networks) are also 
indispensable. Due to the complexity of the economic factors that co-impact innovation 
processes, designing the right mixture of measures and implementing such a broad, overall 
encompassing public innovation policy remains a challenge.  
In the 21st century, the increased recognition of the complexity of the economy and of the 
limitations of economics in measuring or predicting the effects of public intervention on the 
decisions of firms to innovate, has led to new approaches to innovation policy.  
Complexity economists provide such an approach.
437
 They argue that economy is a complex 
adaptive system with many dynamically interacting parts and networks, within which the 
micro-level interactions of the parts leads to macro-level patterns of behavior.  The evolution 
‘algorithm’ (differentiate, select, amplify) explains the growing order and complexity of the 
economic system and of the innovation process.
438
 Unlike the neo-classics, complexity 
economists do not assume economy is an orderly system made of perfectly rational 
individuals tending towards equilibrium, but a complex system, impacted by numerous 
random factors (such as individual capabilities, circumstances at birth, twists of fate etc.) and 
made of imperfect individuals who ‘use inductive rules of thumb to make decisions’ and ‘are 
subject to errors and biases’, but also capable to adapt to changing circumstances.
439
 
Complexity economists advice to employ public policy as an experimental endeavor.440 The 
experimental public policy should focus on ´fostering entrepreneurship in the discovery and 
exploitation of (ever-changing) opportunities´, by creating knowledge and making it 
available and by making information about opportunities available.   
Another approach proposed by Edler et. al in the context of demand-side instruments is to 
develop evaluation metrics and methodologies which are capable to capture the 
integrated effects of a whole set of policy instruments and to adopt an integrated approach 
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to all the stages of set-up, implementation, assessment and fine-tuning of demand-side 
policies. Hence, the policies should be formulated as programmes with bounded goals, 
timescale and budget, and should be accompanied by a logic model that compares the 
goals and the employed activities to achieve these goals against the outputs, and 
outcomes.441    
At the set-up stage, this means that the policy should be formulated only after policy-makers 
have acquired sound knowledge of the current state-of-the-art in the targeted sector, has 
imagined future scenarios regarding technological trajectory and diffusion patterns and has 
identified which incentives move the key actor groups. This could be done through 
systematic consultation with relevant stakeholders, such as potential customers, intermediary 
actors etc. In other words, the policies should only be implemented in markets where the 
measures would achieve the strongest impact (e.g. highly innovative markets, responsive to 
customers’ needs, strong technological base in Europe, depend on public policy intervention 
etc.). Such an analysis would also help to establish the baseline (the choice and delineation 
of the market and the definition of appropriate indicators) against which the impact of the 
policy can be measured. 
Subsequently, the policy-maker should evaluate the appropriateness of the whole policy (the 
conceptualization stage), through surveys and interviews with (potential) buyers, suppliers 
and through analysis of the legal texts and tender documents. At the conceptualization 
stage the problem of non-coordination of inter-related or even conflicting policies should be 
addressed. This entails that the policy-maker should consider the whole conundrum of policy 
measures which may have an impact on its objectives, in order to catch their interactive 
effects and to detect the failures in linking them. Immediate, short-term and long-term goals 
of the policy should at this stage also be formulated.  
The achievement of these goals should be subsequently assessed (the impact assessment 
stage) at different stages during and after the implementation of the policies. The assessment 
should, according to the authors, take three types of impacts into consideration: 1) impact 
on the intermediary actors shaping the market conditions (such as purchasers, standard 
setting bodies, innovation agencies, regulatory bodies etc.); 2) impact on the behaviour of 
the innovators; 3) impact on the market development itself (sales incomes, patents, number 
of producers etc.). Lessons drawn from the assessment exercise should be processed in the 
design and implementation of the policy as going along (the formation stage). 
It is not within the reach of this research project to evaluate whether this type of highly 
nuanced industrial policy in fact possible. However, regardless of the embraced theoretical 
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argumentation, a withdrawal of public support for innovation in Western countries can hardly 
be conceived.442 Examples from the recent history of innovation, which indicate that 
important scientific and technological discoveries and inventions find their origin in publicly 
funded projects, have even lead some economists to argue that it is ‘a mistake to say that 
the private sector is the only, or even the main, engine of technological growth’.443 
2.3.3.2 Economic justification of public intervention in support of innovation 
In the previous section, I outlined the evolution of economic thought on the role innovation 
plays in the economy and on the role R&D plays among the determinants of innovation. In 
this section, I will focus on the different economic justifications for public intervention in 
general and on the accepted economic justifications for public R&D investments in 
particular. I will compare these economic justifications against the market failures PCP 
allegedly seeks to address.  
Neo-classics argue that public intervention should only be justified when the private market is 
not capable to achieve a certain public interest and after the causes of this failure are 
identified. In addition, the government should be convinced that the envisaged form of 
intervention can lead to a better outcome than the one achieved when left to the market. 
This can be demonstrated through a societal cost-benefit analysis, which involves an analysis 
of the causes of the market failure and demonstrates the (social) benefits of the intervention, 
compared to non-intervention or intervention in another form/field.444 A public interest is for 
example present in the case of clean technologies which have the potential to address 
societal challenges such as global warming445 or in the case of drugs for neglected tropical 
diseases.446 
In the case of innovation, neo-classics argue that the free market (or price) mechanism 
achieves better efficiency results than centralized economies,447 but nevertheless, in certain 
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cases outcomes are inconsistent with the expectations of the society.448 This is due to the fact 
that the price mechanism does not capture social value:449 1) when innovations presents the 
characteristics of a public good; 2) when innovations entail positive externalities;450 3) when 
information asymmetries are present; or 4) when monopolies are formed.451  
An innovation has the characteristics of a public good if, once disseminated, users cannot be 
denied further use and cannot be mandated to pay for it. Among the innovation activities, 
basic research is one of the purest forms of public goods. It requires big investments, while it 
does not produce an economic advantage on a short term and can often not be 
appropriated.452 This particularly the case of fundamental research, without a concrete 
commercial application in sight. 
Innovations may present beneficial spillovers (or positive externalities) which cannot be 
translated into benefits for the producers or can only partially be exploited due to the short 
time-span over which the innovation can be appropriated.453 Environmental innovations for 
example, present two types of positive externalities which cannot be translated into private 
return on the R&D investment: knowledge externalities and social/environmental benefits. 
Due to this, an unaided market will not invest sufficiently in the creation of new knowledge. 
Economists take the view that knowledge externalities and spillovers are desirable for the 
emergence of innovation and public intervention in the form of funding can incentivize 
private actors to invest in R&D and produce sufficient amounts of knowledge.454  
In the case of information asymmetries, the private investment market fails to engage 
sufficient funds in highly experimental and uncertain innovations that may potentially yield 
large economic and social benefits, because it lacks information on the innovative 
capabilities of the innovator or the private funder and the innovator are not aware of each 
other’s existence.  
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In the case of monopolist markets, a market failure arises when the monopolist does not have 
sufficient information on whether the consumers are ready to pay the fixed costs of the 
production of a certain product. In this case, public intervention in the form of funding of 
basic research is likely to stimulate the monopolist to invest in innovation. 455 
Some economists also talk of a market failure when competition (or the market selection 
mechanism) is too rapid and may punish the most innovative firms which undertake risky R&D 
projects with long-term perspectives, while being inefficient on a short-term. Capital markets 
intervene in this case, by providing them with the funding necessary to bridge the period until 
the innovative products come on the market. When capital markets do not function well, 
most innovative firms may be excluded from the market.456  
Other justifications for public intervention which are accepted by neo-classical economics 
are: the strategic trade policy (which entails public subsidies to national companies active in 
foreign markets, in order to ensure them a dominant position), and co-ordination (when users 
get locked-in to an old standard/technology and are not willing to pay the costs of 
transaction to the new standard).457  
Neo-classics believe that performing innovative activities and bringing innovative solutions to 
the market remains principally the role of the private market.458 Public policy should only be 
employed to the extent that is needed to correct failures of the private market. 459 Even when 
the intervention is restricted, the neo-classics warn that correcting market or systemic failures 
may come with high costs460 as policy decisions are not always sufficiently informed and 
unbiased to achieve better results than the private market.461 
As a consequence, neo-classics argue that public intervention must be used with care and 
must be quickly transposed into stable rules, as private initiative is stimulated in an 
environment characterized by legal/political certainty.462 
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According to the innovation systems theorists, the justification for public intervention should 
be broader. The following system failures justify government’s intervention: infrastructural 
failures (when the infrastructure for certain desirable economic activities such as universities, 
labs etc. are too costly to be funded by private actors),463 institutional failures (when the legal 
system (IP protection system) or the political and social culture and values do not create a 
climate supportive towards innovative activities),464 interaction failures (when strong network 
ties between the different actors in the national innovation systems lead to ignorance of 
other important external factors, or when there are no ties between complementary 
technologies or actors or there are ties between non-complementary actors),465 transition 
and capability and learning failures (when firms are not capable to adapt to changes in their 
environment, such as new technologies)466.    
Other economists suggest that the state is capable to play a more active role on the 
innovation scene than correcting market failures and creating the right infrastructure and 
linkages between innovation actors.
467
 By investing in early stage, highly uncertain projects, it 
can drive the innovation process rather than just incentivize it.468 
According to Mazzucato, the US government invested in forward-looking innovations through 
its Small Business Innovation Research (‘SBIR’) programme, and managed to play a leading 
role in bringing about innovative breakthroughs. US state investment in different types of risky 
and uncertain research (whether basic or applied research) was there far earlier than private 
investment.469 Mazzucato uses as argument two studies, one conducted by Ruttan and 
another by Block and Keller on the role US state investments has played in the development 
of technology. Based on a study of state investments in six technology areas (the US ‘mass 
production’ system, aviation technologies, space technologies, information technology, 
internet technologies and nuclear power) Ruttan observes that the US government engaged 
funds in the most risky and uncertain early research in areas where it spotted a window of 
technical and commercial opportunity, and continued to oversee the innovation process up 
to commercialization. Government investment constituted the engine for the creation of 
these technologies and in certain cases of technologies that require large investments at 
early stages (such as nuclear power) even the indispensable incentive for their 
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 Block and Keller confirm that between 1971 and 2006, 77 out of 88 of the 




Some complexity theorists argue that public policy is an exogenous factor that stimulates the 
emergence of a variety of innovations to be subsequently exposed to the selection process in 
the marketplace.
473
 They see the policy-maker as an adaptive agent, subject to evolution 
through policy experimentation and policy learning. The more recent approaches in 
complexity theory, advocate to completely drop the debate on state versus private markets 
and concentrate on an effective interplay between the two forces to create an effective 
evolutionary system.474 An evolutionary systems follows the evolutionary algorithm 
(differentiate, select, amplify): it involves actors able to adapt to changing circumstances 
and an evolutionary innovation strategy following many small trajectories and making the 
choice for the most successful trajectory only when uncertainties are much lower. An 
evolutionary system also implies tolerance to ‘redundancy, overlap and excess capacity’.
475
  
In conclusion, economists disagree on the situations when public intervention in the 
innovation processes is justified and on the extent to which it should be employed. Both neo-
classics and systems of innovation theorists admit that private innovation efforts do not always 
lead to the desired result. Neo-classics delineate specific circumstances (market failures) 
under which intervention is justified, while systems of innovation theorists adopt a broader 
view on the conditions and means of intervention. Complexity theorists advise to drop the 
debate altogether and focus on the effective interplay between the state and private actor. 
In practice, innovation policies in the US and the EU are complex and encompass numerous 
supporting actions. The EU policy making, for example, moved from a ‘grants and subsidies’ 
approach to an ‘infrastructure building’ approach. Although the market failure justification 
for policy intervention is still used, the ‘policy maker is no longer seen as a surrogate for a 
perfectly informed social planner correcting imperfect market signals to guide private 
decisions towards more desirable outcomes’.476 Innovation policy action is not always based 
on an economic calculation of size of a market failure and of costs and benefits of a planned 
public measure. Often, decisions are based on political considerations. The EU policy 
approach also differs among different areas, such as is the case of R&D funding. On the one 
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hand, the EU applies strict assessment of the economic conditions to conclude on 
compliancy of national R&D subsidies. On the other hand, the EU does not attach any 
economic conditions to the application of public procurement of R&D services. This is further 
discussed in section 2.3.5. 
2.3.4 Public funding of R&D when the venture capitalist fails  
The PCP Communication and the preceding PCP Expert Group report outlined the following 
assumption: PCP is necessary due to underinvestment of private venture capitalists in risky 
R&D projects.  
In this section, I will outline some of the most important economic studies regarding the role of 
venture capital markets in the innovation process in the US and in the EU. I will highlight the 
conclusions of these studies regarding the role of public R&D investments to compensate for 
less well functioning venture capital markets. This will test the above mentioned assumption 
and will provide guidance to public procurers on the conditions for effective deployment of 
PCP.  
Economists477 point out that the presence of a large number of new firms is an important 
prerequisite for innovation. They perform the role of exploratory devices to test the viability of 
innovations, and put competitive pressure on incumbent firms. They are a source of new 
knowledge even in case of failure. However, the positive effect on economic growth is not 
obtained unless a sufficient number of high-growth start-ups emerge from among the new 
firms. This depends to a large extent upon access of younger innovative firms to finance.478  
In general, venture capital is attributed the merit of mitigating the problem of access to 
finance of such young innovative firms and of spurring their growth.479 Venture capital is 
considered the most efficient financial institution to operate under conditions of uncertainty 
and information asymmetries which characterize innovative projects in young firms.480 
In the US, venture capitalists address the uncertainty and information asymmetry problems 
through intensive scrutiny of business plans, the existence of a syndication partner who shares 
the decision that the investment is attractive, staged funding, intensive monitoring of 
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managers (through representation on the board of directors).481 The existence of an efficient 
financing system with a mature venture capital market is believed to be the reason for the 
sustained economic growth in the US in the 1990s.482 
Based on a study of twenty industries in the US over a period of three decades, Kortum and 
Lerner conclude that venture capital funded firms acquire a larger number of patents 
compared to large firms with R&D divisions, or compared to projects financed through 
private R&D funds.483 However, Kortum and Lerner point out that venture funding does not 
have an uniform impact. During ‘hot’ financial periods, the impact tends to decrease, as 
venture capitalists tend to overestimate the value of projects and over-invest in similar 
projects which leads to excessive duplication, or tend to increase the size of their investment, 
at the cost of reducing their capability to keep control through ‘staged capital 
commitments’.484  
Kline and Rosenberg underline that the incentive of venture capital to finance potentially 
breakthrough innovations is influenced by the level of envisaged costs. The trend of 
increasing development costs of new products in many high tech sectors, particularly when 
those involving radical improvements in product performance, combined with the 
uncertainty and unpredictability of needed efforts, leads to reticence of venture capitalists to 
invest in such projects.485  
Mazzucato notices that the incentives of venture capitalists to invest in high risk long-term 
projects may also be diminished by policies regarding management fees and bonuses for 
high returns, which determine venture capitalists to focus on shorter term investments (of 3 to 
5 years, although they are usually set up for period of 10 years).
486
 
According to Chemmanur et al, this issue is less apparent in Corporate Venture Capital 
(‘CVC’) in the US.487 CVC performs better in nurturing innovation in the funded firms than 
independent venture capitalists due to less concerns with the short-term financial returns of 
the portfolio projects (as a consequence of the payment structure in the form of a fixed 
salary with corporate bonuses) as well as due to the unique knowledge of the industry. These 
features allow the corporate venture capitalist to be more open to experimentation and 
more tolerant to failure. CVCs appear to generate more innovation productivity (in terms of 
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number of patents and citations) from younger, riskier firms, but obtain growth on a long-
term.488  
Tolerance to early failure has also been identified by other studies to be particularly important 
in spurring innovation productivity in firms exposed to high failure risks (such as ventures born 
in recession periods, ventures at early development stages and ventures in highly uncertain 
innovations).489 Economists argue that technological revolutions are preceded by a period of 
increased experimentation in the economy, which comes along with inevitable failure of 
numerous start-ups and destruction of mature firms and which necessitates highly active 
financial markets, which are willing to fund new firms even if the failure risk is high.490 In this 
context, the youngest and most experimental firms are impacted by the financial risks even in 
times of financial equilibrium and are most vulnerable to financial shocks.491  
Thus knowledge of the industry, openness to experimentation and tolerance to failure are key 
attributes that explain the success of venture capital.  
Unlike in the US, European venture capital has not been associated with support of 
innovation, but rather with exploitation of existing technological capabilities of funded 
firms.492 Moreover, economists noticed that in conditions of depressed financial markets, the 
level of venture capital investments at seed and start-up stage tends to fall abruptly in 
Europe.493 The lack of early-stage venture capital for young companies in Europe was 
considered as one of the most important reasons why Europe has fewer young firms as 
leading innovators in high-tech sectors as compared to the US.494  
Another aspect increasing the difficulties of young innovative firms in funding innovative 
undertakings, has been the lack of large public budgets for high-tech R&D such as have 
been available in the US.495 According to Auerswald and Branscomb the amount of US 
government funding just for early stage technology firms, equaled by 2003 the total 
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In the US, the government has acted as an entrepreneurial venture capitalist through the 
Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme and has played a vital role beyond the 
basic research phase of projects.
497
 Mazzucato points out the fact that US SBIR agencies have 
sometimes invested in highly uncertain, high risk undertakings in fields such as genomics or 
ICT, long before venture capital funding was available. One important characteristic which 
has ensured the success of the US SBIR program in stimulating technologies which escaped 
the attention of the traditional venture investor, was the decentralized institutional set-up, with 
program managers looking to fulfill very specific technical needs of the Federal agency.498 
Economists warn that in public venture capital programs such as the SBIR the same pitfalls as 
in the private venture capital arena may occur. The impact of the additional public funding 
proves to be low when short-term reward mechanisms lead public managers to choose firms 
with better prospects of success and already sufficiently funded by venture capitalists.  
In conclusion, several lessons can be drawn for the contracting authority and policy-maker 
from the economic studies analysed in this section.  
Firstly, venture capital funding is often oriented towards close to market innovations and 
overlooks the riskier undertakings even in times of financial bonanza. This entails that public 
R&D funding should target the most cutting-edge and riskier projects, that require large 
investments and/or long-term return on investments.  
Secondly, small innovative firms and particularly start-ups experience more acutely the 
difficulties to access private capital for promising but risky R&D projects.  
Thirdly,  public investment should also focus on firms that have already been funded by VCs 
but that do not succeed in obtaining follow-on capital.  
Fourthly, public R&D funding should concurrently be complemented by measures to increase 
the efficiency of the private market on a long-term, such as facilitating the deployment of 
early-stage technologies and providing tax incentives to stimulate entrepreneurship.499  
                                                          
496 P.E. Auerswald and L.M. Branscomb ‘Valleys of death and Darwinian seas: financing the invention of innovation transition in the United 
States’ 3-4 (2003) 28 Journal of Technology Transfer. 
497 Mazzucato (2013) 41. 
498 Lerner (2002) 17. 
499 Lerner (2002) 17. 
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Fifthly, the investment decisions should be made by program managers in decentralized 
agencies, who possess state-of-the art knowledge on the market structure and status of 
development of innovations.  
Finally, a high degree of experimentation and tolerance to risk must be accepted. 
2.3.5 The role of public needs/demand in innovation – lessons for public policy 
2.3.5.1 Introduction 
Until 2000, the EU innovation policy had a strong focus on supply-side instruments, such as 
R&D subsidies, tax measures etc. The approach has been criticized for its negative effects on 
demand-driven innovation.500  
Since 2000, the EU institutions started to contemplate the adoption of complementary 
demand-side measures. The demand-side innovation policy was defined as ‘all public action 
to induce innovation and/or speed up the diffusion of innovation through: increasing the 
demand for innovation (i.e. the willingness and ability to buy and use an innovation); defining 




Among the various demand-side measures, public procurement is the most direct measure.
502
 
The EU institutions acknowledged since 2000 the need to change the public procurement 
practices and re-direct public purchases towards new technologies.503 Public procurement 
was considered a large source of finance
504
 for innovation in those sectors where the 
government was an important customer.505 Pre-commercial procurement was given an 
important role within the demand-side innovation policy.  
However, the European Commission adopted a fundamentally different approach to the 
implementation of the PCP as compared to R&D subsidies.  
                                                          
500 A. Gavras, L. Hommen, M. Rolfstam, M. Mavis, N. Vasileiadis, L.S. Cardoso, D. Tsigos, D. Serpanos, ‘Procurement as an Innovation 
Instrument’ (2006) 70-2 <http://www.inno-utilities.org/public/Documents/Inno-Utilities-Book.pdf> accessed 28 December 2013; IVA, 
‘Technical development in deregulated markets: What we can learn from the telecom, energy, railway and defence sectors’ (The Royal 
Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences 2003). 
501 Jakob Edler, ‘Review of Policy Measures to Stimulate Private Demand for Innovation. Concepts and Effects’ (2013) 9 
<http://www.innovation-
policy.org.uk/share/12_Review%20of%20Policy%20Measures%20to%20Stimulate%20Private%20Demand%20for%20Innovation.%20Conce
pts%20and%20Effects.pdf> accessed 28 December 2013 
502 Other demand-side measures cover financial (subsidies, tax reductions etc.) and non-financial (information campaigns, labels, trainings 
etc.) support for private demand. See Edler (2013). 
503 COM (2002) 499, 14. 
504 In 2008, EU public procurement amounted to around 2155 billion Euro, equivalent to 17- 18% of EU GDP, out of which approximately 389 
billion Euro was covered by the rules set out in the EU Directives on public procurement. See Mario Monti, ‘A New Strategy for the Single 
market at the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’ (2010) 76, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf> accessed 8 April 2013. 
505 COM (2003) 226 final; Independent Expert Group, ‘Raising EU R&D Intensity – Improving the Effectiveness of Public Support 
Mechanisms for Private Sector Research and Development’ 20, EUR 20717 (2003). 
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In the area of R&D subsidies, the EU adopts a straightforward economic approach. R&D 
subsidies are only considered beneficial when needed to correct a market failure and to the 
extent it is effective and it is necessary to incentivize the private actor to invest itself (more) in 
innovative activities. The European Commission has the competence to check whether 
national R&D funding schemes or individual R&D funding measures are justified. Due to 
restrictive capacity, the Commission has developed certain conditions to assume suitability of 
funding measures. These conditions regard types of activities that potentially target market 
failures, categories of private undertakings particularly affected by market failures, as well as 
amount and percentage of funding for different type of R&D projects.506 The EU performs a 
case-by-case assessment of the compliancy of the measure when the above mentioned 
conditions are not fulfilled. 
The strict supervision by the European Commission of R&D subsidies is justified with the 
argument that EU Member States are often tempted to provide financial support to domestic 
firms with strong lobbying and that this may lead to the exclusion from the market or the 
delayed reward of the most competitive and innovative firms to the detriment of consumers’ 
welfare.507 The EU State aid rules aim to promote a more integrated European market in 
which firms compete effectively and are able to benefit of economies of scale.508 
In contrast to this, the guidance on the implementation of the PCP (the PCP Communication 
and the accompanying PCP Staff Working Document) does not define economic conditions 
for its effective deployment. Neither do they define the necessary safeguards to avoid 
damages to competition. In section 1.7.3, above I argued that the European Commission 
missed the opportunity to provide a clear conceptual outline of the rationale behind the use 
of PCP. PCP was labelled as a demand-side innovation policy instrument. However, it is often 
limited to participation by national companies and does not entail any guarantee or 
commitment for a subsequent purchase of the resulting innovation by the funding agency.  
In this section I will outline the most important economic theories on the role of demand in 
driving innovation and I will address the fourth PCP assumption that public needs can 
influence firms’ strategies for creativity and innovation. I will subsequently derive pre-
conditions for the effective use of public demand as innovation policy instrument.   
                                                          
506 These conditions are described in section 5.3.5. 
507  For example, aid may negatively impact foreign competition and lead to higher prices for the consumer. Friederiszicket al (2005) 638, 
644-5. See also COM(2005) 107 final 3. 




2.3.5.2 Demand-side innovation policy instruments 
According to Mowery and Rosenberg, modern economic theories regarding the role of 
demand
509
 in the innovation process had emerged in the mid 1960’s in the US, when it was 
considered that federal funding of basic research did not lead to solutions for ‘pressing 




However, the idea that funding should be oriented towards addressing societal needs is even 
older.  
The economic historians Godin and Lane trace the first studies on the role of ‘needs’ back to 
1935 and 1939, when J. Huxley, an English evolutionary biologist and J.D. Bernal, an Irish 
mathematician, argued that science should be oriented towards fulfillment of social needs.
511
 
Huxley criticized the bias of public funding towards research in the interest of industry to make 
immediate profit as opposed to long-term beneficial projects to the consumer and the 
individual citizen.
512
 Bernal saw science in a capitalist society working towards destruction, but 
he believed that science should and could be steered towards playing a powerful role in 
curing social injustice and meeting real social desires.
513
  
These studies referred to the concepts of ‘social needs’ or ‘collective needs’.
 514
 Social or 
collective need means a social problem identified by the government or expressed by 
society collectively through the political process. The core idea of these studies was that the 
government should turn the above mentioned needs into public goals, and should fund the 
development of technologies to address these needs.
515
   
However, social needs are not the same as the economic term of ‘demand’. The second 
encompasses trade-offs between quantity, price and performance and entails the willingness 
and ability of customers to buy and use an innovation.  
In 1967, another non-economist referred in a paper commissioned by the Center for Business 
Research at the University of Manchester to the role of needs in the more economic sense. 
The Australian chemist James Albert Allen concluded that ‘the recognition of a need at the 
                                                          
509 Demand can be defined as the ‘willingness to pay a certain price for the satisfaction of a need or want’. See Edler (2013) 8. 
510 Mowery, D. and Rosenberg, N., ‘The Influence of Market Demand upon Innovation: A critical review of some recent empirical studies’ 8 
(1979) Research Policy 105. 
511 Godin and Lane (2013). 
512 Quoted from Nature November 30, 1935, 865. 
513 J.D. Bernal, ‘The Social Function of Science’ (The Macmillan Company 1939) 409-10. 
514 Godin and Lane (2013). 
515 A. Brook, ‘Raising Education Achievement and Breaking the Cycle of Inequality in the United Kingdom’, OECD Economics Department 
Working Papers No.633 (1971) 15. 
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distribution end and the prospect of exploiting it is probably the most powerful driving force 
for the total process [of innovation]’.
516
  
However, the landmark economic contributions on the role of market demand (rather than 
social needs) come from Mowery and Rosenberg (1979), Kline and Rosenberg (1986), von 
Hippel (1986) and Porter (1990). 
In a 1979 study on the role of demand in the innovation process, Mowery and Rosenberg, two 
Stanford economists, distinguished between the role of demand at different moments in the 
innovation process. They admitted that demand had a dominant role at the diffusion phase, 
but criticized the overemphasis of the role of demand in determining the emergence of 
innovative solutions. The decision of firms to innovate is not always caused by the existence of 
customers’ demand or the likelihood of future demand.  
They concluded that market demand, defined as willingness of customers to pay for 
purchasing innovative solutions, is not always and definitely not the only factor motivating 
firms in investing efforts in the desired innovations . They argued that additional and at least 
equally important supply-side conditions were necessary, such as new technological 
opportunities/capabilities which lower production costs and make it possible to bring to the 
market the desired innovation.
517
 Moreover, they expressed doubts on whether firms have the 
capabilities to perceive the demand curve for products
518
 and observed that the most 
radical innovations responded the least to market ‘needs’.
519
  
They concluded that there is an important role for the government to give a decisive impulse 
to the innovation process in areas in which the market does not generate the necessary 
incentives or R&D resources to determine the emergence of innovative solutions for urgent 
social needs. However, public demand will be effective in those areas where the 
technological basis is ripe as a consequence of nourishment though supply-side measures.
520
  
They also signaled the importance of  exchanges of information regarding desired products 
and product characteristics, between users and producers and between non-commercial 
basic research institutions and private firms and laboratories.
521
  
In 1986, Rosenberg teamed up with Stanford mechanical engineering professor Kline and 
conceptualized the chain-linked innovation models. They concluded that innovation is 
                                                          
516 James A. Allen, ‘Studies in Innovation in the Steel and Chemical Industries’ (University of Manchester Press 1967) 23. 
517 Mowery and Rosenberg (1979)142. 
518 Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 145. 
519 Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 143-4. 
520 Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 149 
521 Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 149. 
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triggered by either research or the existence of a potential market.
522
 Even when innovation is 
triggered by basic research, it still needs to be coupled to market needs in order to be 
commercially successful. Kline and Rosenberg support their argument with a quote from the 
journal of Thomas Edison, who, after inventing a vote counting machine only to find out later 
that the Congress was not interested, allegedly said that he would never again spend time 
on an invention with no sound market prospect.
523
 
In the same year, MIT economist von Hippel outlined his ‘lead-users’ theory.524 He argued that 
manufacturers experience significant benefits when they identify  the most experienced and 
leading-edge users (‘lead-users’) and involve them in the product development process. He 
defined ‘lead-users’ as individuals, firms or organisations which present early needs (months or 
years before they become general needs in the market place) and tend to benefit 
significantly from obtaining an early solution to these needs. Based on empirical studies in the 
chemical and computer industries, he concluded that lead-users may contribute to the 
innovation process not only with sharing data regarding their needs (and future general 
needs) but also with ‘rich insight to working and tested prototypes of the desired novel 
product, process, or service’ and even with the development of solutions.
525
 Lead users will 
also tend to be early adopters
526




Harvard economist Porter studied in 1990 the role demanding and sophisticated markets (as 
opposed to individual lead-users) play in creating global competitive advantages for local 
companies. Based on a four-year study of internationally successful industries in ten important 
trading countries (Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the UK and the US), Porter concluded that the quality, and to a lesser extent the size of 
demand in the markets where firms are located have a significant influence on the 
innovation rate of the industry and as a consequence on their competitive advantages on a 
global level.
528
 He explained that local markets which give early and clear signals of 
emerging buyer needs help build a competitive advantage of local firms on foreign markets. 
The most significant effect is observed when the needs are stringent and the lead market 
widely embraces the resulting products. In addition, the needs of the local buyers have to 
‘anticipate or even shape those of other nations’, which happens when a nation is ‘exporting 
                                                          
522 Kline & Rosenberg (1986) 286. 
523 Kline & Rosenberg (1986) 278. 
524 Glen L. Urban and Eric von Hippel, ‘Lead User Analyses for the Development of New Industrial Products’ (1986)  
<http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/papers/Lead%20Users%20Eric%20von%20Hippel%20and%20Glen%20Urban%20-%201988.pdf> 
accessed 8 April 2013. 
525 Edler (2006) 19. 
526 However, lead users are not the same as early adopters. Lead users feel the need before the product is available on the market, before 
early adopters.  
527 Von Hippel (1986) 
528 Michael E. Porter, ‘Competitive Advantage of Nations’ 81 (1990) Harvard Business Review. 
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its values and tastes as well as its products’.
529
 He advocated the legitimate role of the 
government in challenging firms and rewarding the most innovative ones, without falling into 




The theories of von Hippel and Porter inspired Gheorghiou to develop the concept of ‘lead 
markets’.531 These are markets with multiple or large single users who are willing to adopt 
innovations early and pay the premium price for them. In addition, a lead market provides 
‘the more general conditions favourable to innovation such as an efficient and responsive 
regulatory structure, security for intellectual property etc.’.532 Policy action to support the 
emergence of lead markets includes the use of innovation-oriented public procurement. The 
European Commission has embraced this approach and has launched several lead-market 
initiatives, focused on the early uptake of innovations.533 Moreover, the EU concept of lead-
market constitutes a diluted version of the demanding and sophisticated market in Porter’s 
study. Lead-markets entail early adoption of innovations, but do not cover definition of 
advanced requirements to influence the early R&D decisions of the innovating companies.  
PCP has thus not been part of these initiatives. The above described studies argue thus that 
companies are incentivized to engage in innovative activities when sophisticated end-users 
articulate advanced and stringent needs, and adopt the developed innovation at an early 
stage and on a sufficiently large scale. Although they do not refer to the involvement of the 
end-user in funding the R&D trajectory, these studies show that for demand to have an 
impact on the innovative activities of private actors, it needs to entail the involvement of the 
end-users and a clear prospect of early commercialisation at a sufficiently broad scale.  
Other studies that investigate how public demand shapes the innovation process, focus on 
the role of a public agency in financing the R&D stages and on the role of a public agency in 




They warn that the decision of a public agency to support one specific innovation at an early 
R&D phase should be based on a solid knowledge on the technological trajectory and 
market trends, in order ‘to avoid lock-in to a technology that is premature or for which 
                                                          
529 Porter (1990) 82. 
530 Porter (1990) 87. 
531 Luke Georghiou, ‘Effective Innovation Policies for Europe – the Missing Demand-Side’, in Economic Council Secretariat (eds), 
‘Globalisation Challenges for Europe’ (18 ed, Prime Ministers Office Publications Finland 2006) 173-194. 
532 Gheorghiou (2006) 13. 
533 http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-market-initiative/#h2-3  
534 Nesta, ‘Demand and Innovation How  Customer preferences shape the innovation process’ (2010) 14 The Work Foundations Working 
Paper <http://www.nesta.org.uk/library/documents/Working-Paper-Demand-and-Innovation-v7.pdf> accessed 8 April 2013. Edler (2013). 
 
 128 
accompanying business infrastructure is not ready’.535 Otherwise, the public agency should 
fund parallel development trajectories.536  
 




- by paying a premium for the early use of innovations, the public purchaser ensures early 
revenues for the innovating firm, which allows the firm to develop the technology up to the 
point when it is competitive compared to established technologies available on the 
market.537  
- as early-user, the public purchaser can provide important feedback to innovators,
 538
  
- as early-user, the public purchaser can provide credibility to small firms by taking away the 
perception of risk in adopting that new product/service.
539
 
In conclusion, economists agree that public demand can effectively be employed to 
incentivize the emergence of innovations and to redirect private innovation efforts towards 
such desired innovations. Based on the review of relevant economic literature, Dalpé et al
540
 
summarize the following cumulative conditions for an efficient use of public procurement at 
both the R&D stage and at the early-adoption stage: 
- It is employed at the early stages in the life cycle of a product and of an industry; 
- competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process; 
- the government is itself a technologically advanced end-user of the innovation; 
- the government is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the 
developed innovation;  
- the adaptation of the product to larger markets is not cumbersome.     
                                                          
535 Kincsö Izsak & Jakob Edler, ‘Trends and Challenges in Demand-Side Innovation Policies in Europe Thematic Report 2011 under Specific 
Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy Trend Chart with ERAWATCH (2011- 
2012) 18 (2011) <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7011> accessed 2 February 2013.  
536 Luís M B Cabral, Guido Cozzi, Vincenzo Denicolò, Giancarlo Spagnolo and Matteo Zanza, ‘Procuring Innovation’, CEPR Discussion Paper 
Series No.5774 <www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP5774.asp.asp> accessed 8 April 2013. 
537 OECD (2011) 23; F. Malerba, L.Orsenigo, R.Nelson and S.Winter, ‘Public policy and changing boundaries of firms in a history-friendly 
model of the coevolution of the computer and semiconductor industries’ 67 (2008) Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 
538 In the UK, for example, studies show that in many sectors, a large share of spending on innovation is oriented towards marketing and 
preparing the market, rather than on understanding the needs and preferences of customers. See DTI, ‘Innovation in the UK: Indicators and 
insights’ (2006) DTI occasional paper No.6 <http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file31569.pdf> accessed 8 April 2013. 
539 Edler and Georghiou (2007) 955. 
540 Dalpé, Robert, DeBresson, Chris & Xiaoping, Hu, ‘The public sector as first user of innovations’ (1992) 21 Research Policy 252. 
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Using public demand to drive innovation in the context of PCP requires thus that the involved 
public agency is the potential end-user of the developed innovation and has the willingness 
and ability to purchase and use it if developed to expected levels of performance and price. 
As shown in section 1.7.3 above, in such a case, there is a clear conceptual delineation 
between an R&D subsidy and a PCP contract. When PCP is employed to develop an 
innovation for a social need, there may be no prospective private customers/consumers at 
the end of the R&D trajectory, willing and able to buy and use the innovative products. In this 
case, the PCP leads to the granting of a supply-side subsidy.  
2.3.5.3 Empirical studies 
A number of economic studies analyse concrete cases when public procurement was used 
as innovation policy instrument, while others rank public procurement as compared to other 
innovation policy instruments in terms of positive impact on innovation. 
One of the most used examples by economists to demonstrate that public demand can 
compensate for customers’ distrust of the reliability of a new product which is objectively 
superior to the more established competing products, finds itself in the transistors sector.541 The 
initial transistors were initially not competitive in terms of quality and price against vacuum 
tubes. The financial support from the US Department of Defense (‘DoD’) within the US SBIR for 
the continuous improvement of the technology, which by mid 1970s had eliminated vacuum 
tubes from the market. A similar example is that of the jet engines. Although it cannot be 
argued that the technology would not have emerged without the SBIR funding by the DoD, it 
is widely accepted that DoD speeded the time to the market of jet engines. Jet engines 
eventually replaced piston engines in the civil aircraft industry. The same happened in the 
case of Internet, after DoD required the development of a packet/switch network instead of 
the existent circuit/switched network.542  
In Europe, the most well-known example of a successful use of public procurement to steer 
private R&D efforts towards environmentally friendly solutions in the household appliances 
sector comes from Sweden. 543 Between 1988-1998, the Swedish Energy Authorities applied 
catalytic procurement to stimulate technological advancement in the energy sector. More 
concretely, it coordinated end-users, in the residential, the service, and the industrial sector 
and technology experts in identifying potential technological improvements in terms of 
energy efficiency and articulating procurement requirements for such improved products. 
                                                          
541 Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) 148. 
542 Malerba et al (2008). 
543 Lena Neija, Kerstin A˚strand, ‘Outcome indicators for the evaluation of energy policy instruments and technical change’ 34 (2006) Energy 
Policy 2662–2676; Neij, L., ‘Methods to evaluate market transformation programs - experience of the Swedish market transformation 
program’ 29 (2001) Energy Policy 67–79. 
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Through a competitive procedure, the best prototype which met the requirements was then 
selected and awarded.  
The program was accompanied by unique combinations of policy instruments for each 
developed technology, such as subsidies for the installation costs, training of maintenance 
personnel, information campaigns, labeling. The catalytic procurement program was also 
characterized by intensive interaction between the actors involved and by an ongoing 
monitoring and learning process. Thus, failure in the process of technical change was 
identified at an early stage and action was taken to redesign or terminate the policy 
intervention.  
The economic analysis of the Swedish programme concludes on its success in bringing 
improvements in technological performance and in some cases cost reduction. The program 
proved less effective in impacting other outcome indicators such as increasing sales data, 
market share, changes in manufacturers’ assortment, change in knowledge, attitudes and 
behaviour of important actors. Moreover, not all of the 30 procurements of technologies 
included in the program scored positively in terms of outcome. 
Economists who evaluated the Swedish program admit though the limitation of the available 
data necessary for the evaluation, such as lack of information on the levels of the outcome 
indicators before the start of the program. Moreover, by using outcome indicators, the 
evaluation of the program reflects the impact of all the public instruments used without 
distinguishing between them. 
Other studies assess the prospect of having a public customer at the end of the R&D 
trajectory impacts the innovative efforts of the industry. Beise and Rennings544 conclude on 
the basis of case-studies of fuel-efficient passenger cars and wind energy that legislation 
(imposing technological performance requirements) combined with anticipation of 
international demand created the proper conditions for innovation. International demand 
appears to have a positive impact on innovation efforts in the vaccine industry as well. A 
study by Smita Arinivas on the evolution of the vaccine industry in India concludes that 
technical advance is most stimulated by international procurement when the sector is free 
from accusations of protectionism and when delivery terms are long and the number of 
competing suppliers is large. Besides demand, prior learning, enhanced by open 
                                                          
544 Marian Beise & Klaus Rennings, ‘Lead markets and regulation: a framework for analyzing the international diffusion of environmental 
innovations’ 52 (2005) Ecological Economics 5– 17. 
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dissemination of technical standards and regulations and the participation of developers and 
manufacturers in networks, is essential.545 
Other studies, based on surveys of private firms/innovators reach various conclusions 
regarding the positive or significant impact of public procurement on innovation. These 
studies do not distinguish between the type of procurement and do not make clear whether 
the conclusions are related to the active deployment of public procurement in support of 
innovation at the specific time or previous to the survey.  
For example, based on a survey of Finnish innovators from different sectors, Palmberg546 
concludes that public procurement was the least valuable among different sources of 
innovation. Miles et al.547  show that UK firms, out of the seven wider conditions that matter for 
innovation, rate the intensity of competition and demand for new products and services as 
the most important after availability of human resources. The study concludes that firms are 
willing to innovate when innovation delivers them economic and competitive advantages. 
The extent of these advantages  depends on the demand for innovation and the intensity of 
competition they encounter on the market within which they operate. The stronger and the 
more clear the demand for innovation in a market, the more willing the firms will be to 
innovate.548   
Based on qualitative and quantitative analyses of public demand, Rothwell and Zegveld549 
and Geroski
550
 show that on a long-term, public procurement had a more positive impact on 
innovation than R&D subsidies. Other studies bring evidence that the impact of public 
procurement on market success of innovations (indicated by turnover from sales of products 
which are new to the market) is similar in Germany to the impact of university knowledge 
spilling over to firms, and scores better than regulation and subsidies.551 The same study 
indicates that regular procurement rather than defence procurement has a stronger 
influence and that its impact is most clear on small firms in economically challenged regional 
markets, with limited financial resources. 
                                                          
545 Smita Arinivas, ‘Industrial Development and Innovation: Some Lessons from Vaccine Procurement’ 34 (2006) World Development 1742–
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549 Rothwell, R.; Zegveld, W., ‘Government regulations  and innovation – Industrial Innovation and Public Policy’ in Rothwell, R./Zegveld, W. 
(ed), ‘Industrial Innovation and Public Policy’ (Pinter 1981) 116-47. 
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A more recent survey performed on 10% of the public sector suppliers in the UK, shows that 
public procurement is the second most important incentive for innovation, following changes 
in the market demand and preceding internal R&D or private buyers. The survey also 
concludes that 51,4% of the suppliers who had performed R&D in the previous three years, 
had increased their R&D expenses as a result of participation in a public award procedure.552  
The empirical studies support thus the conclusion of the previous subsection that public 
demand can have an positive impact on innovation. 
2.3.6 Services innovation 
The 2007 PCP Communication and the accompanying PCP Staff Working Document are not 
clear on whether PCP is a suitable instrument for the development of innovative services, 
particularly when they are not built around a(n innovative) technology. On the one hand, the 
policy documents talk about the role of PCP to assure the development of technological 
solutions to meet challenging societal needs.553 On the other hand, they indicate that the 
result of a PCP can be either an innovative product or an innovative service.554  
In this section, I will outline the general approach of EU innovation policy to services 
innovation and I will sketch the main economic theories in this area. Based on this, I will test 
the fifth assumption that PCP is a suitable instrument to stimulate technological, as well as 
services innovations.  
2.3.6.1 EU policy in support of services innovation 
Innovation theories have until recently focused on technologies.555 And so has EU’s innovation 
policy. But service sectors have increasingly been recognized as important drivers of 
competitiveness and growth.556 By 2009, services represented 74,1% of the gross value-added, 
generated by the EU 27557 and promised to provide most of the future new jobs and to play 
an important role in improving the living standards in Europe.558  
                                                          
552 Luke Gheorghiou, Jakob Edler, Elvira uyarra, Jilian Yeow, e Gheorghiou, Jakob Edler, Elvira uyarra, Jilian Yef"  " CChoice, design and 
assessment, Technological Forecasting & Social Change (2013) 7 
553 PCP Communication 4, 9, 10; PCP Staff Working Document 2-3, 10-1. 
554 PCP Communication 2-3, 8; PCP Staff Working Document 3-4, 8. 
555 Service firms were, for instance, included for the first time in the third Community Innovation Survey (CIS-3)capturing innovation 
performance in 1998-2000. See Commission, ‘Challenges for EU support to innovation in services – Fostering new markets and jobs 
through innovation’ 12 SEC(2009) 1195. 
556 Henk L.M. Kox and Luis Rubalcaba, ‘Business services and the changing structure of European economic growth’ (2007) MPRA Paper 
No.3750 < http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/3750/1/MPRA_paper_3750.pdf> accessed 8 April 2013;  J.A. Camacho and M. Rodriguez, 
‘Integration and diffusion of KIS for industry performance’ in Rubalcaba, L. and Kox, H. (eds), ‘Business Services in European Economic 
Growth’ (Palgrave/Macmillan 2007) 128-143; M. Tomlinson, ‘The contribution of services to the manufacturing industry’, in B. Andersen, J. 
Howells, R. Hull, I. Miles and J. Roberts (eds.), ‘Knowledge and innovation in the new service economy’ (Edward Elgar 2000) 36-48; P. 
Windrum and M. Tomlinson, ‘Knowledge-intensive services and international competitiveness: a four country comparison’, 11 (1999) 
Technology Analysis and Strategic Management 391-408. 
557 Eurostat yearbook 2011, 36. 
558 SEC(2009) 1195 final 9, 15. 
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Despite the perceived importance of services in the EU economy, economists remarked that 
the present innovation system policies are not well adapted to accommodate the new 
realities.559 The EU had only recently taken into consideration the potential of public policies 
to stimulate innovation in services.560 The EU funding of R&D in services, although at roughly 
equal levels with the manufacturing firms, had occurred incidentally and mainly in ICT – 
related services.561 
The Council of the EU invited in 2006 the European Commission to analyse the status of 
innovation in services and to assess the necessity to adjust policy accordingly, in order to take 
into account non-technological innovation.562 A study commissioned on the basis of this 
mandate confirmed that R&D and innovation in services need to be stimulated through 
public policy.563 As a consequence, the Commission developed in 2007 a policy framework 
aiming at better supporting innovation in services,564 and set-up a Working Group on R&D in 
Services (‘Group’) to refine potential policy measures to be included in the innovation 
strategy for the services sector.565  
The Group concluded that, due to the heterogeneous nature of services, it is difficult to 
design a single uniform policy to stimulate R&D in services and that more knowledge is 
needed to this end.566 According to the Group, R&D in services is often based on 
collaborations between disciplines, across sectors and regions and ‘it is often affected more 
by mainstream policies than by those aimed directly at innovation’.567 
Based on the Group’s recommendations, the Commission concluded in a 2009 Staff Working 
Document that, although less European service firms have reached the top-50 of global 
players compared to their American counterparts and although innovative small-, medium- 
and micro-enterprises (‘SMEs’)568 active in knowledge intensive services experience difficulties 
in accessing private finance, this is not sufficient proof of market or systemic failures to justify 
                                                          
559 Rubalcaba, Jorge Gallego and Pim Den Hertog, ‘The case of market and system failures in services innovation’, 30 (2010) The Service 
Industries Journal 549–566; OECD, ‘Enhancing the Performance of the Service Sector’ (OECD Publishing 2005). 
560 Expert Group on Innovation in Services, ‘Fostering Innovation in Services’ (2007) 
<http://www.gencat.cat/diue/doc/doc_33636404_1.pdf> accessed 28 December 2013; Commission, ‘Towards a European strategy in 
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561 SEC(2009) 1195 , 64. 
562 Council, ‘2769th Competitiveness (Internal Market, Industry and Research) Council Meeting’ (2006) point 8. 
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innova.eu/c/document_library/get_file?folderId=21454&name=DLFE-12859.pdf> accessed 8 April 2013.  
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566 Kuusisto, (2008) 51. 
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public intervention. The Commission proposes to build up a better understanding of how 
innovation takes place in services, before policy tools are developed. 569 
This conclusion is also reflected in the policy approach to R&D subsidies to organizational and 
process innovation in the State aid area. The Framework for R&D&I imposes separate 
conditions to aid to process and organisational innovation in services, distinct from the 
conditions imposed to aid to R&D projects:  
- the organizational innovation is related to the use and exploitation of ICT;  
- both organisational and process innovation are conducted within a proper R&D 
project with an identified and qualified project manager and with identified project 
costs, and entails a clear degree of risk; 
- the result of the innovation projects are new or substantially improved compared to 
the state of the art in its industry; 
- the results are in the form of ‘a standard, a business model, methodology or concept 
which can be systematically reproduced, possibly certified and possibly patented’;570  
- the maximum aid intensity are lower than for traditional R&D technology projects571 
(15% of the cost of the project for large enterprises, 25% for medium enterprises and 
35% for small enterprises). 
According to the Framework, the separate treatment is justified by the fact that innovative 
activities in services do not always conform with the definition of R&D, but is ‘typically less 
systematic and stems frequently from customer interaction, market demand, adoption of 
businesses and organisational models and practices from more innovative sectors or from 
other sources’.572 
In 2011, the European Commission set-up a new advisory group formed of high-profile 
economists to provide advice on policy options regarding R&D and innovation.573 In 
December 2012, the policy recommendations point out to the importance of a supporting 
policy for innovative services, but at the same time to the gap in knowledge regarding the 
creation of innovations in services sectors.574 The experts outline areas of research that need 
                                                          
569 SEC(2009) 1195, 55, 68-70. 
570 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 5.5. 
571 Framework for State aid for R&D&I had also extended the definition of R&D to experimental development, which corresponds to the 
testing phase of the PCP.  
572 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 5.5. 
573 See http://ec.europa.eu/research/innovation-union/index_en.cfm?pg=expert-groups  




to be addressed in order to fill the above mentioned funding gap. They also argue among 
other, that a revision of public financial schemes in order to make them accommodate 
services innovations beyond e-services and the use of demand-side instruments such as 
public procurement are constitute necessary policy measures. It remains to be seen how 
these recommendations will be reflected into future policy actions undertaken by the 
European Commission in the area of service innovations. 
In conclusion, EU’s view on the need to support innovation in services is restrictive. This means 
that PCP is mainly relevant for technologically demanding solutions. But whenever the 
minimum conditions for the application of a PCP are fulfilled (particularly the condition that 
the project activities qualify as R&D services), services innovations could also form the aim of 
the PCP. The concept of R&D in the PCP area is not limited to activities encompassing (ICT) 
technologies as it is the case in the R&D policy area.
575
 However, activities to develop 
innovative service solutions will more quickly qualify as R&D services when based on 
technologies.  
2.3.6.2 Economic theories of innovation in services and related empirical studies   
As already mentioned, the EU policy choice for limited support to innovation in services is 
currently based on the fact that theory regarding innovation in service firms is at an early 
stage.576 In this section, I will shortly outline the economic literature on the innovation patterns 
in services. 
Some economists consider that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ innovation cycle applies to all service 
sectors,577 while others argue that innovation in services does not have a uniform pattern and 
that innovation intensity in specific service activities and in specific types of companies may 
actually be higher than the manufacturing average.578  
For example, based on empirical data from Spain, Un and Montoro-Sanchez579 conclude that 
small- and medium-sized companies (employing fewer than 200 workers) and start-ups have 
a greater tendency to innovate, both in products (whether in goods or services) and in 
processes. Moreover, the companies with a greater tendency to implement process 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
_service_innovation.pdf#view=fit&pagemode=none last accessed 10 October 2013. 
575 The Frascatti Manual remains the leading authority for interpreting the R&D concept. 
576 Services are difficult to define. According to Bryson et al. service functions/activities ‘refer to tasks that are being carried out in 
connection with productive processes and consumption of both goods and services’. J. Bryson, P. Daniels and B. Warf, ‘Service Worlds. 
People, Organisations, Technologies’ (Routledge2004). 
577 Barras concluded that service innovations are characterized by a reverse product cycle (RPC) made of three stages: (1) improved 
efficiency phase, which means an investment in new technology to increase the efficiency of delivery of existing services; (2) improved 
quality phase, in which technology is used to improve the quality of services; and, ending the cycle, the stage (3) new products phase, 
which consists, basically, of the generation of new services. See R. Barras, ‘Towards a theory of innovation in services’ 15 (1986) Research 
Policy 161-73. 
578 X. Vence and A. Trigo, ‘Diversity of innovation patterns in services’ 29 (2009) The Service Industries Journal 1635–57. 
579 C. Annique Un and Angeles Montoro-Sanchez, ‘Public funding for product, process and organizational innovation in service industries’ 30 
(2010) The Service Industries Journal 137. 
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innovations are those in the financial sector.580 In contrast, real estate and transport 
companies prefer not to innovate in services. This conclusion is confirmed by Hollenstein581 
based on the Swiss case. He identifies the causes of the low innovativeness of these services 
sectors in the weak demand prospects, strong price competition, low appropriability and 
innovation opportunities, and relatively poor human capital endowment. 
Business services582 more generally are identified by other economists as services which find 
themselves at the forefront of innovation.583 Innovation in this sector appears to be the result 
of combinations of knowledge from different sources (mainly tacit knowledge).584 Innovation 
in this sector is positively influenced by intense level of interaction and the high level of 
interface with clients. The banking, insurance, and other financial services are also sensitive to 
the innovation coming from suppliers of new technologies and ICT.585  
The PRO-INNO study586 came in 2009 to the conclusion that the innovation patterns of 
knowledge intensive service firms587 in Europe – which present an R&D intensity above the 
average of manufacturing companies - are similar to those of manufacturing firms. However, 
innovation in other services than knowledge intensive ones, is more incremental rather than 
radical. Compared to the manufacturing sector, less service firms develop internal R&D 
activities and most new ideas in service companies come from employees and customers. 
Other economists advocate that innovation in services should be treated as a completely 
different field from innovation in manufacturing, thus requiring new theories and instruments 
of analysis,588 because the traditional indicators of innovation inputs (levels of R&D 
expenditures) and innovation outputs (the number of patents) do not reflect the ‘hidden 
parts’ of innovation in services. Innovation in services is often not related to R&D activities and 
tangible results as defined in the context of technological innovation.589 Innovation in services 
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is instead often determined by users and tacit knowledge rather than by research. Therefore, 
different measurement indicators are necessary.590  
Based on empirical data from the UK, Abreua et al591 remark that organisational innovation is 
a substantial part of the ‘hidden’ dimension of innovation in services, especially in three 
sectors: financial intermediation, computer services and research and development services. 
These sectors introduce more major changes in organisation and business structure than 
either manufacturing or other services. Abreua considers that although there are a number of 
key drivers of innovation in services, there is no one dominant pattern or model of innovation. 
The most efficient form of public intervention in support of innovation is to incentivize trainings 
for high-level skills. This is recommendable for two reasons. Firstly, labour skills are crucial for the 
innovative capacity of service firms. Secondly, service firms tend to underinvest in training 
and staff development due to the intensive movement of labour. 
The ServPPin study592 argues that the current prevailing theory for service innovation should be 
a synthesis between the technological and services theory of innovation, on the background 
of a converging trend in the manufacturing and services sector in terms of specialization and 
modularity. Unlike the innovation patterns defined by Schumpeter in which the entrepreneur 
or the internal R&D labs play a central role, the ServPPIN study remark a trend towards a neo-
Schumpeterian innovative pattern in which the central role is occupied by networks of firms.  
The Study also provides an overview of the reasons for active and direct public support of 
services innovation within the framework of public-private networks. The study argues that 
governments have ‘a leading role in initiating and pulling through innovation processes’ in 
the services sector. This is driven by the privatization of numerous public tasks, the 
internationalization of economics and politics and the serious social challenges (such as 
social inequality and environmental threats) that put pressure on the public actor to 
collaborate with the private sector in finding innovative solutions. Moreover, the public body 
remains ‘the largest service provider in most developed countries’ and most of these services 
have the characteristic of public goods. This entails that the private sector is not able to 
provide improvements unilaterally. 
Some economists593 divide the policy tools that may enhance the appropriate environment 
for innovation in the service sectors between: (i) regulatory-framework-related and (ii) 
complementary policies. The former group comprises more-normative-oriented policy 
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measures, which range from pro-competition policies to SMEs, support measures and 
transparency in markets mechanisms, from reinforcement of the appropriability system 
measures to supporting the creation of a European common market for services. 
Among the complementary policy actions the authors recommend to promote service 
quality and brand recognition for service firms, to encourage results dissemination, to enable 
collaborative schemes (networks) between both research and industry and users and 
producers, to enhance access to venture capital and finance from outside the firm. The 
same authors advocate the important role of standardization in the field of services in order 
to reduce the asymmetry in information, for the benefit of both provider and user and in 
order to provide a guarantee of the quality being supplied. The authors see also a role for 
commercial public procurement of innovative services as a means to reduce uncertainty 
problems caused by asymmetry of information and to increase through competition the 
number of active service providers in a market.  
In conclusion, most economic studies analysed in this subsection consider that innovation 
patterns and R&D intensities differ among the various service sectors. Amongst these, 
knowledge intensive service sectors perform better in terms of R&D intensities than the 
manufacturing sector. However, innovation activities in many service sectors, and particularly 
innovation activities in organizational processes, do not qualify as R&D in the traditional sense. 
This makes established R&D public policies less relevant.  
Economists largely agree that the most important drivers of innovation in services are: quality 
of the human capital (including tacit knowledge), intense levels of interaction with clients 
and use of innovative (ICT) technologies. Moreover, economists agree that mainstream 
policies (such as incentives for training of high-level skills etc.) positively impact innovation in 
services, often more than those policies aimed directly at innovation in services. Among 
policy measures aimed directly at innovation in services, economists mention: increased 
access to external finance and commercial public procurement.  
PCP as policy instrument is not mentioned in any of the reviewed literature. PCP may however 
be employed when the minimum conditions for its applicability are fulfilled. However, the 
condition that only R&D services may be funded through PCP limits the relevance of PCP for 
the services sector. 
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has described in the first part the policy process which led to the adoption of 
PCP and the political expectations which built around this instrument. Summarized, the EU 
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policy-makers expect PCP to incentivize private actors to invest in R&D projects that have the 
potential to provide ground-breaking solutions to important social problems. In addition, PCP 
is expected to enhance the innovation capabilities of EU businesses and to grant them a 
competitive advantage in (new) global markets. 
The second part of this chapter tested 5 of the most important economic assumptions that lie 
at the foundation of PCP, against authoritative economic theories and studies encompassing 
but going beyond those embraced by the EU innovation policy-makers.  
I concluded that there is broad support in economic theory for the first assumption that 
innovation leads to (social) welfare. Economists also broadly support the second assumption, 
that R&D investment is a necessary pre-condition of innovation, although it may not be the 
only or the most important one. Economists differ mostly on the role the government can play 
as investor in R&D. According to neo-classics, public R&D investments should be justified only 
in case of a demonstrated failure of the market to invest itself in R&D. According to systems of 
innovation theorists, public intervention should be approached in a more integrated manner, 
and should particularly be focused on facilitating interactions between the different public 
and private institutions that form the systems of innovation.  
More recent complexity theories underline that due to the large number of factors that co-
impact innovation processes and due to their complex and to a certain extent random 
patterns of interaction, public innovation policy should be designed as an evolutionary 
system, open to experimentation, learning and adaptation. In respect of R&D funding, such 
an evolutionary innovation policy should entail:  
- stimulating the emergence of a variety of innovations to be subsequently exposed to the 
selection process in the marketplace;  
- choosing for the most successful innovative trajectory when uncertainties are much lower;  
- tolerating redundancy, overlap and excess capacity.   
This chapter also tested the assumption that PCP is needed in the EU, due to insufficient 
investments by venture capitalists in risky R&D projects. Based on a comparative analysis of 
theories and studies dealing with the role of venture capital in the US and the EU, I concluded 
that this third assumption is correct. In the US, private venture capital mitigates to a certain 
extent the difficulties of new innovative firms to access finance for risky R&D projects. 
However, venture capital is insufficient in the US for potentially high value projects which 
involve high failure risks, large research and development costs, or long-term return on 
investment. The shortage of venture capital for risky R&D projects becomes more acute in 
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times of economic downturn. US public investments in early stage technology firms 
compensates to a large extent for the funding difficulties of new innovative firms. By 2003, the 
US government dedicated approximately two to eight times more funds to early stage 
technology firms than private venture capitalists.   
In contrast to the US, EU copes with a far less developed private venture capital market and 
with low public investments in high risk R&D projects. 
This chapter also showed that there is wide support among economists for the fourth 
assumption, that demand is a key determinant of innovation. Economists distinguish between 
social or collective needs and demand. Social or collective needs are social problems 
identified by the government or expressed by society collectively through the political 
process, while demand is the willingness and ability to buy and use an innovative solution. 
Based on several landmark economic studies, I concluded that:  
- demand may motivate firms to invest in R&D; 
- firms are not always able to perceive demand; 
- the government has an important role to signal public demand for innovative solutions; 
- involvement of the most experienced and leading-edge users (lead-users) in the product 
development process yields significant benefits to the innovative firm in terms of insight into 
future demand, testing inputs and even innovative ideas. 
- early signaling of advanced and stringent needs together with early and sufficiently wide 
adoption of the resulting innovation strengthens the competitive position of firms on global 
markets.  
This chapter has also tested the fifth assumption that PCP is a suitable instrument to stimulate 
technological, as well as services innovations. I pointed out that due to the increasing 
importance of services for economic growth in Europe and due to the important role of the 
government as service provider, the EU policy-maker has in recent years investigated the 
need to support innovation processes in services. Based on outcomes of commissioned 
studies and expert groups, the European Commission has so far concluded that due to the 
limited understanding of how innovation emerges in services, a specific public policy cannot 
be designed. This does not change the fact that whenever innovative activities related to 
services qualify as R&D, they may form the target of a PCP procedure. This will mainly be the 
case when the innovation is related to the use of technologies. Thus, PCP remains mainly 
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relevant for technologically demanding solutions and only to a limited extent for innovation in 
services.      
On the basis of the analysed economic studies and theories, I can summarize the following 
economic preconditions for the effective implementation of PCP: 
1. the public R&D funding targets the most experimental and riskiest R&D projects;  
2. the public R&D funding targets small companies, that experience difficulties in obtaining 
(sufficient amounts of) private capital for experimental/risky R&D projects;  
3. a high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure are accepted; 
4. competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process; 
5. the public purchaser is the technologically sophisticated end-user of the envisaged 
innovation; 
6. the public purchaser is willing to pay the premium price for the early use of the developed 
innovation and is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the developed 
innovation; 
7. when the public purchaser is not the end-user of the envisaged innovation, it is capable to 
convey the advanced needs of the private end-users to the innovator  and it is capable to 
adopt additional policy measures to stimulate the early up-take of the developed 
innovations by the private end-users (the case of the so-called catalytic PCP); 
8. the adaptation of the product to larger (foreign/global) markets is not cumbersome; 
9. innovative technologies rather than innovative services are targeted; 
10. a continuous scrutiny/measurement of the impact of PCP is performed and lessons learnt 
are codified in guidance. 
This chapter sets the scene for the following outline of the differences between the US SBIR, 
and the PCP procedure and for the discussion on the significance of these differences for the 





CHAPTER 3. PCP- a poor imitation of the US SBIR ? 
3.1 Introduction 
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the European Commission formulated the PCP 
Communication with the aim to emulate the success of the US Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) program, by pulling valuable R&D projects into the commercialization phase 
and enhancing the competitive position of its suppliers on the global market. The US SBIR had 
been attributed the merit of creating a demanding environment for innovations and 
stimulating private investors to increase their share of R&D funding.594 The content of the PCP 
procedure as presented in the PCP Communication shows that the US SBIR constituted the 
source of inspiration.  
In this chapter, I will compare the EU PCP procedure with the US SBIR and I will investigate 
whether they comply with the efficiency indicators summarized in section 2.4 of Chapter 2. To 
this end, I will describe in section 3.2 the format of the US SBIR program and the rationale for its 
adoption. I will also summarize the conclusions of the different evaluations of the SBIR 
program. I will point out throughout the text the relevant differences between the EU PCP 
and the US SBIR. In section 3.3 I will sum-up the differences between the two programs and I 
will also highlight in how far the two programmes incorporate the conditions for efficient 
implementation identified in Chapter 2. 
3.2 The US SBIR programme 
3.2.1 Legislated set-asides 
The US SBIR program was set-up in 1982 through the Small Business Innovation Development 
Act (Act).595 The Act mandated Federal agencies with yearly extramural R&D budgets in 
excess of $100.000.000 to reserve certain percentages of these budgets for contracts and 
grants to small businesses.596 The Act represented a codification of the practice first 
implemented at the National Science Foundation (NSF).597 This type of federal institutions with 
large and stable R&D budgets cannot be found within the EU. Although some organisations 
were set-up in order to facilitate the collaboration of EU Member States in R&D projects (such 
as the European Defence Agency), they have an evident intergovernmental character. 
Decisions to proceed with an R&D project depend on the approval of national defence 
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ministries of the EU Member States.598 The different set-up of the EU as compared to the US is 
described in Chapter 5, section 5.2. A detailed institutional analysis remains however outside 
the scope of this research. 
Since 1982, the SBIR program has been repeatedly reauthorized, and amended.599 The 
mandatory set-aside percentage grew from 0,2 to 1,25 % between 1982 and 1988 and was 
established at 2,5% in 1992.600  
In December 2011, the latest Reauthorization Act extended the SBIR program for a period of 
six (6) years up to September 30, 2017 and brought significant changes which implement 
most of the recommendations made in an extensive evaluation report of the National 
Research Council (NRC).601 Among others, the Reauthorization Act of 2011 provided for a 
gradual increase in the minimum set-asides for the period 2012-2017: 2,6 % in 2012 and an 
increase by 0.1 percentage point each fiscal year until it reaches 3.2% for fiscal year 2017.602 
These changes took effect on the 6th of August 2012.603 On that date, the Small Business 
Administration (SBA), the central organization in charge of managing the SBIR programme, 
published guidelines regarding the implementation of the legislative changes (these are 
described in more detail in section 3.2.2.1).   
Within the framework of the SBIR program over 4000 awards are made each year, for a total 
of around $2 billion annually.604 By 2009, over 112.500 awards had been made since its 
inception, for a total amount of more than $26.9 billion.605 11 federal departments and 
agencies are currently mandated to conduct SBIR programs: Department of Agriculture, 
Department of Commerce, Department of Defense, Department of Education, Department 
of Energy, Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Homeland Security, 
Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration (NASA), and National Science Foundation. The largest SBIR funding 
agencies are the Department of Defense and the National Institutes of Health. The 
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<http://www.oecd.org/innovation/policyplatform/48136807.pdf> accessed 2 February 2013. 
605 See SBA website <http://www.sbir.gov/about/about-sbir> accessed 18 December 2013.  
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Department of Defense, National Institutes of Health, NASA, National Science Foundation and 
the Department of Energy have each SBIR budgets of over $100 million.606 
Other Federal agencies than the ones mentioned above may voluntarily participate in the 
SBIR Program, upon written approval of SBA.607 
Unlike the US SBIR, PCP is a voluntary instrument. As shown in section 1.4 above, the EU does 
not have the competence to regulate such budgetary aspects of Member States. Moreover, 
the Lisbon Treaty does not offer a ground for legislative action in the field of research and 
development,608 nor in the field of strengthening the competitiveness of EU industry. It rather 
allows the EU to adopt policy and coordinating action.609 Mandatory set-asides are left to the 
discretion of each Member State.610 
3.2.2 Goals and rationale 
The idea for the set-up of the US SBIR program emerged at the end of the 1970s, when 
industrial competitiveness in the global market was increasingly acknowledged as the 
prerequisite for increased standards of living and for improved national defense. During the 
same period, concerns were growing that the US was losing its competitive position in 
emerging technologies against its main competitor, Japan.611 
The US concluded that the cause of its poor performance was the inability to commercialize 
innovative technologies in global markets. At the same time, small businesses were identified 
as ‘particularly capable of developing research and development results into new products’. 
Small businesses were also considered to be ‘among the most cost effective performers of 
research and development’.612 Despite their important role in the innovation process, small 
businesses encountered difficulties in accessing finance, and particularly federal R&D 
finance, for risky R&D projects.613 The difficulties to access finance appeared to be especially 
acute for small starting businesses, who lacked a record in innovative activities, who 
                                                          
606 David Connell, ‘Secrets’ of the World’s Largest Seed Capital Fund: How the United States Government Uses its Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) Programme and Procurement Budgets to Support Small Technology Firms’ (2006)  (Connell 2006) 9 
<http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/SBIR%20Full%20Report.pdf> accessed 5 February 2013. 
607 SBA Policy Directives 34. 
608 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) [2008] OJ  115/47, art 4(3), 179(2), 181(2). 
609 Art 173(1) TFEU provides for example, that the EU shall ensure the proper conditions for the competitiveness of the Union’s industry by 
‘fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and technological development’. 
610 Some states (such as the UK) have already adopted such minimum set-asides for their PCP-like programs. For details, see discussion in 
chapter 4. 
611 Mary Ellen Mogee, ‘Technology Policy and Critical Technologies, A summary of Recent Reports’ (National Academy Press, Washington 
1991) (mogee (1991)) 27. 
612 Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982 section2(a). 
613 The SBIR agencies are currently required to find ‘a portofolio balance between exploratory projects of high technological risk and those 
with greater likelihood of success’. See SBA Policy Directives 28. See also Technopolis Group, ‘Eerste evaluatie Small Business Innovation 
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performed small projects of limited interest to private investors, and who lacked information 
or means to come in contact with potentially interested investors.614   
As a consequence, the SBIR program was established with the aim to ‘strengthen the role of 
innovative small business concerns (SBCs) in Federally-funded research or research and 
development (R/R&D)’.615 More broadly, the following objectives were associated with the 
SBIR programme: 1) to stimulate technological innovation; 2) to increase the 
commercialisation of innovations; 3) to use the innovative capabilities of small businesses to 
meet federal research and development needs; and 4) to stimulate minorities and 
disadvantaged persons to participate in the creation of technological innovation.616  
Since 1990, SBIR agencies were required to give priority to specific areas identified  as critical 
to national security and economic prosperity.617 On the basis of this obligation, various lists of 
National Critical Technologies were produced by the National Critical Technologies panel or 
by the Secretary of Defense.618 Such technologies were identified as crucial in enhancing the 
competitive advantage of the US in the global competition, on the basis of such criteria as 
the importance/criticality of a technology for the national economy or the size of the 
commercialization market.619 Many technologies (such as ICT, semiconductors, 
optoelectronics, artificial intelligence, manufacturing technologies, sensor technologies and 
high-density data storage) are repeatedly uptaken in different reports and there is 
considerable overlap between the critical defense technologies and critical commercial 
technologies.620 Nevertheless, whenever contracts are awarded, the concrete and direct 
needs of the SBIR agency take lead in determining the subject-matter and area of an SBIR 
call. 
The justification of the government intervention through SBIR was found in the economic 
theory of innovation ecosystems, which is similar to the ‘systems of innovation’ theory which 
became influential in the EU since the 1970s. The theory of innovation ecosystems is based on 
the idea that ‘complex synergies among a variety of collective efforts [are needed to] 
                                                          
614 NRC (2008) 31-3. 
615 SBA Policy Directives 3. 
616 Small Business Innovation Development Act of 1982, Sec.2 (b). 
617 According to the United States Code, 1991 Edition, Title 42 The Public Health and Welfare (42 U.S.C. 6683) such reports should be issued 
biannually by the National Critical Technologies Panel and should include not more than 30 of the most economically important emerging 
civilian technologies for the next 10 years, including an estimation of the current and future size of the domestic and international markets 
for products derived from such technologies (section 6683(a)-(b)). National critical technologies are those technologies which have the 
potential ‘to further long-term national security or economic prosperity of the United States’ (section 6683(b)). The Secretary of Defense is 
mandated by the same legislation to identify technologies for the defense area. (10 U.S.C. 2522) Section on Armament retooling and 
manufacturing. See also Executive Order 13329 of February 24, 2004. Section 2 mandates the heads of SBIR agencies to give priority to 
manufacture-related R&D and to report to SBA and to the Office of Science and Technology Policy on the undertaken efforts to implement 
this executive order.  
618 The obligation to formulate SBIR solicitations  is reiterated in SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011, section 638 (g)(3). 
619 Mogee (1991) 20-3. 
620 Mogee (1991) 26. 
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bringing innovation to market’.621 These are internal as well as collaborative efforts of 
numerous actors: large and small businesses, universities, and research institutes and 
laboratories, as well as venture capital firms and financial markets and government policy.622 
Moreover, multiple institutional variables influence the efficiency of an innovation process: 
e.g. rules that protect property (including intellectual property) and the regulations and 
incentives that structure capital, labor, and financial and consumer markets. Also the ‘shared 
social norms and value systems — especially those concerning attitudes towards business 
failure, social mobility, and entrepreneurship’ impact the innovation ecosystem.623 
Public policies were considered to improve innovation-led growth by strengthening links 
within the system and SBIR was in this regard seen as an intermediating institution between 
venture capitalists, entrepreneurs and other participants in the innovation eco-system. As 
intermediating institution, the SBIR brings these actors together in achieving desired national 
objectives, which, without the government intervention, would not come about on the 
private market.624 The US SBIR is thus not viewed in terms of demand-side or supply-side 
approach, but as a measure to create the links between the relevant actors in the innovation 
eco-system. In section 3.2.3.7, I will point out that the US SBIR can be qualified as both a 
demand-side and a supply-side innovation policy instrument. 
The goals of the US SBIR are similar to those invoked by the EU in regard of the PCP.625 The 
public R&D support is meant to stimulate enhanced R&D efforts in areas of public importance 
that would otherwise not be addressed by private innovators. In addition, the public R&D 
support is meant to increase the global competitive advantage of national companies and 
trigger benefits for the national economy.  
However, the two counterprograms differ in an important aspect. The US SBIR targets the most 
innovative small-businesses that may encounter difficulties in accessing funds for risky R&D 
projects.626 This was confirmed in Chapter 2 as being a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the 
public intervention. Unlike in the US, in the EU the dominant view is that small and large 
businesses encounter equal funding difficulties in developing technological solutions for 
societal challenges and early customer feedback on new product developments can be 
                                                          
621 NRC (2008); The idea of an innovation ecosystem builds on the concept of a National Innovation System (NIS), was popularized by 
Richard Nelson of Columbia University. According to Nelson, a NIS is ‘a set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative 
performance … of national firms’. See Richard R. Nelson and Nathan Rosenberg, ‘Technical Innovation and National Systems’ in ‘National 
Innovation Systems: A Comparative Analysis’, Richard R. Nelson eds (OUP 1993). 
622 Mogee (1991) 28. 
623 Interesting to note here is that Europeans seem to have, for example, a greater fear of entrepreneurial failure than Americans. See the 
NRC (2008) 29; Commission, “Entrepreneurship—Flash Eurobarometer Survey’ (January 2004) 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/enterprise_policy/survey/eurobarometer83.htm accessed 18 December 2012.  
624 The  Valley of the Death is the period of transition when a developing technology is deemed promising, but too new to validate its 
commercial potential and thereby attract the capital necessary for its continued development.  
625 Discussed in section 1.2 above. 
626 Fred Patterson, ‘The SBIR Game: How to Play it to Win’ (June 2005) <http://www.sbircoach.com/files/The%20SBIR%20Game%20-
%20How%20To%20Play%20It%20To%20Win.pdf> accessed 15 July 2014. 
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beneficial for companies of all sizes.627 Moreover, the exclusion of large companies from 
participation in a PCP procedure would entail according to the European Commission 
discrimination on the basis of nationality against large companies from other Member States 
and would breach the TFEU.628 
3.2.3 Organisational features  
3.2.3.1Decentralised implementation 
According to section 9(j) of the Small Business Act (Act), the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) is endowed with the coordination, monitoring, support and evaluation of the SBIR 
program.  
SBA fulfills its coordinating role by formulating mandatory guidelines for the Federal agencies 
which operate SBIR programmes. As previously mentioned, the latest guidelines (SBA Policy 
Directives) came into effect upon their publication on the 6th of August 2012. These SBA Policy 
Directives enforce the latest amendments to the SBIR Program, introduced by the Re-
authorization Act of 31th of December 2011. SBA’s Policy Directives are meant to bring 
consistency in the implementation of the SBIR program within the different agencies, while 
leaving sufficient flexibility to the agencies to adapt the program to their specific needs. The 
Policy Directives establish for example the 3 phased structure of an SBIR procedure, but leave 
it to the agencies to formulate evaluation criteria. They also mandate the agencies to 
exclude applicants with more than 20 Phase I awards or 15 Phase II awards over the prior 5, 
10 or 15 fiscal years, who do not achieve sufficient commercialization rates. Yet they allow 
the agencies to establish the applicable commercialization benchmarks.629  
The SBIR agencies formulate goals in achieving certain performance areas, which are set by 
the SBA (for example, an agency will decide by how much it aims to reduce timelines for 
awards). Together they will agree on performance metrics to evaluate the achievement of 
the goals.630 The SBIR agencies are also mandated to report yearly, as well as throughout the 
year on different aspects of their SBIR programme.631 SBA will bundle these yearly reports and 
other information provided by the agencies throughout the year and will report back to the 
Congress on the overall performance of the SBIR program.632 Evaluation of certain aspects of 
the SBIR program may be performed by the Interagency SBIR Policy Committee, an institution 
made of representatives from SBIR agencies and SBA. This Committee reviews certain aspects 
                                                          
627 Commission, ‘Policy related Frequently Asked Questions on Pre-Commercial Procurement (PCP) and the link with Public Procurement of 
Innovative Solutions (PPI)’ (FAQ PCP) <http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/docs/faq-v9.pdf> accessed 30 January 2013. 
628 PCP Communication 7. This point is not largely supported by literature or case-law. Max V. Kidalov, ‘Small Business Contracting in the 
United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment’ 40 Pub. Cont. L.J. (2011) 453. 
629 SBA Policy Directives 9-11. 
630 SBA Policy Directives section 10(i) and 11(d)(5). 
631 SBA Policy Directives 33, 38, 46-8, 50. 
632 SBA Policy Directives section 10(g). 
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of the program (such as commercialization assistance best practices, flexibility in Phase I and 
II award sizes, etc.) and makes policy recommendations for the improvement of the 
program’s effectiveness and efficiency.633 Moreover, every four (4) years, studies of the 
functioning of the SBIR should be performed by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 
accordance with the parameters set by the Interagency SBIR Policy Committee.634 
In its coordinating role, SBA acts as an information hub for the SBIR competitions of all 
participating agencies. It publishes before August 1 of each year the schedule of up-coming 
SBIR competitions and manages a searchable database with the upcoming SBIR calls for 
proposals from all the involved agencies (topics and closing dates).635 SBA also coordinates 
the release schedules, in order to spread the SBIR competitions throughout the whole year. 
This allows small businesses sufficient time to submit proposals for more than one topic.636 
However, the granting agencies drive the SBIR process. It is the responsibility of each SBIR 
agency to formulate the SBIR calls in line with its needs and its mission. It is also the 
responsibility of each SBIR agency to carefully consider the priority sectors, when formulating 
the SBIR calls.637 The SBIR agencies  are responsible for receiving and evaluating SBIR 
proposals, for signing funding agreements and for the publication of award announcements, 
and for managing the funding agreements.638  
SBA fulfills its monitoring tasks by reviewing the compliance of policies, rules, regulations, 
interpretations and procedures generated by the agencies with its own Policy Directives,639 
and by supervising the correct use of discretion, granted to the SBIR agencies and individual 
program managers. SBA monitors, for example, the correct calculation of the extramural R&D 
budgets,640 the implementation of the recommendations of the Interagency Policy 
Committee to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the program,641 the existence of 
conflicts of interest when making multiple awards to the same company or awarding an 
agreement for which only one proposal had been received,642, the consideration of the 
critical technologies when defining the SBIR topics,643 compliance with the maximum 
                                                          
633 SBA Policy Directives 37. 
634 SBA Policy Directives 37-8. 
635 Ecorys, ‘Study on pre-commercial procurement in the field of security’ (November 2011) 47 
<http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/security/files/doc/pcp_sec_finalreport_en.pdf> accessed 29 January 2013. Small Business Act of 
1958, section 9(b) and (j) SBA Policy Directives 41. 
636 SBA Policy Directives 15. 
637 Such as the National Critical Technologies as discussed in the previous section.  
638 Small Business Act of 1958, section 9(g). SBA Policy Directives 28-9, 50. 
639 SBA Policy Directives 52. 
640 SBA Policy Directives 4, 49. 
641 SBA Policy Directives 50. 
642 Small Business Act of 1958, section 9(l). 
643 According to section 9(g)(3) of the Small Business Act of 1958, each Federal agency is required when formulating SBIR solicitations to 
give special consideration to research topics which further one or more critical technologies, as defined by the National Critical 
Technologies Panel or the Secretary of Defense. 
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thresholds for awards to venture capital (VC), hedge funds or private equity owned small 
business644 etc.  
Besides assessments and recommendations, SBA has various corrective mechanisms, such as 
appealing the decision of a project officer with the head of the SBIR agency, or receiving 
back the funds unrightfully awarded to companies that do not meet the SBIR eligibility criteria 
from agency’s non-SBIR funds.645 Against the companies that make false declarations during 
the SBIR competitive procedure, SBA (or the SBIR agency) may pursue criminal, civil or 
administrative remedies.646 The False Claims Act is attributed an important role in this context. 
According to the False Claims Act, a penalty of up to three times the value of the SBIR 
funding may be applied for false certification.647 
On the support side, SBA establishes and maintains several databases related to the SBIR 
program, such as a database with information on ownership and affiliation of SBIR applicants 
(information submitted and updated by businesses which intend to apply for SBIR awards), 
including VC, hedge funds or private equity owned small businesses; a database with 
information on the number of Phase I and II awardees and a database with calculation of 
Phase I-II transition rates for Phase I awardees and commercialization rates for all Phase II 
awardees).648 
SBA is also responsible for tackling the problem of lower participation of small businesses from 
certain states within the SBIR program. The Small Business Act creates the possibility for the 
respective states to provide matching funds from non-federal sources to small businesses 
located within their territory in order to stimulate their participation in the program. To the 
same end, the Small Business Act mandates the SBA to provide additional assistance in 
programs and activities employed within these states.649  
The US SBIR program is thus a program set up by Federal legislation, with organizational 
responsibilities shared between SBA and the participating Federal agencies. Moreover, in the 
US a continuous assessment of the impact of the SBIR programme is performed by different 
institutions and recommendations are implemented in practice. This was identified in Chapter 
2 as an important prerequisite for the effective deployment of public R&D funding.  
                                                          
644 SBA Policy Directives 18. 
645 SBA Policy Directives 18. 
646 SBA Policy Directives 60.  
647 David P. Metzeger, ‘SBA’s Final SBIR/STTR Eligibility Rule: A Safer Harbor for SBIR Financing’, available at 
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/SBAs%20Final%20SBIR-STTR%20Eligibility%20Rule_%20CIT.pdf, last accessed 12 July 
2014. 
648 SBA Policy Directives 4, 12, 39-45. 
649 Small Business Act of 1958, section 9(s). 
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Unlike in the US, PCP has not been set-up as a mandatory program to be executed by certain 
EU-wide agencies. PCP has a recommendation status and relies on the will of national 
contracting authorities to find common needs and engage in the perils of cross-border 
collaborations. Moreover, in the EU there is no agency endowed with the task to coordinate, 
monitor or assess the application of PCP. The European Commission has partially assumed 
such a role. Besides having initiated the drafting of the PCP Communication, the European 
Commission has commissioned regular evaluations of the status of application of PCP in the 
EU and has financed dissemination of knowledge and best practice on PCP through the set-
up of networks of contracting authorities from different Member States. Recently, the 
European Commission adopted a more hands-on approach, meant to encourage the 
creation of best practices in the application of PCP. It funds all the organisational costs of a 
collaborative cross-border PCP procedure and part of the subsequent R&D costs. It also 
monitors the execution of these funded projects.650 However, the subsidiarity principle and 
the strong national interests in the EU have impeded so far the adoption of a mandatory and  
PCP programme coordinated at EU level (these aspects are discussed also in Chapter 5, 
section 5.2).  
3.2.3.2 Eligibility criteria 
The US SBIR sets eligibility requirements regarding the ownership of the company, type and 
location of the work performed and past performance of SBIR applicants. 
Firstly, only ‘for-profit’ US companies may participate, which are at least 51% owned by US 
citizens (or legally admitted permanent resident aliens), or at least 51% owned by another 
“for profit” business, that is itself at least 51% owned and controlled by one or more US citizens. 
Moreover, the company or its parent company may not have more than 500 employees.651 
These eligibility criteria need to be complied with at the time of the award, not the proposal, 
which allows individuals to set-up a company in-between.652 The latest Reauthorization Act of 
2011 has introduced a major change, by allowing the award of maximum 25 % of the SBIR 
funds of the NIH and National Science Institute, and 15 % of the SBIR budget of the other 
agencies to firms that are owned in majority by (multiple) venture capitals (VC), hedge funds 
or private equity companies. In order to make use of this possibility, each agency needs to 
obtain prior authorization from the SBA. To this end, each SBIR agency needs to show that 
awards to such companies would not undermine the objectives of SBIR, and would 
complement rather than substitute the financial means of the VC, hedge fund or equity 
capital owned company.653  
                                                          
650 For an overview of the current PCP projects funded by the EU, see <http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/projects_en.html>. 
651 13 CFR Ch. I (1-1-01 Edition), section 121.702.  
652 SBA Policy Directives 17; 13 CFR Ch. I (1-1-01), section 121.704. 
653 Section 5107(a)(dd) of SBA’s Policy Directives provides that the head of the Federal agency will explain in written why the award to firms 
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Secondly, all the R&D activities funded by SBIR program must take place in the United States, 
while up to 1/3 of Phase I and 1/2 of Phase II may be performed outside the company 
concerned. The project leader of an SBIR project must be for at least 51% of his/her time 
employed by the company.654 This allows researchers from universities or from research 
institutions to progress towards a commercial business.655  
Thirdly, only novel work may be funded within the SBIR program. The same application (or 
‘essentially equivalent work’) may not be funded twice within different SBIR competitions656 
and only work meant to create and/or apply new knowledge may be funded, such as: ‘(A) a 
systematic, intensive study directed toward greater knowledge or understanding of the 
subject studied; (B) a systematic study directed specifically toward applying new knowledge 
to meet a recognized need; or (C) a systematic application of knowledge toward the 
production of useful materials, devices, and systems or methods, including design, 
development, and improvement of prototypes and new processes to meet specific 
requirements’. 657 
Fourthly, the SBIR applicants who have received more than a certain number of Phase I or 
Phase II awards during the previous 5, 10 and 15 years, from any of the SBIR agencies, must 
meet certain benchmarks for progress towards commercialization, as well as actual 
commercialization rates of products resulting from previous SBIR funded projects.658 Moreover, 
SBIR applicants who have received in previous 5, 10 or 15 years a certain number of Phase I 
awards, must meets certain benchmarks regarding the rate of winning Phase II 
agreements.659 An applicant who does not meet the commercialization threshold when 
submitting the application could be excluded from SBIR competitions for one year starting 
from the date the application was submitted.660 These newly introduced eligibility criteria seek 
to reward applicants which have a good record in proceeding to Phase II and to 
commercialization.661 For example, an SBIR agency may decide that an SBIR applicant who 
received in the last 10 years more than 4 Phase II awards should prove commercialization of 
at least one of the products developed under one of these SBIR Phase II contracts. In case 
the SBIR participant is not capable to bring this proof, he may be excluded for one year from 
participation in SBIR competitions advertised by the agency.   
                                                                                                                                                                                     
funded in majority by venture capital/hedge fund/private equity firms, will: “(A) induce additional venture capital, hedge fund, or private 
equity firm funding of small business innovations; (B) substantially contribute to the mission of the Federal agency; (C) demonstrate a need 
for public research; and (D) otherwise fulfill the capital needs of small business concerns for additional financing for SBIR projects.” See also 
section 5107(c), SBA Policy Directives. 
654 SBA Policy Directives 18-9. 
655 SBA Policy Directives 18-9. Connell (2006) 8. 
656 SBA Policy Directives 22. 
657 Small Business Act of 1958, section 9(5).  
658 SBA Policy Directives 10. 
659 SBA Policy Directives 11. 
660 SBA Policy Directives 10. 
661 SBA Policy Directives 9. 
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As already mentioned in section 1.3, the European Commission chose to adopt a more open 
approach to the eligibility criteria for PCP. The Commission recommends in its 2007 
Communication that participation in PCP should not be restricted to participation by EU-
based or EU-owned companies, but should be left open to participation of businesses from all 
parties to the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), provided they locate their 
research activities within the EU. The approach of the EU PCP is based on the premise that 
stimulating technological solutions for societal challenges in international competition (but on 
the EU territory) will bring the desired growth and welfare and will indirectly contribute to 
enhancing the innovative capabilities of European businesses.662 However, EU procurers may 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether competition within a PCP should be limited to EU 
service providers.663  
The EU PCP does not define any further requirements regarding ownership of the companies 
allowed to participate in a PCP. Within the US SBIR, companies owned by private equity 
funds, venture capitals or hedge funds may be entitled to compete for the R&D funds. This is 
in line with the conclusion in Chapter 2 that venture capital does not fund the riskiest but most 
promising R&D projects.  
3.2.3.3 Phases 
The SBIR program is a phased program, which awards funds in competition and based on 
merit.664 No limitation is imposed on the number of SBIR agreements individual firms may 
acquire, unless it does not justify the efficient use of the funds through minimum 
commercialization rates.665  
The first two of the following three phases outlined below are funded under SBIR:666 
 Phase I, the feasibility study, can be funded with maximum USD 150 000. Small firms 
can test during six (6) months the scientific and technical value and the feasibility of 
their R&D effort. 
 Phase II, the R/R&D effort, takes place during two years and involves a funding of 
maximum USD 1.000.000 for a full R&D effort. However, it is not necessary to exhaust 
the whole R&D effort needed for commercialization. This means that the  
 Phase III, when the firm pursues the commercialisation objectives resulting from Phases 
I and II.  
                                                          
662 PCP Communication 6.. 
663 When procurers are concerned with aspects related to national security, they may limit competition to European businesses. See PCP 
Communication 6. 
664 NRC (2008) 65; SBA Policy Directives 9. 
665 NRC (2008) 65. 
666 Small Business Reauthorization Act of 2011, section 5103(a)-(c); SBA Policy Directives 24. 
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Phase III does not receive funds from the SBIR program. This phase may though be funded 
from other budgetary sources. Studies indicate that about 10% of projects are supported by 
other federal research funding.667 SBIR Phase III awards may be made without competition 
and there is no limit on the number, duration or amount of Phase III awards and the limitation 
on the size of the business ceases to apply.668 
Before the latest Reauthorization Act of 2011, all Phase II recipients must have received first a 
Phase I award. This requirement was meant to ensure that more advanced research is not 
favoured to the detriment of Phase I projects.669 The Reauthorization Act of 2011 introduced 
the possibility to deviate from this requirement under certain circumstances: when awarding 
a SBIR Phase II to an STTR Phase I awardee,670 provided the awardee meets the other eligibility 
criteria; upon written motivation by the heads of the National Institutes of Health (NIH), DoD 
and the Department of Education.671 Moreover, multiple Phase II funding may be provided to 
continue the initial R&D effort.672 This approach highlights the high level of flexibility in 
experimenting with uncertain research projects and the high level of tolerance to early failure 
embedded in the programme. These features were identified in Chapter 2 as prerequisites for 
successful implementation of a public innovation policy. 
Companies that completed a Phase II successfully, can obtain a Phase III status. This entails 
that they benefit of a preference in case of future purchases of products such as those 
developed within SBIR projects. A government agency will be able to sole source (purchase 
without competition) the product from this company. This preference extends to the case 
when a sub-contractor is involved in the supply or when the business is taken over by a larger 
company.673 
However, in practice, it appears difficult to get purchasers to buy SBIR products. They often 
consider the obligation to buy SBIR products as a burden on their budgets and tend to avoid 
the risks associated with new products. Besides being encouraged by top management to 
purchase SBIR products, the procurement officers are regularly informed about the available 
products.674 The latest Reauthorization Act of 2011 underlines the need to prioritize the 
purchase of products developed through SBIR. Section 9(r) has been amended to include 
the following: “(4) Phase III Awards – To the greatest extent practicable, Federal agencies 
                                                          
667 NRC (2008). 
668 SBA Policy Directives 14. 
669 NRC (2008) 82. 
670 The Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programme is another federal programme that funds R&D performed by small businesses 
and nonprofit institutions in collaboration with a public research institute. 
671 SBA Policy Directives 12. 
672 SBA Policy Directives 13. 
673 NRC (2008) 12. 
674 Technopolis (2010) 85. 
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and Federal prime contractors shall issue Phase III awards relating to technology, including 
sole source awards, to the SBIR and STTR award recipients that developed the technology.”675 
Moreover, SBA has been mandated by the same Reauthorization Act to monitor and report 
to Congress all the instances in which an agency pursues the same R&D or production of a 
technology with another business than the SBIR awardee.676 In order to implement this 
obligation, SBA requires SBIR agencies to notify and motivate their decisions to engage with 
other businesses than SBIR awardees for the same type of R&D or production. SBA may 
appeal these decisions, but is not endowed to coerce a different course of action.677 
The structure of the US SBIR and PCP is similar. As mentioned in section 1.3, PCP proposes to 
divide the contract into three phases: feasibility, development and testing, while the US SBIR 
limits to feasibility and the full R&D effort (which may involve a testing phase as well). There is 
however, a major difference between the US SBIR and the PCP in terms of post-PCP 
possibilities: PCP does not provide for a ‘Phase III’ status and an EU contracting authority is not 
allowed to purchase directly a product resulting from the PCP procedure.678 Moreover, the 
PCP guidance does not mention the need for the contracting authority to commit or 
guarantee to subsequently purchase the targeted innovative solution. The early uptake of 
the developed innovation has been identified in Chapter 2 as an important prerequisite for 
the successful implementation of a demand-side R&D policy. In this sense, the EU PCP lacks 
an important efficiency prerequisite.  
3.2.3.4 Percentage of funded R&D costs  
In the US, there is no requirement of cost-sharing between the Federal agency and the small 
business, although such a course may be stimulated by certain agencies (however, not 
allowed as an evaluation factor of the proposal).679 Most SBIR agreements (whether contracts 
or grants) fund the full costs of the R&D project, according to cost principles and procedures 
approved by each agency, plus a ‘reasonable fee or profit’.680 Moreover, agencies have the 
freedom to make SBIR awards as fixed price contracts or cost type contracts.681  
PCP on the other side, requires contracting authorities to pay a market price for the 
contracted R&D services, which should reflect the sharing of benefits and risks with the 
supplier. This entails that the contracting authority should not pay 100% of the R&D costs. This 
distinction was considered necessary to ensure compliance with the EU State aid rules, which 
do not allow EU contracting authorities to fund the total costs of an R&D project. As I will 
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explain more in detail in Chapter 5, only the costs of basic research may be fully funded with 
public money, while applied and experimental research (which form the target of PCP) may 
only partially be funded.  
3.2.3.5 Confidentiality and IPR 
The SBIR Re-Authorization Act of 2011 and SBA’s Policy Directives provide for confidential 
treatment of any proprietary information submitted in an SBIR proposal or generated during 
the performance of an SBIR agreement. The Small Business Act provides for ‘retention by a 
[small business] of the rights to data generated by the concern in the performance of an SBIR 
award’ (copyrighted material) and the SBIR agency is mandated to protect such data from 
disclosure and non-governmental use for a period of at least 4 years from delivery of last 
deliverable in any (subsequent) SBIR funding agreement, unless express permission for 
disclosure is granted by the owner.682 Data in the sense of these clauses covers ‘recorded 
information’, meaning something that can be read (e.g. SBIR Phases I and II final reports, 
computer code, computer programs, computer documentation, drawings, equations etc.)683 
The Government obtains a royalty-free license ’to use and to authorize others to use on its 
behalf, these data for Government purposes (…)’.684  
The US government also retains a royalty-free license for Federal use of patented inventions, 
while the small business may retain the principal worldwide patent rights. The US government 
may also require under certain circumstances the patent holder to license others and may 
require that inventions be manufactured in the US. The invention will not be disclosed for a 
period of 4 years, in order to allow sufficient time for obtaining patent protection.685   
These provisions are mandatory for all SBIR agencies and may not be subject to negotiations 
with applicants in SBIR competitions.686 According to the Bayh-Dole Act, which governs the 
division of rights to inventions made by small businesses under government funded grants, 
contracts or cooperative agreements, and is the framework legislation applicable to SBIR 
contracts, the public agency may deviate from this standard arrangement for reasons of 
national security. The decision to deviate from this standard needs to be motivated and can 
be appealed by the contractor.687 
The intellectual property conditions of the SBIR and PCP are similar. However, unlike in the EU, 
the division of intellectual property rights (‘IPR’) between the contracting authority and the 
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supplier is in the US mandated by legislation and is also legislated in detail.688 The ownership of 
the innovation developed during the project goes by default to the company, while no 
royalty or repayment in case of successful commercialisation is due to the government.689 The 
Bayh-Dole Act, also provides detailed control and enforcement mechanisms for SBIR 
contracts, such as time-limits for disclosure of the invention, consequences related to non-
disclosure, reporting on the application of the invention after the SBIR contract etc.690 
3.2.3.6 Flexibility 
As already mentioned, the SBA’s Policy Directives provide mandatory guidelines to federal 
agencies on the operation of their SBIR programs and SBA supervises the proper 
implementation of these guidelines and the exercise of the discretion allowed by the Policy 
Directives. Within this context, the SBIR agencies retain substantial flexibility in conducting their 
own SBIR programs.691  
For example, SBA’s Policy Directives indicate which evaluation criteria an SBIR agency must 
minimally use:692 (i) technical approach and expected benefits; (ii) adequacy of the 
proposed effort to achieve the desired solution and the intensity of the relationship to the 
fulfillment of the solution; (iii) soundness and technical merit of the proposal; (iv) qualifications 
of the main researchers and other participants; (v) commercialisation potential  (based on 
the following sub-criteria: commercialization record in previous SBIR projects or other 
research, existence of third parties funding commitments, existence of Phase III commitments, 
other indicators of the commercial potential). An SBIR agency is however allowed to further 
specify these criteria or add others.  
Moreover, the Policy Directives allow deviation from certain rules, upon written motivation 
and approval from SBA or the head of the SBIR agency. Rules from which deviation is possible 
regard, for example: the obligation to perform the 1/3 of Phase I activities and ½ of the Phase 
II activities within the organization of the awardee; obligation for the principal investigator 
(researcher) to be employed for more than half of his working time by the awardee; the 
obligation to perform the R&D work within the US territory for both Phase I and II;693 the 
obligation to extend the contract period,694 or the value of the awards.695 The new 
Reauthorization Act increases flexibility in funding Phase II agreements from another agency 
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than the Phase I awardee or following an STTR Phase I award.696 Moreover, a pilot between 
2012-2017 allows the National Institutes of Health, the Department of Defense and the 
Department of Education to provide Phase II awards to a small business which has not 
previously received a Phase I award regarding the same project.697 
The allowed flexibility leads to differences between the precise approach to SBIR among the 
different federal agencies and among the different departments of the same agency (such 
as among the different departments of DoD), in terms of procedure, amount of funding, 
degree of innovativeness required, number of calls, broadness or specificity of the topics etc.  
Hereunder, I provide a summary of the SBIR procedures within the DoD and National Institutes 
of Health (NIH), the two most important agencies in terms of SBIR program size and with the 
most diverging approaches.  
DoD awards annually around 2000 Phase I and 1000 Phase II contracts,698 defines its topics in 
detail, steers the research during the execution of the R&D contract and uses procurement 
and other mechanisms to stimulate the subsequent commercialization of the resulting 
products.699 DoD’s SBIR department is organized in a flexible manner, with few overheads and 
high quality programme managers appointed for short periods of four to six years.700 A DoD 
programme manager is mandated to prepare in advance a Technology Development 
Strategy that assesses the needs which can be met through new SBIR procedures, and 
outlines support measures for the commercialization of technologies developed during 
previous SBIR contracts.701 For each topic a Technical Point of Contact (TPOC) is appointed, 
which can be contacted for questions and clarifications on the technical aspects of the call 
for proposals up to the deadline for submission of the proposals.702  
DoD focuses thus within the framework of the SBIR, on developing technologies meant to fulfill 
its operational needs and hires high-quality managers to identify these needs and the most 
suitable support measures for the commercialisation of the developed technologies. DoD 
managers closely interact with the SBIR participant and steer the R&D contract during the 
execution of the project. Moreover, SBIR liason officers ensure communication between the 
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SBIR contractor and the end-customers within the agency.703 These are important features for 
effective R&D demand-side public policies, as identified in Chapter 2.  
Within the DoD, the Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is endowed with 
the mission to promote the most radical, high risk projects with long-term return 
expectations.704 In line with its focus on highly innovative solutions, DARPA has more flexibility 
than other Department of Defense agencies in conducting the SBIR programme.705 This 
flexibility allows DARPA to experiment with new strategies, such as increasing the exchange of 
knowledge across competing research groups, bringing in contact university researchers and 
entrepreneurs interested to start a new company, small businesses and venture capitalists, 
SBIR awardees and large companies able to commercialize the developed technology 
etc.706 DARPA’s approach to fund the most radical, high risk projects, to allow 
experimentation and to tolerate early R&D failure are characteristics that pay-off on the long-
term. Some of the most successful technologies in the market place have been funded by 
DARPA at very early stages in the R&D trajectory.707 These features are confirmed by the 
economic studies analysed in Chapter 2, as being crucial for an effective employment of 
public R&D funding from the demand-side. 
Within the DoD, there are three main criteria for evaluating proposals: 
• Soundness, technical merit and the level of innovation of the proposed approach, and its 
incremental progress towards the topic or subtopic solution; 
• Qualifications of the firm and team to perform the R&D and commercialize results; 
• Potential for commercialisation. This includes evaluation on the basis of past performance 
of the company with the commercialisation of the results of previous SBIR projects (as 
indicated by the Commercialisation Achievement Index (CAI), a centralized database at 
federal level).708 
Following the evaluation, price negotiations are performed with the best ranked applicants. 
The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides in article 15.404-1(b)(2) a list of techniques to 
perform price analysis. 
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Although for most of the SBIR projects 100% funding is provided, DoD operates a so-called 
“Fast Track” policy for some SBIR and STTR projects. This entails that better chances of 
proceeding to Phase II are given if some matching cash is found by the participating 
company from outside investors, customers or sponsors. The proportion of projects receiving 
this treatment is though small (for example, only about 2% of Army Phase II awards).709 DoD 
provides multiple Phase II awards to promising SBIR projects which necessitate additional 
development, test and evaluation (Phase II Enhancement program).710  
Since 2006, support is also provided for commercialisation at Phase III. DoD signs, for example, 
Technology Transition Agreements with SBIR awardees during Phase II, with the objective of 
increasing the commercialization chances of an SBIR technology and minimizing the risks of 
uptake of such technologies into the DoD organisation. The Technology Transition 
Agreements identify the stakeholders (acquisition officers within DoD (including the end-
customer), SBIR manager and SBIR awardee) and attribute responsibilities and commitments 
in the process of developing, delivering and integrating an SBIR technology into 
commercially ready products. The agreements identify for example, funding sources beyond 
Phase II, as well as strategies regarding integration and testing.711  
DoD departments are moreover allowed to set up a Commercialisation Pilot Program (CPP) 
and provide subsidies for the commercialization phase and encourage subsequent 
commercial procurements of the developed products. The Reauthorization Act of 2011 has 
renamed it the Commercialisation Readiness Program. Within this program, the Secretary of 
each DoD department is authorized to identify research programs funded under SBIR which 
meet high-priority needs and are close to commercialisaiton and use incentives to 
encourage the SBIR program managers to fund follow-on awards.712 The Navy, for example, 
sets aside around 20% of its SBIR funds for the CPP and by 2009, had supported 129 projects.713  
Within the context of the CPP, the Navy has for example, set up a Transition Assistance 
Programme (TAP), which consists concretely in a series of workshops, trainings and briefing 
meetings which are organized over a 10 month period, to help companies develop their 
commercialisation plans and present their technology to both DoD and private undertakings. 
At the end of the TAP, the annual Navy Opportunities Forum gives companies that have 
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successfully completed the TAP programme the opportunity to present their products to a 
broad audience of around 400-500 representatives of DoD and of the private sector.714  
In addition, DoD must give preference, including sole-source awards to the SBIR awardees 
and whenever R&D contracts or production contracts are pursued with another company 
than the business which developed the SBIR-technology, report and justification is due to the 
SBA.715 
Unlike DoD, NIH focuses on innovative drugs and medical devices for the private end-user 
and awards in 95% of the cases grants instead of contracts. As opposed to the DoD 
approach, it defines less specified SBIR topics and allows unsolicited proposals as well.716  
During the performance of the project, no substantial involvement with the recipient of the 
grant occurs.717 Overall size of grants is the same as within DoD ($100k Phase I and $750k 
Phase II), but in practice individual grants vary widely in amount.  
The key evaluation criteria are718: 
(i) Significance (does the project address an important problem/critical barrier in the field 
and does the envisaged solution have a high probability of commercialization?); 
(ii) The proposed approach (are the proposed strategy, methodology and analyses suitable 
to lead to the achievement of the envisaged solution?); 
(iii)Level of innovation (are novel theoretical concepts, approaches or methodologies, 
instrumentation, or interventions proposed?); 
(iv)Experience and expertise of the “principal investigator” (main researcher) and research 
team; 
(v) Adequacy of the facilities and resources of the project. 
In addition, evaluation of Phase II proposals take into consideration the progress towards 
meeting the objectives set in the Phase I proposal. Moreover, NIH operates a so-called “Fast 
Track” policy for SBIR projects, which entails that both Phase I and Phase II applications are 
reviewed at the same time in order to eliminate the funding gap between the two SBIR 
phases. In this case, better scores are given if commercialization plans are submitted and 
letters of support from potential commercialisation partners and/or Phase III funders are 
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provided.719 Moreover, starting in 2014, a database regarding the transition rate to Phase II 
and commercialization rates of recipients of a certain amount of SBIR awards is expected to 
be operative and the transition rate and commercialization rate will be taken into 
consideration in the evaluation of the SBIR applications.  
NIH also supports commercialisation of the products developed within SBIR programs and the 
Phase III financial support is more substantial than within DoD in terms of amount of funding 
and available coaching on commercialization strategies. This difference is justified by the fact 
that developing promising drug compounds and medical devices takes much more money 
and time than is available under the SBIR phases. Thus, within the framework of NIH’s 
Commercialization Assistance Program (CAP), Renewal Applications may be submitted by 
Phase II awardees. Within the CAP, funds may be provided for subsequent development 
work, for preclinical studies of drugs or devices, for regulatory approval, etc. These awards 
generally amount to $1m per year for up to three years.720  
Supplementary consulting programs are made available, to assist SBIR awardees with 
commercialization. At Phase I, NIH provides consulting support related to the potential of the 
innovation to be commercialised and related to the aspects that need to be taken into 
consideration, such as competitors, applicable regulation, potential clients and price; at 
phase II it provides one-on-one consulting (from an advisor/industry expert) for a period of 18 
months, related to concrete steps towards commercialization, such as finding investors, 
partnerships, applying for IPR etc.721 
In conclusion, unlike the EU PCP, the US SBIR programme is a large, established programme, 
with experienced personnel that is allowed sufficient flexibility to tailor the support to each 
project and to adopt a large array of support measures up to the commercialization phase. 
As already mentioned, a high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure have been 
identified in Chapter 2 as key prerequisite for the success of demand-side R&D policies. 
3.2.3.7 Contracts and grants 
The EU has identified SBIR as a demand-side policy instrument (or a public procurement 
instrument) used by the US in pulling R&D projects into the commercialization phase. 
However, the SBIR program covers both demand- and supply-side instruments. According to 
the Small Business Development Act of 1982, the SBIR program covers ‘contracts, grants or 
cooperative agreements entered into between any Federal agency and any small business 
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for the performance of experimental, developmental, or research work funded in whole or in 
part by the Federal Government’.722  
Agencies such as DoD and NASA mainly focus on topics related to their specific needs and 
award contracts, while the National Institute of Health (hereafter: NIH) accepts (unsolicited) 
applications, that are not directly linked to a specific need of NIH (or to a specific call) and 
awards grants.723  
The grants correspond to what one calls ‘subsidies’ in the EU, while contracts correspond to 
public contracts subject to the EU public procurement rules. The distinction in the US between 
grants and contracts lies in the purpose of the R&D contract. According to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), contracts are used ‘only when the principal purpose is the 
acquisition of supplies or services for the direct benefit or use of the Federal Government’ and 
grants are used ‘when the principal purpose of the transaction is to stimulate or support 
research and development for another public purpose’.724 SBIR contract awards are more 
specific than grants and are defined in detail. The SBIR agency awarding contracts gets 
involved closely in the execution of the SBIR project and is capable of sole-sourcing 
(purchasing without competition) at a later stage the developed solution.  
An SBIR contract is thus awarded when the Federal agency needs a product which is not 
available commercially on the private market, for accomplishing its own tasks. Such an 
example constitutes the SBIR call launched by NASA, to fulfill its  need for a much lighter, 
energy efficient laser system than available on the market, to be used for a new NASA 
science mission that would take continuous measurements of CO2 (carbon dioxide) and O2 
(oxygen) data from space. The data collected by the satellite would form the basis of better-
informed policy decisions related to climate change. 
Such collection of data would be for the first time achieved by using a satellite rotating 
around the globe. The laser transmitter module was the crucial component in sensing which 
areas of the globe are emitting O2 and/or CO2. The small company EM4 received an SBIR 
award to develop this module. They came up with a module 7 times lighter, 3 times more 
energy efficient and with improved functionalities, which was subsequently used by NASA for 
its mission.725  
In conclusion, the US SBIR distinguishes between grants (or subsidies) for the development of 
solutions whose end-customer finds itself on the private market and  R&D contracts for the 
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direct benefit and use by the SBIR agency. PCP covers as well both types of instruments, but 
has been labeled in its entirety as a demand-side instrument.  
3.2.4 Evaluation of the US SBIR 
3.2.4.1 Impact of US SBIR 
Since the inception of the US SBIR, economists have interpreted in different ways the results of 
the programme, without reaching general consensus on its positive impact on innovation. 
Qualitative assessments (on the bases of success stories), as well as quantitative assessments 
(how many patents are or how much money is generated from the SBIR funds, after exiting 
the program) have been performed. Both approaches present difficulties in depicting the 
real economic impact of the program. The first approach can be criticised for not taking into 
account the tendency of government agencies to choose advanced technologies with a 
good chance for success. The second approach presents three main difficulties: 1) finding 
comparable firms that did not benefit of SBIR funds; 2) quantifying profits from the 
commercialisation of products developed with SBIR funds; 3) reflecting social value which is 
not captured by patents or profit.726 
An example of a quantitative assessment of the US SBIR is that performed by Joshua Lerner in 
1999. He compared 500 companies that had received SBIR contracts with 900 matched 
companies which hadn’t. He came to the conclusion that firms who had received SBIR funds 
created within 10 years five times and in some regions even 17 times more jobs and attracted 
more venture capital than firms who hadn’t received an SBIR contract.727  
In a more recent analysis, Furman et al728 expresses doubts about the positive impact of the 
public investment in defence-related R&D on the national innovation performance. He found 
that the R&D spending in industry and universities – which are not linked to investments in 
defence-related R&D - have a heavy impact. He also found indications that the level of 
investment in defence-related R&D may influence negatively the level of industry investment 
in R&D. To reach these conclusions, he used a quantitative indicator of innovative outcomes, 
namely the number of patents. 
Mowery729 presents a more nuanced conclusion. He notices that, on the one side, defence-
related investments in innovation have created bodies of scientific or engineering 
knowledge, have stimulated the development of new technologies with both civilian and 
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defence-related applications (the spin-off effect) and have determined the creation of a 
market for early versions of new technologies. He considers that defence-related 
procurement had especially a positive impact on the information technology sector in the US 
and that technologies such as the jet engine, swept-wing airframe or light-water nuclear 
reactors are ‘spinoffs’ from defence-related R&D spending. On the other side, the author 
underlines that defense-related procurement had a detrimental impact on some products 
and industries, such as the numerically controlled machine tools.  
Mowery also notices that in the ‘80s and ‘90s public R&D support for small firms specialized in 
defence applications in the semiconductors and information technology sectors attracted 
numerous critics.730 A general line of criticism referred to the low social return of investments in 
defence-related R&D and to the risk that defence-related R&D would be a disincentive to 
private finance for R&D in civilian technologies. Mowery remarks that criticism weakened 
since late ‘90s, when a surge in productivity marked the beginning of the so-called ‘new 
economy’. In the case of many new technologies, the US defence agencies acted as lead 
customers and paid premium prices for the early use of these new technologies. They 
supported in this manner the further development of groundbreaking technologies up to the 
point when they became commercially competitive.731 
As part of the re-authorization of the SBIR program, the Congress mandated in 2000, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of the program in stimulating 
commercialization of innovation and in providing additional economic and non-economic 
benefits. The SBIR programs of the 5 agencies which account for more than 90% of the total 
value of the program (the Department of Defence, the National Institutes of Health, the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Department of Energy, and the National 
Science Foundation) formed the subject of evaluation. The study was conducted by the 
National Research Council (NRC) on the basis of surveys, case studies, data and document 
analyses, as well as on the basis of interviews of program staff and agency officials. It resulted 
in a series of reports between 2005-2009.  
NRC recognized from the beginning the difficulties in evaluating a program such as SBIR. In 
setting metrics for SBIR projects, NRC considers that it is important to have realistic 
expectations of success rates for new firms and for unproven but promising technologies.732 
On the one hand, SBIR pursues highly novel, risky and difficult research, which inevitably 
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involves failed projects.733 On the other hand, even when successfully developed to meet 
intrinsic needs of the contracting Federal agency, such technologies may still not reach 
commercial maturity due to various obstacles, such as cancelled programs and missions or 
the perception of risk, which prevents them from being up-taken in the acquisition process. 
However, such project failures should not necessarily be seen as programme failure.734  
Many of the surveyed participating companies confirmed that they would not have 
undertaken the R&D without public support because the private return that they perceived 
they would earn would be less than the minimum accepted rate of return required for private 
financing of projects (private hurdle). The NRC Study estimates that up to two-thirds of the 
SBIR projects constitute such projects and that in these cases the SBIR support helps to reach 
the appropriate rates on return of R&D.735 Moreover, 20% of the respondents to the surveys 
indicated that the SBIR award was entirely or partially the triggering factor to found a 
company.  
The 2009 Study of NRC underlines that approximately 30-40% of the products developed 
through SBIR reach the commercialization stage.736 On average, the respondent firms grew 
from the time of the Phase II award until the time of the survey, with 29,9 of full-time 
employees. Out of these, the interviewed firms estimated that, as a direct effect of the SBIR 
award, they were able to employ 2,4 employees and to retain 2,1 more. However, the 
number may lie much lower, due to the fact that most firms which went out of business are 
not taken into account.   
The general conclusion of NRC is that the SBIR programme is ‘sound in concept and effective 
in practice’.737 The SBIR programme achieves important goals: 1) it leads to the creation of 
new scientific and technical knowledge; 2) it facilitates private investment by signaling 
quality and thus reducing the information asymmetries between innovators and private 
investors; 3) it supports the growth of a diverse array of small businesses; and 4) it encourages 
the commercialisation of the products developed with public R&D funds; 5) it stimulates the 
development of technologies which can meet the specific needs of public agencies in 
health, transport, the environment, and defense.738 This is particularly relevant to DoD, which 
faces new challenges in an era of new threats, constrained budgets and stretched 
manpower.739 
                                                          
733 NRC (2008) 65. 
734 NRC (2008) 65. 
735 NRC (2008) 55. 
736 National Research Council, ‘21st Century Innovation Systems for Japan and the United States: Lessons from a Decade of Change: Report 
of a Symposium’ (2009) (NRC 2009) <www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12194&page=92> accessed 18 December 2013. 
737 NRC (2008) 54-5. 
738 NRC (2008) 57. 
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Another study on the effects of the NIH SBIR program concluded that the average 
employment and sales growth of Phase I and/or Phase II firms, over three, five and eight years 
following the first year after the SBIR award, was higher than that of firms whose applications 
for SBIR funding were rejected.740 The interviewed firms confirmed that a large share of this 
growth was due to the SBIR awards.741 Other studies have focused on the impact of the SBIR 
funds in certain areas or on the success of certain companies.742 These studies stress the 
particular importance of the SBIR program in funding R&D in the so-called ‘enabling platform 
technologies’ (such as biotechnology or ICT), which have multiple applications in different 
areas, and can trigger potentially broad societal benefits.743 They stress the importance of the 
initial boost provided by military demand, which eventually diminishes once private 
applications are up-taken.744 
3.2.4.2 Strengths, weaknesses and points of improvement 
The NRC studies concludes that flexibility, 3 Phased structure and possibility for multiple 
awards to individual firms are the key features to the effectiveness of the SBIR programme. 
According to NRC data, most companies with multiple awards are high performers in 
meeting the agency’s needs and in reaching large amounts of commercial sales. The 2008 
NRC Study dismisses the concerns that allowing venture capital (VC) funded firms to 
participate in the SBIR would crowd out private funding in high-risk projects.745 Based on 
various economic studies,746 the Study concludes that the SBIR funding does not exclude, but 
complements the VC funding and allows companies to pursue high risk research in addition 
to the projects typically funded by VC investors.747 Moreover, the NRC Study considers 
unjustified the obligation adopted during the reauthorization of the programme in 2000, to 
                                                          
740 M. Ege, ‘How do grants influence firm performance? An econometric evaluation of the SBIR programmes at NIH’ (PhD thesis, State 
University of New Jersey 2009). 
741 6.82% greater sales growth, and 6.90% greater employment growth. In 44% of cases SBIR awards were credited with over 50% of 
company growth. 
742 Audretsch, for example, argues that the SBIR program has been beneficial to highly innovative American companies, such as Apple 
Computer, Chiron, Compaq and Intel, which received funding at an early stage in their innovation processes. See David B. Audretsch, 
‘Standing on the Shoulders of Midgets: The U.S. Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR)’ 20 (2003) Small Business Economics 
133. See also John Tirman, ‘The Militarization of high technology’ (Ballinger Pub. Co. 1984); Robert B. Archibald and David H. Finifter, 
‘Evaluation of the Department of Defense Small Business Innovation Research Program and Fast Track Initiative: A Balanced Approach’ in 
Wessner Charles W. (ed) ‘The Small Business Innovation Research Program: An Assessment of the Department of Defense Fast Track 
Initiative’ (National Academy Press 2000); Alic et al (1992). 
743 Maryann P. Feldman, ‘Role of the Department of Defense in Building Biotech Expertise’, in Charles Wessner (ed) ‘The Small Business 
Innovation Research Program (SBIR): An Assessment of the Department of Defense Fast Track Initiative’ (National Academy Press 2001) 251-
74. 
744 Microelectronics, semiconductors, where advances were initially driven by military demand, which eventually diminished to less than 1% 
by 2002, in favour of civil applications . See Enelle Guichard, ‘Dual-use policies in the French and European perspectives’ (October 2003) 4 
<http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/events/KP_Conf_03/documents/Guichard.pdf> accessed 18 December 2012. 
745 NRC (2008) 71. 
746 Joshua S. Gans and Scott Stern, ‘When Does Funding Research by Smaller Firms Bear Fruit ?: Evidence from the SBIR Program’ 
(September 2000) <http://www.nber.org/papers/w7877> accessed 2 February 2013.  
747 NRC (2008) 72. 
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restrict SBIR participation to companies which are 51% owned or controlled by US citizens or 
permanent residents.748  
As already mentioned, the Reauthorization Act of 2011 introduces the possibility for SBIR 
agencies to allow VC, hedge funds or private equity owned small businesses to participate in 
SBIR competitions and win up to a certain percentage of the SBIR budget.749 However, the 
second NRC recommendation regarding the ownership eligibility criteria, has not been up-
taken. 
NRC also underlines the importance of allowing flexibility to adapt the structure of the SBIR 
award procedure. Program managers need to be given room to adapt the program to the 
needs of specific technologies and unique mission needs (such as waivers on funding size or 
on amount of support for commercialization, possibility to change the specifications of the 
call during the R&D project).750 This is considered the only way to encourage program 
managers to make a balance between high-risk  technologies with important long-term 
benefits against less radical technologies with promising commercialisation perspectives and 
immediate benefits.  
However, allowing such flexibility entails the risk that choices may be influenced by lobbying. 
NRC suggests that regular assessments of the performance of the programme can act as a 
guarantee against abuses.751 The new Reauthorization Act of 2011 has picked up on these 
recommendations. As already mentioned, deviations from funding amounts, award of 
multiple Phase II awards and increased commercialization support is made possible, while the 
possibilities for reporting fraud and for measuring the results of the program are strengthened. 
The NRC study underlines the following weaknesses in the implementation of the SBIR 
programme: 1) long evaluation times of the SBIR proposals, particularly before Phase II, which 
creates a funding gap for small high-tech companies with limited own resources; 2) tendency 
to award to more proven technologies; 3) complex rules and procedures to be followed by 
bidding firms;752 4) high overhead costs for the SBIR agencies, mainly due to the focus of the 
SBIR on a large number of small projects (this increases the time and effort to prepare the 
calls, to evaluate the offers and to monitor the progress after the award).753 As already 
described in the previous sections, the Reauthorization Act of 2011 took heed of the 
recommendation to shorten the evaluation times. SBIR agencies other than the National 
Institutes of Health or National Science Foundation (to which the term of 1 year is applicable) 
                                                          
748 NRC (2008) 70. 
749 SBA Policy Directives 17; 13 CFR Ch. I (1-1-01), section 121.704. 
750 NRC (2008) 66. 
751 NRC (2008) 55. 
752 NRC (2008) 38. 
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are required to adopt measures to reduce the evaluation time to 90 days from the 
application deadline.754  
The NRC Study makes other concrete suggestions for improvements: 1) adoption within more 
agencies of Fast Track program such as the one of DoD;755 2) adoption of Phase III support, 
particularly when the agency does not acquire the products of the firms receiving the SBIR 
award; 3) strengthening the evaluation methodologies and practices in order to ensure that 
any changes in the programme result in positive effects; 4) increase Phase I awards to 
$150.000 and Phase II awards to $1.000.000, with the flexibility to deviate from these standard 
amounts.756 The Reauthorization Act of 2011 responds to these recommendations by raising 
the financial thresholds to the proposed amounts and allowing SBIR managers to increase 
them by a maximum of 50%, upon motivation submitted to SBA. Moreover, reporting is 
strengthened in order to make measurement of the success of the program possible (in terms 
of commercialization rates)757 and to signal and prevent fraud, waste or abuses.758 In 
addition, each agency is mandated to develop metrics for measuring the effectiveness and 
the social benefits of the SBIR,759 and a comprehensively evaluation of the working of the SBIR 
program, is already planned not later than 4 years after the enactment of the 
Reauthorization Act of 2011.760  
An OECD Report on national SBIR initiatives named in 2010 some of the same weaknesses 
identified by NRC and added some more recent concerns. Firstly, it reiterated the concern 
that public funding through SBIR may crowd out the investments by the firm in R&D and may 
transfer the costs of innovation from the firm to the government.761 Secondly, it highlighted 
concerns related to the weak implementation of the programme: the sensitivity of awards to 
lobbying; the insufficient effort put into choosing the right performer or into follow-up action 
after the project exits the SBIR program; the long evaluation times before the funds are 
received.762 Additional criticism regarded the tendency of the government agencies to 
select projects which find themselves in an advanced phase of the innovation cycle, in 
search for success stories.763 On the other hand, the SBIR program was praised for acting as a 
                                                          
754 SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011, section 5126. 
755 This program requires matching funds for Phase II. Wessner found that the Fast Track Program increases the efficiency of the 
Department of Defense SBIR program by encouraging the commercialization of new technologies and the entry of new firms to the 
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Track Initiative’ (National Academy Press 2001) 
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certification of a firm/technology quality, which enhances the chances to attract private 
investments, for enhancing collaboration between industry and academia and for triggering 
employment and sales growth within the award-winning firms.764  
3.3 Conclusions 
By drafting guidance on how to conduct a PCP procedure and by encouraging its 
deployment within the EU, the European Commission attempts to emulate the perceived 
success of the US in bringing R&D projects into the commercialization phase and increasing 
the competitive advantages of its firms in the global market. The US SBIR program was 
attributed by the Commission the merit for these successes and was used as a source of 
inspiration for PCP. 
However, the European Commission drafted the PCP in compliance with the particular legal 
conditions imposed on the EU by the GPA and the legal rules governing EU’s legal order. As a 
consequence, PCP embodies major differences from its US counterprogram. Some of these 
differences relate to SBIR characteristics which were identified in Chapter 2 as prerequisites 
for successful demand-side R&D policies. Some of these features were also identified by the 
above summarized evaluation studies as key to the success of the SBIR programme. The EU 
did not perform an in-depth analysis on whether these differences would affect the 
effectiveness of the PCP.  
Hereunder I enumerate the most important differences between the US SBIR and the EU 
approach to PCP: 
1.  The mandatory contribution to the SBIR budget is legislated. The SBIR program is, as a 
consequence, independent of an yearly budget approval process. In the EU, on the other 
side, PCP has been introduced through a soft-law instrument (interpretative communication). 
The EU does not have the competence to legislate such budgetary aspects and mandatory 
set-asides have only recently been imposed at national level in some Member States that are 
leaders in innovation policies. This is discussed in Chapter 4. 
2. The US SBIR programme provides funds to small businesses for risky or uncertain R&D 
projects that present long-term prospects to yield substantial benefits, but may not easily 
attract private venture capital. This was identified in Chapter 2 as being a prerequisite for the 
effectiveness of the public intervention. The EU PCP, on the other hand, is based on the 
assumption that small and large businesses encounter equal funding difficulties in developing 
technological solutions for societal challenges. 
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3. The US SBIR program is deployed by eleven Federal agencies in order to address their most 
advanced needs. Flexibility characterizes the organisation of the US SBIR program. 
Programme managers with state-of-the-art knowledge of the technological aspects of the 
project and with short-term appointments run the SBIRs. They are allowed to tailor the size and 
timeline of awards to the concrete needs of the project as well as to adopt various support 
measures up to the commercialization stage. The specifications of the project may also be 
changed during the execution of the contracts. This encourages a high degree of 
experimentation in high risk and uncertain R&D projects, which has been identified in Chapter 
2 as important for the success of policy instruments such as SBIR or PCP. In the EU, procedural 
flexibility is limited. Moreover, no specific agencies are designated to perform PCPs. It is 
believed that any contracting authority is/should be able to define advanced needs and 
forward innovations. 
4. Coordination, supervision and support of the US SBIR is provided by a centralized 
independent agency (SBA). Periodic assessments are performed by the SBA and lessons are 
regularly implemented into the programme. This has been identified in Chapter 2 as 
important features for the success of R&D policy programmes. In the EU, PCP- or SBIR-like 
programs have only been set-up at national level, with no EU-wide coordination or 
supervision. The EU has only recently started to steer through funding the deployment of cross-
border PCP procedures in conformity with the 2007 PCP Communication.  
5. In the US, SBIR awards provide 100% funding of a project, plus a small profit. PCP only covers 
R&D services contracts whose IPR and funding are shared between the contracting authority 
and the private service provider. Moreover, PCP recommends the payment of a market price 
which reflects the division of risks and benefits. This means that less than 100% of the R&D costs 
may be funded within the framework of a PCP contract.  
6. A successful SBIR participant may obtain a ‘sole-source’ contract for the subsequent 
development of the technology and product derived from the SBIR award,765 while in the EU, 
the results of the R&D performed during the PCP procedure may not be purchased through 
direct negotiations with one of the PCP finalists. Early involvement of the end-user in the R&D 
process and early uptake of the developed innovation have been identified in Chapter 2 as 
crucial conditions for bringing the funded R&D projects into the commercialization phase. 
Having identified the main differences between PCP and the US SBIR, I will turn in the next 
Chapter to the analysis of practical implementations of PCP- or SBIR-like initiatives in three 
front-runner EU Member States. This analysis will highlight in how far these initiatives are in line 
with their US source of inspiration or with the PCP approach recommended by the European 
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Commission. In addition, I will underline whether these initiatives present the prerequisites 
identified in Chapter 2 as being key to the success of demand-side R&D policies. Finally, the 
analysis of evaluation studies of these initiatives will reveal which PCP features are considered 
by contracting authorities within the EU as barriers to its wide deployment. 
Chapter 5 will close in on some of the above summarized differences which have been 
identified in different EU funded reports as the reasons for which PCP has not been embraced 
by EU public procurers and for which PCP may not work as effective as the US SBIR. Chapter 5 
will subsequently investigate whether legal constraints made the adoption of the different 

















CHAPTER 4. Implementation of PCP or PCP-like schemes in 
the EU – the current ‘state of play’ 
4.1. Introduction 
By 2011, there were no known examples of PCP procedures in the form proposed by the 
European Commission in its 2007 PCP Communication.766 By that time, only national initiatives 
inspired by the US SBIR were being piloted in three Member States: the Netherlands, UK and 
Belgium. These initiatives were all implemented by centralised innovation agencies and 
closely resembled subsidies – more than public contracts. These programmes involved no or 
only sporadic interaction with the end-customer and did not attract EU-wide competition.  
The European Commission became aware that contracting authorities with operational 
needs that positioned them as potential end-customers of innovation needed additional 
incentives to engage in PCPs. To this end, the European Commission fosters since 2009 
collaborations and exchanges of best practices between EU contracting authorities, by 
funding the set-up of networks. Since 2011, the European Commission moreover began 
funding all of the organisational costs, and part of the contractual costs, of concrete cross-
border collaborative PCPs.  
This chapter outlines the general state of implementation of PCP(-like) initiatives in the EU. 
Based on available reviews and studies, I describe in section 4.2 the state of implementation 
of PCPs throughout the EU by 2011. I also summarize the barriers to widespread 
implementation, felt by EU contracting authorities.  
In sections 4.3-4.5, I describe the set-up and practical implementation of the most established 
PCP/SBIR-like initiatives in the Netherlands, in the UK and in Belgium. In this context, I compare 
the features of the three national initiatives with their US source of inspiration. I subsequently 
establish whether or not the national initiatives incorporate the prerequisites for an effective 
implementation of a PCP, as identified in Chapter 2.  
In the following section 4.6, I outline the efforts of the European Commission to create better 
PCP practices within the EU. Finally, in section 4.7 I draw conclusions on the remaining barriers 
to a wide and effective implementation of PCP within the EU. 
4.2 PCP’s ‘state of play’ in the EU  
Already during the preparation of the PCP Communication, the European Commission 
                                                          
766 Commission, Compilation of Results of the EC Survey on the Status of Implementation of Pre-Commercial procurement Across Europe 
(April 2011) (PCP Survey (2011)) < http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/pcp-survey.pdf> accessed 12 November 2012.  
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investigated whether there were known practices in the EU, in line with the envisaged PCP 
procedure. An early report of 2007 indicated there were no known PCP procedures being 
tested in the EU. 767 Based on interviews with contracting authorities and suppliers involved in 
innovation-oriented procurements coming close to PCP, the report pointed out several 
barriers to the up-take of PCP procedures. These are: lack of technical knowledge of the 
contracting authority, organisational difficulties in cross-border projects, difficulty to agree on 
shared demand requirements, difficulty to argument the benefits for supplier to participate in 
a PCP when subsequent commercialisation is not guaranteed.  
Three years after the release of the PCP Communication, the European Commission 
performed another review of the state of implementation of PCP in Europe. The survey 
revealed that no examples of cross-border collaborative PCP procedures, as envisaged by 
the 2007 PCP Communication, were known. The Commission’s efforts had thus not helped to 
bring about the expected practice. 
PCP-like initiatives had however been set-up in a handful of Member States by national or 
regional innovation agencies that were driven by national innovation policy motivations 
rather than concrete procurement needs. Most importantly, these PCP-like initiatives did not 
promote EU-wide competition.768 The initiatives in the UK and the Netherlands were the most 
established, followed by the ones in Belgium, Finland,769 Sweden,770 Spain,771 the Czech 
Republic772 and Italy773.  
The Commission’s PCP Survey concluded that EU contracting authorities expected a greater 
effort on the part of the EU to stimulate the implementation of PCPs (through sharing of 
practices as well as through funding) in broad areas.774 The survey further confirmed that 
concerns on compliance with the EU state aid rules constituted a reason for contracting 
                                                          
767 Rambøll Management A/S, ‘Opportunities for Public Technology Procurement in the ICT-related sectors in Europe’ (June 2008) (Rambøll 
Report (2008)) <ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/pcp/pcp-final-ramboll-report-js2_en.pdf> accessed 29 January 2013. 
 
769 See <http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/docs/pcp-case-finland-v3.pdf> accessed 8 November 2013. 
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authorities not to implement PCPs.775  
A study of 2011776 confirmed that PCP is growing in popularity in the EU Member States. Based 
on interviews with contracting authorities, the study concluded that this was partly due to the 
success of the US scheme (which was replicated in the Netherlands and in the UK), and partly 
due to the European Commission’s efforts to promote this instrument. However, the study 
confirmed the conclusion of the previous EU review, that individual contracting authorities 
that had the concrete needs and had the potential to act as end-customers were rarely 
involved in the available PCP-like schemes.777 
Another study, on the demand-side innovation policies of OECD countries, confirmed in the 
same year that EU contracting authorities tend to favour already proven, low-risk solutions 
and that they lack knowledge and capabilities as well as incentives to adopt a different 
attitude.778  
In conclusion, PCP conducted in collaboration between contracting authorities from different 
Member States with the aim to find innovative solutions to shared needs, did not occur by 
2011.   
The reviews and studies analysed in this section identify the following barriers to the uptake of 
PCP: 
 lack of technical knowledge; 
 aversion to risk; 
 organisational difficulties in cross-border projects; 
 difficulty to agree on shared demand requirements; 
 difficulty to convince suppliers of the benefits to participate in PCP when subsequent 
commercialisation is not guaranteed; 
 concerns regarding compliance with EU State aid. 
In the next sections, I will outline which type of PCP-like programmes were being 
implemented in the Netherlands, UK and Belgium by 2011 and beyond. 
                                                          
775 Ibid. Already in 2003, the same concern that EU State Aid legislative provisions constitute a barrier to the funding of R&D project in 
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4.3 The Dutch SBIR 
4.3.1 Background to adoption 
In the Netherlands, a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) programme was started in 
2004. Initially, the scheme was not considered to be a procurement instrument, but a form of 
subsidy.779 SBIR was considered to give more effective support than the existent subsidy 
schemes, due to its competitive element and due to the envisaged presence of a 
demanding customer.780 Later, the legal justification of the scheme became article 16(f) of 
Directive 2004/18 and SBIR became a public procurement instrument.781  
Its declared objectives were (1) to identify innovative solutions to societal challenges and (2) 
to support innovative SMEs.782 The justification for the intervention of the government through 
the SBIR scheme was found in the difficulties that SMEs encounter when looking for private 
financing of the first phases of innovative projects.  It was also submitted that the private 
market provided insufficient stimuli for the creation of innovative solutions for societal 
challenges.783  
The particular focus on support for SMEs was in line with the rationale of the US SBIR. Following 
a review by the European Commission though, the Dutch SBIR was modified to allow both 
small and large companies to participate. In addition, the eligibility condition for the 
company to reside on the territory of the Netherlands was dropped.784 Yet, in practice, the 
scheme proved to be particularly attractive to small and medium sized, mainly Dutch 
businesses.785 Statistics show that between 2004-2010, less than 10% of the 252 contracts at 
phase 1 (Fig.1) and 89 at Phase 2 (Fig.2)) were awarded to large companies.786  
                                                          
779 Minister-president, ’Reactie op het rapport “Vitalisering van de Kenniseconomie”’ (8 February 2004) (Reactie op het Rapport 
“Vitalisering van de Kenniseconomie (2004)) <http://media.europa-nu.nl/9353000/1/j9vvhjsfpncqnhs/vi3anawcbqzu> accessed 2 February 
2013. 
780 It was also proposed to complement the SBIR with financial support to private investors of risk capital. Sociaal Economische Raad, ‘Advies 
Interactie voor innovatie’ (19 december 2003) 76 <http://www.ser.nl/~/media/DB_Adviezen/2000_2009/2003/b22254%20pdf.ashx> 
accessed 1 February 2013. 
781 NL Agency, ‘SBIR - The power of public procurement: innovative solutions to societal challenges’ (January 2011) (NL Agency (2011)) 
<http://www.agentschapnl.nl/sites/default/files/bijlagen/SBIR%20brochure%20The%20power%20of%20public%20procurement.pdf> 
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782 NL Agency (2011) 3. 
783 Technopolis (2010) 23-4. 
784 Technopolis (2010) 21. 
785 The SBIR scheme is labeled as supportive to Dutch SMEs. NL Agency (2011). 




Fig. 1 Source: NL Agency 
 
Fig. 2 Source: NL Agency 
The SBIR scheme was from the beginning divided into two parts: one departmental SBIR run 
by the NL Agency (Agentschap NL), an innovation agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and one run by the Dutch Organisation for Applied Sciences (TNO). The second SBIR scheme 
is mainly intended to fund companies that are willing to commercialise product ideas of 
TNO.787 Only the departmental SBIR forms the subject of the analysis in this section as only this 
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is identified as pre-commercial procurement.788 
The departmental SBIR scheme was set-up as a centralised scheme. NL Agency was put in 
charge of running it for different government departments (ministries). It was not set-up 
through legislation and there is no official document introducing the SBIR programme, 
besides guidance on  the possibility to conduct the SBIR within the existing legal framework.789 
This scheme started in 2004 with a first pilot project run by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.790 In 
2005, after the positive assessment of the pilot, the broad application of the SBIR scheme 
throughout all government departments was given green light. At the end of 2008, NL 
Agency set up an SBIR programme office. In the same year, the scheme was taken outside of 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and brought under the responsibility of an interdepartmental 
entity, named Knowledge and Innovation (Kennis en Innovatie). It continued to be centrally 
run by the NL Agency, however. 
Thus, the SBIR instrument was integrated into the innovation policy of the Dutch government 
and was included by the different government departments (ministries) into their Societal 
Innovation Agenda (MIA)791 budgets. This enables them to regularly employ SBIR projects.792 In 
2010 there were six departments employing the SBIR instrument and the number of SBIR calls 
for proposals were on a rising curve.793  
In February 2010 the Dutch SBIR scheme was evaluated. Out of the total of 28 projects 
awarded by then, only the first pilot project (of 2004) was finalised. By that time, the Dutch 
SBIR had spent €71,5 million.794 
4.3.2 Features of the NL SBIR initiative 
a) Non-mandatory participation 
Unlike in the US, the implementation of SBIR projects by contracting authorities in the 
Netherlands is not expressed in legislation.  The Societal Innovation Agendas of several Dutch 
ministries include now references to the SBIR instrument. This provides justification for funding 
SBIR contracts, but does not mandate them to participate in the SBIR programme and to 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
.com%2Fdownload%2Ffs%2Fdoc%2Freports%2Finnovation-20report-
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788 Technopolis (2010) 27, 89. 
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791 Maatschappelijke Innovatie Agenda’s. 
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reserve budgets therefore. The evaluation performed by Technopolis in 2010 shows that some 
ministries had not deployed the SBIR instrument.795 
b) Centralised implementation 
The participating ministries are, moreover, only marginally involved in the SBIR projects they 
decide to fund. Unlike in the US SBIR, the funding agencies only dictate the broad topic, while 
the NL Agency runs the SBIR competition, signs and subsequently monitors the contract 
execution. NL Agency may also propose a topic to a specific ministry. In both cases, NL 
Agency provides the ministry extensive support in defining the concrete call requirements.796  
Another difference with the US SBIR constitutes the coordination of the SBIR competition by NL 
Agency project officers who do not possess in-depth technical expertise on the respective 
topic.797 
c) Eligibility criteria 
Unlike the US SBIR, but in line with EU guidance, both large and small companies are allowed 
to submit offers in NL SBIR calls.798 Moreover, eligibility is not conditioned as in the US upon 
ownership or control by EU citizens. Only performance of the R&D within an EU Member State 
is required. This means that non-EU owned companies may win NL SBIR contracts. Moreover, 
as ownership is not checked, companies majority-owned by venture capital or hedge funds 
or companies controlled by equity funds may participate in the NL SBIR competitions.799   
In addition, only proposals for R&D activities are eligible within a NL SBIR project. According to 
the SBIR Guide of 2011,800 the following R&D activities are eligible for funding under the SBIR 
scheme:  
 Experimental or theoretical activities which are conducted in order to accumulate 
new knowledge; 
 Planned or critical research which is intended to accumulate new knowledge and 
capabilities which are necessary for developing new products, processes or services, 
or to improve substantially existing products, processes or services; 
 Acquiring, combining, designing and using existing scientific, technical, business or 
                                                          
795 Technopolis (2010) 30-1. 
796 Technopolis (2010) 34. 
797 None of the 7 employees of the SBIR office of NL Agency has strong technical background. Moreover, they are not full-time engaged in 
deploying the SBIR programme.  See Technopolis (2010) 33. 
798 Also institutes, corporations are currently allowed to participate if they can convincingly demonstrate that they are capable to 
commercialize the products. SBIR programmabureau van Agentschap NL, ‘SBIR handleiding voor ondernemers’ (SBIR Guide (2011)) (7 July 
2011) 10 <http://www.agentschapnl.nl/sites/default/files/bijlagen/SBIR%20handleiding%202011-1.pdf> accessed 18 December 2013. 
799 This type of companies is only recently allowed to participate in the US SBIR competitions. 
800 SBIR Guide (2011) 5. 
 
 179 
other relevant knowledge and capabilities for plans, schemes or design of new, 
modified or improved products, processes or services; 
 Making designs, drawings, plans and other documentation, provided that these are 
not intended for commercial use; 
 Developing commercially useful prototypes and pilots, if the prototype is the 
commercial end-product and the production of such a prototype is too expensive to 
use it just for demonstration and validation purposes; 
 The experimental development and testing of products, processes and services, for so 
far as these cannot be used or be adjusted for industrial use or for commercial 
exploitation; 
 The production of a limited 0-serie: limited production or supply in order to incorporate 
the results of field testing and to demonstrate that the product or service is suitable for 
mass production or supply to acceptable quality standards; 
The following activities do not, according to the SBIR guide, fall under the concept of R&D: 
 Routine or periodical modification of existing products, production lines, 
manufacturing processes, services and other normal activities, even if these 
modifications may regard improvements; 
 Prototypes whose commercial readiness has already been tested; 
 Commercial development such as serial production, delivery intended to achieve 
commercial viability or to recover R&D costs, integration, customization, incremental 
modifications and improvements of existing products or processes. 
The NL SBIR follows the definitions of R&D in the Frascati Manual and of R&D in the US SBIR 
context. It is difficult to establish how the R&D definitions work in practice by studying the 
general description of the NL SBIR awarded projects.801 There may, however, be serious gaps 
between the law in the book and the law in action here. 
It appears, for instance, that no market consultation or market analysis is undertaken 
preceding a NL SBIR call. It also appears that no attention is paid to whether the contract 
can be qualified as an  R&D service contract, or otherwise an R&D works (e.g. construction of 
prototypes) or R&D supplies contract (e.g. prototypes). The R&D service condition was 
included in the EU procurement legislation in order to discourage funding of innovative 
products that are very close to commercialization.  
                                                          
801 For a description of 25 SBIR awarded projects see NL Agency (2011).    
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As a consequence, it may happen that the desired functionality is available on the market or 
that the contract involves marginal innovation and cannot be qualified as an R&D service 
contract.  
d) Phases 
Following the US model, the Dutch SBIR scheme provides funding at two stages, namely the 
feasibility stage, which investigates the viability of the idea, and the development stage, 
which covers the full R&D effort and the development of a prototype or proof-of-
concept/demonstration. Phase 1 is funded with €20.000 - €50.000 and may take up to 6 
months. Phase 2 is funded with €150.000 - €500.000 and may take up to 2 years.802 It is not 
expressly allowed to deviate from the maximum amounts or from the maximum time-limits. 
The Dutch scheme provides considerably lower amounts of funding than its US counterpart.803 
Moreover, the timeline for Phase 2 is limited compared to both the US SBIR (which does not 
specify maximum timelines for Phase 2) and to the EU guidance (4-5,5 years for a whole PCP 
procedure).804 In addition, no explicit possibility is granted to award multiple sequential Phase 
2 contracts to the same company for continuing the R&D effort in case the first PCP does not 
reach commercialisation. This indicates that tolerance to early failure is not embedded in the 
programme and that closer to market projects will be favoured.  
Subsequent commercialisation (after Phase 2) is not financially supported as part of the 
Dutch SBIR, but the NL Agency makes efforts to spread information on the project, to 
organize visits from ministries to the project and to organize workshops in which companies 
present their developed products.805 Contrary to the US SBIR, the NL SBIR does not allow direct 
purchase of the developed innovations by the funding agency. Instead, a separate 
procurement procedure needs to be organized. This has been identified as a barrier to 
participation in SBIRs by contracting authorities with concrete needs for innovative solutions, 
particularly by the Dutch Department of Defence).806 
e) Percentage of funded R&D costs 
Initially, the NL SBIR followed the US model and funded 100% of the R&D costs.807 After being 
brought in line with the EU PCP approach and the EU state aid rules, the Dutch SBIR requires 
bidders to offer a discount for retaining the ownership of the developed innovative 
                                                          
802 SBIR Guide 2011). 
803 The EU PCP does not prescribe specific amounts of funding. 
804 Phase 2 of the NL SBIR covers the activities of both Phase 2 and 3 of a PCP as described in the PCP Communication.  
805 Ibid 35. 
806 Technopolis (2010) 30-1. 
807 Nelleke Corbett, ‘Juridisch kader voor SBIR’ (17 January 2006) slide 2. 
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product.808 This is in line with the PCP Communication requirement to ensure that a market 
price is paid and no State aid is granted. At the same time, this deviates from the practice 
within the US SBIR programme, where 100% of the R&D costs and a small profit are covered.  
In practice though, compliance with the market price requirement within the NL SBIR 
competitions is not enforced.809 Thus, offers are not evaluated on price. The available budget 
per Phase is pre-set in each individual NL SBIR call as fixed ceiling price.810  This turns the whole 
market price requirement into a formality and leaves room for non-compliance with the EU 
State aid rules. The perception of the participating companies that they receive 100% of the 
R&D costs constitutes an additional proof that the market price criterion is nothing more than 
a formality.811 Further discussion of this issue can be found in Chapter 5.  
f) IPR arrangements 
The IPR arrangements within the Dutch SBIR for both Phase 1 and 2 are in line with the 
recommendations of the European Commission in its 2007 Communication, as well as with the 
US SBIR. IP ownership remains with the SBIR participant, while the government retains a royalty-
free license to use the results. It also obtains the following rights: to disseminate the results, to 
make the knowledge public when justified by the public interest, and to mandate the 
supplier to provide licenses to third parties under reasonable conditions.812 Unlike in the US, 
however, the provisions are drafted in very general terms and no enforcing mechanisms are 
specified.813   
g) Award criteria 
The bids are evaluated against the following general criteria814, which may be further 
specified on a case-by-case basis:815 
 Potential of solving the societal problem which is the subject of the NL SBIR call, 
against a reasonable cost; 
 Entrepreneurship (whether the company (and its project partners) is/(are) capable of 
bringing the product to the market: vision, ambition, experience etc.); 
 Degree of innovativeness (originality and inventiveness of the proposed solution); 
 Economic perspective (the chances that the product will be commercialised); 
                                                          
808 SBIR Guide (2011). 
809 The guidance for implementation of SBIR does not mention any obligation for the award commission to check whether the reduction 
indicated in the SBIR bids corresponds to market realities. 
810 SBIR Guide (2011) 6. 
811 Technopolis (2010) 89. 
812 SBIR Guide (2011) 8. 
813 Ibid. 
814 SBIR Guide (2011) 7. 
815 Technopolis (2010) 33-4. 
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 Environmental and social aspects (whether the developed product constitutes by 
itself a polluting or resource intensive solution); 
 Quality of the proposal and of the project (is the proposal clearly drafted and does it 
have the potential to achieve the proposed solution). 
Three of the award criteria lay a strong accent on the commercial potential of the proposed 
R&D project, compared to two criteria related to the innovativeness and quality of the 
proposal. This reveals a potential bias towards closer to market solutions. In contrast, the first 
four award criteria in the US SBIR (described in section 3.2.2.7) focus on the (technical) quality 
of the proposal, while commercialization potential is listed as the fifth award criterion. 
4.3.3 Evaluation 
In March 2010, Technopolis performed an early evaluation of the Dutch SBIR scheme.816 
Because the Dutch SBIR finds itself at an early stage, the evaluation does not cover an 
impact assessment, but only input and process aspects. The evaluation is based on the 
analysis of the SBIR calls, literature, interviews and surveys.817 In this section, I summarize its 
findings. 
According to Technopolis, the SBIR programme provides the participating departments 
relatively quickly with multiple innovative solutions.818 Participating companies are also found 
positive regarding the functioning of the scheme. They consider that the SBIR awards 
accelerate their access to the market by enhancing the trust of public and private clients in 
their innovative products. The same companies also submit that participation in the SBIR 
programme enables them to get valuable insights into the technical feasibility of the 
developed product as well as into the competitive strengths of their innovative ideas/solution 
compared to competitive ideas/solutions on the market.819 
In addition, the participating companies indicate that the provision of 100% funding of the 
phases820 were the key reasons to participate in the SBIR competitions.821  The SBIR awards 
were considered crucial for stimulating the development of the products, which would 
otherwise not be funded by the company itself or by external private investors. The 
participating companies expect that the received SBIR awards will positively impact the 
turnover and growth of their companies in the future.822 
                                                          
816 Ibid. 
817 Technopolis (2010) viii. 
818 Technopolis (2010) viii. 
819 Technopolis (2010) 26. 
820 In the evaluation this phrase is understood as meaning that no external funding is required. At Phase 2, the availability of external funds 
is considered a plus for the award of the contract. 
821 Technopolis (2010) 26. 
822 Technopolis (2010) 41. 
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Participating companies are less positive on (the information they got on) the role of the 
participating government agencies in purchasing the product and in providing financial 
support at the commercialization phase.823 They express dissatisfaction regarding the 
disconnection between the ministry department employing the SBIR and the purchasing 
department that has the potential to act as launching customer. According to them, the SBIR 
call does not correspond to actual purchasing needs of the government agencies.824 
Among the participating government agencies, particularly the Dutch Department of 
Defence (DoD) experiences the friction between PCP and the commercial procurement 
regulation. The Dutch DoD considers that the design of the SBIR programme does not 
accommodate its normal procurement practices, because it requires a separate 
procurement procedure for the purchase of the developed innovations.825 DoD uses R&D 
procurement to fulfill its proper needs instead of promoting entrepreneurship and innovation 
in areas of societal interest. As a consequence, it is especially interested to directly buy the 
product developed during the SBIR project.826  
The evaluation report remarks that since 2008, there has been political awareness on the 
need to ensure the link between public R&D funding through SBIR contracts and commercial 
uptake of the developed innovations. Participating  government agencies have since 2010 
been stimulated to act as launching customer (or first customer of newly developed 
products).827 Moreover, the government has contemplated support by regulation, 
certification, standardization or the requirement to pay back the funding of Phase 2 in case 
of commercial success.828 These initiatives are still being discussed.  
The evaluation also summarizes the reasons invoked by Dutch ministries for not engaging in 
SBIR projects: the difficulty to re-assign R&D funds from previous programmes to SBIR 
competitions; the inadequate marketing of SBIR as innovation instrument of the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs; the lack of understanding of this instrument; the lack of incentives (such as 
practical support, mandatory set-asides, enthusiast ambassadors etc.) to engage in using this 
instrument.829 
Regarding the organizational make-up of the Dutch SBIR, Technopolis concludes that its 
centralized deployment by the NL Agency presents both advantages and disadvantages. 
On the one side, experience is gathered and easily spread. On the other side, NL SBIR remains 
                                                          
823 Technopolis (2010) 39. 
824 Technopolis (2010) 38. 
825 Technopolis (2010) x. 
826 Technopolis (2010) 31. 
827 Technopolis (2010) 27. 
828 Technopolis (2010) xi, 27. 
829 Technopolis (2010) 30-1. 
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disconnected from the needs and strategic policy agendas of the different participating 
departments.830  
Unfortunately, the evaluation does not provide information on the compliance of the SBIR 
programme with the legal provisions (such as the presence of R&D activities) or on the 
degree of innovativeness of the selected projects. As already mentioned it does not cover an 
impact assessment, due to the early stage of implementation of the Dutch SBIR programme. 
Another more general study evaluating the result of the overall innovation policy of the Dutch 
government (of which the NL SBIR forms part) indicates that up to 2008, no positive results had 
been booked in enhancing the innovative capabilities of Dutch companies. SMEs in the 
Netherlands have become less innovative between 1998-2008, and the percentage of 
innovative SMEs is considerably lower than the EU average.831 Although this research does not 
specifically assess the NL SBIR, it indicates though that no major impact was achieved by 
2008.  
The subsequent survey performed by the European Commission in 2010 and the study 
performed by Izsak and Edler in 2011 confirm that the NL SBIR has been driven by national 
innovation policy motivations and has not favoured EU-wide competition. Furthermore, the 
centralized organization by the national innovation agency went hand in hand with limited 
involvement of end-users. This approach hinders commercial roll-out of the developed 
products.832  
In conclusion, the NL SBIR programme has been positively received by the participating 
companies for providing access to needed funding and for providing insights into the 
technical feasibility of the developed product as well as into the competitive strengths of 
their envisaged innovations compared to those available on the market. The NL SBIR is mainly 
criticized for the limited involvement of the end-users and for the lack of support at the 
commercialisation phase. Participating government agencies with concrete needs (such as 
the Department of Defence) have expressed discontent with the impossibility to directly 
acquire the developed innovations for use in their organisation.  
4.3.4 Projects 
This section provides an overview of the main characteristics of NL SBIR funded projects. It is 
based on a documentary analysis of all the 37 SBIR calls for proposals which have been 
published by NL Agency by January 2014 as well as on a documentary analysis of the 
available summaries of phase 2 projects in 8 of the 37 SBIR competitions. I have analysed 
these documents on several effectiveness criteria, as identified in Chapter 2: (1) the existence 
                                                          
830 Technopolis (2010) 38. 
831 Erik Stam, ‘Entrepreneurship and Innovation Policy’ (Jena Economic Research Papers, 2008) 40-1, 340. 
832 PCP Survey (2011) 4; Izsak & Edler (2011) 22-3. 
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of a public end-customer, (2) targeting technological innovations, (3) targeting high-risk or 
uncertain R&D. I have chosen these 3 criteria from the list of criteria in Chapter 2, based on 
their relevance for the type of information available in the SBIR calls. 
Due to the fact that I have only had access to the calls for proposals, but not to the 
evaluation of the submitted proposals or to the monitoring of the winning projects, my 
research is to some extent interpretative. In order to verify some of the conclusions I have 
conducted individual interviews with two of the NL Agency employees who had been 
involved in the set-up and implementation of the NL SBIR initiative.833  
My first and most important observation is that the majority of the NL SBIR calls are catalytic 
forms of pre-commercial procurement. This entails that the novel products developed within 
the frame of the NL SBIR competitions are not intended for public end-customers. Only 5 of 
the 37 NL SBIR calls analysed have been conducted for a specific public end-user and 
another 6 may have both a public and a private end-customer.834  
My second observation is that the SBIR calls not only cover technical solutions, but also the 
development of non-technological solutions to societal problems. 21 out of the 37 calls for 
proposals also target service innovations. Such are: the call for new services to ensure longer 
independent and healthy living for the elderly; the call for solutions to make travelling by train 
more attractive; the call for solutions to develop and increase landscape quality and to 
stimulate a sustainable and profitable recreation sector; the call for solutions to reduce the 
number of kilometers in transporting agricultural products etc.835 Based on the analysis of the 
calls, it is not possible for me to research and expose how the projects were evaluated 
against the R&D services minimum requirements.  
My third observation, is that the NL SBIR does not pursue groundbreaking, but merely 
incremental innovation (e.g. new applications of existing technologies). This observation is 
based on the analysis of the available descriptions of phase 2 SBIR projects. Illustrative 
examples are the two phase 2 projects performed as part of the 2009 SBIR call titled 
‘Innovatie voor recreatie en ruimte’ (Development and conservation of landscape quality 
together with the development of a sustainable and profitable recreation sector). The first 
project regards the construction of a forest hut exclusively of sustainable materials, while the 
second regards placing labels on several prohibition signs in natural habitats and linking them 
to a webpage that contains the reasons for the adoption of the respective prohibitive 
measure.836 Another illustrative example is the outcome of the 2009 SBIR call titled 
                                                          
833 The individual interviews were loosely structured, and consisted exclusively of open-ended questions. 
834 See <http://www.agentschapnl.nl/onderwerp/aanbesteden-van-innovaties> accessed 2 February 2013. 
835 See <http://www.agentschapnl.nl/onderwerp/aanbesteden-van-innovaties> accessed 2 February 2013. 
836 See <http://www.rvo.nl/subsidies-regelingen/projecten-sbir-innovatie-voor-recreatie-en-ruimte>  accessed 15 January 2014. 
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‘Bevorderen en behouden biodiversiteit’ (Foster and maintain biodiversity). The innovative 
solution to avoid destruction of biodiversity when mowing wet grassland, regarded in this 
case a mowing machine equipped with caterpillars instead of wheels.837  
4.3.5 Conclusions 
In the previous sections 4.3.2-4.3.3, I have outlined the major differences between the NL SBIR 
scheme and its US counterpart. I have pointed out whether these differences are a 
consequence of European Commission’s guidance on compliance of PCP initiatives with the 
EU legal rules. The existence of some of these differences was confirmed by the analysis of the 
SBIR calls in section 4.3.4. By reference the prerequisites identified in Chapter 2, I draw 
conclusions regarding the consequence of these differences for the effective 
implementation of the Dutch SBIR.  
1. Public R&D funding targets the most experimental and riskiest R&D projects (see Chapter 
2).  
Some features of the Dutch SBIR programme indicate that the riskiest/most uncertain 
R&D projects are not the primary target.  
First, NL SBIR is not financed from a separate budget, but from the existing R&D 
budgets of the different governmental departments. These departments do not have 
the obligation to dedicate a certain percentage of their R&D budgets to NL SBIR 
projects. The implementation of SBIR projects depends on the efforts of the NL Agency 
to promote the SBIR scheme within the different government departments.838 This 
creates the risk that SBIR officers take less risks and favour closer-to-market 
technologies. That this is the case, has been confirmed by the analysis of the SBIR calls 
in section 4.3.4.  
Second, the Dutch SBIR programme does not require an analysis of the market 
dynamics in the field that each SBIR call is aiming to advance. Moreover, the award 
criteria in the NL SBIR lay a stronger accent on the commercialization potential of the 
proposed solution than its US counterprogramme. This entails the risk that close-to-
commercialisation projects are funded instead of early-stage R&D projects. In 
addition, this raises questions of compliance with the minimum requirement for the 
legitimate use of PCP, regarding the R&S service character of the contract. 
2. Public R&D funding targets small companies, that experience difficulties in obtaining 
(sufficient amounts of) private capital for experimental/risky R&D projects (see Chapter 2). 
                                                          
837 See http://supplymanagementcongress.nl/ accessed 12 August 2012. 
838 Technopolis (2010) 43. 
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The Dutch SBIR programme targets both large and small companies, that are in 
principle equally entitled to participate in SBIR competitions. In practice though, the 
SBIR contracts prove particularly attractive to small and medium sized firms (as shown 
in section 4.3.1).  
In line with the PCP guidance, the Dutch SBIR programme does not aim to cover the 
full cost of the R&D.839 This may constitute a disincentive for small companies to 
participate in SBIR competitions with their riskiest/most uncertain R&D projects. 
However, in practice the Dutch SBIR programme does not properly enforce the 
requirement of cost sharing. Although firms are required to offer a discount on the 
R&D costs in return for retaining the IP ownership, compliance with this requirement is 
not checked.  
3. A high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure are accepted. (see Chapter 2) 
The Dutch SBIR programme in its current set-up does not present the incentives for the 
NL SBIR officers to adopt such highly experimental and tolerant attitudes. Lower 
maximum amounts of funding per stage and shorter timelines for the R&D effort are 
available than within the US SBIR, while no flexibility is provided to deviate from the 
maximum values. Moreover, the possibility to award an additional, sequential Phase 2 
award to the same company for continuing research initiated in the first phase 2 
award is not available.  
4. Competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process (see Chapter 2). 
The condition of EU-wide competition is officially embedded into the Dutch SBIR. 
Following alignment with the EU legal rules, the eligibility criterion of Dutch ownership 
has been replaced by the requirement to conduct the targeted R&D within a EU 
Member State. In practice, however, the requirement of using the Dutch language 
during the whole SBIR process functions as a powerful de facto barrier to the 
participation of firms from other EU countries. In addition, the Dutch SBIR does not 
embed a serious investigation of whether the envisaged projects significantly 
advance international state-of-the-art. These factors entail the risk that national 
companies are protected from European and international competition instead of 
being challenged to developed advanced innovation that can subsequently 
compete with success on global markets. 
                                                          
839 The PCP Communication indicates that in order to exclude the applicability of EU State aid rules, the contracting authority should share 
the R&D costs with the participating company, in accordance with the predefined sharing of IPR. 
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5. The public purchaser is the technologically sophisticated end-user of the envisaged 
innovation (see Chapter 2). 
The deployment of the Dutch SBIR is centrally organized by NL Agency, in the name of 
different ministries. Most often neither NL Agency nor a ministry is the end-user of the 
developed innovation, and no action is taken to involve end-users into the SBIR 
project. Moreover, the NL Agency’s officers in charge of formulating each SBIR call 
are not required to be in command of the relevant technical expertise. The 
consequence is that the NL SBIR grants subsidies that need to comply with the EU 
State aid rules. This not only challenges the effectiveness of the NL SBIR scheme, but 
also raises questions of compliance with EU State aid rules (the latter aspect is further 
discussed in Chapter 5).   
6. The public purchaser is willing to pay the premium price for the early use of the developed 
innovation and is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the developed innovation 
(see Chapter 2).  
In line with the PCP guidance, the Dutch SBIR does not allow the direct procurement 
of the developed innovative products or services. Instead, a separate competitive 
award must be organized in compliance with the applicable Procurement Directive. 
Moreover, no alternative support for reaching the commercialization stage is 
available. This is experienced as a disincentive to engage in NL SBIR competitions, by 
both public agencies (that want to use NL SBIR competitions to develop innovative 
solutions for their own operational needs) and by participating suppliers.  
7. Innovative technologies rather than innovative services are targeted (see Chapter 2).  
The NL SBIR funds SBIR competitions for the development of innovative services, 
without any relation to technologies. Funding R&D in services within the framework of 
the NL SBIR raises questions on the effectiveness of the public spending, particularly 
when the minimum requirement that exclusively R&D service contracts be funded is 
neither assessed nor monitored.   
8. A continuous scrutiny/measurement of the impact of PCP is performed and lessons learnt 
are codified in guidance (see Chapter 2). 
The Dutch SBIR has went through an early qualitative assessment. However, this 
assessment has not led to any major change in the implementation guidance or in the 
practice.   
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In conclusion, the Dutch SBIR programme is grounded into an innovation policy mindset 
which is subsidy-like and national in scope. Partly due to the need to comply with EU rules, 
partly due to an insufficient understanding of the fundaments of  an effective R&D 
procurement, the Dutch SBIR fails to provide the link with the real needs of public end-users 
and it fails to challenge national companies to advance their innovations beyond global 
state-of-the-art. Instead it funds close-to-market solutions without prospective public or 
private end-customers and without a prospective competitive advantage on the European 
or global market.  
4.4 The UK SBRI 
4.4.1 Background and evaluation of SBRI (2001-2009) 
In 2001, the UK set up the first European scheme for strengthening the demand-side of its 
public innovation policy, aiming to emulate SBIR’s success in the US.840 The UK scheme was 
called the Small Business Research Initiative (‘SBRI’). It encouraged public bodies to invest 
2,5% of their external R&D budgets in small and early stage UK technology companies that 
encountered difficulties in accessing private funding.841  
Similar to the US SBIR, the SBRI scheme provides for two staged-funding of R&D, for the 
feasibility study at Phase 1 and for product development at Phase 2. The SBRI scheme 
covered 100% of the R&D costs with a maximum of £200k per project. However, contrary to 
the US SBIR, a participating company needed to be able to fund itself 65% of the total costs 
before any work could start. Grants for multiple projects were excluded.842 
The SBRI had a very slow start. Until 2005, it had only advertised contracts of around £2m843  
per year instead of more than £100m.844 
In 2005, in an effort to boost the SBRI programme, the contribution of 2,5% of the external R&D 
budgets of all government departments was made mandatory by legislation. Despite this 
measure, Lord Sainsbury’s report revealed two years later that the attitude change needed 
to make the SBRI programme a success had not occurred.845 Due to the unclear formulation 
of the legislation, government departments continued to include into the mandatory 2,5% 
                                                          
840 Lord Sainsbury of Turville, ‘The Race to the Top, A review of the Government’s Science and Innovation Policies’ (October 2007) 129 (Lord 
Sainsbury (2007)) <http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/sainsbury_review051007.pdf> accessed 2 February 2013. 
841 David Connell, ‘Secrets’ of the World’s Largest Seed Capital Fund: How the United States Government Uses its Small Business Innovation 
Research (SBIR) Programme and Procurement Budgets to Support Small Technology Firms’ (2006) (Connell (2006)) 4. 
842 Connell  (2006) 3. 
843 Kirsten Bound and Ruth Puttick, ‘Buying Power? Is the Small Business Research Initiative for procuring R&D driving innovation in the 
UK?’ (June 2010) 3 (Bound & Puttick (2010) <http://www.nesta.org.uk/library/documents/Buying_Power_150610.pdf> accessed 2 
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844 Lord Sainsbury’s report shows that between 2001-2005, 2,5% of the UK government’s R&D budget constituted more than £100m. See 
Lord Sainsbury (2007) 120. 
845 Lord Sainsbury (2007) 135. 
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contribution, investments in policy development research (besides scientific and technical 
research). As a consequence, only 1% of the 200 funded projects placed before 2008 were in 
line with the definition of R&D as defined by the UK Treasury.846  
The reluctant attitude of the government departments to participate in the SBRI scheme was 
attributed to two main reasons.  
Firstly, the SBRI scheme was imposed top-down without clarification of its objectives 
and functioning.847 The Department of Trade and Industry inappropriately 
underscored the aim to stimulate the innovativeness of companies, without 
highlighting the opportunity offered by the SBRI to help achieve each department’s 
public objectives. As a consequence, the individual government departments did not 
feel incentivised to identify needs for innovative technologies (solutions) and did not 
initiate SBRI competitions.848 
Secondly, R&D projects did not pass the mandatory value-for-money assessment.849 
Lord Sainsbury’s report provided concrete recommendations to bring the SBRI programme 
more in line with the US SBIR counterpart. The improved SBRI was launched in 2009 and was 
followed by two early evaluations in 2010, performed by Nesta and Pro-Inno Europe. In the 
following sections, I will outline these developments. 
4.4.2 SBRI – features of the latest version (2009 and later) 
a) Introduction 
Lord Sainsbury’s 2007 report recommended to bring SBRI more in line with the US SBIR scheme 
and to direct it towards fulfilling the objectives of the departments involved.850 Lord Sainsbury 
submitted concrete proposals to this end. Departments should publicize up front and on a 
regular basis the technological areas in which SBRI competitions would be conducted. The 
SBRI competitions should be strictly limited to funding R&D activities and should exclude 
projects falling within the field of humanities and social sciences. The SBRI awards should be in 
the form of contracts, not equity loans or grants, in order to ensure that the governmental 
                                                          
846 Bound and Puttick (2010) 7. 
847 Technopolis (2010) 32. 
848 Technopolis (2010); Ernst &Young (2011); Connell (2006) 2. 
849 See Connell (2006) 35. The value-for-money assessment should be applied to all procurements, before taking a decision to start the 
procedure. In summary, the value-for-money assessment entails a check on the viability of the project (whether efficiency, accountability or 
equity arguments oppose the envisaged procurement), desirability (assessment of the relative benefits compared to other routes which 
may achieve better outcomes) and achievability (analysis of market interest and availability of market solutions, assessment of the capacity 
of the contracting authority to manage the envisaged process). In addition, the value-for-money assessment entails factors such as an 
optimum allocation of risks and calculation of whole life costs which cannot always be complied with in pre-commercial procurements.  See 
also: HM Treasury, ‘Value-for-money Assessment Guidance’ (November 2006) <http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/d/vfm_assessmentguidance061006opt.pdf> accessed 30 June 2012. 
850 Lord Sainsbury (2007) 12. 
 
 191 
departments clearly define the objectives of the awarded projects and check whether these 
have been fulfilled. In this manner, the completion of an SBRI project would become a quality 
label for SBRI participants to show to future investors and customers.851  
Regarding the organisational structure of the SBRI scheme, the report suggested to grant a 
central administrative role to the Technology Strategy Board (TSB), which is an agency of the 
UK’s Trade Ministry similar to the Small Business Administration in the US. TSB would be made 
responsible for publicizing twice a year a list of up-coming SBRI calls and their technological 
areas. TSB would also be responsible for the administration of the award procedure, while the 
evaluation of the SBRI proposals would be performed jointly with the awarding 
department(s).852 Finally, Lord Sainsbury recommended to decrease the percentage of the 
extramural R&D funds to be invested in SBRI competitions to 1,5% and to progressively 
increase it to 2% and 2,5% in the subsequent two years.853 
b) Non-mandatory participation 
Based on these recommendations an adapted SBRI scheme was implemented in April 2009, 
following an initial pilot in 2008.854 There are currently 6 to 8 government departments that 
participate in the SBRI scheme coordinated by TSB. Each department defines its innovation 
challenges in Innovation Procurement Plans. The declared aim is to define the challenges in a 
manner  that attracts sufficient bidders and that leaves room for the most innovative 
proposals.855  
Participation in the SBRI and budget set-asides are currently voluntary. TSB regularly organises 
workshops to encourage the implementation of SBRI competitions by explaining its 
functioning and benefits for the policy objectives of the different departments. In 2011, £20m 
were set aside by the Department of Health for SBRI competitions. TSB reserved in its turn £10m 
for co-funding participation by 7 other public bodies such as the Welsh Government, WRAP 
(working together for a world without waste), NHS London, NHS Midlands and East, the 
National Centre for the Refinement, Reduction and Replacement of Animals in Health 
(NC3Rs), the Ministry of Defence and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural 
Affairs.856 The co-financing is meant to incentivise these departments to employ their own 
R&D funds in SBRI competitions.   
                                                          
851 Lord Sainsbury (2007) 131. 
852 Lord Sainsbury (2007) 131. 
853 Ibid. 
854 Bound & Puttick (2010) 3. 
855 Christiaan Holland,’Peer Review of Small Business Research Initiative (SBRI) – UK’ (9 June 2010) 8 (Holland (2010)) <http://www.proinno-
europe.eu/sites/default/files/repository_files/11/06/D%202%202%20INNO-
Partnering%20Forum%20Pilot%20Peer%20Review%20Report%20SBRI%20UK%20delivered.pdf > accessed 2 February 2013. 
856 Technology Strategy Board, ‘Delivery Plan Financial year 2012-13’ (2012) 20 (TSB Delivery Plan (2012)) 
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c) Decentralised implementation 
In line with the US example, TSB was attributed coordination and support roles similar to those 
of the US Small Business Administration. TSB provides operational support in, for example, 
defining calls and finding expert evaluators for SBRI bids.857 It is not clear whether technically 
advanced project officers are in charge of defining the calls. Nor is it clear whether project 
officers are allowed flexibility to adapt the topic or amount and time of funding to the needs 
of each project, as is the case within the framework of the US SBIR. Yet, the more 
decentralized set-up of the UK SBRI scheme, allows closer involvement of the public end-
customers into the R&D process when compared to the NL SBIR scheme.  
Independent from the SBRI scheme coordinated by TSB, other PCP-like initiatives have been 
implemented since 2006 by the Department of Health’s National Innovation Centre (NHS) 
and the Energy Technologies Institute (set up in 2006 as a private company by global energy 
companies and the UK Government). They follow the same approach as TSB, but 
independently implement the whole SBRI process. Interesting to remark is the requirement 
that the NHS introduced for applicants from other Member States than UK, namely to present 
proof that the developed products would (also) be commercialized on the UK market.858  
d) Eligibility criteria 
Analogous to the situation in the Netherlands, the UK scheme remains open to small and 
large businesses. In practice, more than 75% of the funding is awarded to small businesses.859 
Besides small and emerging businesses, academia and charities are eligible for participation, 
provided they demonstrate access to a route to market for the developed solutions.860  
It is not clear how compliance with the minimum requirement that only R&D service contracts 
are eligible for funding through the SBIR is ensured. No market consultation in relation to each 
SBRI competition is organized. However, the TSB regularly sets up Innovation Platforms (‘IPs’) to 
identify the range of technologies that can provide solutions to societal challenges in various 
areas. These IPs are also used to identify the range of policies and regulatory actions needed 
to bring the novel technologies to the (global) market. Herefore, thorough market research 
and economic/business research studies are performed.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
<http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/delivery_plan_2012.pdf> accessed 2 February 2013. 
857 Technopolis (2010) 32. 
858 My research does not separately investigate this initiative, due to the fact that the same approach is followed as the SBRI as well as due 
to the limited amount of information available..  FAQ Department of Health, available at: 
http://www.london.nhs.uk/webfiles/Innovation%20documents/SBRI_DH_100_005%20FAQ.pdf .  
859 TSB Delivery Plan (2012) 13. 
860 TSB, ‘SBRI - – Government challenges. Ideas from business. Innovative solutions.’ (September 2011) 2 (TSB Government Challenges 
(2011)) <http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/sbri_brochure_2011.pdf> accessed 2 January 2013. 
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The market research engages relevant stakeholders (such as businesses, academics, 
government agencies) in an effort to identify the available technologies and the relevant 
ongoing R&D projects (a technology roadmap). The commissioned studies are meant to 
outline which (combination of) policies and legislations can ensure the large-scale 
deployment of the novel products and which changes in the system (for example in the 
health care system) are required by the new solutions. Moreover, studies may be 
commissioned to identify the expectations of the end-users and their perception of the novel 
solutions (for example the openness of end-users to acquire the new skills to use the new 
technologies; the privacy objections etc).861 However, as already mentioned, the IPs do not 
cover all the areas in which SBRI competitions are organized and do not seem to be directly 
linked to the SBRI competitions.862 In addition, the market research is performed at the 
national level.863  
e) Phases 
In line with the US SBIR, the amount of funding per call has been increased to between £50k 
and £100k for Phase 1, and between £250k and £1m for Phase 2. However, the timeline for 
Phase 2 is considerably shorter than the EU PCP prescriptions (up to two years). No express 
possibility is provided to deviate from the maximum time-limits or from the maximum amounts 
per Phase. In addition, and similar to the NL SBIR, no explicit opportunity is granted to award 
multiple sequential Phase 2 contracts to the same company. This entails that tolerance to 
early failure is not expressly embedded in the programme and that closer to market projects 
may be favoured.  
Commercialization following the completion of Phase 2 is up to the SBRI finalist company. The 
government does not guarantee the purchase of the developed novel products.864 The UK 
SBRI follows in this respect the PCP guidance and presents thus the same diversion from the US 
SBIR as the NL SBIR.  
f) Percentage of funded R&D costs 
Following the US SBIR approach, both Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the SBRI provide 100% of the 
feasibility and prototyping costs.865 As already mentioned in the overview of the NL SBIR, this 
                                                          
861 More information can be found at <http://www.innovateuk.org/ourstrategy/innovationplatforms/assistedliving/assisted-living-
innovation-platform.ashx> accessed at 4 September 2012.  
862 There are currently six innovation platforms: low carbon vehicles – established 2007; assisted living – established 2007; low impact 
buildings – established 2008; detection and identification of infectious agents – established 2008; sustainable agriculture and food – 
established 2009; stratified medicine – established 2010. See TSB Delivery Plan (2012) 21. 
863 See for example the Assissted Living Roadmap exercise of 8 January 2007: 
https://connect.innovateuk.org/c/document_library/get_file?p_l_id=145400&folderId=609151&name=DLFE-4588.pdf  
864 TSB Government Challenges (2011) 3. 
865 TSB Government Challenges (2011) 4. 
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approach disregards the PCP guidance and raises questions of compliance with EU State aid 
rules. 
g) IPR arrangements and award criteria 
IPR arrangements are described in very broad terms (the R&D service provider retains the 
Intellectual property),866 while generic award criteria on this issue are not published. 
4.4.3 SBRI – 2010 evaluation  
There is no impact evaluation of the UK SBRI scheme so far, as it only recently began to run in 
its current form.867 Two reports by Pro Inno Europe and Nesta have evaluated the 
intermediate results of the programme.868 
The report by Pro Inno Europe shows that both the participating departments and the 
participating businesses are positive about the functioning and the results of the new 
programme. Government departments consider that the programme grants them access to 
innovative ideas and to new suppliers. Participating companies list several incentives to 
participate in the SBRI. First, the programme offers them the opportunity to closely collaborate 
with a future customer. Second, the programme ensures funding that could not be acquired 
from the private market, and does not require matching funding. Third, the programme 
operates as a quality certification mechanism supporting the future acquisition of venture 
capital.869  
The Pro Inno report further lists as strengths of the scheme: flexibility in the support level 
provided by TSB during the set-up and management of the SBRI competition; short evaluation 
times and simple procedures; broad involvement of the funding agency with the innovation 
project compared to subsidies.870  
The report mentions a few downsides of the scheme. These include: a low number of 
participating funding agencies; relative high costs of conducting the scheme; the lack of a 
market consultation that precedes the definition of the SBRI challenge; the support gap at 
Phase III (the functionaries running the SBRI should encourage the procurement functionaries 
more to purchase the results of SBRI projects); the lack of budget continuity (no central 
budget for SBRI is available, while the R&D budgets of the individual departments may suffer 
cuts due to the recent economic crisis).871 
                                                          
866 TSB Government Challenges (2011) 3. 
867 TSB Delivery Plan (2012) 32. 
868 Holland (2010); Bound and Puttick (2010). 
869 Holland (2010) 10. 
870 Holland (2010) 12. 
871 Holland (2010) 13. 
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The Pro Inno Europe Report thus submits that increased political support is needed for the 
wider implementation of the programme. It also advocates improving the knowledge on the 
potential benefits and risks of the scheme. Interestingly, the Pro Inno Europe Report points out 
that there is moderate support among stakeholders for addressing shared European needs 
through the set-up of a similar programme by the EU (as funding agency). According to the 
report, such a programme would have the advantage of avoiding the criticism that national 
public funds are spent without immediate visible results. 872  
Nesta’s Report finds early indications of success of the SBRI in its new form, based on 
interviews with SBRI participants and on the analysis of 10 of the 28 SBRI competitions 
launched between 2008 and 2010,. The report reaches conclusions, similar to the InnoPro 
report’s. SBRI provides much needed funding in a challenging financial climate. In addition, 
by acting as a ‘lead demonstrator’, the government enhances the credibility of the awarded 
companies in the face of potential private investors.873  Moreover, the programme creates 
and boosts market opportunities (such as in the home-retrofitting sector), when deployed on 
a sufficiently large scale.874  
Nesta’s Report expresses the same view as the Pro Inno report, that the decentralized 
implementation and the procedural flexibility (allowing the adaptation of the SBRI make-up 
to the needs of individual participating public agencies) constitute strengths of the 
programme.875 According to the Nesta report, the main shortcomings of the SBRI are the 
missing uptake of developed solutions by public purchasers and the lack of follow-up up to 
the commercialization stage. Unlike the Pro Inno report, Nesta’s Report concludes that 
voluntary participation supported by (financial) incentives from TSB may potentially be more 
effective than mandatory participation. According to Nesta, thus the risk will be eliminated 
that contracting authorities will fund unsuitable competitions, just to comply with mandatory 
spending thresholds as it happened until 2009.  
Finally, Nesta’s Report mentions the need to collect relevant data and to regularly assess the 
impact of the programme. It also suggests to collect success stories and experiences, and to 
share them among public bodies.876 
4.4.4 Projects 
By 2010, 28 SBRI calls were published and 1,030 offers were received. A total of 373 contracts 
were subsequently awarded. 283 of these were Phase 1 contracts and 90 were Phase 2 
contracts. The 373 contracts were concluded with 283 suppliers, which indicates that some 
                                                          
872 Ibid. 
873 Bound and Puttick (2010) 15-7. 
874 Bound & Puttick (2010) 15. 
875 Bound & Puttick (2010) 15-7, 20. 
876 Bound & Puttick (2010)-20. 
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suppliers won contracts in more than one SBRI competition. The value of the contracts 
amounted to a total of £ 24 million. Of that amount, 74% went to SMEs, the remainder to large 
companies.877  
Since 2010, a surge in the number of SBRI competitions can be observed. The total number of 
published calls by August 2012 was close to one hundred.878  In this section, I discuss some 
characteristics of the SBRI programme, based on a documentary analysis of 27 SBRI calls 
published on TSB’s website between October 2012 and December 2013. I analyse the calls 
against the same criteria as I used with the Dutch SBIR: (1) the existence of a public end-
customer, (2) targeting technological innovations, (3) targeting high-risk or uncertain R&D.  
Based on this analysis, I can summarize the following observations.  
My first observation is that unlike in the Netherlands, most SBRI calls regard the development 
of innovative solutions for concrete operational needs of the participating public agencies. 
19 of the 27 analysed calls were funded by a public agency who could potentially act as 
end-customer of the targeted innovation. Also interesting to mention is that 13 of these 19 
direct PCPs were funded by research agencies of the Ministry of Defense (‘MoD’).  
My second observation is that the SBRI programme focuses predominantly on technological 
innovations. 21 of the 27 calls target exclusively the development of technological 
innovations. In 5 other calls it appears that services innovations are also accepted. Only 1 
calls targets exclusively service innovations. 
My third observation is that a large share of the calls expressly target high-risk innovations. 
Thus, 11 of the 13 calls published by MoD stress that submitted proposals should target high-
risk R&D and should aim to develop disruptive innovations. Only 2 calls provide indication that 
late stage technologies are preferred: one requires the delivery of a prototype within one 
year;879 another call requires new applications of existing technologies880.  
4.4.5 Conclusions 
Since 2008, the UK SBRI has been brought more in line with the philosophy and operational 
make-up of the US SBIR. In this form, the UK SBRI comes closer to the US SBIR than the Dutch 
initiative. Hereunder, I summarise the differences and highlight whether they bear relevance 
                                                          
877 Holland (2010) 10. 
878 See <http://www.innovateuk.org/deliveringinnovation/smallbusinessresearchinitiative/competitions.ashx> accessed 4 September 2012.  
879 See ‘Innovation design for future climate resilience in the infrastructure and built environment sectors’, available at 
https://www.innovateuk.org/competition-display-page/-/asset_publisher/RqEt2AKmEBhi/content/innovative-design-for-future-climate-
resilience-in-the-infrastructure-and-built-environment-sectors?p_p_auth=KwurO9n8 accessed 14 January 2014. 
880 See ‘land vehicles exercise’, available at https://www.innovateuk.org/competition-display-page/-
/asset_publisher/RqEt2AKmEBhi/content/land-vehicle-exercise-lvex-2013?p_p_auth=KwurO9n8> accessed 14 January 2014. 
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for the potential impact of the programme according to the prerequisites identified in 
Chapter 2.  
1. The public R&D funding targets the most experimental and riskiest R&D projects (see 
Chapter 2). 
Participation in the UK SBRI is not mandatory. Neither is it mandatory for public bodies 
to set aside dedicated SBRI budgets. Participation in the SBRI is encouraged through 
advocacy and co-funding by TSB. This approach was considered suitable for the UK 
framework, considering the previous experience with mandatory set-asides that did 
not lead to the expected mind-set change. However, lack of a clear obligation to 
engage in SBRI projects may inhibit the risk-taking attitude of the public authorities, 
particularly in times of budgetary crunch.  
The documentary analysis of the SBRI calls provided indications that high risk R&D is 
targeted, particularly by MoD. It is however unclear whether choice of SBRI projects is 
preceded by a thorough scrutiny of the technologies already available on the 
market. TSB regularly performs extended analyses of the stage of development of 
alternative technologies, market structure and end-users’ preferences. However, they 
are not performed in direct relation with the SBRI scheme and are not performed in all 
areas where SBRI projects are published. This entails the risk that close-to-market 
technologies are funded instead of early stage R&D. 
2. The public R&D funding targets small companies, that experience difficulties in obtaining 
(sufficient amounts of) private capital for experimental/risky R&D projects (see Chapter 2). 
Similar to the Dutch SBIR, the UK SBRI programme targets both large and small 
companies. But the UK SBRI was also set-up initially to attract small and medium sized 
firms. Moreover, within the UK SBRI, 100% of the R&D costs are covered. Although, 
unlike in the US, no profit is covered, this feature shows that the UK SBRI is more aligned 
with the rationale that small firms have difficulties in finding matching funds for risky or 
uncertain R&D projects. Full coverage of R&D costs within the UK SBRI provides an 
additional incentive to small companies to participate in SBRI competitions with their 
riskiest/most uncertain R&D projects. 
3. A high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure are accepted (see Chapter 2). 
The UK SBRI provides insufficient incentives for the project officers to adopt highly 
experimental and failure tolerant attitudes. Although the amount of funding per Phase 
is at the same levels as in the US, the possibility to deviate from the maximum values is 
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not provided. Neither is the possibility to award multiple sequential Phase 2 awards to 
promising projects that have not successfully accomplished the prototyping phase in 
the first SBRI call.  
4. Competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process (see Chapter 2). 
Although EU-wide competition is foreseen in the UK SBRI, restricted access to the 
procurement documentation sheds some doubts regarding compliance with this 
requirement. In addition, the market scrutiny performed by TSB under the name of 
Innovation Platforms does not seem to be directly linked to the SBRI competitions and 
are national in scope. These aspects entail the risk that the SBRI competitions tend to 
protect national companies from EU and international competition instead of driving 
them to advance the international state-of-the-art and gain competitive advantages 
on global markets. 
5. The public purchaser is the technologically sophisticated end-user of the envisaged 
innovation (see Chapter 2). 
Implementation of the SBRI programme is more decentralized than the Dutch SBIR 
and approaches the US SBIR in this respect. TSB provides different degrees of support, 
but SBRI award and contract management is generally performed by the  funding 
agency. These public bodies are most often also the end-customers of the developed 
solutions.  
6. The public purchaser is willing to pay the premium price for the early use of the developed 
innovation and is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the developed innovation 
(see Chapter 2). 
Similar to the Dutch SBIR and conform the PCP guidance, the UK SBRI does not ensure 
purchase of the developed solutions. Although in the UK there is experience with the 
Forward Commitment Procurement (‘FCP’, see Chapter 1, section 1.5.4 above), which 
can guarantee an end-customer of the developed products, FCP has so far been 
piloted without any link to SBRI or TSB.881 
7. A continuous scrutiny/measurement of the impact of PCP is performed and lessons learnt 
are codified in guidance. 
                                                          
881 FCP entails a competitive award under the scope of the Procurement Directives and does not guarantee the purchase of the products 
developed during the SBRI project. See Department for Business Innovation & Skills, ‘Case Study: Forward Commitment Procurement’ 
(2011) <http://www.bis.gov.uk/assets/BISCore/corporate/MigratedD/publications/C/cs01_fcp.pdf> accessed 2 February 2013. 
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 The UK SBRI has regularly been assessed and as a consequence thereof, important 
changes have been included into the progrmme.  
The UK SBRI embeds more prerequisites for effectiveness than the Dutch SBIR. However, it 
supports to a lesser extent than the US SBIR participating (national) companies to create 
globally competitive innovations and gain global market shares. 
4.5 The Flemish Procurement of Innovation 
4.5.1 Description and initiation background    
The UK SBRI and the NL SBIR are the first and most established PCP-like initiatives in the EU. In 
2006, IWT (Agentschap voor Innovatie door Wetenschap en Technologie, the Flemish 
innovation agency) followed suit. IWT explored (in the context of a thematic working group of 
the Innovation Platform on Environmental Issues and Energy) the possibilities to use Flemish 
Procurement of Innovation (PoI) as a tool to develop the technological base of the Flemish 
region, to find cost-efficient solutions to important socio-economic problems and to improve 
public services.882 Because explicit discrimination in favour of Flemish businesses is not allowed 
by EU competition rules, IWT directed the deployment of PoI towards areas wherein Flemish 
companies already possess core competencies.883  
PoI was defined as procurement of products/services ‘that do(es) not exist, but which could 
(probably) be developed within a reasonable period of time, based on additional or new 
innovative work by the organization(s) undertaking to produce, supply, and sell the product 
being purchased’ (my translation).884  
IWT pointed out that the following elements were considered crucial for the successful 
deployment of PoI:  
 political support for the PoI;  
 dialogue between the contracting authorities and suppliers;  
 sharing of risks and benefits;  
 use of foresight techniques;  
                                                          
882 C.Veys, P. Thevissen, H. Bodewes, S. Hargeskog, L. Müller, M. Ottolander, N. Widmark, ‘Exploring Public Procurement of Innovation as a 
Strategic Innovation Policy Mix Instrument’ (March 2009) 37 (Veys et al (2009))  <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/files/409> 
accessed 2 February 2013 
883 IWT, ‘Vlaams Actieplan Innovatief Aanbesteden (2008-2010)’ 3, 5 (IWT Actieplan (2008-2010)) 
<http://www.iwt.be/sites/default/files/IA_Vlaams_actieplan.pdf> accessed 2 February 2013.  
884 IWT, ‘Innovatief Aanbesteden door de Vlaamse Overheid’ (17 November 2006) slide 8. Inspired by Charles Edquist and Leif Hommen 




 use of the risk management expertise by the public buyer.
885
  
Subsequently, IWT refined the methodology, partially based on the lessons learnt with the 
framework of the European OMC-PTP project. 886  
PoI as refined by IWT consists of the following steps.  
 The impetus for initiating a procurement of innovation must originate in the political 
ambitions of each participating ministry.  
 Each ministry is required to supervise the drafting of a master plan by a contracting 
authority, in line with the above mentioned political ambitions. The contracting 
authority should justify in the master plan why it needs a new solution and how this 
can enhance the effective and efficient execution of its public tasks.
887
  
 At this stage, a list of requirements for the desired innovations and a list of Key 
Performance Indicators are also defined.
888
  
Besides defining the business-case for deploying a PoI, the role of a master plan is to signal 
political commitment for the development of new technologies to the market. The master 
plan is also expected to raise visibility for the PoI and as a consequence to encourage other 
contracting authorities to get involved.  
 Following the formulation of the master plan, the market is consulted in order to find 
out whether the desired solutions are available. This is done though a so-called 
Innovation Platform, established for a period of 6 months.
889
  
The function of the Innovation Platform is both to consult the market on the existence of the 
desired solution and to receive concrete input on defining the procurement specifications. It 
facilitates an exchange of information between several stakeholders (e.g., procurers, 
knowledge centres, firms), with the aim to align the private strategies with the public ones. 
The Innovation Platform is also meant to identify other innovation policy instruments besides or 
                                                          
885 Idem. 
886 The OMC-PTP project was a project funded by the European Commission under FP6 and had the objective to set up pilot programmes 
involving various forms of procurement of new technology and innovation in the participating countries and provide a platform for 
exchanges of experiences and feedback. See 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/search/index.cfm?fuseaction=result.document&RS_LANG=EN&RS_RCN=12564029&q> accessed 4 September 
2012.  
887 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 7. 
888 Veys et al (2009). 
889 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 10. 
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instead of public procurement, which would be (more) suitable to stimulate the development 
of the desired solution.890  
 The information obtained through the Innovation Platform is processed into an 
Innovation Matrix: one of the axis will indicate the type of involvement of the 
government in the procurement of the technology: direct procurement, co-operative 
or catalytic procurement; the other axis will indicate the stage of development of the 
required technology: feasibility study, prototype, field tests, commercially available. 891 
Fig.3 The structure of a PoI innovation matrix892 
Lack of explorative trajectories in the Innovation Matrix is considered an indication that 
insufficient attention has been paid by the government agency to future socio-economic 
needs.893 The filled-out Innovation Matrix provides support for the choice of the most suitable 
procurement instrument.894 If the technology already exists (e.g. finds itself at the 
integration/adaptation or diffusion phase on the Matrix) but it is not yet broadly 
commercialised, commercial procurement should be chosen. When the technology finds 
itself at an R&D stage (e.g. concept, feasibility, prototype, pilot), PCP should be chosen.895 
The entire approach can be visualised as follows: 
                                                          
890 Veys et al (2009) 37. 
891 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 4. The Matrix was inspired by Hommen’s Matrix. See Hommen, Leif & Rolfstam, Max, ‘Classifying Public 
Procurement of Innovation: A Taxonomy’ (2006) Oct Issue Tijdschrift Aanbestedingsrecht 112. 
892 Source: Presentation of Peter Thevissen en Stephan Corvers, Brussels, January 2007 
893 Concept van Innovatief aanbesteden voor Vlaanderen 11. IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 8. 





Fig.4 PoI model896  
4.5.2 Features of the Flemish PoI 
In this section I summarise the PoI in terms of what I consider its defining features: 
a) Non-mandatory participation 
The policy described in the previous section was approved by the Flemish government 
in July 2008. Within this context, an Action Plan was drafted  that focused specifically 
on the procurement of R&D. IWT was appointed to pilot pre-commercial procurement 
calls between 2009 - 2014.  IWT received a budget of EUR 10m for realizing this in the 
period 2008-2010.897   
The Flemish PoI finds itself at the piloting stage and it is not clear whether the 
programme may afterwards become mandatory for certain contracting authorities. It 
is currently voluntary. 
b) Centralised implementation 
The Flemish PoI is centrally driven by IWT. The centralized set-up of the programme 
bears a strong resemblance to the NL SBIR. IWT is in charge of organizing Innovation 
Platforms and of subsequently conducting PCP procedures, in the name of the 
                                                          
896 Source: The Flemish model for Procurement of Innovation, IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 




commissioning ministry. The ministry decides whether an Innovation Platform needs to 
be set-up on a certain topic. It subsequently approaches IWT with the request to draft 
a master plan, to run an Innovation Platform and to run the subsequent pre-
commercial procurements.898 It appears that a contracting authority with concrete 
needs  not necessarily involved in initiating the process but will be invited to 
participate in the Innovation Platform.899 Each Innovation Platform is advertised on a 
EU-wide forum and is open to any relevant stakeholder for participation.900 Yet, the 
required use of the Flemish language901 will discourage companies from other 
Member States to participate.902 
More in line with the US SBIR, IWT employs personnel with relevant technical expertise 
depending on the needs of each project. Such technical expertise is particularly used 
during the Innovation Platforms to determine the degree of technical innovation 
needed for the development of the desired solutions.903  
c) Eligibility criteria 
The activities that may be eligible for award are not defined. It is therefore not possible 
for me to conclude whether these are in line with the definition of R&D, as outlined in 
the Frascati Manual or as used within the US SBIR. IWT is, however, in charge of 
supervising compliance with the minimum legal requirements governing PCP 
throughout the whole process.904  
d) Phases 
The Flemish PCP procedure is divided into 3 phases: feasibility study, prototype and 
pilot project. For each phase, IWT will make the following budgets available: up to 
80.000 euro for the feasibility study, up to 500.000 euro for prototyping and between 
750.000 euro and 1.5 million euro for the pilot. Each client ministry may provide 
additional budgets.905 These amounts are in line with the US SBIR approach.  
                                                          
898 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 10-1. 
899 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010)10. 
900 Chapter 5.1, http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/juridisch> accessed 10 November 2013. 
901 And the long timeline of an Innovation Platform combined with non-reimbursement of participation costs may discourage companies 
from other Member States to participate. See also: Chapter 5.2, http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/juridisch> accessed 10 November 
2013. 
 
903 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 9. 
904 Vermeulen (2011). 
905 IWT Actieplan (2008-2010) 12. 
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No regulatory guidance is provided on the time constraints for the different Phases, 
and neither is such guidance available on the possibility to fund multiple sequential 
Phase 2 awards to the same contestant.  
Similar to the NL SBIR and the UK SBRI, the Flemish programme does not offer the 
possibility for a contracting authority to directly purchase the results of the pre-
commercial procurement. No alternative support is provided for the 
commercialization phase. However, IWT requires the involved contracting authorities 
to sign a letter of engagement by which they commit to organize a commercial 
procurement in order to purchase a solution such as the one targeted by the PCP.906 It 
is not clear in how far this commitment is enforceable. 
d) Sharing arrangements for IPR and R&D costs 
The Flemish programme does not define a pre-set manner to share IP rights or other 
benefits. This is decided on a case-by-case basis. Depending on the type of project, 
the government may also choose to share with the R&D service provider the profits 
made at later commercialization stages. It is also not pre-defined how the 
government shares R&D costs with the R&D service provider. The guidance for 
conducting pre-commercial procurement  indicates that a market price will be paid 
by the government, in accordance with the division of IP rights. No specific 
mechanism to ensure compliance with this requirement is provided.907 The 
programme guidance does not exclude that state aid is granted additionally. 
Ensuring compliance with EU State aid rules is decided on a case-by-case basis as 
well.908 
The PoI scheme has not yet been officially notified to the European Commission and has thus 
not been checked for compliance with the EU legal rules. IWT plans to do that after the pilot 
is closed in 2014.909 
4.5.3 Projects 
By 2011, the 13 government agencies involved in the PoI had proposed 48 PoI calls, out of 
which 15 were selected.910 By January 2014, 12 of these 15 projects had been deployed by 
IWT. I performed a documentary analysis of the information available on the IWT website 
regarding these 12 projects. A preliminary observation was that 6 of the 12 projects had been 
                                                          
906 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/juridisch> accessed 10 November 2013. 
907 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/juridisch> accessed 10 November 2013. 
908 Chapter 6, http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/juridisch> accessed 10 November 2013. 
909 Ibid. 
910 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/lopende_projecten> accessed 4 September 2012..  
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either stopped due to lack of funding or had proceeded as a commercial procurement 
following the conclusion of the innovation platform that desired solutions were already 
available on the market.  
I analysed the remaining 6 projects that were chosen for a PCP trajectory against the same 
criteria as I used for the Dutch SBIR and UK SBRI: (1) the existence of a public end-customer, 
(2) technological innovations as target, (3) high-risk or uncertain R&D as target. Based on this 
analysis, I  outline the following observations.  
My first observation is that the majority of the PCP calls (4 out of 6) target solutions for a 
potential public end-customers. However, in 3 of the 4 cases in which a public end-user is 
conceivable, the PCP is not conducted by the end-user, but by a ministry together with IWT. 
My second observation is that the majority of the PCP calls (4 out of 6) target exclusively 
technological innovation.  
My third observation is that the calls do not target high-risk innovations. To illustrate this, I will 
describe 3 of the 6 PCP projects.  
The first project within the pilot programme was proposed by the governmental agency of 
Socio-Cultural Work. The project regards the development of a prototype for an e-book 
platform, which should provide a permanent and secure inventory of digital editions of 
Flemish books. This e-book platform is intended for exploitation by editors, book traders, 
libraries and content collectors etc. The project was financed with EUR 500.000 by the Ministry 
of Innovation and Culture.911  
The innovative element of this project regarded integrating functions of import, inventory, 
exploitation of text with security issues regarding the content and the need to ensure a full 
text search facility. The platform envisages in addition ´an archiving function for a future 
cultural heritage centre and a coding module to produce different formats´.912 I find it very 
difficult to read anything beyond standard and well-established technology in this project.  
The market failure that the government invoked in this case regards the lack of private 
funding for digitalizing Flemish literature, which entails the danger of loss of diversity for the 
readers.913 
A second project finds itself at the market scouting stage and presents already difficulties in 
receiving the needed input from relevant stakeholders regarding the (technological) areas 
                                                          
911 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/project/vlaams_e-boek_platform_(vep)> accessed 4 February 2013. 
912 Vermeulen (2011) 115-122. 
913 Vlaams E-boek platform: Informatievergadering (22 December 2011) slide 5 <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/files/2047> 
accessed 4 February 2013. 
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that may be advanced beyond state-of-the-art through a PCP.914 The aim of the project is to 
develop a website that can catalyse the development and commercialization of 
environmentally-friendly products and services. Although the innovation platform was set-up 
at the end of 2012, this project has one and a half year later not moved beyond this stage, 
which suggests that it may be discontinued in the near future. 
The third project that presents indications that no high-risk technological innovation is 
targeted, regards the construction of energy-neutral buildings.915 This project explores 4 sub-
topics:916 (1) testing the scale-effects on costs, by building 6 (almost) energy-neutral 
prototype houses with existing technologies; (2) technological solutions for energy-saving 
windows, doors and walls in monuments, in which the focus is on existing innovations and 
quick-wins; (3) development of a life-cycle cost (‘LCC’) method to calculate the cost of a 
construction project; (4) exploring the potential cost savings resulting from the application of 
a cooperative investment model (‘ESCO-model’) in a school renovation. 
None of the envisaged sub-projects describes the technological area that should be 
advanced beyond state-of-the-art. They target application of existing technologies in 
already planned renovation projects. The third sub-project has already been stopped 
following the conclusion that no R&D services were involved.917 Moreover, there is no recent 
information on the status of implementation of the other 3 sub-projects.918  
In conclusion, the Flemish PoI scores poorly in deploying PCPs. Of the 3 remaining projects 
one still finds itself at the market consultation phase.919 It remains to be seen whether this 
project will continue as a PCP. This leaves the Flemish PoI with only 2 PCPs initiated since 2008.  
These 2 projects are at an early stage: the PCP contracts have been awarded in the second 
half of 2013. The first one project targets the development of an innovative software capable 
to support the sub-titling of Dutch speaking television programmes,920 while the other one 
targets innovative technologies for greenhouses.921 
                                                          
914 See http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/project/katalytisch_eco-aankopen> accessed 15 January 2014. 
915 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/project/energieneutraal_bouwen_zonder_meerkost/documents> accessed 15 January 
2014. 
916 Dany Robberecht – Verhaert, ‘Innovatief Aanbesteden – Energieneutraal Bouwen, Masterplan Innovatie’ (21 May 2012) 20, 24, 28 
<http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/files/2408> accessed 15 January 2014. 
917 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/project/energieneutraal_bouwen_zonder_meerkost> accessed 15 January 2014. 
918 The latest document dates 21 May 2012. It is unclear whether PCP calls for proposals have been published or whether continuation of 
these projects is under discussion.  
919 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/project/hydrografische_peilingen_in_ondiep_water_over_grote_gebieden> accessed 15 
January 2014. 
920 See <http://www.innovatiefaanbesteden.be/project/spraak-_en_taaltechnologisch_ondertitelen_in_het_nederlands> accessed 15 
January 2014. 





The Flemish PoI scheme finds itself at an incipient stage. In its current form there are 
shortcomings that may affect the potential impact of the program, according to the 
parameters identified in Chapter 2. I hereunder outline these shortcomings.  
1. The public R&D funding targets the most experimental and riskiest R&D projects (see 
Chapter 2). 
The Flemish programme has so far been deployed as a pilot. In 2014 a decision should 
be taken regarding the continuation of the programme. As a consequence, the 
deploying entity, IWT was divided between the need to comply with the EU legal 
constrains regarding open competition and value of funded R&D services, on the one 
side, and the need to attract participation of government agencies that are more 
interested in supporting local companies than advancing the EU Lisbon agenda, on 
the other side. This made it difficult for IWT to develop effective, transparent and 
objective PoI practices. 
The result is a muddled programme which is biased towards closer to market projects. 
That this is the case was confirmed by the analysis in the previous section.  
2. A high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure are accepted (see Chapter 2). 
The Flemish programme is divided into three phases (feasibility, prototyping and pilot). 
The amounts of funding per stage are flexible, but depend on the financial 
commitments of the commissioning ministries. In addition, similar to the other two 
national programmes analysed in this chapter, no possibility to award multiple Phase 2 
contracts is provided. This points out the limited degree of experimentation and 
tolerance to failure embedded into the Flemish program. And in practice, not a single 
high-risk innovation project could be found among the 12 projects investigated. 
3. Competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process (see Chapter 2). 
 
The Flemish programme embeds a market consultation, related to each PCP 
competition ( the so-called Innovation Platform). The market consultation is advertised 
through EU-wide means and participation is open to foreign companies. This could be 
an important strength of the programme. However, the strong national policy interests 
of the participating funding agencies induce to require the use of the Flemish 
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language and to discourage in practice foreign companies from participating. This 
entails the risk that instead of driving national companies to compete with the 
international state-of-the-art practices and to thus gain global competitive 
advantages, it will merely protect national companies from foreign competition and 
waste public funds on solutions that already have been made available elsewhere.  
4. The public purchaser is the technologically sophisticated end-user of the envisaged 
innovation (see Chapter 2). 
The Flemish programme is centrally run by a national innovation agency that is not an 
end-user of the developed innovations. The (private) end-users are not involved in the 
PCP procedure, they participate in the Innovation Platforms. As a consequence, the 
programme resembles more of a supply-side subsidy scheme than a demand-side 
instrument. 
5. The public purchaser is willing to pay the premium price for the early use of the developed 
innovation and is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the developed innovation 
(see Chapter 2).  
Similar to the Dutch SBIR and the UK SBRI and in line with the PCP guidance, the 
Flemish programme does not allow the direct purchase of the developed innovations 
by the participating public authorities. Moreover, no additional support is provided for 
the commercialization phase. But letters of engagement to purchase solutions with 
the performance levels and functionalities of those developed through PCP are 
signed by the involved contracting authorities. However, the fact that many solutions 
are not developed for a public end-customer weakens the value of this feature. 
In conclusion, the Flemish PoI programme lacks important prerequisites for an effective 
implementation. The fundaments of the programme are vested in national interests to 
provide funding to national companies, leading to what I called a muddled PoI. Due to 
insufficient political clarity and backing, the future of the programme depends on an opaque 
political evaluation  of the initial piloting phase. As a consequence the pilot has turned 




4.6 EU support for PCP 
4.6.1 Basis for European Commission’s action 
By drafting the PCP, the European Commission expected to stimulate contracting authorities 
to contribute to the European innovation agenda from the demand-side. Moreover, the 
European Commission intended to ensure that this demand-side policy instrument supports 
and exploits the benefits of EU-wide competition and of EU-wide markets.  
In contract with these expectations, PCP-like initiatives have exclusively been implemented 
as national or regional programmes, and in a very limited number of Member States. 
Although some of the challenges issued in different programmes are functionally related or 
even almost identical,922 none of them resulted in trans-national cooperation and neither did 
they result in EU-wide competition. On the contrary, where effective, procedures are 
conducted in the national languages of the funding agencies. This approach constitutes, 
particularly in the Netherlands and Flanders, a strong and legitimate barrier against 
participation by companies from other EU Member States. 
Moreover, the PCP-like schemes under consideration present features that are not in line with 
the requirements for an effective demand-side instrument such as identified in Chapter 2. 
Things are complicated by the consideration that these schemes are potentially in breach of 
EU State aid legal rules.  
PCP in its cross-border form as envisaged by the PCP Communication remained by 2011, 
largely unknown among individual contracting authorities in most EU Member States.923 
In the study preceding the adoption of the PCP Communication in 2007, it was anticipated 
that conducting a PCP procedure entails (legal, technical and organisational) risks that 
contracting authorities are not willing to take. The study warned that the EU would need to 
incentivize the contracting authorities to apply PCP procedures, particularly in areas of 
common European interest, where cross-border collaboration is desirable in order to ensure 
interoperability and create economies of scale.924  
4.6.2 European Commission incentivizing actions 
Arguably, there are multiple reasons for the reticence of individual contracting authorities to 
engage in cross-border PCP procedures. Some of these have been discussed in section 4.2. 
                                                          
922 For example, the call for assisted living and protective equipment for military combat in urban environments is practically identical within 
the Dutch SBIR and the UK SBRI. See <www.innovateuk.org/deliveringinnovation/smallbusinessresearchinitiative.ashx> accessed 4 
September 2012. 
923 PCP Survey (2011).  
924 National IST Research Directors Forum Working Group on Public Procurement in support of ICT Research and Innovation, ‘Pre-
commercial Procurement of Innovation: A Missing Link in the European Innovation Cycle (PCP Expert Group)’ (March 2006) 29 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/pcp/precommercial-procurement-of-innovation_en.pdf>, accessed 12 November 2012. 
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They cover: lack of technical knowledge; contracting authorities’ aversion to risk (particularly 
when PCP-like initiatives are not institutionalized and are not mandated); lack of clarity 
around the distinction between PCP and regular subsidies and the accompanying concerns 
regarding compliance with EU State aid rules; the irrelevance for regular contracting 
authorities when subsequent direct purchase of the developed innovation is not allowed; the 
complexity of the procedure itself (to find matching partners in other Member States, to 
define common requirements and to coordinate common procedures etc.). 
The Commission has since 2009 acted upon some of the difficulties encountered by 
contracting authorities when deciding to conduct PCP. Initially, the Commission financially 
supported the formation of procurer groups and of networking activities related to PCP, 
under the FP7 and RFEC programmes.925 This appeared soon to be insufficient, as the support 
did not lead to the emergence of the good practices expected. 
Funding PCPs 
As a consequence, the European Commission took the initiative to fund, under the FP7 
programme, all of the organizational costs and part of the contractual costs of PCPs 
conducted by European consortia of public authorities. Call 7 allocated, for example, in 
2011, 6M euro to joint PCPs in services for mobile access to patient health info and to robotic 
solutions for ageing well. Call 8 made in 2012 a budget of 3 M euro available for joint cross-
border PCPs in the area of 'Photonic technologies' aimed at improving quality and/or 
efficiency of public services. Additional funding for PCP networking has also been made 
available under Call 8 covering any sector of interest.   
Funding of joint cross-border PCP has also been made available under the FP7 Capacities – 
Research Infrastructures work programme (INFRA-2012-2.3.1) on the third implementation 
phase of the European High Performance Computing (HPC) service organized through 
PRACE (Partnership for Advanced Computing in Europe). PCP was considered a suitable 
instrument to advance the state-of-the-art in HPC systems, as the public sector is an 
important procurer of such systems. Moreover, bundling resources and demand at the EU-
level is considered to have the capability to give a boost to the EU HPC sector, which is 
considered unattainable for Member States individually.926 
There are currently 8 joint PCP projects funded by the European Commission. The first 
awarded project is SILVER, a collaboration between several European cities to stimulate the 
development of robotic solutions to support independent living for the elderly. The project 
                                                          
925 <http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/projects_en.html> accessed 4 February 2013. 
926 Commission, ‘High-Performance Computing: Europe's place in a Global Race’ COM(2012) 45 final 6. 
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started in January 2012 and is planned to be completed after 45 month (none of the 
projects is thus close to conclusion).  
The European Commission intends to continue the funding of collaborative PCPs. For 
example, pre-commercial procurement was introduced as a new funding instrument in 
Horizon 2020, the new framework programme for EU support to research and innovation for 
the period 2014-2020. Horizon 2020 will financially support PCPs conducted by consortia of 
contracting authorities from different Member States. EU institutions or EU funding bodies may 
also participate in such consortia.927 For 2014-2015 EUR 130-140 million have been reserved for 
collaborative PCPs and collaborative procurements of innovation (PPI).928  
Data collection 
Besides funding of collaborative PCPs, the Commission has also offered funding in 2011 for 
collecting data on R&D expenditure through procurement across Europe. This was meant to 
support better informed decision-making about public intervention that encourage 
innovation from the public demand-side, such as through pre-commercial procurement.929 
The project is expected to yield results in the beginning of 2014. The Commission intends to 
collect this type of data systematically in the future. 
Further studies on EU involvement 
In addition, the Commission has explored new ways to incentivize the broad implementation 
of PCP. In 2011, the European Commission commissioned a study to explore the support for 
EU involvement in PCP-type of procedures. This study concludes that contracting authorities 
across the EU envisage a coordination role for the EU in cross-border projects, particularly in 
learning activities and in drafting procurement specifications. Interviewed contracting 
authorities consider though that defining the needs and assessing the bids should be left to 
the Member States. A mix of competences is favoured also in setting the topics of the 
procurement initiatives, both falling within the broad common-EU policy objectives, as well 
as driven by the concrete needs of the contracting authorities.930  
Signals regarding support for a more hands-on involvement of the EU in PCPs are also 
perceived in national studies. EU involvement in stimulating EU-wide competition in PCPs 
                                                          
927 See <cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/policy_en.html> accessed 5 November 2013. 
928 Lieve Bos, Presentation in Krakow 14 November 2013, <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/files/public-
procurement/krakow-2013-bos_en.pdf> accessed 15 December 2013. 
929 Quantifying public procurement of research and development of ICT solutions, Deadline: 16 September 2011 
<http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/itemdetail.cfm?item_id=7157> accessed 2 February 2013. 
930 John Rigby, Patries Boekholt, Abby Semple, Jasper Deuten, Ramona Apostol, 
Stephan Corvers, Jakob Edler, ‘Feasibility study on future EU support to public procurement of innovative solutions: Obtaining Evidence for 
a Full Scheme’ (2 February 2012) (Feasibility Study (2012) <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/innovation/policy/lead-market-




around challenges common to more than one Member State, is seen as an important pre-
condition to escape the ‘political criticism that national tax money goes to foreign 
companies’.931 There has been so far no analysis of the possibility to combine the national 
and the EU initiatives on PCP-like schemes. This analysis falls outside the scope of this research 
as this falls within the ambit of institutional economics. 
The new Procurement Directives 
Most recently, the Commission has taken the initiative to include in the new Procurement 
Directives default provisions for cases of cross-border collaborations in (pre-commercial) 
procurement.932 The new Procurement Directives also introduce the Innovation Partnership 
procedure, allowing contracting authorities to purchase R&D and the resulting innovations. A 
more detailed discussion on the Innovation Partnership procedure and on its relation to PCP 
can be found in Chapter 5, section 5.4.4. 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed the state of implementation of collaborative PCPs as envisaged by 
the European Commission in its 2007 PCP Communication. It concluded that by 2011, there 
were practically no examples of collaborative cross-border PCP projects.  
The studies evaluating the state of implementation of PCP identified the following reasons for 
the limited appeal of PCP to contracting authorities: 
- lack of technical knowledge;  
- contracting authorities’ aversion to risk particularly when PCP(-like) initiatives are not 
institutionalized and are not mandated;  
- lack of clarity around the distinction between PCP and regular subsidies and the 
accompanying concerns regarding compliance with EU State aid rules;  
- the irrelevance for contracting authorities when subsequent direct purchase of the 
developed innovation is not allowed;  
- the complexity of a cross-border procedure (to find matching partners in other 
Member States, to define common requirements and to coordinate common 
procedures etc.). 
                                                          
931 Holland (2010) 14. 
932 Article 38, Joint procurement between contracting authorities from different Member States, Directive 2014/24/EU of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 February 2014  on public procurement and repealing Directive 2004/18/EC. 
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In the second part, this chapter analysed the forms of PCP that have been set-up at the 
national level. These were being implemented by innovation agencies in three Member 
States: the Netherlands, the UK and Belgium. The analysis has revealed that important 
differences persist between these schemes and the US SBIR scheme. Most of these 
differences can be related to missing requirements for the effective implementation of R&D 
procurement, as identified in Chapter 2. Evaluation are planned in 2014 for all three 
programmes. In view of the poor results booked so far, there is a real chance that they will be 
discontinued. 
The main shortcomings of the analysed national PCP-like schemes are outlined below. 
1. The participation is voluntary in all the national PCP-like schemes analysed in this chapter. 
The implementation of the schemes depends on the promotion efforts of the innovation 
agency running or coordinating the scheme. Arguably, this increases the pressure to come 
up with success stories and consequently closer-to-commercialization projects are preferred. 
As a consequence, the PCP-like projects do not target the riskier and the more uncertain R&D 
projects, which could benefit most from the public funding.  
2. The same risk that close to commercialization projects are chosen may also occur when no 
market research is performed. Definition of advanced requirements that go beyond the 
international state-of-the-art was identified in Chapter 2 as crucial to creating global 
competitive advantages for firms participating in R&D procurement. This is not achieved 
when market research is limited to national participants. 
3. The centralized deployment of the Dutch and Flemish programmes and the consequent 
limited involvement of the end-customers and of the end-users are important shortcomings. 
Most competitions within these two programmes target solutions for the private end-
customer, which limits the prospects of early adoption of the developed innovation.  
4. Moreover, of the three analysed national PCP-like initiatives none allows for the direct 
purchase of the developed innovation by public authorities. This is in line with the EU 
legislation on public procurement, but in contrast to the US SBIR and to the recommendation 
to encourage early adoption of innovations in order to enhance the global competitive 
advantages of the innovating companies. 
4. The timelines envisaged for the R&D procurements in all three schemes are relatively short 
compared to the EU guidance and to the US SBIR practice.  
5. Moreover, limited flexibility is embedded into the three national programmes to deviate 
from these timelines and from the maximum amounts of funding per Phase.  
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6. Besides that, none of the 3 programmes provides the possibility to award multiple 
sequential Phase 2 awards to the same company. This indicates that a high degree of 
experimentation and tolerance to failure are not embedded into the programmes, although 
they are important prerequisites for successful demand-side R&D funding. 
7. The NL SBIR and the Flemish PoI and to a less extent the UK SBRI, award R&D contracts for 
the development of close-to-market products and the development of innovations in 
services. According to the conclusions in Chapter 2, innovation in services does not occur as 
a result of R&D projects, and the drivers of innovation in services are not well understood. This 
raises the question whether spending of public R&D funds is justified. 
8. Finally, the individual Member States that have so far implemented PCP-like programs are 
motivated by the desire to support national companies. This desire can be by itself legitimate, 
yet may lead to muddled programs. When this occurs, they will miss important characteristics 
that are needed to achieve their EU aims.  
Since 2007, the European Commission has taken action to boost the implementation of PCPs 
conducted in collaboration by contracting authorities from different Member States. It has 
not attempted to harmonise the national programmes, as it lacks the necessary 
competence. However, the Commission has set the boundaries for these initiatives in its 2007 
PCP Communication, in line with the EU rules on State aid and freedom of movement. Since 
2009, the Commission has also provided funding for exchanges of experiences on PCP 
projects and since 2011 it has provided funding for the organizational and contractual costs 
of collaborative PCPs. More recently, it has focused on funding data collection and 
measurement studies and proposing legislative amendments.  
The funding of collaborative PCPs is the most important attempt of the European Commission 
to create good practice and to enhance collaboration between contracting authorities 
from different EU Member States. It is considered to be the only tool available to the 
European Commission to steer the national practices into the desired direction. It has the 
potential to complement the national PCP-like  initiatives and to leverage the support for EU 
coordinated action in the PCP area. It is unclear though whether the European Commission 
has a clear vision on the complementarity and consistency of the national and EU initiatives. 
Moreover, whether the projects co-funded by the EU embed the required conditions for 
achieving the targeted impact could not be assessed in this research, due to the early stage 
of the co-funded projects and the lack of information.  
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The European Commission has moreover not yet paid attention to the large disparities that 
are being created between the leading Member States in the area of R&D and innovation 
and the laggards.  
My overall conclusion is that there has not yet been any confirmation that the EU initiatives 
aimed at boosting investments in R&D have had any result. Despite this, the EU continues 
(and even intensifies) these initiatives – seemingly unaware of the reasons why these initiatives 
tend to fail in practice.  
In the next Chapter 5, I will focus on the most important barriers envisaged by individual 
contracting authorities to the wide implementation of PCP. I will investigate to what extent 















CHAPTER 5. Legal barriers to the implementation of the PCP 
procedure 
5.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 4 I concluded that (1) the obligation to conduct a separate competitive award in 
order to purchase the innovative solution targeted by the PCP competition, and (2) the legal 
uncertainty regarding compliance with EU State aid rules were identified by contracting 
authorities as important barriers to the wide implementation of PCP. Contracting authorities 
(at least in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands) express even the concern that a PCP 
finalist933 might need to be excluded from a subsequent competitive procedure due to the 
important knowledge benefits gained during the PCP.934 
Particularly individual contracting authorities that need to use the developed innovation to 
fulfill their public tasks feel discouraged to use PCPs by the above mentioned barriers. Besides 
being the potential end-users, these contracting authorities are also the prospective early 
adopters of the developed innovations. Stimulating these authorities to act as entrepreneurial 
risk-taking actors in the innovation market is crucial for achieving the desired policy aims. The 
existence of the above mentioned barriers weakens thus the potential positive impact of PCP 
as innovation policy instrument.  
The two PCP features identified as barriers to its wide implementation, find their origin in legal 
rules. I will explore in this chapter which legal rules  constrained the choice regarding the 
above mentioned PCP features. I will subsequently conclude on the remaining flexibility for 
purchasing the innovative results of a PCP and I will suggest potential legislative amendments 
or alternative policy solutions. 
To this end, I analyse in section 5.3 the provisions of the WTO Government Procurement 
Agreement that are invoked by the European Commission as reasons for not allowing direct 
purchase of the innovative solutions developed through PCP. I subsequently analyse how 
these provisions have influenced the content of the current EU procurement rules, as well as 
of the proposed procurement directives. Based on this analysis, I will draw conclusions on the 
suitability of the current regulatory framework to advance EU’s interests in the area of R&D 
and innovation and I will point out possible solutions to the problems thus identified.935 
                                                          
933 A PCP finalist is an undertaking which completed successfully all the PCP stages. 
934 Kincsö Izsak & Jakob Edler, ‘Trends and Challenges in Demand-Side Innovation Policies in Europe Thematic Report 2011 under Specific 
Contract for the Integration of INNO Policy Trend Chart with ERAWATCH (2011- 
2012) 18 (26 October 2011) (Izsak & Edler (2011)) <http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/newsroom/cf/_getdocument.cfm?doc_id=7011> 
accessed 2 February 2013. 
935 Parts of this Chapter are based on a previously published article by the author. See Anca Ramona Apostol, ‘Pre-commercial procurement 
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In section 5.4, I will address the concern of contracting authorities that PCP finalists might 
need to be excluded from a subsequent competitive procedure for the purchase of a 
solution as the one developed during the respective PCP, in order to comply with the equal 
treatment principle.   
In section 5.5, I criticize the choice of the European Commission to condition the 
inapplicability of the EU State aid rules upon compliance with the market price criterion. I 
define alternative approaches to ensure compliance with the EU State aid rules.  
Before entering the discussion on the above mentioned barriers, I will outline the legal 
landscape in the EU and I will point out the differences between the EU as a supranational 
order and a national/federal state. This will increase the  understanding of the background 
for some of the choices of the EU legislator and policy-maker regarding the design of the 
PCP. 
5.2 The EU legal landscape  
I have already underlined in Chapter 2 that the same type of technically advanced and 
financially endowed institutions such as the Federal agencies that implement the US SBIR 
programme cannot be found in the EU. EU is not a state and diverging national interests have 
prevented the creation of similar institutions. Particularly in areas such as R&D and innovation, 
national interests have clearly manifested. In this section, I provide an overview of the 
foundation and development of the EU. This will enhance the understanding of how the EU 
differs from a national state and will explain the constrains determining the choices around 
PCP. 
The basis of the current European Union was laid in the 1951 Treaty of Paris, establishing the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) after the Second World War. The aim of the 
Treaty of Paris was to supervise the steel and coal sectors, which during the war had been 
used in the production of war munitions. This would make a rehearsal of the 1939-1945 
catastrophe ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’.936 
This initial economic collaboration was subsequently extended through the Treaties of Rome 
of 1957 establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM). These treaties were determined by the increased awareness 
that coordination of the economic activities and policies of the European states would lead 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
in support of innovation: Regulatory effectiveness?’ (2012) 21 PPLR 212. 
936 Damian Chalmers, Gareth Davies and Giorgio Monti, ‘European Union Law’ (2nd Edition CUP 2010) 10 (Chalmers et al (2010)). 
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not only to an increase in political stability but also to ‘an accelerated raising of the standard 
of living’.937 
The Treaty of Rome provided the most important tools to achieve economic integration: the 
obligations for the Member States to refrain from taking action which may impede upon the 
freedom of movement of goods, workers, services and capital over the borders of the 
Member States. At the same time, the Treaty of Rome provided the institutional capabilities 
and the legislative competences to achieve this economic integration.938 
Through subsequent amendments and accession of new members (28 Member States 
currently939), the European Communities were gradually extended and deepened. Legislative 
competence was granted to the EEC in additional sectors (health, safety at work, economic 
and social cohesion, research and development and environmental protection and 
cooperation in foreign policy940, monetary union and culture, education, health and 
consumer protection, home affairs941, area of freedom, security and justice, immigration, 
asylum, discrimination based on sex, race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation942) and simplified voting procedures were introduced.943 
The deepening and widening of the EEC was supported by the desire of the Member States 
to increase their economic leverage in a globalized economy. At the same time, awareness 
grew that further economic integration could only be achieved if the political union was 
strengthened and the European demos was enhanced on the basis of ‘a set of shared values 
and on commitment to a form of collective identity/sociopolitical unit’.944 This translated 
within the Treaty of Maastricht in 1991 into a claim of a political union besides an economic 
one.945 But the enlargement with new Member States each with particular structures and 
values increased the diversity within the EU and revealed the challenge to reaching a 
relatively homogenous environment which is the necessary basis for a further political 
integration.946 
The fact that the EU is not comparable with a federal state and is not yet moving into that 
direction became most obvious in 2004, when the Constitutional Treaty was rejected in two 
referendums in France and the Netherlands. The negative outcome of the referendums 
                                                          
937 Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community [1957] art 1. 
938 Chalmers et al (2010) 32. 
939 On 1st of July 2013, the newest member, Croatia, acceded the European Union. 
940 Single European Act (SEA) [1986] OJ L169. 
941 Treaty of Maastricht on the European Union [1992] OJ C191.  
942 Treaty of Amsterdam [1997] OJ C340. 
943 The Treaty of Amsterdam extended the qualified majority voting to new fields, thus making the veto an exception. See Chalmers, Damian 
and Hadjiemmanuil, Christos and Monti, Giorgio and Tomkins, Adam, ‘European Union law: text and materials’ (CUP 2006) 43 (Chalmers et 
al (2006)). 
944 D. Obradovic, 'Policy Legitimacy and the European Union'(1996) 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 208 
945 Chalmers et al (2006) 61. 
946 J. Zielonka, 'How New Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union'(2001) 39 Journal of Common Market Studies 513-15. 
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signaled the reticence of the European citizens to accept the message of federative 
integration of the Constitutional Treaty. The failure of the Constitutional Treaty revealed that 
European citizens had perceived the EU as an intruder into areas of national competence, 
while the EU suffered from a democratic deficit.947 The lack of the elective element and the 
lack of transparency of the decision-making processes were advanced as potential reasons 
for the rejection.948 
Despite the drawback of 2004, the European Union remains a unique political union which 
reached more deeply into the way Member States govern and regulate themselves and their 
societies than any other international organisation.949 
The EU has so far achieved important successes, such as an uninterrupted period of 50 years 
of peace and unprecedented levels of welfare.950 However, the ambitions of the EU have 
grown far beyond its initial objectives and cover areas such as security and international 
justice, ensuring environmental protection and curing world poverty, reaching global 
leadership based on European values of social welfare.951 The achievement of these aims 
requires not only to adapt the EU competences to its ambitions but also to wisely use the 
flexibility offered by the current legal framework. 
The reality for the time being is that there are important differences between the EU and a 
national state: the EU 'does not tax, spend, implement, coerce or, in most areas, monopolise 
public authority'.952 Moreover, the EU implements very few of its policies (competition, 
monetary policy, and the conduct and control over the external trade negotiations). For the 
other areas, the implementation falls within the competence of national states or within the 
shared competence of the national state and the EU.953  
According to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), fostering industry’s 
competitive potential through policies of innovation, research and technological 
development constitutes a common goal for the Union and the Member States. The 
competences to take action in this area are shared between the EU and the Member States 
based on the principle of subsidiarity. The EU is, for example, allowed to carry out research, 
technological development and demonstration programmes, provided that the exercise of 
that competence does not prevent Member States from carrying out their own 
                                                          
947 Chalmers et al (2006) 64. 
948 According to Chalmers et al (2006) 65-7, this may be simply a question of perception, due to the fact that the areas of competences 
attributed to the EU do not fall within the themes of main concern to voters (health care, education, law and order, social security and 
taxation), while sufficient checks and balances are already in place. 
949 A. Moravcsik, 'The European Constitutional Compromise and the Neofunctionalist Legacy’(2005) 12 Journal of European Public Policy 349 
(Moravcsik (2005)); Chalmers et al (2006) 51. 
950 Chalmers et al (2006) 61. 
951 Chalmers et al (2006) 69. 
952 Moravcsik (2005) 370. 
953 Chalmers et al (2010) 33. 
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programmes.954 The European Parliament and the Council are expressly authorized to adopt 
specific measures to support the Member States in this area, as long as they do not cover 
harmonisation of Member States’ laws and regulations.955 The specific competences granted 
to the European Commission are to promote coordination of Member States’ actions in the 
area of innovation, research and technological development. In particular, the Commission is 
allowed to formulate guidelines and indicators, to organise exchanges of best practice, and 
to prepare the necessary elements for periodic monitoring and evaluation.956  
In conclusion, the EU is more divided by national interests than what one expects a Federal 
state would be. These national interests are the reason for the limited competences granted 
to the EU in setting-up a centralized PCP programme, centrally coordinated and deployed 
by supranational institutions such as in the US. These national interests are moreover the 
reason why the EU embeds in its areas of competence (legislative) safeguards against 
economically inefficient national practices. The two barriers that form the topic of this 
chapter are intended to function as such safeguards.  
The European Commission explains in the PCP Communication that the obligation to 
conduct a separate competitive award for the purchase of the innovative solution targeted 
by the PCP, is motivated by the choice made within the framework of the WTO Government 
Procurement Agreement not to make any reservations for the direct purchase of supplies 
(see section 5.3 below). But arguably, this choice was determined by the concern that 
contracting authorities would use procurement to shield national companies from foreign 
competition. Based on the analysis of the three national PCP-like programmes in Chapter 4, 
such a concern appears justified. The European Commission seems to have used the GPA as 
an excuse to foreclose discrimination within the EU. 
The State aid rules have also been put in place to act as safeguards against the tendency of 
EU Member States to engage in wasteful races to finance their national champions, at the 
detriment of economic efficiency and of consumers’ welfare.    
In the sections below, I will investigate more in depth the legal origin of the two above 
mentioned barriers and I will conclude on the most suitable solutions to both maintain the 
safeguards and provide the stimuli for the wide deployment of PCP. 
                                                          
954 Arts 180-1 of the Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 9.5.2008 OJEU C 115/47 (TFEU). 
955 Art 173 TFEU. 
956 Art 173(2) TFEU. 
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5.3 The burden of a new competitive procedure for the purchase of PCP 
solutions 
5.3.1 Introduction 
As already indicated above, according to the PCP Communication, the EU public 
procurement legislation does not allow the purchase of the PCP results through direct 
negotiation with (one of) the PCP finalist(s).957 This barrier is both relevant when the PCP finalist 
has production capabilities and is able to deliver itself the innovative product in the desired 
quantities, and when another company than the PCP finalist is able to deliver the innovative 
products created by the PCP finalist. 
The Communication explains that direct purchase of a product developed through PCP is 
constrained by compliance with the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA).958 
However, the PCP Communication does not explain which GPA provisions create this 
constrain. Moreover, it should be remembered that the GPA does not legally constrain the 
freedom EU has in regulating the relations between its Member States. GPA defines the 
obligations for the EU as a whole to open its public markets to participation of businesses from 
the other GPA parties.  
The PCP Communication most probably refers to the fact that the EU exempted in Annex 4 to 
the 1994 GPA, R&D service contracts from the scope of application of the GPA, but did not 
exempt any procurement of commercial products (such as those resulting from the previously 
exempted R&D service contracts). As a consequence, the GPA would not allow EU 
contracting authorities to discriminate against suppliers from GPA partner countries when 
purchasing innovative products resulting from excluded R&D service contracts.  
The EU Procurement Directives are drafted in compliance with the GPA obligations towards 
GPA partner countries and the EU contracting authorities are required to apply the same 
provisions of the EU Procurement Directives to both EU companies and companies from GPA 
partner countries.959 Due to this fact, it is relevant to analyse whether the flexibility offered by 
the GPA to directly purchase the results of R&D contracts has to its full extent been translated 
into the EU Procurement Directives. To this end, I will pay particular attention to  article 
XV(1)(e) of the 1994 GPA.I will investigate in section 5.3.2 what degree of flexibility article 
XV(1)(e) of the 1994 GPA allows to directly purchase the innovative results of an R&D service 
                                                          
957 Commission, ’Pre-commercial Procurement: Driving innovation to ensure sustainable high quality public services in Europe’ COM (2007) 
799 final 9-10 (PCP Communication). 
958 PCP Communication 10. Unlike the EU, the US has excluded from the scope of the GPA set-asides on behalf of small and minority 
businesses. See para.1 of General Notes of the US, part of the Appendix I to Government Procurement Agreement. 
959 Recitals (7) Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the coordination of procedures for 
the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public service contracts [2004] OJ L 134/114 (Public Sector Directive) 
provides: ‘the contracting authorities covered by the Agreement [the GPA Agreement] which comply with this Directive and which apply the 




contract. In the following section 5.3.3, I will investigate how the current EU Procurement 
Directives have incorporated this flexibility. I will also investigate the degree of flexibility other 
provisions of the current EU Procurement Directives grant a contracting authority to directly 
purchase the PCP results. 
In section 5.3.4, I will outline the changes brought in the newly adopted procurement 
directives to the above analysed provisions and I will particularly scrutinize the newly 
introduced Innovation Partnership procedure, that covers an R&D contract as well as the 
purchase of the results thereof. 
Based on this analysis, I will draw conclusions on the suitability of the current and future 
regulatory framework to advance EU’s interests in the area of R&D and innovation and I will 
point out the improvements needed to persuade contracting authorities to perform their key 
role as demanding first customers of innovative solutions. 
5.3.2  The WTO GPA constrains regarding EU’s freedom to regulate purchases of PCP 
solutions 
5.3.2.1 Short introduction to the GPA 
The international legal framework for the procurement of R&D is the GPA. The GPA is the only 
WTO agreement on public procurement. It was negotiated during the Uruguay Round in 
1994, and entered into force on 1 January 1996. It has at present 14 parties, amongst which 
the EU with regard to its 27 Member States. The US is also a party to the GPA. An amended 
GPA text was agreed upon in 2012 and will enter into force upon formal acceptance by two 
thirds of the GPA parties.960 
All the states parties are developed countries. Although special and differential treatment for 
developing countries has been included, such countries have not yet acceded the 
agreement. 
The GPA is a plurilateral agreement. This means that it is the sum of a series of bilaterally 
negotiated agreements. The provisions of the agreement apply only to the procurements 
brought by each state party under the scope of application of the agreement and state 
parties open their public markets to different extents towards each other depending on 
mutual concessions.961 The results of these bilaterally negotiated agreements are laid down in 
Annexes 1-5 and in the General Notes to Appendix I of the GPA. Annexes 1 to 3 list the entities 
to which the agreement is applicable. Annexes 4 and 5 list the services that are brought 
                                                          
960 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm> accessed 4 February 2013. By December 2013, the threshold for entry 




under the scope of application of the agreement, while the General Notes contain 
additional reservations.962 
The text of the GPA provides the common procedural rules all GPA parties agree to apply 
towards businesses from the other signatory parties, to the extent to which the respective 
procurement falls within the material scope laid down in Appendix I. As a consequence, the 
GPA does not govern the relations between the EU Member States, but the relations between 
the EU as a whole and the GPA parties. To this extent, the EU could have drafted separate 
procurement rules to regulate these sets of relations. Arguably for reasons of simplicity, the EU 
chose to formulate one set of rules (the EU Procurement Directives) and to require EU 
contracting authorities to apply them to both EU companies and companies from GPA 
partner countries. This had 2 important consequences. The first was already mentioned in the 
introduction and regards the need to draft the EU Procurement Directives in compliance with 
the GPA. The second regards the broader opening of the EU public market for foreign 
competition than required by the GPA (as the EU procurement directives also cover 
contracts which are exempted from the GPA).963  
Following the recent conclusion that GPA partners do not open their public markets to the 
same extent to international competition, the European Commission advances a different 
approach in the recently adopted Procurement Directives. The new Directives will only be 
applicable to economic operators from GPA countries when the contracts and entities 
covered by Annexes I, II, IV and V and by the General Notes to the EU’s Appendix 1 of the 
GPA are involved.964 However, the EU Procurement Directives will remain the legal framework 
to be applied to both EU companies as well as to companies from GPA partner countries. 
5.3.2.2 GPA’s coverage of R&D services and of resulting innovations 
The EU left R&D services outside the coverage of the 1994 GPA by not listing these services in 
Annex IV to the GPA.965 Most GPA parties have excluded R&D services from the scope of 
application of the GPA. This choice is arguably due to the particular importance of research 
and development contracts in strengthening the innovative and competitive capabilities of 
the domestic economy and the need to be able to reserve these contracts for domestic 
companies. 
                                                          
962 <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm#appendixI> accessed 4 February 2013.  
963 Such are R&D contracts fully funded by contracting authorities whose benefits accrue to the same contracting authority. This is further 
explained in the next section. 
964 Article 23 of Directive 2014/24/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on public procurement and repealing Directive 
2004/18/EC (the new Public Sector Directive) and article 38 of Directive 2014/25/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
February 2014 on procurement by entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors and repealing Directive 
2004/17/EC (the new Utilities Directive). 
965 See EU Annex 4 Appendix I GPA, available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/appendices_e.htm#ec> accessed 2 December 2013. 
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The US also chose for excluding R&D services from the scope of application of the GPA.966 In 
addition, the US also excluded set-asides for small businesses from the scope of the GPA.967 
This reservation allows the US not to open to competition from other GPA signatory parties the 
procurement of the innovative products developed during an R&D contract within the 
framework of the SBIR programme. 
The reason why the EU did not make a similar reservation for small businesses is arguably 
related to its reluctance to allow EU contracting authorities to award supply contracts without 
competition. The EU feared that this would encourage inefficient awards by Member States, 
based on national policy motivations rather than competitive merits. This is a consequence, 
as shown in section 5.2, of the unique character of the EU as a supranational order of states 
brought together by the aim to achieve shared goals, but still divided by often diverging 
national interests. 
The PCP Communication suggests that the choice not to include a similar reservation to the 
US in the GPA, is the reason why direct purchases of products developed through PCP is not 
legally allowed.968 
Although the EU did not reserve the right to exclude from the scope of the GPA purchases of 
the results of an R&D contract, the text of the GPA itself offers the possibility to directly 
purchase the first product or service resulting from an R&D contract without re-opening the 
contract to competition (article XV(1)(e) GPA). Hereafter I investigate what degree of 
flexibility this provision offers for the purchase of an innovative product resulting from a PCP 
procedure and  how this flexibility has been translated into the EU procurement rules. 
According to article XV(1)(e) GPA (article XIII(1)(f) of the newly amended GPA), a 
contracting authority may conduct a limited tendering procedure, which is the equivalent of 
the negotiated procedure without prior notice of the EU Procurement Directives969 in order to 
purchase ‘a first product or service which [is] developed at its request in the course of, and 
for, a particular contract for research, experiment, study or original development’.970 The 
                                                          
966 National IST Research Directors Forum Working Group on Public Procurement in support of ICT Research and Innovation ‘Pre-commercial 
Procurement of Innovation: A Missing Link in the European Innovation Cycle’ (March 2006) 7 (PCP Expert Group) 
<ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ict/docs/pcp/precommercial-procurement-of-innovation_en.pdf>, accessed 12 November 2012. 
967 See para 1 US General Notes Appendix I GPA. 
968 PCP Communication 9-10. The PCP Communication also takes the view that the direct purchase is not economically desirable. Re-
opening the contract to competition ensures that no better solutions have been developed on the market independently from the PCP 
procedure 
969 The limited tendering is defined as the procedure where the entity contacts suppliers individually. Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Reviewing the GPA: 
the role and development of the plurilateral agreement after Doha’ (2002) 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 761. 
970 Art XV (1) The provisions of Arts VII through XIV governing open and selective tendering procedures need not apply in the following 
conditions, provided that limited tendering is not used with a view to avoiding maximum possible competition or in a manner which would 
constitute a means of discrimination among suppliers of other Parties or protection to domestic producers or suppliers: (…) (e) when an 
entity procures prototypes or a first product or service which are developed at its request in the course of, and for, a particular contract for 
research, experiment, study or original development. When such contracts have been fulfilled, subsequent procurements of products or 
services shall be subject to Articles VII through XIV(6); 
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newly amended text of the new GPA reiterates in slightly different words the same 
provision.971 
The direct purchase of the first product or service resulting from an R&D contract is thus 
allowed under the following conditions: the same contracting authority that commissioned 
the R&D, purchases the resulting first good or service; and at the moment of purchase, the 
good or service has not been commercialized yet and the contracting authority is the first 
customer. After the execution of this contract, the purchase of the same goods or services by 
the same contracting authority or by any other contracting authority needs to be conducted 
in compliance with a competitive procurement (open or selective tendering). Figure 1 below  






This means that, even if no express set-asides were negotiated within the GPA, the EU still had 
the flexibility to allow an EU contracting authority to directly purchase the first products or 
                                                          
971 Art XIII (1) GPA: ‘Provided that it does not use this provision for the purpose of avoiding competition among suppliers or in a manner 
that discriminates against suppliers of any other Party or protects domestic suppliers, a procuring entity may use limited tendering and 
may choose not to apply Articles VII through IX, X (paragraphs 7 through 11), XI, XII, XIV and XV only under any of the following 
circumstances: (…) (f) where a procuring entity procures a prototype or a first good or service that is developed at its request in the course 
of, and for, a particular contract for research, experiment, study or original development. Original development of a first good or service 
may include limited production or supply in order to incorporate the results of field testing and to demonstrate that the good or service is 
suitable for production or supply in quantity to acceptable quality standards, but does not include quantity production or supply to 
establish commercial viability or to recover research and development costs; 
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services resulting from an R&D contract without re-opening the competition for suppliers 
belonging to other GPA parties.  
It should be reminded at this point that Phase 3 of a PCP procedure, following the 
prototyping phase, covers the production of a first batch of pre-products/services, their 
testing in relevant environments and the incorporation of the results of the field testing in a 
limited series of products, meant to demonstrate the suitability for full-scale quantity 
production.972 It could be argued that this phase concerns the development of first products. 
This does not mean though that the contracting authority is automatically allowed to retain 
the ownership of these first products and to subsequently use them in its operational activity. 
It should be reminded that PCP may only cover R&D services, which entails that the value of 
the purchased prototype and/or first products may not be higher than the value of the 
intangible knowledge created within the framework of the PCP. Arguably, the PCP was not 
envisaged by the EU policy-maker to cover the purchase by the contracting authority of the 
first products resulting from Phase 3. I will come back to how the flexibility offered by article 
XV(1)(e) of the 1994 GPA was translated into the EU procurement rules in the next section. 
For now, I address two important questions regarding this GPA exception. Firstly, are ‘first 
products or services’ operational products which can be used by the contracting authority in 
fulfilling its public tasks, or are they equivalent to prototypes? Secondly, would favouring 
domestic businesses during the procurement of the research and development services 
contract (which is not covered by the GPA) limit the discretion of a GPA party to rely on the 
limited tendering exception ? 
The Trondheim Panel Report shed light on some relevant aspects for the interpretation of 
article XV(1)(e) GPA.973 In the Trondheim case, brought before the GPA Panel by the United 
States, a Norwegian public authority was found to have wrongfully relied on article XV(1)(e) 
to justify the direct award to a Norwegian company. The Norwegian authority argued that 
the contract regarded the purchase of prototypes which had been the result of a research 
contract.974 The Panel examined whether the contract regarded the purchase of a 
prototype. However, it  also provided some guidance on the interpretation of the concept of 
‘first products’. 
                                                          
972 PCP Expert Group 23 
973 Norway – Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim (Trondheim case) (panel report adopted 13 May 1992, BISD 
40S/319) (Trondheim case). 
974 Trondheim case, section 4.7: In examining this issue, the Panel first noted that, while the provision referred to "research, experiment, 
study or original development", the parties to the dispute had referred only to research and development. Furthermore, although the 




Before going into the substance, the Panel clarified that the exception provided by article 
XV(1)(e) should be interpreted narrowly and that the Party invoking the provision should bring 
the proof of conformity.975 Subsequently, by making reference to the definition of prototypes 
in the Frascati Manual,976 the Panel ruled that ‘for products to be considered prototypes, they 
must have as their principal purpose the testing and furthering of the knowledge that the 
procuring entity was procuring under the contract for research and/or development.’977 
Subsequently, the Panel extended its conclusions to first products or services. It underlined 
that a ‘contract for research … or original development’ entails the purchase of knowledge. 
Knowledge should not be expressed exclusively in the form of abstract results such as 
scientific papers. The procurement of a prototype or a first product could be intended to 
‘enable the contracting authority to learn of, and to test the validity of, the results of the 
research and/or development in a more practical way’. 
In this case, the Norwegian authority was considered to have failed to demonstrate that the 
purpose of the contract had been the purchase of research and/or development results (in 
the form of a prototype) rather than a final operational product.978 
In conclusion, the Trondheim case underlined that a contract qualifies as a research or 
original development contract and may be awarded through a limited tendering only if the 
scope of the purchase is to perform testing activities and there is still some uncertainty 
regarding the potential of the prototype or first product or service to fulfill the operational 
needs of the contracting authority.  
Unfortunately the Panel did not clarify the distinction between a prototype and a first product 
or service, but seemed to treat them as interchangeable concepts.979 The Panel’s 
interpretation suggests that ‘first products or services’ may not be used as a ground for 
directly purchasing operational products that result from a previous R&D contract. 
The definition of original development of a first product or service, included in the footnote to 
article XV(1)(e) also provides a definition of ‘original development of a first product or 
service’.  
It states: ‘Original development of a first product or service may include limited production or 
supply in order to incorporate the results of field testing and to demonstrate that the product 
or service is suitable for production or supply in quantity to acceptable quality standards. It 
                                                          
975 Trondheim case, section 4.5. 
976 OECD, eim case, section 4.5.ctice for Surveys on Research and Experimental Developmententlopmenti uality public Frascati Manual 
(2002)). 
977 Trondheim case, section 4.9.  
978 Trondheim case, section 4.11. 
979 The Frascatti Manual (2002) does not use this terminology. 
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does not extend to quantity production or supply to establish commercial viability or to 
recover research and development costs’. 
This definition suggests that first products or services cover the stage following prototyping. A 
contract for original development regards thus the purchase of a first batch of operational 
products which incorporate the results of the prototyping/testing stage, but whose working in 
real operational environments at the expected quality levels has not been proven. Moreover, 
the commercial viability of a first product or service is also not proven. Commercial viability 
means the capability to compete on the basis of price and quality with alternative available 
solutions.  
This suggests that the contracting authority is allowed to use these first products/services for 
operational purposes, when this is possible. For example, when a water utility purchases R&D 
services for the development of an innovative water purifying installation, it may also retain 
the option to purchase from the same company through limited tendering the resulting first 
product (the purification installation) and use it to operate part of its processes. In response to 
my first question, it is thus defendable to conclude that the GPA allows a contracting 
authority that sponsored a PCP procedure to purchase its results (in the form of first products 
or services) and use them in the fulfillment of operational needs. 
The second question refers specifically to the requirement recommended by the PCP 
Communication for a company to locate its R&D activities within the EU in order to obtain a 
PCP contract. It is unclear whether this requirement should be considered discriminatory in 
light of the GPA and if so, whether it breaches article XV(1) GPA (article XIII(1) of the newly 
amended GPA) which  expressly provides that the limited tendering procedure may not be 
used ‘for the purpose of avoiding competition among suppliers or in a manner that 
discriminates against suppliers of any other Party or protects domestic suppliers’. In case of a 
positive answer, the non-competitive purchase of the PCP result would not be possible based 
on this provision.  
It is worth mentioning at this point, that only a GPA party may complain before a GPA Panel 
against the illegal use of the limited tendering procedure. A discontent EU or GPA supplier 
would not be able to rely on this provision before EU national courts, as the Procurement 
Directives expressly exclude the direct effect of the GPA within the EU legal order.980 It should 
also be noted that the chances of a challenge by a GPA party are, in practical terms, 
extremely remote. Contorting EU innovation policy to avoid the possibility of such a challenge 
seems illogical -- unless, of course, the contortions are really for an ‘internal’ EU purpose. 
                                                          
980 Recital (7) Public Sector Directive and recital (14) Utilities Directive. 
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According to Arrowsmith, the introductory provision to article XV(1) (and of the new article 
XIII(1)) covers two separate obligations. The first obligation, not to use the limited tendering 
‘for the purpose of avoiding competition among suppliers’ relates to the reasons for applying 
the limited tendering.981 The second obligation, not to use the limited tendering ‘in a manner 
which would constitute a means of discrimination among suppliers of other Parties or 
protection to domestic producers or suppliers’ relates to the way the limited tendering is 
carried out and not to the reasons for applying it.982 
According to the first obligation, a contracting authority which relies on the limited tendering 
exception to purchase the first products or services resulting from a PCP, should not be 
motivated by the desire to protect domestic companies, but by the desire to fulfill an 
operational need (which cannot be fulfilled by commercially available products) and to 
avoid the financial burden of an additional competition.983 The obligation to justify the choice 
for a limited tendering (or negotiated procedure without prior publication) in terms of reasons 
has not expressly been up-taken in the EU public procurement legislation (see discussion in 
the next section). 
The prohibition to use limited tendering ‘for the purpose of avoiding competition among 
suppliers’ may entail an additional obligation for a contracting authority to  organize informal 
competitive negotiations, in case there are more than one suppliers who could offer similar 
solutions. Arrowsmith subsequently dismisses this interpretation due to the legal uncertainty it 
would create..984 It could be though envisaged that in the context of a PCP which yielded 2 
finalists, applying the limited tendering exception to award the contract to the domestic 
finalist without any informal negotiations with the other finalist originating from a GPA state 
party, would breach this provision.  
When the PCP merely yielded one finalist, it is unclear whether the contracting authority 
should actively investigate the existence of similar solution on the market. The market 
consultation/research performed at the preparatory stage of a PCP in order to justify the 
novelty of the R&D services would arguably be a sufficient source of information, despite the 
potentially occurred changes in the market situation. In the Trondheim case, the United 
Stated raised a similar argument. It argued that the contracting authority in question was at 
least required to consult ‘known and eager competitors’.985 Unfortunately, the Panel did not 
address this issue. 
                                                          
981 Sue Arrowsmith, ‘Government Procurement in the WTO’  (Vol.16, Kluwer Law International 2003) 282 (Arrowsmith (2003)).  
982 Arrowsmith (2003) 282-4. 
983 Arrowsmith (2003) 283 considers, for example, that a wide range of commercial reasons for invoking the limited tendering exceptions 
should be recognized. 
984 Arrowsmith (2003) 297. 
985 Trondheim case section 3.5. 
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The second obligation of the introductory provision to article XV(1) prohibits the use of the 
limited tendering ‘in a manner which would constitute a means of discrimination among 
suppliers of other Parties or protection to domestic producers or suppliers’. The question arises 
whether this provision covers the discriminatory intention and/or effect of the PCP 
requirement to locate the R&D activities within the EU. 
The definition of the non-discrimination principle in Article III GPA sheds light on the 
interpretation of the introductory provision of article XV(1).986 The non-discrimination principle 
is equivalent with the national treatment principle, and entails that suppliers from all member 
parties will be treated no less favourably than domestic suppliers.987 According to 
jurisprudence within the GATT on the interpretation of the national treatment principle, 
formally identical but de facto (indirect) discriminatory measures are in breach of the non-
discrimination principle of the GPA.988 In this light, the requirement to locate the R&D activities 
within the EU, although equally applied to both GPA parties and domestic companies, 
discriminates de facto against companies from GPA state parties, which do not have an 
establishment on the EU territory.  
However, this discriminatory requirement is applied in the context of a contract which is 
excluded from the scope of application of the GPA, albeit with a de facto discriminatory 
effect at the stage of a procurement which falls within the scope of application of the GPA. 
The discussed requirement has the de facto effect that only locally produced products would 
make the chance to win the contract. However, to adopt this interpretation would effectively 
bring many GPA obligations on award procedures in expressly excluded R&D contracts 
‘through the back door’. If the parties to the GPA intended to exclude the effect of 
requirements set in previous procurements excepted from the scope of application of the 
GPA, then this obligation could have been specifically provided. On the contrary, article XV 
refers to the requirements set within the framework of the limited tendering at hand (‘the 
limited tendering is not used (…) in a manner which would constitute a means of 
discrimination among suppliers of other Parties or protection to domestic producers or 
suppliers’). 
In conclusion, it is defendable to argue that the GPA allows a contracting authority to directly 
purchase the PCP results (namely first products or services) despite the PCP requirement to 
                                                          
986 The limited tendering is subject to compliance with Article III GPA on non-discrimination. Article III.1 GPA provides: ‘With respect to all 
laws, regulations, procedures and practices regarding government procurement covered by this Agreement, each Party shall provide 
immediately and unconditionally to the products, services and suppliers of other Parties offering products or services of the Parties, 
treatment no less favourable than: (a) that accorded to domestic products, services and suppliers…’ 
987 Caroline Nicholas, ‘Work of UNCITRAL on government procurement: purpose, objectives and complementarity with the work of the 
WTO’ 766 in Sue Arrowsmith and Robert D. Anderson (eds) ‘The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform’ (CUP 
2011).  
988 Arrowsmith (2003) 160-1. 
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locate the R&D activities within the EU, provided that the contracting engages in informal 
negotiations with all PCP finalists belonging to GPA state parties.  
Lastly, it should be mentioned that the question of non-conformity with the GPA does not 
arise when a EU contracting authority opens an R&D services contract to competition from 
GPA businesses and does not impose a requirement regarding the location of the R&D 
activities. Such a contracting authority may directly purchase the innovative first product or 
service from (one of) the contractor(s) in the R&D contract, provided it does not exclude from 
the informal negotiations the PCP finalists belonging to GPA state parties. 
This does not change the fact that a EU contracting authority would still breach the EU public 
procurement rules when procuring directly such results, as the Procurement Directives have 
chosen to adopt a stricter approach than allowed by the GPA and do not provide this 
possibility. In the following section, I will outline how the EU has so far regulated the award of 
R&D contracts and how much flexibility it allows for the direct purchase of the innovative 
results thereof.  
5.3.3 EU Procurement Directives provisions relevant for the purchase of PCP solutions 
5.3.3.1 R&D contracts 
As already mentioned, the EU exempted from the application of the GPA R&D service 
contracts, but not R&D works or R&D supplies contracts. The EU further divided the R&D 
service contracts into two categories and brought them partially under the scope of the EU 
GPA by leaving them under the scope of the EU Procurement Directives and by requiring 
contracting authorities to apply the EU Procurement Directives to tenderers from GPA partner 
countries as well. The R&D works and R&D supplies contracts are also regulated by the EU 
Procurement Directives. They allow more flexibility to (directly) negotiate with a market party. 
However, they do not extend their reach to first operational products. 
R&D service contracts 
The EU divided the R&D service contracts into two categories and allowed increased 
purchasing flexibility (by exempting them from the scope of the EU Procurement Directive) 
only to R&D service contracts whose risks and benefits are shared between the contracting 
authority and the R&D service provider. The R&D service contracts whose benefits exclusively 
accrue to the contracting authority and whose costs are fully paid by the same contracting 
authority remain within the scope of application of the EU Procurement Directives and should 
be awarded in compliance with their provisions. 
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R&D services procured under a shared risk-benefit approach have from the start been 
excepted from the scope of application of the EU procurement rules. The first procurement 
directive regulating services (Directive 92/50/EC) excluded these R&D services from the 
concept of public service contracts.989 
R&D services fully funded by the contracting authority and whose benefits exclusively accrue 
to the same contracting authority have always been covered by the EU procurement 
regime. However, the 1997 Services Procurement Directive - which brought the procurement 
legislation in line with the 1994 GPA – allowed contracting authorities to exclude competitors 
from GPA countries. In Directive 97/52/EC, it was made clear that the scope of the GPA does 
not cover R&D service contracts mentioned in category 8 of Annex I A thereto.990 Category 8 
of Annex I A refers to R&D services when all benefits accrue to the contracting authority and 
the full cost of development is paid by the contracting authority/entity. 
This provision has been dropped into the current Procurement Directives.991 This means that, 
under the current rules, EU contracting authorities are encouraged to open these R&D 
contracts to competition from GPA state parties. The proposed Procurement Directives 
change this again. The Directives will only be applicable to contracts that are brought by the 
EU within the scope of application of the GPA.992 
R&D works and R&D supplies contracts 
The EU did not translate into the Procurement Directives the flexibility offered by the above 
discussed art XV(1)(e) GPA on limited tendering of first products or services.  
In Article 31(2)(a) and (d) of Directive 2004/18/EC allows the use of the negotiated procedure 
without prior publication of a contract notice (which entails direct negotiations with a 
particular firm) only for products which are destined to be used within the framework of 
research, experimentation, study or development projects.993 This provision covers prototypes 
which can only be procured for the purpose of testing and does not extend to the purchase 
                                                          
989 Art 1 Directive 92/50/EC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts [1992] OJL 
209:  For the purposes of this Directive: (a) public service contracts shall mean contracts for pecuniary interest concluded in writing 
between a service provider and a contracting authority, to the exclusion of: (….) ix) research and development service contracts other than 
those where the benefits accrue exclusively to the contracting authority for its use in the conduct of its own affairs, on condition that the 
service provided is wholly remunerated by the contracting authority.’ 
990 See Art 1 European Parliament and Council Directive 97/52/EC of 13 October 1997 amending Directives 92/50/EEC, 93/36/EEC and 
93/37/EEC concerning the coordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts, public supply contracts and public works 
contracts respectively [1997] OJ L 328. 
991 See Annex IIA Directive 2004/18 and Annex XVIIA Directive 2004/17/EC of 31 March 2004 coordinating the procurement procedures of 
entities operating in the water, energy, transport and postal services sectors [2004] OJL 134/1. 
992 Recital (8) of the new Public Sector Directive. 
993 Art 31(2)(a) Public Sector Directive: ‘when the products involved are manufactured purely for the purpose of research, experimentation, 
study or development; this provision does not extend to quantity production to establish commercial viability or to recover research and 
development costs’.  
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of first products developed within the context of a PCP procedure.994 For the procurement of 
R&D works, article 30(1)(d) allows even less flexibility. The award should be open to 
competition. However, negotiations with the tenderers are allowed. 
Directive 2004/17/EC includes a more general provision which allows direct negotiations for 
the award of all kinds of R&D contracts, whether services, supplies or works. However, article 
40(3)(b) clearly states that the purchase of the products developed through such an R&D 
contract should be conducted through competitive procurement procedures. This entails 
that the direct purchase of first products/services resulting from a PCP is neither covered by 
this provision. 
5.3.3.2 Other grounds to justify the direct purchase of PCP solutions  
In the previous section I analysed how the flexibility allowed by the GPA to directly purchase 
the first operational results following an R&D contract was reflected into the EU Procurement  
Directives. In this section, I investigate under which conditions articles 31(1)(b) of Directive 
2004/18 and 40(3)(c) of Directive 2004/17 provide the legal ground for the direct purchase of 
the first products/services resulting from a PCP procedure.  
According to the above mentioned provisions, a contacting authority may follow a 
negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice, if ‘for technical or 
artistic reasons, or for reasons connected with the protection of exclusive rights, the contract 
may be awarded only to a particular economic operator’.995 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has already stated in jurisprudence that 
the scope of application of these provisions is restrictive.996 In Case C-328/92, in which the 
European Commission contested the non-competitive purchase of pharmaceutical products 
by the Spanish government, the European judge clarified that it is not enough that a product 
is protected by exclusive rights. It must also ’be capable of being manufactured or delivered 
only by a particular supplier’. The judge added that this requirement ‘is satisfied only in 
respect of those products and specialties for which there is no competition in the market’.997 
In other words, the Spanish government could rely on this exception only if it had the 
following cumulative proof: 
- that the owner of the IP of the pharmaceutical products had not granted licenses to 
other parties for manufacturing and delivering the same IPR protected products; and 
                                                          
994 Art 32(3)(a) of the new Public Sector Directive restricts this provision to supply contract (thus prototypes).  
995 Art 31(1)(b) Public Sector Directive and art 40(3)(c) Utilities Directive. 
996 Case C-199/85, Commission v Italy [1987] ECR I-039 para 14; Case C-57/94 Commission v Italy [1995] ECR I-1249 para 23; Case C-318/94 
Commission v Germany [1996] ECR I-1949 para 13; Case C-385/02 Commission v Italy [2004] ECR I-08121 paras 19-20; Case C-394/02, 
Commission v Greece [2005] ECR I-4713 para 33. 
997 Case C-328/92, Commission v Spain [1994] I-01569 para 17. 
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- that there were no competing products on the market in respect of functionalities 
and/or performance levels. 
When technical reasons are relied on for derogating from a competitive award, the Court 
similarly ruled that it must be ‘absolutely essential’ that the contract in question be awarded 
to a particular undertaking, and not to another undertaking.998 The Court suggested that a 
contracting authority should prove that the technical difficulties could not be surmounted if 
the contract were awarded to another undertaking and should rely to this end on a 
technical report of an independent expert. 999 In other words, the contracting authority should 
be able to prove that the preferred contractor is the only one on the market who possesses 
of the needed expertise to deal with the respective technical difficulties. 1000 
5.3.3.3 Conclusions 
In conclusion, by allowing the choice for a negotiated procedure without prior publication 
only for the purchase of a prototype and not for the purchase of a first product or service, the 
EU legislator has adopted a stricter approach than the GPA. The PCP itself covers the 
development of first products at Phase 3. However, this does not entail that the contracting 
authority may retain ownership of these first products and subsequently use them for 
operational purposes. The requirement that the value of the R&D services is higher that the 
value of the R&D supplies (prototypes and first products) prevents this scenario in most cases. 
As a consequence, the EU legislator failed to embed into the EU Procurement Directives the 
incentive for contracting authorities to act as early adopters of innovations developed in 
previously performed PCPs. It didn’t strike thus the right balance between the need to 
stimulate innovation from the demand-side and the need to ensure that innovation is pursued 
under EU-wide competition. 
I argued in the previous section that this choice was not due to legal constrains flowing from 
the GPA, but it was due to the desire of the EU legislator to prevent excessive reliance by 
national contracting authorities on this exception, based on national industrial policy 
motivations rather than real needs. Nevertheless, this missing incentive has a negative impact 
on the potential of the PCP to achieve its innovation policy aims.  
However, there is some room within the current legal rules to formulate strict requirements 
which may lead to the procurement of the product/service developed during a PCP. When 
a contracting authority can demonstrate that the innovative solution developed through a  
                                                          
998 Case C-57/94 paras 24-5; Case C-385/02 Commission v Italy, paras 18, 20 and 21; Case C-394/02 para 34. 
999 Case C-57/94 para 27. 
1000 Case C-394/02 paras 35-9. 
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PCP procedure, performs certain functionalities and achieves certain levels of performance 
which are not met by other products on the market, it may successfully rely on this exception 
to directly award the contract to the PCP finalist. This will thus be possible when: 
- only one company successfully finalized the PCP procedure (if there are two finalists, a 
competitive procedure should be organized); and 
- when the result of a PCP procedure is a breakthrough innovation, which significantly 
advances state-of-the-art.  
However, reliance on this provision for the direct purchase of a PCP result is not expressly 
allowed by the current rules. As a consequence, individual contracting authorities may 
perceive legal risks in pursuing such an approach. 
In the next section, I will investigate whether the Proposals for the new EU Procurement 
Directives1001 increase or restrict the flexibility to purchase the innovative solutions developed 
during a PCP procedure. 
5.3.4 The Proposals for the new EU Procurement Directives EU – constrains and 
incentives for the purchase of PCP solutions 
5.3.4.1 Introduction 
The Proposal for the new Public Sector Directive maintains the same provision regarding the 
use of negotiations without prior notice for the purchase of R&D supplies (in practice 
prototypes or first products).1002 R&D works contracts may still be purchased through a 
negotiated procedure with prior publication of a contract notice (now called ‘competitive 
procedure with negotiations’). This is not expressly mentioned anymore, as the grounds for 
application of the competitive procedure with negotiations have become more lenient. 
According to article 24(1c)(a)(ii), a contracting authority may choose this procedure when 
the contract includes design or innovative solutions. R&D works would qualify though as 
contracts including innovative solutions. 
The Proposal for a new Utilities Directive also maintains the old provision for all types of  R&D 
contracts.1003 
Changes are brought by the Proposals in respect of the grounds for the negotiated 
procedure without prior notice when due to artistic reasons, technical reasons, IPRs or other 
                                                          
1001 The European Parliament has adopted on the 15th of January 2014 the new procurement directives. The directives will be due for 
implementation within 2 years from their adoption. 
1002 Art.32(3)(a) of the new Public Sector Directive. 
1003 Art50(b) of the new Utilities Directive. Art.32(3)(a) of the new Public Sector Directive. 
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exclusive rights only a particular economic operator can supply the works, supplies or 
services.1004 Moreover, the Proposals introduce the new Innovation Partnership procedure.  
This section analyses in how far the changes brought by the new Procurement Directives 
increase or restrict the flexibility to purchase the innovative solutions developed during a PCP 
procedure. To this end, section 5.3.4.2 focuses on the use of the negotiated procedure 
without prior notice for technical or IPR reasons and section 5.3.4.3 analyses the newly 
introduced Innovation Partnership procedure. Section 5.3.4.4 concludes whether sufficient 
incentives are embedded in the new procurement rules to stimulate contracting authorities 
to act as early adopters of innovative products or services. 
5.3.4.2 The use of the negotiated procedure without prior notice for technical or IPR reasons 
The novelty brought by the Proposals in the negotiated procedure without prior notice for 
technical or IPR reasons is the following addition: when relying on the technical or exclusive 
rights grounds, the contracting authority needs to demonstrate that no ‘reasonable 
alternative or substitute’ exists and that ‘the absence of competition is not the result of an 
artificial narrowing down of the parameters of the procurement’.1005 
The question arises whether these additional conditions restrict the possibility of a contracting 
authority to rely on direct negotiations in order to purchase the innovative products/services 
developed through a PCP procedure, as compared to the current Procurement Directives.  
More specifically, do these additional conditions require the contracting authority to lower 
the required level of performance or the amount of functionalities, depending on the level of 
competition on the market?  
To find an answer to this, I will first take a look at the judicial interpretation of the concept of 
‘reasonable substitutes or alternatives’ by the CJEU (sub-section a). Subsequently, I will outline 
the interpretation of the concept of ‘reasonableness’ and ‘proportionality’ in the 
administrative area in national or international jurisdictions (sub-sections b, c and d). In sub-
section e., I will conclude on the most suitable interpretation of the obligation to demonstrate 
that no ‘reasonable alternative or substitute’  exists. After investigating the interpretation of 
                                                          
1004 Art32(2)(b) of the new Public Sector Directive; art 50(c) of the new Utilities Directive. The negotiated procedure without prior 
publication of a contract notice is allowed ‘where the works, supplies or services can be supplied only by a particular economic operator for 
any of the following reasons:  
(i) the aim of the procurement is the creation or acquisition of a unique work of art or artistic performance; 
(ii) competition is absent for technical reasons; 
(iii) the protection of exclusive rights, including intellectual property rights. 
This exceptions set out in points (ii) and (iii) only apply when no reasonable alternative or substitute exists and the absence of competition is 
not the result of an artificial narrowing down of the parameters of the procurement’. 
1005 The recitals of the Proposed Directives reiterate that ‘only situations of objective exclusivity can justify the use of the negotiated 
procedure without publication’ and that this will not be the case if the contracting authority has designed the award requirement such as to 
create that exclusivity. Moreover, the availability of adequate substitutes should be assessed thoroughly. 
 
 237 
the concept of reasonable alternatives or substitutes, I will analyse what concrete obligations 
the prohibition to ‘artificially narrowing down the parameters of the procurement’ potentially 
entails (sub-section f). 
a. CJEU jurisprudence on reasonable alternatives or substitutes 
Cases regarding the evaluation of two services/products as reasonable alternatives are most 
common in the area of competition law. The identification of reasonable alternatives in such 
cases has a different objective than discussed in the context of procurement. By investigating 
the existence of reasonable alternatives, the CJEU aims to identify the relevant market (made 
of competitive products) for the calculation of the market share of one or more undertakings. 
Nevertheless, the analysis of the CJEU is helpful in understanding the characteristics which 
determine two products being considered alternatives or substitutes. 
In case T-395/94, the Court of First Instance (CFI) evaluated the grounds for annulment of 
European Commission’s decision that the agreement between North European shipping lines 
for the scheduled transport of containers, which fixed conditions (such as prices and 
available capacity) for the provision of maritime and inland transport services to shippers 
from various Member States, negatively affected trade between EU Member States and was 
in breach of the EU competition rules.1006 
In order to conclude whether competition was unjustifiably restricted, CFI  analyzed whether 
the agreement covered most of the operators in the relevant market, or whether there still 
existed reasonable alternatives to containerized liner shipping services on the market, beyond 
those covered by the agreement. Following a thorough analysis, the Court concluded that 
other maritime, air or conventional bulk transport modes are not reasonable alternatives to 
containerized liner shipping services, because they cost more and do not offer transportation 
services for all types of products.1007 
In a previous case, C-322/81,1008 the Court analyzed whether there are products which can 
form a genuine alternative as regards quality and price to the products offered by the 
investigated undertaking. In that case, Michelin argued that for the calculation of its market 
share the Commission should have included second-hand tyres (retreads) to the relevant 
market. The Court concludes that ‘new tyres and retreads are interchangeable to some 
                                                          
1006 Case T-395/94 R II Atlantic Container Line and Others v Commission [1995] ECR 11-2893. 
1007 Ibid paras 272-3, 279, 281. 
1008 Case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 3461 para 37. 
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degree, but only to a limited extent and not for all purposes’ and that to the extent they were 
interchangeable constituted a genuine alternative.1009 
In conclusion, a service or a product is considered to be a reasonable or genuine alternative, 
if it fulfills the same functionalities and levels of performance and if it is offered against 
competitive/similar prices. If any of these elements is missing, the product does not qualify as 
a reasonable alternative or substitute.1010 
It is defendable to argue that the same interpretation should be used in the context of 
provisions 30(2)(b) of the Proposal for a new Public Sector Directive and 44(d) of the Proposal 
for a new Utilities Directive. The assessment of reasonableness of the alternative or substitute 
should thus not put into discussion the functionalities and purposes required by the public 
purchaser. 
This also entails that the contracting authority is not mandated to investigate the degree of 
competition on the market, before deciding on its procurement requirements in terms of 
functions and levels of performance.  
However, if we take the view that the decision to formulate its need (particularly in the area 
of innovation) weighs diverse interests and policy objectives, a different test may apply when 
reviewing how the contracting authority exercises its discretion to set the desired levels of 
performance and functionalities. 
In order to conclude on the most suitable test to be applied in this context, I analyse the 
reasonableness test, as applied in the administrative area in national or international 
jurisdictions when reviewing the limits of discretion conferred by legislation on public 
authorities. The Anglo-Saxon legal traditions employ the reasonableness principle, while in 
German-Austrian legal traditions, the extent of the discretion of a public authority is reviewed 
through the application of the proportionality principle. The latter principle will only be 
analysed in the context of the CJEU’s jurisprudence and within the legal framework of the 
WTO. 
b. The standard for judicial review of reasonableness of administrative acts  
Reasonableness has been a ground for review of administrative acts in the UK since the 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury case.1011 In the UK, the approach to 
                                                          
1009 Ibid paras 49-53. 
1010 ‘Suitable alternative goods’ are defined in the WTO framework as ‘those goods which perform the same or similar function as the 
imported good and which would compete directly with the imported good’. See ‘Trade Policies and Practices by Measure’, WT/TPR/S/216, 
para 29. 
1011 Wednesbury [1948] 1 K.B. 223 (C.A.). 
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judicial review on grounds of reasonableness is characterized by judicial deference. 
Reasonableness is a ground of annulment of administrative acts, only when it amounts to 
irrationality or bad faith. At no time, the court will ‘replace the legislature’s intent or the 
executive’s legally exercised discretion’.1012 
In the Wednesbury case, the English Court concluded that a reasonable use of discretion 
entails compliance with the following two cumulative conditions: on the one side, to consider 
all interests which are relevant for taking the decision and to leave out irrelevant aspects; 
and on the other side, to draw therefrom a decision which finds itself within the range of 
rational possible conclusions. A decision could thus be struck down when it has a defect 
either in ‘the evidentiary foundation itself or in the logical process by which conclusions are 
sought to be drawn from it.’1013  
In balancing individual human rights against policy interests, the UK Courts apply a stricter, 
less deferent test, which involves a general assessment of the competing interests, weighed 
against each other and comes closer to the proportionality test.1014 In the view of UK judges, 
the central difference between the reasonableness and proportionality test is that 
proportionality ‘may require the reviewing court to assess the balance which the decision 
maker has struck, not merely whether it is within the range of rational or reasonable 
decisions’, and this ‘may require attention to be directed to the relative weight accorded to 
interests and considerations’.1015  
The decision to set certain levels of performance and functionality within the framework of a 
public procurement does not entail balancing human rights against policy interests. The 
deferent reasonableness test may prove to be the most relevant for the purposes of this 
discussion. 
In the Netherlands, the reasonableness test, codified in article 3:4 of the General 
Administrative Law, appears to set a similar standard of review to the UK.1016 It entails two 
similar steps. Firstly, the judge should investigate whether all relevant interests have been 
considered. Which interests should be considered in the decision-making may be limited by 
the extent of the competence (discretion) offered by the applicable legislation. For example, 
if the legislation allows a public authority to refuse to grant a building permit on grounds of 
protection of underground water, the public authority may not involve other public interests 
                                                          
1012 Ibid 19. 
1013 Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) [1999] 2 S. C. R. 817, para 63 (Baker v Canada case). 
1014 Margit Cohn, ‘Legal Transplants Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality Review of the Administration in the 
United Kingdom’ 19 (2010) American Journal of Comparative Law 27-8 (Cohn (2010)). 
1015 Cohn (2010) 29 referring to R. (Daly) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] 2 A.C. 532 (H.L.) 547. 
1016 Art 3:4 provides: ‘1. The administrative organ weighs the interests which are directly related to the decision-making, as far as this is not 
limited by legislation or the extent of the competence being exercised. 2. The negative consequences of the decision for one or more of the 
interested parties may not be unreasonable in comparison to the intended objectives of the decision’. 
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which may negatively impact the decision-making, besides the impact on the underground 
water.1017 On the other side, even when the interests of third parties have been weighed in 
the legislative process, the public authority remains obliged to consider the interests of the 
individuals directly affected by the concrete decision. 1018 
Secondly, the judge should investigate whether by weighing the relevant conflicting interests 
the public authority has struck the balance such as not to cause unreasonably negative 
consequences to one or more of the interested parties. The judge will thus not investigate 
whether the public authority stroke the best balance between the competing interests, but 
will only strike down a decision, if the respective conclusion based on the weighing of the 
relevant interests amounts to arbitrariness. 1019 
The Canadian federal law applies the same approach. Decisions classified as discretionary 
may only be reviewed on limited grounds such as ‘the bad faith of the decisions-makers, the 
exercise of discretion from an improper purpose, and the use of irrelevant considerations’.1020 
In other words, a reasonable exercise of the discretion offered by the legislation entails a 
close weighing of the interests at stake.1021 A deferent review by the courts entails, on the 
other hand, ‘a respectful attention to the reasons offered or which could be offered in 
support of a decision’.1022 
In setting the appropriate level of deference of the judicial review, the Canadian courts take 
into consideration several concrete factors: the level of expertise of the decision-maker (the 
more expertise the more deferent the court should act); the purpose of the legislative 
provision (and legislation as a whole) awarding discretion to the authority, the competing 
interests or rights which need to be balanced (when the decision impacts directly the rights 
and interests of an individual in relation to the government, judicial scrutiny should be stricter 
than when the decision involves balancing the interests of various government 
constituencies); the nature of the decision, fact- or law-based (when a decision is of a fact-
based nature, deference is appropriate).1023 
Within the context of a decision to rely on the direct negotiations procedure to purchase the 
resulting innovative products/services from a PCP procedure, a contracting authority is 
weighing the interest of opening the Internal market to competition against the interest to 
                                                          
1017 PJJ van Buuren and TC Borman, ‘Algemene Wet Bestuurrecht – Tekst & Commentaar’ (Kluwer 2009) 82 refering to Memorie van 
Toellichting, Parl. Gesch. Awb I, p.210 (van Buuren and Borman (2009)). 
1018 Cases AB 1984, 21 August 1984, ARRS 542 and AB 1987, 27 May 1986, Vz. ARRS 267, JB 2005/248, 22 June 2005, ABRS. 
1019 Van Buuren and Borman (2009) 83 refering to cases CRvB 28 mei 1998, AB 1998, 244; CRvB 6 september 2006, JB 2006/311. 
1020 Baker v. Canada case para 55. 
1021 Baker v. Canada case para 55. 
1022 D. Dyzenhaus, ‘The Politics of Deference: Judicial Review and Democracy’ 286 in M. Taggart (ed) ‘The Province of Administrative Law’ 
(Hart Publishing 1997) (Dyzenhaus (1997)). 
1023 Baker v. Canada case paras 58-62. 
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promote innovative capabilities of EU firms and bring breakthrough innovation earlier to the 
commercialization stage. 
The contracting authority should be given significant leeway in defining its own needs, in 
requiring the desired minimum levels of performance and specific functionalities, irrespective 
of the market structure. The contracting authority should only be able to convincingly 
demonstrate that its minimum levels of performance and functionality are not met by more 
than one supplier on the market. 
c. The proportionality principle in the CJEU jurisprudence 
CJEU does not employ reasonableness as a principle to review the exercise of discretion in 
derogating from the obligations under EU law.1024 For these purposes, CJEU has employed the 
proportionality principle since the Internationale Handelsgesellschaft case1025 as a general 
principle of Community law.  
The proportionality principle may be either related to weighing of two competing rights or to 
weighing collective/state interests against individual interests/rights.1026 The following tests are 
applied by the CJEU.1027 Firstly, the suitability/appropriateness test assesses whether the 
measure is suitable or appropriate to achieve the targeted aim. This test includes also a 
review of the legitimacy of the objectives. Derogations from EU law are permitted on 
restricted grounds, provided by the TFEU1028 or recognized in CJEU’s jurisprudence1029. Once it 
concludes that the policy reason behind the measure falls within the range of legitimate 
policy reasons, the Court does not question the level of protection chosen by the Member 
State.1030  
Secondly, the necessity test assesses whether the measure is the least restrictive one capable 
to achieve the aim, or whether there are less restrictive measures which may achieve the 
                                                          
1024 Dyzenhaus (1997) 386.  
1025 Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v Einfuhr- und Vorratstelle Getreide [1970] ECR 1125 para 4. 
1026 Tor-Inge Harbo, ‘The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU law’ 16 (2010) European Law Journal 164 (Harbo (2010)). 
1027 Case C-331/88 R v Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1990] E.C.R. I-4023, para 13 (“[b]y virtue of [the principle of 
proportionality], the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are 
appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice 
between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be 
disproportionate to the aims pursued”). Harbo (n83) 173. 
1028 Article 52(1) TFEU (ex Article 46(1) TEC): “The provisions of this Chapter [on the right of establishment] and measures taken in 
pursuance thereof shall not prejudice the applicability of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action providing for 
special treatment for foreign nationals on grounds of public policy, public security or public health.” 
1029 Such as maintaining media pluralism or protecting human rights. Case C-368/95, Familiapress [1997] ECR I-368; Case C-112/00 




same goal. Thirdly, the proportionality test stricto sensu assesses whether the measure, 
although necessary and suitable, poses an excessive burden on the individual.1031  
According to some authors, CJEU scrutinizes with different levels of strictness the decisions of 
the authorities and it is sometimes more creative than others when it comes to envisaging less 
restrictive alternatives (it applies sometimes the three-tier test and sometimes the two-tier 
test).1032 Harbo finds a pattern in the CJEU jurisprudence: in cases concerning alleged 
infringements of the EU fundamental freedoms by national legislative or administrative 
measures, the Court performs a thorough proportionality test.1033 In cases concerning  a 
balancing exercise between human rights and EU fundamental rights, the Court strikes the 
balance differently depending on the importance of the human right.1034 
Heyvaert concludes that the CJEU applies the proportionality test in a changing manner, 
depending on the importance of a derogation ground at a certain moment in time. 
Although the European Union was set-up mainly as a custom union and a free trade zone in 
which economic objectives were overriding social and welfare considerations, this changed 
with the increasing importance of environmental and human health concerns.1035  
The CJEU has in its jurisprudence continuously balanced the fundamental freedoms (the 
imperatives of the internal market) against the prerogatives and regulatory powers of the 
Member States. Even if we admit that in the case of formulating a procurement need, a 
contracting authority is balancing various objectives, the fact that these are two legitimate 
EU objectives, argues in favour of a deferent standard for review of its discretion. 
d. Reasonableness and proportionality in international economic law 
In international trade law, the WTO Appellate Body applies a similar test to the proportionality 
principle when reviewing the discretion of State Parties to deviate from the agreement’s 
obligations for public policy reasons.  
Firstly, the Appellate Body analyses how close the link is between the measure and the aims. 
In other words, in how far the measure contributes to the aim pursued. Secondly, the 
Appellate Body analyses the importance of the common interests or values protected by the 
measure. The third element taken into consideration is the extent of the negative impact of 
                                                          
1031 Harbo (2010) 165. 
1032 Cohn (2010) 26. Harbo (2010) 172. 
1033 Harbo (2010) 172-6. 
1034 Harbo (2010) 179. 
1035 Case C-473/98, Kemikalieinspektionen v Toolex Alpha AB ECR 2000 I-05681. Veerle Heyvaert, ‘Balancing Trade and Environment in the 
European Union: Proportionality Substituted ?’ (2001) 13 Journal of Environmental Law 402-3. 
 
 243 
the measure on trade.1036  
These three elements are subsequently balanced against each other. This comes down to 
investigating whether a WTO-consistent or a less WTO-inconsistent alternative is reasonably 
available.’1037  
When performing this last test, the Appellate Body adopts a deferent approach to the level 
of protection defined by the State Party. In cases in which the exceptions set forth in GATT 
Article XX(b) and (d) were invoked, the Appellate Body did not question the prerogative of a 
State Party to set the desired level of protection.1038 Other WTO agreements arguably codify 
this jurisprudence and expressly recognize the right of States Parties to set high levels of 
protection based on public policy.1039  
The Appellate Body not only does not question the high level of protection set by the State, 
but it requires clear evidence from the complainant that the alternative, less restrictive/WTO 
compliant measure will achieve the same level of protection. For example, in EC – Asbestos 
case, where France had set high level of health protection against exposure to asbestos and 
prohibited the use of asbestos products, the review body disagreed with the complainant 
(Canada) who argued that a reasonable alternative measure was the controlled use of 
asbestos. The Appellate Body considered that there was not sufficiently clear scientific 
evidence that controlled use of asbestos would protect human health to the same levels as 
prohibition in the use of asbestos products.1040 Similarly, in the US –Gambling case, the 
Appellate Body dismissed the international consultations as a reasonable alternative to the 
restricted access of online betting providers to its gambling market, due to the uncertainty 
that they may achieve the same objective of preventing crime and underage and 
pathological gambling.1041 
However, the Appellate Body adopts a less deferent approach when other policy reasons 
than human health or human morality are invoked. In these cases, international cooperation 
                                                          
1036 Meinhard Hilf and Sebastian Puth, ’The Principle of Proportionality on its Way into WTO/GATT Law’ in Armin von Bogdandy, Petros C. 
Mavroidis & Yves Mény (eds) ‘European Integration and International Co-ordination’ (Kluwer Law International 2002) (Hilf and Puth (2002)). 
Federico Ortino, ‘From ‘non-discrimination’ to ‘reasonableness’: a paradigm shift in international economic law ?’ (2005) Jean Monet 
Working Paper 01/05, 30 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922524> accessed 5 February 2013. 
1037 See Appellate Body Report, Korea-Beef, para 166; citation in Hilf and Puth (2002). 
1038 Panel Report, Australia –Salmon, paras 8.173 and 8.175. Appellate Body Report, Australia – Salmon, paras 210, 242; Panel Report, Japan 
– Agricultural Products II, paras 8.83-4. 
1039 Art 2.2 of the TBT Agreement provides that ‘technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
objective, taking account of the risks non-fulfillment would create’. Art 5.6 SPS Agreement provides: ‘Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of 
Article 3, when establishing or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection, taking into account technical and economic feasibility.’ 
1040 Appellate Body Report, EC –Asbestos, para 174. 
1041 Appellate Body Report, US – Gambling, para 317. 
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or negotiations are considered as reasonable alternative measures.1042 
e. Reasonableness – summarizing remarks 
In European law, the judicial investigation of the existence of reasonable alternatives to 
goods or services in the area of competition law, entails an objective investigation of the 
existence on the market of products or services which comply with the same levels of 
functionality and performance as those of the reference products/services and have similar 
prices.  
However, when reviewing measures applied by Member States to advance 
national/industrial policy aims, the EU judges weights the different interests/policy aims 
involved. They review the legitimacy of the policy objective set by the Member State, the 
suitability of the adopted measure to achieve this legitimate objective and the existence of 
less trade restrictive measures.  
Within the legal framework of the WTO, reasonableness as a concept is part of the evaluation 
of WTO-compliant or less trade restrictive measure and involves deference to the right of the 
State to define the desired levels of protection.  
In the UK reasonableness is applied as a fully-fledged principle, which illustrates ‘a positivist 
concept of law and constitutional design underpinning a strong legislator and weak basis of 
individual rights and judicial power’.1043 These jurisdictions adopt a deferent approach to 
reviewing the discretion exercised by administrative bodies. The UK judges merely strike down 
these decisions when they amount to irrationality or bad faith.  
The proportionality test as employed by the EU judge is not suitable for reviewing the 
discretion of a contracting authority in defining its own needs within the framework of a 
public procurement. The proportionality test involving a weighing of relevant private and (EU 
or national) collective interests should be avoided for the degree of uncertainty it would 
introduce in the public procurement area, at a time when the EU actively supports 
contracting authorities to act as launching customers of breakthrough innovations.   
Nevertheless, if we admit that a review of the balancing of interests should be applied, the 
reasonableness principle in its deferent form is more suitable. When taking the decision to 
purchase through direct negotiations the innovative PCP results, a contracting authority 
favours the EU innovation policy goals and serves on a long-term the economic objectives of 
increased welfare. Its decision should thus only be reviewed on grounds of bad faith and 
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irrationality, such as adopted by the UK and Canadian jurisdictions. This should of course be 
the case, only when the decision is not informed by national industrial policy considerations. 
f. Artificially narrowing down the parameters of the procurement 
In addition to the requirement that no alternative products or services are available, article 
30(2)(b) of the Proposal for a new Public Sector Directive and 44(d) of the Proposal for a new 
Utilities Directive, require that the ‘absence of competition should not be the result of an 
artificial narrowing down of the parameters of the procurement’. The question which arises in 
this context is whether this only prohibits the formulation of redundant requirements which do 
not contribute to fulfilling the legitimate need of the contracting authority or whether this 
means that the contracting authority is mandated to lower its functionality and performance 
requirements in order to ensure competition. 
In line with the above discussion on the legitimate prerogative of the contracting authority to 
formulate the desired level of performance and functionality, the first interpretation should be 
considered correct. 
This conclusion is also supported by the decision of the CJEU in the Concordia case. In this 
case, the contracting authority awarded additional points at the evaluation stage to 
proposals offering vehicles that did not emit more nitrogen oxide than 2 g/k Wh. Competitors 
complained in this case that only natural gas powered buses could comply with the 
requirement and there was only one service station in the whole of Finland which could 
supply natural gas. Moreover, the capacity of the service station was already fully used by 
one company, which in practice amounted to the practical consequence that only one 
company could comply with the requirement.1044 
The CJEU performed in this case a test of the legitimacy of the requirement and concluded 
that integrating environmental protection requirements into Community policies and 
activities is a Treaty objective and therefore environmental criteria may be used to assess the 
economically most advantageous proposal.1045  
5.3.4.3 Innovation Partnership procedure 
The most important novelty in the Proposals for the purposes of the discussion in this section, is 
the Innovation Partnership procedure.1046 This new procedure allows the set-up of a structured 
partnership with one or several private undertakings with the aim of conducting research and 
                                                          
1044 Case C-513/99 Concordia Bus Finland v Helsingin kaupunki and HKL-Bussiliikenne [2002] ECR I-07213 (Concordia case) para 71. 
1045 Ibid para 57. 
1046 Art 29 of the new Public Sector Directive and art 40 of the new Utilities Directive.  
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development activities (in parallel) and subsequently purchasing the resulting product, 
service or work, provided it can be delivered at the initially agreed performance levels and 
costs.  
The Innovation Partnership procedure has been introduced with the aim to provide 
contracting authorities with a clear tool to act as demanding customers and early adopters 
of desired innovations. The EU seems to have dropped the concerns that direct purchase of 
the results of an R&D service contract would be in breach of the GPA. 
In the initial drafts of the Proposals, it was not made clear whether the legislator had in mind 
to provide an alternative or an additional instrument to the pre-commercial procurement 
procedure. The relation between the two was nowhere in the Proposals clarified, which may 
create the impression that the Innovation Partnership procedure was meant to provide an 
improved and legally accepted alternative. In the text of the new Procurement Directives, 
adopted by the European Parliament in January 2014, pre-commercial procurement is 
mentioned.1047 It is made clear that pre-commercial procurement remains applicable to R&D 
contracts excluded from the scope of the Directives, while the Innovation Partnership 
procedure is applicable to contracts falling within the scope of the directives.  
However, this distinction is theoretical, as the new Procurement Directives do not prohibit a 
contracting authority to bring an excluded contract within the scope of the directives and 
award it according to their provisions. In Chapter 1, section 1.6 I indicated that the 
obligations flowing out of the fundamental principles of public procurement outside the 
scope of the Directives are far-reaching. As a consequence, there would be not much 
procedural flexibility in conducting a PCP procedure as compared to an Innovation 
Partnership. A contracting authority will thus be able to freely choose between the two 
procedures depending on whether it wants to purchase the innovative results. The co-
funding for PCP available under the new funding programme of the EU, Horizon 2020, may 
though constitute an incentive to choose for PCP.  
Many aspects of the implementation of the Innovation Partnership procedure remain open. 
In this section, I outline these aspects and identify its weaknesses. 
Phases 
Article 29(2) of the new Public Sector Directiveand its equivalent within the new Utilities 
Directive specify that the Innovation Partnership covers the R&D phase as well as the 
subsequent purchase of the resulting supplies, services or works. 
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The R&D phase of the partnership must follow the sequence of steps in the research and 
innovation process. It is not made clear whether these steps correspond to the R&D phases 
proposed by the PCP Communication, namely solution exploration, prototyping, field tests or 
whether they could start at a more fundamental research stage. Moreover, no definition of 
R&D is provided and no reference to the Frascati Manual as guiding authority is made.  
The new Procurement Directives underline that at the end of each phase (e.g. R&D, 
manufacturing, delivery etc.) the contracting authority may decide to terminate the 
partnership or may decide to reduce the number of partners if applicable, provided this has 
been indicated in the procurement documents.1048 
IPR arrangements 
The legislator does not specify any type of IPR sharing between the contracting authority and 
the private partner as minimum requirement for the application of the Innovation 
Partnership.1049 The only indication is provided in recitals, which mention that the Innovation 
Partnership is applicable to contracts falling under the scope of the Directive.1050  This means 
that Innovation Partnerships were intended to cover R&D contracts whose IPR accrue to the 
contracting authority and whose costs are fully covered by the contracting authority. 
However, the directive does not prevent a contracting authority that shares the IPRs with the 
supplier to conduct an Innovation Partnership procedure.  
Rules of a competitive procedure with negotiation 
The new Procurement Directives make clear that the choice of the private partner(s) should 
be done ‘in accordance with the rules of a competitive procedure with negotiation’ 
(replacing the old negotiated procedure with prior call for competition). Article 24(1b) makes 
clear that the contracting authority does not need to demonstrate one of the application 
grounds for the competitive procedure with negotiations.1051 The contracting authority is 
though obliged to follow the procedural steps of a competitive procedure with 
negotiation.1052  
The procedural steps of a competitive procedure with negotiations are more prescriptive in 
the new Public Sector Directive as compared to the new Utilities Directive. Under both 
                                                          
1048 Art.29(2) of the new Public Sector Directive.  
1049 See article 29(3c) of the new Public Sector Directive. 
1050 Recital (17a) of the new Public Sector Directive.  
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regimes, the contracting authority/entity is mandated to start the procedure with an open 
call which invites any economic operator within the EU to submit a request to participate 
within a period of 30 days (the minimum time limit).1053  
Within the public sector rules, the invited economic operators will need to submit a tender 
which will form the basis of negotiations, while in the framework of the utilities sector, these 
negotiations may be more freely organized and the previous submission of a tender is not 
mandatory.1054  
Under both regimes, the contracting authority/entity may formulate selection criteria to be 
met by the economic operators in order to be invited to tender/to negotiate.1055  
Only the new Public Sector Directive expressly mentions that the contracting authority/entity 
may reduce the number of economic operators during the negotiations.1056 This may be 
performed by applying the award criteria specified in the contract notice. Initial drafts of the 
Proposals allowed selection during the negotiations merely when a sufficient number of 
candidates had passed the suitability criteria.1057 The Proposal for the new Public Sector 
Directive imposed a minimum number of 3 candidates to be invited to submit an initial 
tender,1058 while the Proposal for a new Utilities Directive did not mention a minimum number, 
but required the contracting authority/entity to maintain competition.1059 In the final text of 
the new Procurement Directives these additional requirements have been dropped.  
Only the new Public Sector Directive expressly mentions that certain elements of the 
procurement may not be changed during negotiations (the minimum requirements and the 
award criteria). The new Public Sector Directive also mentions that during negotiations 
candidates should be treated equally and if needed, sensitive information should be treated 
confidentially. This means that all tenderers should receive information in a non-discriminatory 
manner and should be allowed the same amount of time to (re-)submit tenders.1060 Although 
not specifically mentioned in the new Utilities Directive, the same obligations will flow from the 
application of the principle of equal treatment.  
Following negotiations, all selected candidate will be allowed the same amount of time to 
prepare and submit the tenders. A time-limit is not prescribed, but should be mutually agreed 
                                                          
1053 Both new Procurement Directives provide the possibility to reduce this time limit. See art 42(1) of the new Utilities Directive and art 
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between the contracting authority/entity and the selected candidates.1061  Only the new 
Utilities Directive provides for a minimum of 10 days when mutual agreement cannot be 
reached. 
Purchase of the R&D results 
The new Procurement Directives allow the public partner to directly purchase the supplies, 
services or works resulting from the R&D trajectory of the Innovation Partnership, provided 
these can be delivered at the initially agreed performance levels and maximum costs.1062 But 
the provisions on innovation partnerships do not clarify how the purchase should be 
conducted when there is more than one company that successfully completes the R&D 
trajectory and develops an operationally viable product. It is not clear whether the 
contracting authority may freely choose one of these companies or should organize some 
kind of competition among them. 
The only limitation set to the subsequent purchase of the R&D results regards the value of the 
contract. This should not be disproportionate in relation to the investment in the development 
phase.1063 It is not clear whether this provision refers to the investments made by the 
contracting authority within the framework of the innovation partnership or whether the 
investments made previously by the private partner should also be considered. If the second 
view is accepted, the provision allows significant discretion to contracting authorities to 
award large value contracts for long durations for the purchase of the R&D results. 
In an earlier version of the Proposals, it was provided that the value and duration of the 
commercial procurement following the development phase ‘shall remain within appropriate 
limits, taking into account the need to recover the costs, including those incurred in 
developing an innovative solution, and to achieve an adequate profit’.1064 Arguably, this 
provision granted contracting authorities even greater discretion in deciding on the value 
and duration of a contract for the purchase of the R&D results. 
The fact that the old provision was replaced by a proportionality tests indicates that the risk of 
market foreclosure was acknowledged during the negotiations of the Proposals, but there 
was lack of agreement on a different approach. As a consequence, the final text of the new 
Procurement Directives leaves it to the judiciary to resolve this dispute. The European judges 
will need to evaluate on a case-by-case basis whether the value of such a contract is 
proportional in relation to the R&D investments. 
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Another shortcoming of the current provision is that it does not limit the commercial purchase 
of the R&D results to ‘first products or services’. As a consequence, a contracting authority 
could in theory buy the developed product/service even after this was commercialized. The 
contracting authority will thus not be stimulated to act as first customer and ‘pull’ onto the 
market innovative products/services. On the contrary, it will be allowed to create obstacles 
to competition. Moreover, this would potentially breach the GPA, when the Innovation 
partnership is not open to competition from GPA parties. 
This is arguably a dangerous choice, considering the recent economic and financial crisis 
which has increased the disparities between the budgetary strengths of Member States and 
has increased the potential for anticompetitive reactions. Under such conditions, Europe’s 
growth can be maintained through better and bundled use of scarce public resources. This 
entails that public spending (in whatever form: direct spending, tax refunds, loans etc.) should 
be carefully targeted at growth-promoting policies and should make use of bundled efforts 
towards common European objectives.1065 Public spending in the form allowed by the 
Innovation Partnership procedure is not only a potential waste of public resources, but it may 
potentially worsen the conditions for competition for the actors active in the Single Market. 
The recitals of the new Procurement Directives warn that the partnership ‘should be 
structured in such a way that it can provide the necessary ‘market-pull’’ instead of 
foreclosing the market or preventing, restricting or distorting competition.1066 The extended 
warning is an acknowledgement of the risks brought by the innovation partnerships. It also re-
confirms that strenuous negotiations preceded the adoption of this legislative provision.  
Relation to GPA 
Also interesting to mention is, that the new Procurement Directives retain the requirement to 
apply the Directives equally in respect to EU and GPA parties. However, the new 
Procurement Directives limit their applicability to contracts brought by the EU under the 
scope of the GPA.1067 This means that in theory a contracting authority may exclude GPA 
participation from the award of R&D contracts that fall under the scope of the new 
Procurement Directives, including an Innovation Partnership. However, when the Innovation 
Partnership procedure also covers the purchase of the commercial results of the R&D 
trajectory, it is doubtful that a contracting authority may exclude GPA participation.  
Arguably, according to my argumentation in section 5.3.2, to the contracting authority may 
at least require that the R&D activities are conducted within the EU. It is otherwise difficult to 
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imagine that EU contracting authorities will be willing to finance R&D trajectories which would 
be undertaken not only outside the national borders, but even outside the EU. This could only 
be envisaged when the Innovation Partnership is not used strategically to improve the 
innovative capabilities of national or European companies, but purely to development a new 
solution which is needed for the daily functioning of the contracting authority.  
Either way it is certain that Innovation Partnerships should be open to participation from 
companies from GPA partner countries. 
Mandatory transposition 
Finally, it should be reminded that in the initial draft of the Proposals Member States had the 
choice to implement in their procurement legislations the Innovation Partnership procedure, 
but were not mandated to do so. The final text of the new Procurement Directives leaves this 
choice out. Member States are mandated to transpose the Innovation Partnership procedure 
into national legislation.1068  
Concluding remarks 
In conclusion, from the perspective of a contracting authority, the Innovation partnership 
presents certain important advantages compared to the PCP procedure. Firstly, the resulting 
innovative products can be directly purchased without re-opening competition. Secondly, 
the Innovation Partnership covers R&D services, as well as contracts which are qualified as 
R&D works and supplies. The contracting authority is thus not mandated to demonstrate that 
the value of the R&D services is higher than the value of the prototypes/R&D works. Thirdly, 
the Innovation Partnership does not require cross-border collaboration and does not impose 
conducting parallel R&D trajectories with more than one economic operator. Fourthly, the 
contracting authority is not mandated to ensure compliance with a market price criterion, 
but it may cover the costs of the R&D plus profit margins. Moreover, the obligation to select 
the private Innovation partner through a competitive procedure with negotiations does not 
constitute an additional burden. As shown in section 1.6, except for precise time limits and 
application grounds, the applicable fundamental principles of public procurement amount 
to the same obligations as imposed by a negotiated procedure with prior notice (or 
competitive procedure with negotiations). 
From a public policy point of view the Innovation Partnership is not a better choice 
compared to the PCP procedure. The Innovation Partnership holds the advantage that it is 
provided by legislation and creates legal certainty on the possibilities of contracting 
                                                          
1068 Art 24(1) of the new Public Sector Directive and 43(1) of the new Utilities Directive. 
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authorities to engage in a long-term (high-risk) R&D project and that it overcomes the barrier 
of a separate competitive award to purchase the innovative end results. Moreover, it limits 
the application by contracting authorities only in case when it can also act as end-user, and 
purchase the innovative results of the R&D trajectory. However, the main risks for its efficiency 
lie in the potential lack of competitive pressure during the R&D stages and in the possibility to 
purchase the developed products long after the products have been developed and do not 
depend on the contracting authority to act as an early adopter.    
The introduction of the Innovation Partnership procedure is thus welcome for its potential to 
stimulate contracting authorities to invest in R&D and to purchase the resulting 
products/services. However, its weak drafting in ensuring competition and preventing abusive 
use will probably reduce its effectiveness in achieving the innovation policy objectives.  
It should also be mentioned that the contracting authority retains under certain 
circumstances the choice between an Innovation Partnership and the negotiated procedure 
without prior publication. Under the new public sector regime, whenever the value of a 
prototype or of R&D works outweighs the value of the R&D services, a contracting authority 
has the choice between the Innovation Partnership and the negotiated  procedure without 
prior publication.1069 Under the new utilities regime, contracting authorities will have the free 
option between the Innovation Partnership and the negotiated procedure without prior call 
for competition, irrespective of the type of the R&D contract (whether it qualifies as services, 
works or supplies).1070  The choice will be determined by the desire of the contracting 
authority to procure the innovative results of the R&D contract.   
5.3.4.4 Conclusions 
The new Procurement Directives bring several changes in the provisions that may be relied on 
by a contracting authority in order to justify the direct purchase of PCP results. For example, 
when relying on technical or IPR reasons to directly award a contract to one supplier, the 
contracting authority will need to demonstrate that no ‘reasonable alternative or substitute’ 
exists and that ‘the absence of competition is not the result of an artificial narrowing down of 
the parameters of the procurement’. I argued in this section that these additional obligations 
do not restrict the discretion of a contracting authority in defining high levels of performance 
and advanced functionalities for the desired solutions.    
The most important novelty in the new Procurement Directives is the Innovation Partnership 
procedure. I have analysed in this section whether the new procedure enables contracting 
authorities to play their key role in stimulating innovation from the demand side. I concluded 
                                                          
1069 Art 32(3)(a) of the new Public Sector Directive. 
1070 Art 50(b) of the new Utilities Directive.  
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that this new procedure fails to strike an adequate balance between European innovation 
and competition interests. The procedure does not limit the direct purchase to the ‘first’ 
products/services resulting from the R&D phase. By allowing the direct purchase of the 
resulting products/services long after they were commercialized, the procedure not only fails 
to incentivize a contracting authority to act as first customer of innovation, but allows room 
for potential distortion of competition. Moreover, the new Procurement Directives fail to 
enhance the legal certainty around its application. 
Arguably, the Innovation Partnership procedure was adopted under the pressure of 
strengthened national interests. The fact that the Horizon 2020 only provides funding for PCP 
supports this hypothesis.  
5.4 The obligation to ensure a ‘level playing field’ 
5.4.1 Introduction 
As illustrated in section 5.3.3, a contracting authority will not always be able to conduct direct 
negotiations for the purchase of a PCP solution in accordance with the current EU 
Procurement Directives. It will most of the times be obliged to conduct a separate 
competitive procurement. 
However, within the framework of such a competitive procurement, a PCP finalist has 
significantly improved chances to win the contract, due to the knowledge/IPR acquired 
during the PCP, and to the possibility to offer the product at a lower price (as the contracting 
authority has gained during the PCP the right to freely use the developed product/service). 
These circumstances are often considered by contracting authorities (at least in Belgium, 
Denmark and the Netherlands) as reasons, to exclude the PCP finalist from the later award 
procedure for the purchase of the developed novel product.1071 
This section investigates to what extent these concerns are justified. More concretely, this 
section will analyze whether the equal treatment principle and the thereof derived obligation 
to ensure a level playing field restrict the freedom of a contracting authority to set the same 
demanding requirements of the PCP procedure, or obliges the contracting authority to 
neutralize (some of) the advantages possessed by a PCP finalist. 
5.4.2 The extent of the obligation to level the playing field 
The obligation of a contracting authority to ensure a level playing field for bidders stems out 
                                                          
1071 Izsak & Edler (2011)18. 
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of the principles of equal treatment,1072 and transparency. The principle of equal treatment is 
meant to ´promote the development of healthy and effective competition between 
undertakings taking part in a public procurement procedure’.1073 This principle obliges the 
contracting authority to afford all tenderers ´equality of opportunity when formulating their 
tenders, which therefore implies that the tenders of all competitors must be subject to the 
same conditions’.1074 Moreover contracting authorities are not allowed to formulate strict 
technical specifications which unjustifiably restrict the access of economic operators to the 
procurement procedure.1075 Finally, the transparency principle obliges the contracting 
authority to make relevant information available to all bidders. 
In the context of an award procedure following a PCP, the question arises whether the 
contracting authority needs to exclude a PCP finalist because of its involvement in the pre-
procurement phase, or otherwise lower the strictness of the technical requirements in order to 
enhance participation of other companies than the PCP finalists.1076 In addition, the question 
arises which information related to the pre-commercial procurement needs to be made 
available to all bidders. 
Important answers to the above formulated questions can be found in jurisprudence of the 
CJEU. In the Fabricom case,1077 the European judge decided that the Belgian law which 
mandated a contracting authority to exclude from a procurement procedure persons 
instructed to carry out research, experiments, studies, or development in connection with that 
procurement, was disproportionate and therefore in breach of the procurement directives. 
According to the Court, the Belgian law went beyond what was necessary to ensure equal 
treatment. According to the Court the involvement of such a firm in the pre-procurement 
preparations does not necessarily involve a risk to competition and this should be decided on 
a case-by-case basis. A proportionate law would only exclude the firms which are not able to 
provide the proof that competition is not at risk.  The Court overturned the balance made by 
the Belgian government between the interest of competition and the competing interests of 
certainty and transparency.1078 The Court did not clarify though whether a contracting 
authority would be mandated to exclude a firm when there is a risk to competition or when 
the firm involved in the pre-procurement preparations cannot prove there is no risk to 
                                                          
1072 The equal treatment principle requires that comparable situations must not be treated differently and that different situations must not 
be treated in the sa00me way unless such treatment is objectively justified. See, for example, Case C-106/83 Sermide v Cassa Conguaglio 
Zucchero and Others [1984] ECR 4209 para 28, Case C-203/86 Spain v Council [1988] ECR 4563 para 25, and Case C-306/93 SMW Winzersekt 
v Land Rheinland-Pfalz [1994] ECR I-5555 para 30. 
1073 Case C-496/99 Commission of the European Communities v CAS Succhi di Frutta SpA [2004] ECR I-3801 paras 110-1. 
1074 Ibid para.110; Case T-437/05 Brink's Security Luxembourg v Commission [2009] ECR II-3233 paras 112-5; Case T-332/03 European 
Network v Commission [2008] ECR II-32 para 125.  
1075 Art 23(2) Public Sector Directive and 34(2) Utilities Directive: ‘Technical specifications shall afford equal access for tenderers and not 
have the effect of creating unjustified obstacles to the opening up of public procurement to competition’. 
1076 The second question has been answered negatively in the context of the negotiated procedure without prior notice in section 5.2.4.1. 
1077 Joined Cases C-21/03 and C-34/03, 3 March 2005 Fabricom v Belgian State [2005] I-1559 paras 32-6. 




The Court of First Instance (CFI) confirmed in a subsequent case that a previous contractual 
relation with a tenderer does not generate an obligation for the contracting authority to 
neutralize all the advantages enjoyed by that tenderer.1079 A contracting authority must 
protect as far as possible the principle of equal treatment and must avoid all consequences 
which are contrary to its own interests, but should not neutralize the advantages of the 
tenderer if it is not technically easy and economically acceptable or if it infringes the rights of 
that tenderer (such as IP rights).1080 In this case, one company complained that the sitting 
contractor did not have to follow the 3 months “run in phase” and had an advantage 
because it did not have to make these costs. The Court clarified that the existing contractor 
and its subcontractors have an ‘inherent de facto advantage’ whenever they decide to 
participate in the re-tendering of the contract, which is not the consequence of any conduct 
on the part of the contracting authority.1081 The contracting authority is not obliged to 
neutralize such an advantage. The Court did not specify whether the choice of the existing 
contractor through competition in the previous tendering procedure was important for the 
extent to which the contracting authority needs to ensure a level playing field. It can be 
envisaged that the court would not consider the advantage of the previous contractor as 
inherent, when the choice for that contractor took place outside competition.  
In the context of a post-PCP procurement, a contracting authority would thus neither be 
mandated to exclude a PCP finalist nor to neutralize any inherent price advantage. However, 
the contracting authority should make available all information which is relevant for the level 
of quality or of the price of the offer, unless that information is protected by intellectual 
property rights or confidentiality.1082 Moreover, a contracting is forbidden to use in a post-PCP 
procurement imprecise award criteria which could in practice favour the PCP finalist, due to 
the fact that he is in the best position, as a result of its experience, to assess what the real 
needs of the contracting authority are.1083 
The CJEU has also ruled that a contracting authority does not breach the principle of equal 
treatment when allowing participation in the award to bodies which receive subsidies 
allowing them to submit lower priced tenders. This clarification of the CJEU is important for the 
                                                          
1079 Case T-345/03 –European Dynamics V Commission [2008] ECR II-341 para 73. 
1080 Ibid paras 75-6. 
1081 Ibid para 70: ‘In that regard, it should be pointed out that the fact that an advantage may be conferred upon an existing contractor by a 
running-in phase is not the consequence of any conduct on the part of the contracting authority. Unless such a contractor were 
automatically excluded from any new call for tenders or, indeed, were forbidden from having part of the contract subcontracted to it, it is 
inevitable that an advantage will be conferred upon the existing contractor or the tenderer connected to that party by virtue of a 
subcontract, since it is inherent in any situation in which a contracting authority decides to initiate a tendering procedure for the award of a 
contract which has been performed, up to that point, by a single contractor. That fact constitutes, in effect, an ‘inherent de facto advantage’. 
1082 Ibid paras 183-203. 




case when the PCP does not comply with the market price criterion and entails a State aid 
element. In this case, the CJEU considered that the legislator would have stated such a 
prohibition explicitly, if it had so desired.1084  
Whether a contracting authority is mandated by the equal treatment principle to 
downgrade its requirements in order to ensure that a large number of potential bidders can 
submit a compliant offer has also been answered negatively in section 5.2.4.1.1085 Two 
undertakings would in this case be treated differently only because they are not in identical 
situations. Nor does the proportionality principle prevent a contracting authority from setting 
demanding requirements - which may only be complied with by the PCP finalist -, if 
justified.1086 Such restrictive requirements are justified if they are appropriate to the specific 
nature of the public task1087 and if they are not formulated with the only scope of distorting 
the competition by favouring one bidder (the PCP finalist).1088 Such requirements could 
possibly be acceptable even if indirectly discriminatory, but in any case when they are non-
discriminatory.1089  
A contracting authority could in addition require the bidders to show experience in 
implementing the respective product/service. It can be envisaged that the PCP finalist who 
completed all the stages of a PCP, including the testing stage, is the only one able to provide 
such a reference. Arguably, such a requirement is justified by the concern for the quality and 
reliability of such innovative products/services and is sufficiently related to the subject-matter 
of the procurement. Unjustifiably restrictive technical specifications are those which are not 
related to the nature of the contract or to the need of the contracting authority. However, 
the contracting authorities may freely define their need in high levels of functionality and 
performance.  
5.4.3 Conclusions 
In conclusion, the advantages accumulated by a PCP finalist in terms of knowledge/IPR and 
costs are inherent advantages and such a bidder does not have to be excluded from 
participation in the post-PCP procurement procedure. A contracting authority should though 
make all the necessary information available to the other tenderers, unless it regards 
                                                          
1084 Case C-305/08, Consorzio Nazionale Interuniversitario per le Scienze del Mare (Conisma) v Regione Marche ECR 2009 I-12129, para 40. 
1085 Concordia case para 86: ‘the principle of equal treatment does not preclude the taking into consideration of criteria…. solely because the 
contracting entities owned transport undertaking is one of the few undertakings able to offer a bus fleet satisfying those criteria’ 
1086 According to article 23(2) Public Sector Directive: ‘technical specifications shall afford equal access for tenderers and not have the effect 
of creating unjustified obstacles to the opening up of public procurement to competition’. 
1087 T-437/05 para.120-1. Based on case C-324/93 Evans Medical and Macfarlan Smith [1995] ECR I-563 , the AG in the Concordia case 
argued that criteria are not allowed, only if they could not be justified objectively, having regard to the characteristics of the contracts and 
needs of the CA (para.151). 
1088 However, if the winning tenderer also helped in the preparation of the tender, that might be an indication that the award requirements 
were unduly restricted. Case C-315/99 Ismeri Europa v Court of Auditors [2001] ECR I-5281 para 47. 




information protected by IPR and should define all the requirements clearly.  
This is not the same as ensuring that a large number of bidders comply with the requirements. 
A contracting authority is allowed to formulate during the commercial procurement the 
same demanding requirements for the desired product/service as it did in the preceding PCP 
procedure. The fact that potentially only the PCP-finalist(s) can submit a compliant offer, 
would not entail a breach of the principles of public procurement law. 
5.5 Interplay between PCP and EU State aid rules 
5.5.1 Introduction 
As already mentioned earlier in this thesis, the PCP Communication mentions the need to pay 
a market price for the R&D services within a PCP procedure, in order to exclude the 
applicability of the EU State aid rules. However, the PCP Communication admits that a 
contracting authority may disregard this requirement and choose to justify a State aid 
element in conformity with the EU rules applicable in that area.  
In this section, I outline the argumentation around the market price criterion and I criticize this 
choice, for being dissonant with the philosophy behind PCP, for difficulties in its proper 
application in practice and for being easily abused in the form accepted by the European 
Commission (sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.3). I outline an alternative, more suitable approach 
(section 5.5.4). In addition, this section summarizes the conditions for justification of a State aid 
element (section 5.5.5). 
5.5.2 The argumentation for the market price criterion 
The current Framework for R&D&I takes the view that conducting a procurement procedure 
for the procurement of R&D, in line with the Procurement Directives represents a presumption 
of market conditions and leads to the inapplicability of the State aid rules.1090 More recent 
State aid rules nuance this statement by considering only the competitive procedures of the 
Procurement Directives, that ensures the least cost to the community, as sufficient proof of no 
illegal aid.1091 
As shown in section 1.6 above, PCP as recommended by the European Commission is the 
equivalent of a negotiated procedure with prior publication of a contract notice as 
described in the Procurement Directives, except for compliance with the grounds of 
                                                          
1090 Commission, ‘Community Framework for State aid for Research and Development and Innovation’ (30 December 2006) OJ C 323/1 
(Framework for State aid for R&D&I), para 2.1. The recent Communication SGEI 2012, on the other side, limits the scope to open and 
restricted procedures. The presumption does not exist for the negotiated procedures. See Commission, Communication on the application 
of the European Union State aid rules to compensation granted for the provision of services of general economic interest (2012/C 8/02) 
(Communication SGEI (2012)). 
1091 Communication SGEI (2012) paras 65-6.  
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application of such a procedure and the mandatory time-limits. Thus, it is not a procurement 
procedure conducted in compliance with the Procurement Directives. 
This means that within the current State aid rules, the competitive award of a PCP contract in 
line with the 2007 Communication does not automatically entail that a market price has 
been paid. The contracting authority needs to perform an additional objective check (in 
comparison with prices in other sectors for example) on whether the price offered by a 
bidder is in line with market conditions. 
The European Commission expressed the same view in its 2007 PCP Communication. The 
Commission developed thus the market price criterion. According to the Commission, a PCP 
procedure escapes the applicability of the EU State aid rules if a market price is paid for the 
R&D services and if the market price reflects the previously decided division of risks and 
benefits. By paying a market price, the contracting authority does not – according to the 
Commission - provide an unwarranted advantage to a certain economic operator and does 
not distort thus competition.1092 
The reason for creating the market price requirement was on the one side, to clarify that PCP 
could not be used to circumvent the State aid rules which prohibit the payment of 100% of 
the costs for applied R&D.1093 Because the market price should reflect the division of risks and 
benefits prior established in the PCP call, and because the PCP participant retains by default 
the ownership of the results, a market price entails in principle  that less than 100% of the R&D 
costs should be paid by the contracting authority. 
On the other side, the European Commission attempted to find a simple method to avoid the 
applicability of the EU State aid rules, which require prior notification of the planned funding 
and prior evaluation by the European Commission. 
The European Commission outlines two ways of complying with the market price criterion. The 
first is to determine the maximum price a contracting authority is ready to pay by deducting 
from the total cost of R&D1094 plus a reasonable profit margin, the market present value (MPV) 
of the commercialization opportunities left to the participating company (this value will need 
to reflect also the risks assumed by the participating company, such as the cost carried by 
                                                          
1092 PCP Communication 8; Commission, ’Example of a possible approach for procuring R&D services applying risk-benefit sharing at 
market conditions, i.e. pre-commercial procurement’(PCP Staff Working Document) SEC(2007) 1668. 
1093 As shown in Chapter 4, the innovation agencies of the UK and the Netherlands introduced the possibility to pay 100% of the R&D costs 
in the SBRI, and the SBIR scheme respectively. 
1094 This is made of all the costs incurred by the company - for example the market value of the salaries of researchers/developers in a 
certain sector and the costs of R&D material required to perform the work. Commission, ‘Policy related Frequently Asked Questions on Pre-
Commercial Procurement (PCP) and the link with Public Procurement of Innovative Solutions (PPI)’ (FAQ PCP) question nr 8 
<http://cordis.europa.eu/fp7/ict/pcp/docs/faq-v9.pdf> accessed 30 January 2013. 
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the company for maintaining the IPRs and commercializing the products).1095 Bidding 
companies are invited to compete by offering an equal or lower price. The Communication 
does not elaborate on the situation when the MPV of the commercialization opportunities 
may appear higher than the total R&D costs (including reasonable profit margins).1096 
Due to the difficulty in determining the value of the commercialization opportunities of yet-to-
be-developed products, the European Commission accepts a second type of check. This 
consists of asking bidding companies (1) to supply the calculation of the price reduction they 
can offer in return for the IPR benefits (this calculation should be related to their business 
cases analysis in their PCP offer) and (2) to include a financial expert in the PCP tender 
evaluation committee who is charged with assessing whether the business-case and 
associated price reductions for the IPRs offered by different companies are indeed in line with 
normal market conditions in that sector.1097 As already shown in Chapter 4, the national PCP-
like programmes either cover 100% of the R&D costs or ignore the market price criterion. 
The above options can be visualised as follows: 
                                                          
1095 PCP Staff Working Document 9. 
1096 John Rigby, rking Document 9.t of Pre-commercial Procurementw Direcentation at the OECD workshop on measuring the link between 
public procurement, R&D and innovation, 5-6 December 2013. 
1097 FAQ PCP question nr.8: ‘one way used by patent traders to calculate the price reduction for IPR ownership rights uses the so-called 
present value method. It is normal practice that companies make a business case, and thus estimate the potential market over the years to 
come, when deciding to start investing in a new development or not. The price reduction on the PCP bid towards the procurer can be 
calculated as a portion of the 'present' value of projected profits for the company (the 'present' value is the value discounted back in time 
to the day of the bid), that is proportional to the investment/risks taken by the government (PCP price paid to the company) compared to 
the total investments required to turn the R&D efforts into a commercially viable product (this includes the projected investment/risks that 
will be carried by the company e.g. costs of maintaining IPR projection, further production, marketing and commercialisation investments). 





However, the market price criterion is not a necessary condition to ensure that public 
procurement of R&D whose risks and benefits are shared between the contracting 
authority/entity and the private actors, complies with the EU State aid rules.  
Legally, a state aid element within a PCP could be justified at the moment when the PCP 
Communication was adopted within the Framework for R&D&I and since 2008 also within the 
framework of the GBER. 
The PCP Communication misses though the opportunity to draw a clear distinction between 
the situation in which it would be employed to award of a public contract as opposed to 
granting a subsidy. This was discussed in section 1.7.3 above. 
Award in compliance 
with PP Directives  
Yes  
Automatic assumption 
that no State aid is 
involved 
No 
Additional check on lack 
of State aid 
Cap price = total R&D 
costs + reasonable profit 
- MPV of 
commercialization  
Ask bidders to indicate 
discount on R&D costs 
for retaining IP 





As already shown in Chapter 4, the UK SBRI and the Dutch SBIR, which were implemented in 
the two Member States before the adoption of the EU PCP guidance, allowed 100% 
coverage of the R&D services costs. Currently, the UK SBRI maintains the 100% coverage 
despite the clarification in the PCP Communication.1098 The Dutch SBIR, on the other side, 
formally applies the second approach accepted by the Commission. However, in the Dutch 
SBIR, companies bidding on an SBIR call are requested to indicate the discount in price they 
grant for retaining the IPR and no control mechanisms are embodied into the award process. 
This leaves room for circumventing the EU State aid rules in practice.1099 The Flemish PoI does 
not set a standard approach regarding the market price criterion. 
This shows that the market price criterion, is either too difficult to implement or it can easily be 
abused.  
In addition, the market price criterion is dissonant with the philosophy of PCP. PCP was in 
theory brought into existence with the aim to relieve the difficulties encountered by 
companies to find (sufficient) private investments for risky but potentially highly beneficial R&D 
projects. As a consequence, it can be argued that the funding of R&D contracts through PCP 
never entails the payment of a market price. In other words, even payment of less than the 
R&D costs is more than a normal market investor would be willing to pay. The PCP award is 
intended to signal quality and lower the risks, in order to incentivize private investments. It is 
thus never a normal commercial transaction at a market price, but always entails a State aid 
element. 
This argumentation is supported by jurisprudence of the CJEU in the area of competition 
law.1100 According to the Tubacex case, when the state decides to provide funds to an 
undertaking, the test of aid is whether a market creditor would act in the same way. In other 
words, the proof that there is no State aid granted, is that the undertaking could find the 
finance on the private market.  
The European judge has also confirmed that a State aid element may be present even when 
a procurement procedure in line with the Procurement Directives is conducted. The 
European Court of First Instance (‘CFI’) has ruled that a purchasing decision which does not 
correspond to ‘actual needs felt by the authorities’ involves State aid even when the 
purchase was made on market conditions which a private investor would have accepted 
                                                          
1098 TSB, ‘SBRI – Government challenges, ideas from businesses, innovative solutions’ (September 2011) 3 
<http://www.innovateuk.org/_assets/sbri_brochure_2011.pdf> accessed 5 February 2013. 
1099 SBIR programmabureau van Agentschap NL, ‘SBIR handleiding voor ondernemers’ (7 July 2011) 5 
<http://www.agentschapnl.nl/sites/default/files/bijlagen/SBIR%20handleiding%202011-1.pdf> accessed 18 December 2013.  
1100 Case C-342/96, Tubacex [1999] ECR I-02459.  
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(regarding for example duration, and price), or in other words it constituted a normal 
commercial transaction.1101 Actual needs is not interpreted by the CFI as operational needs 
of the contracting authority acting as end-user. Rather the Court took into consideration in 
this case the fact that the public authority bought a much larger number of vouchers than 
there was demand for (end-users were in this case private citizens).  
This case could though provide support for the conclusion that a catalytic PCP would earlier 
contain an element of State aid, when the contracting authority cannot demonstrate that 
there is a corresponding need on the private market for the products being developed. As 
contracting authorities which get involved in catalytic PCPs seldom analyse the availability of 
private demand, investments through PCP could generate breaches of the EU State aid rules.  
5.5.4 Proposed solution 
As already mentioned in section 1.7.3 above, the EU policy guidance should clarify that PCP 
may be employed to either award public contracts or to grant a subsidy. A clear distinction 
should further be made between public contracts and subsidies, in line with the ‘direct 
economic interest’ criterion outline by the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in the Helmut 
Muller case. In accordance with this criterion, the PCP would lead to the award of a public 
contract when the involved contracting authority is the end-user of the envisaged 
innovation. When private entities are the end-users of the envisaged solution and the 
contracting authority pursues only a public goal of indirect economic interest, PCP would be 
employed to grant a subsidy.     
This distinction should be codified in the State aid rules in order to provide legal certainty and 
eliminate one barrier to the applicability of PCP. Instead of the ‘market price’ criterion, the  
Framework for State aid for R&D&I should for example, enumerate the cumulative conditions 
under which a PCP can be presumed to lead to the award of a public contract, as opposed 
to a subsidy. Besides the end-user criterion (or the ‘direct economic interest’ criterion), the 
Framework for State aid for R&D&I  mentione additional criteria, related to the competitive 
nature of the award.  
The European Commission has recently conducted a public consultation regarding the 
amendment of the Framework for State aid for R&D&I.1102 In the proposed Framework several 
cumulative conditions create the presumption that no State aid is granted. These pertain to 
the openness, transparency and fairness of the PCP procedure, separation from commercial 
procurement of the developed solutions and dissemination or commercialization of the 
                                                          
1101 Joined cases T-116/01 and T-118/01, PּטO European Ferries (Vizcaya) SA and Diputación Foral di Vizcaya v Commission [2003] ECR II-
2956, para116. 
1102 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1300_en.htm. 
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developed knowledge.1103 At the time of writing this thesis, the text of the new Framework 
was however not finalized. As already mentioned, the ‘direct economic interest’ or the end-
user criterion should be added to these conditions. 
The Framework should also clarify that whenever one of the cumulative conditions is not 
complied with, PCP leads to a subsidy. Such a subsidy should be subject to the EU State aid 
rules. In the following section, I will describe the obligations which need to be observed under 
the current legislative framework, when a contracting authority chooses to grant a subsidy 
through PCP. 
5.5.5 Applicable rules to a PCP subsidy  
According to the PCP Communication, when contracting authorities/entities do not 
commission R&D from companies at a market price, this will involve State aid within the 
meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.  
In this case, the contracting authority is held to comply with the applicable EU State aid 
rules.1104 These rules are provided by the Community Framework for State Aid for Research 
and Development and Innovation (‘Framework for State aid for R&D&I’) and by the General 
Block Exemption Regulation (‘GBER’).1105 In the previous section, I proposed to replace the 
market price criterion with a set of cumulative conditions regarding the competitive, 
transparent and fair nature of the award procedure and regarding the role of the involved 
contracting authority as end-user of the envisaged innovation. Whenever, one of these 
condition is not complied with, I proposed to apply the same EU State aid rules as currently 
outline in the Framework for State aid for R&D&I and GBER. In this section I describe the 
content of these rules. 
As already mentioned in section 2.4.5.2 above, the EU State aid rules ensure the achievement 
of one of the underlying concepts of the European Union, according to which a market-
based economy in which companies are rewarded according to their innovativeness and 
efficiency is the best way to ensure that consumers are provided with the products they wish 
to obtain, at low prices. This eventually leads to increased living standards for all European 
citizens. Unwarranted support provided by Member States to some national companies may 
lead to the exclusion from the market or the delayed reward of the most competitive firms, 
                                                          
1103 Commission, a.aper of the services of DG Competition containing a draft Framework for state aid for research and development and 
innovationn’ (19 December 2013) 16, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_state_aid_rdi/rdi_draft_framework_en.pdf> accessed 25 February 2014. 
1104 PCP Staff Working Document 5-6. 
1105 Commission, Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the common market in 
application of Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty (General block exemption Regulation or GBER) OJ 214/3. 
 
 264 
with the negative consequence related (such as higher prices, lower quality goods and less 
innovation).1106 
When the Communication on PCP was published, the possibility to justify state aid for R&D 
under Article 107(3)(b) and 107(3)(c) TFEU, was governed by the Community Framework for 
State Aid for R&D&I. The Framework acknowledged the conclusion of the 2000 Lisbon 
European Council that investment in R&D in the EU does not happen at optimal levels. 
Because state aid can be distortive and may lead to disincentives for economic operators to 
invest themselves in R&D if used improperly,1107 the Commission developed in this Framework 
some economic tests to assess whether the aid measures envisaged by public authorities are 
suitable to achieve their target. In 2008, GBER amended the regime created by the 
Framework. 
Within the current regime created by the Framework and GBER, the following rules are 
applicable. 
Aid granted to an SME and which remains under the threshold of 20 million for a fundamental 
research project, 10 million for an industrial research project and 7,5 million for an 
experimental development project1108 and does not constitute more than 75%, 50% and 25% 
respectively of the value of the above mentioned types of projects,1109 are automatically 
considered to be compliant with the State aid rules, subject to several transparency-related 
obligations (the R&D subsidy is easily identifiable as R&D grant1110, the aid scheme or 
individual measure (whether based on the scheme or ad-hoc) contains an express reference 
to the GBER1111 and the request for aid is made prior to the start of the subsidized activity1112). 
Aid to a large company will be considered in compliance with the State aid rules if, in 
addition to the above mentioned conditions, the contracting authority brings proof of the 
incentive effect (increase in size, scope, total amount or speed of completion of the project, 
                                                          
1106 Commission, State Aid Action Plan: Less and better targeted state aid: a roadmap for state aid reform 2005–2009 (Consultation 
document) COM(2005) 107 final 3. 
1107 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 1.2.: ‘When an undertaking receives aid, this generally strengthens its position on the market 
and reduces the return on investment for other undertakings. When the reduction is significant enough, it is possible that rivals will cut 
back on their R&D&I activity. In addition, when the aid results in a soft budget constraint for the beneficiary, it may also reduce the 
incentive to innovate at the level of the beneficiary. Furthermore, the aid can support inefficient undertakings or enable the beneficiary to 
enhance exclusionary practices or market power.’ 
1108 Art.6(1)(e) GBER. Which category of research the project falls in for the calculation of the applicable threshold depends on the 
predominant activities (50% or more of the eligible costs). When the predominant character cannot be determined, the lower threshold will 
apply. 
1109 Art.31(3)-(4) GBER. 
1110 Art.5 GBER. it should be ‘possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent ex ante without a need to undertake a risk 
assessment’. See recital 20 GBER. 
1111 Art.3 GBER. 
1112 Art 8 (1)-(2) GBER 
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or proof that the project would not have been carried out in the assisted region without the 
regional investment aid).1113 
The State aid regime for R&D embodies a more lenient approach towards aid to SMEs, based 
on the presumption that innovative SMEs experience more difficulties to access funding for 
R&D than large companies.1114  
In these cases, the granting authority does not need to notify its intention to grant the aid to 
the European Commission,1115 but needs though to fulfill certain administrative tasks which 
enable an ex post control. Member State should send to the Commission summarized 
information regarding the granted aid (whether an aid scheme or ad hoc aid) within 20 days 
from the entry into force of the scheme or from the awarding of the ad hoc aid and should 
publish it as well on its own website for as long as the measure stays in force with a reference 
to the relevant provisions of the GBER. Detailed records shall be maintained during 10 year 
from the date of the grant and shall be presented to the Commission whenever required.1116 
Finally, annual report regarding each aid measure (whether a scheme, individual aid under a 
scheme or ad hoc aid) should also be submitted by each Member State to the 
Commission.1117 These GBER presumptions apply equally to aid projects justified on the basis 
of both art.107(3)(b) and 107(3)(c). 
This means that a PCP scheme could obtain approval as a State aid scheme. However, the 
main disadvantage, besides the ex post transparency obligations, is that the contracting 
authority will only be able to reimburse 50% or 25% of the industrial research and experimental 
development project respectively.  
The above described cumulative conditions to benefit of an assumption of compliance with 
EU State aid rules, can be summarized in the following visual form (see Fig.3 below): 
                                                          
1113 Art 8(3) GBER. 
1114 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para.1.5. 
1115 Art 6(1)(e) GBER. 
1116 Art 10 GBER. 
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Aid to SMEs or large companies, which is not covered by GBER (such as aids above 20 million 
for fundamental research, 10 million for industrial research and 7,5 million for experimental 
development) or aid to process and organisational innovation, remains under the scope of 
the Framework and needs to be notified for approval to the European Commission, before 
being granted. The Framework will also apply if a Member States decides to ‘notify a 
measure which could in principle have been exempted under the (G)BER’.1118 
Aid may be justified only if it remains below the same percentages of the eligible costs of the 
R&D project (100% for fundamental research, 50% for industrial research and 25% for 
experimental research, with possibilities to raise the percentage under specific 
circumstances) and passes a detailed test of appropriateness, proportionality, incentive 
effect and overall positive effects.1119 This can be visualised as follows: 
 
                                                          
1118 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para.1.2. 
1119 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 1.3.6. 
Aid to SMEs and large companies 
above the thresholds; AND 
Aid to process and organisational 
innovations. 
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Commission 
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- appropriateness; 
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- incentive effect; 
- overall positive effect; 
- below the allowed percentages. 
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The Framework develops a separate test for justification under article 107(3)(b), when aid is 
employed for a common European interest.1120 The common European interest is present if 
the benefits extend to the whole European Union (for example, spillovers for society, 
improvements to EU’s position in R&D&I on the international market through the development 
of new technologies or creation of new markets), and it is rolled-out by co-operating 
authorities from different Member States. In such a case, the aid need not be limited to 
certain thresholds or percentages of the total project value, but more flexibility is granted to 
the subsidizing institution.  
This provision may be used as escape from the market price criterion when PCP procedures 
are conducted through collaboration between contracting authorities from different 
Member States. However, this possibility is limited to large projects, with an aid value above 
20 million for fundamental research, 10 million for industrial research and 7,5 million for 
experimental development. But this provision can be used for process and organisational 
innovations, irrespective of the value of the project.  
Finally, an additional disadvantage when granting a PCP subsidy is the administrative burden 
posed by both the Framework and the GBER to calculate the maximum aid intensities for 
R&D by taking into account the total amount of public support for the aided activity or 
project, coming from local, regional, national or Community sources.1121 
5.6 Conclusions 
I have explored in this chapter the legal rules that lie at the foundation of two important 
barriers to the wide and efficient implementation of PCP: (1) the obligation to conduct a 
separate competitive award in order to purchase the innovative solution targeted by the 
PCP competition, and (2) the legal uncertainty regarding compliance with EU State aid rules. 
I argued in section 5.3 that although the GPA was advanced by the European Commission as 
the reason to prohibit EU contracting authorities to directly purchase the resulting innovations 
from a PCP procedure, the GPA allows more flexibility than the current Procurement 
Directives or the recently adopted Procurement Directives. I argued that the GPA provision 
on limited tendering allows a EU contracting authority to directly purchase the first PCP results 
in spite of the PCP requirement to locate the R&D activities within the EU, provided that the 
EU contracting authority engages in informal negotiations with all PCP finalists belonging to 
GPA state parties (if any). 
The new Procurement Directives seem to have dropped the concerns that allowing for direct 
                                                          
1120 According to art107(3)(b) TFEU; Framework for State aid for R&D&I 12-13. 
1121 Framework for State aid for R&D&I para 8; art 7(1) GBER. 
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purchase of resulting innovations from an R&D trajectory would breach the GPA. The newly 
introduced Innovation Partnership procedure accommodates contracting authorities to act 
as early adopters of innovations developed at their request. However, the main risks related 
to this procedure lie in the potential lack of competitive pressure during the R&D stages and 
in the possibility to purchase the developed products long after the products have been 
developed. The new procedure seems to have been adopted under increasing pressure of 
national interests and will constitute a serious threat to the uptake of the PCP. Yet, the 
envisaged EU funding available for collaborative cross-border PCPs will provide some 
incentives for contracting authorities to continue engaging in PCPs. 
Other provisions of the current and future Procurement Directives also offer the possibility to 
directly purchase the results of a PCP. E.g., the provision of the EU Procurement Directives on 
negotiated procedure without prior publication of a contract notice when technical reasons 
or IPRs make it absolutely essential that the contract be awarded to one specific tenderer. 
The new Procurement Directives seem to restrict the flexibility to negotiate directly with one of 
the PCP finalists. However, this chapter argued that the newly introduced requirement that 
‘no reasonable alternative or substitute exists on the market’ does not constrain the freedom 
of a contracting authority to define its needs in ambitious terms of functionality and 
performance.  
This chapter has also discussed in section 5.4 the obligation of a contracting authority to 
neutralize the inherent advantages of a PCP finalist when participating in a post-PCP 
competitive procedure. I concluded that the equal treatment principle does not mandate 
the contracting authority to exclude the PCP finalist(s) or to lower the ambitious level of 
functionality or performance. The equal treatment principle neither mandates the 
contracting authority to neutralize an inherent price or technical advantage. It does 
mandate, however, that the contracting authority provides all relevant information (including 
in precise terms the scope of the contract) to all competitors, unless the information is 
protected by IPR.  
In section 5.5 I argued that the market price criterion as currently recommended by the 
European Commission is complex and leaves room for abuse. In practice, none of the 
national PCP-like initiatives complies with it. Increased certainty and simplification can be 
achieved by replacing the ‘market price’ criterion with several cumulative conditions related 
to the qualification of the involved contracting authority as end-user of the envisaged 
innovation and to the competitive, transparent and fair nature of the award procedure. It 
should be clarified that under these conditions a PCP public contract is awarded, as 
opposed to a PCP subsidy. Whenever one of the cumulative conditions is not complied with, 
the PCP will lead to granting a subsidy. This subsidy should be subject to the EU State aid rules 
 
 270 
as defined in the Framework for State aid for R&D&I and GBER.  
These rules  impose payment limitation to less than 100% of the costs of the R&D services as 





















CHAPTER 6. Conclusions and recommendations  
Research background  
 
The PCP procedure was proposed by the European Commission in 2007 as a means to 
enhance Europe’s competitiveness on the global market and to incentivize private 
innovation efforts towards solutions for several important European problems (such as climate 
change, ageing, shortage of natural resources etc.). This initiative was driven by the desire to 
emulate the perceived success of the US SBIR programme in bringing innovative technologies 
to the market and boosting the competitive advantages of its national businesses. The 
European Commission did not question the effectiveness of government intervention in 
support of innovation and did not define pre-conditions for an effective implementation of 
SBIR-type of government measures. It simply noted that SBIR-type of measures were missing 
from the innovation policies of the EU Member States and decided to stimulate their 
adoption. 
Despite great expectations, by 2010 there were no known examples of PCP procedures in the 
form proposed by the European Commission in its 2007 PCP Communication. A few initiatives 
inspired by the US SBIR were being piloted in the Netherlands, UK and Belgium. But these 
initiatives were implemented by centralised national innovation agencies with no or sporadic 
interaction with the end-customer and without competition beyond national borders. 
Moreover, the few implementations had not proven their effectiveness. The EU still lags 
behind its main competitors in important innovation indicators. 
The European Commission concluded that contracting authorities with operational needs, 
that may act as end-customers of novel products developed through PCPs, needed 
additional incentives to engage in PCPs. The European Commission contracted a series of 
studies to find instances of PCP implementation and to understand why individual 
contracting authorities refrained from PCP deployment. These studies revealed a series of 
barriers, ranging from organizational complexities in cross-border collaborations to risk 
aversion, to legal uncertainties on compliance with State aid rules and to the impossibility to 
directly purchase the end-results from a PCP finalist.    
Since 2009 the European Commission started to tackle the organizational and risk aversion 
barriers. Funds have been made available for the creation of networks of contracting 
authorities that could stimulate collaborations and exchanges of best practices. Since 2011 
funds are available for all the organisational costs as well as for part of the contractual costs 
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of cross-border collaborative PCPs. Several collaborative PCP projects are currently running 
under European Commission supervision (monitoring).  
This research has focused on the following central research question: 
In how far do current legal and policy arrangements in the EU enable pre-commercial-
procurement, as innovation policy instrument, to achieve its objectives to stimulate the 
competitiveness of European companies and to find solutions to Europe’s public challenges ? 
To answer the above question, I first address the six research sub-questions mentioned in the 
beginning of this thesis. 
6.1 What is PCP and what are the gaps in PCP’s framework 
conditions ? (Q1) 
In this thesis I analysed the objectives and features of PCP as described by the European 
Commission in its 2007 PCP Communication and in the accompanying Staff Working 
Document. I identified several gaps in the EU policy guidance regarding the rationale for 
implementing the PCP and its applicability conditions. I concluded that clear guidance from 
the European Commission is missing on several important aspects, that I outline below. 
Concepts surrounding PCP: demand-side as opposed to supply-side innovation policy 
instrument; public contracts as opposed to subsidies 
As mentioned in section 1.3, PCP may cover the development of innovative solutions for both 
the involved contracting authorities as end-users (direct procurement) and for private end-
users (catalytic procurement). In practice, some national innovation agencies have adopted 
a coordinating role in the application of national PCP-/SBIR-like schemes, which focus on 
catalytic PCPs. They have not ensured (sufficient) connection with the (private or public) end-
users. This is the case, to a larger or lesser extent, in all three Member States that have begun 
implementing PCP-like initiatives (UK, Netherlands, Belgium) (as documented in Chapter 4). In 
neither of the 2 cases, the contracting authority/innovation agency directly purchases the 
resulting innovations, as this is prevented by the applicable EU procurement rules. However, 
the contracting authority/innovation agency neither commits nor guarantees to organize a 
subsequent procurement procedure which would offer PCP suppliers the chance to 
compete for public contracts and sell the resulting innovation. 
This has led policy researchers to criticize the conceptualization of PCP as demand-side 
policy instrument in support of innovation. Involvement of the end-users in the R&D trajectory 
as well as the early and sufficiently sizeable uptake of the developed innovations has also 
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been identified in Chapter 2 as key prerequisites for the effective deployment of public R&D 
investments.  
From a legal point of view, the deployment of PCP to meet direct and societal needs of 
contracting authorities has raised questions of compliance with the EU State aid rules. This has 
deterred individual contracting authorities throughout the EU from engaging in PCPs, 
undermining the potential impact of this policy instrument. The PCP Communication refers to 
the ‘market price’ criterion to exclude that EU State aid rules become applicable. However, I 
showed in Chapter 4 and 5 that this criterion has proven both difficult to implement correctly 
and easy to circumvent. National innovation agencies implementing SBIR-/PCP-like initiatives 
have formally embraced this criterion while depriving it of any practical meaning.  
It is also important to clarify and simplify under which conditions PCP results in a subsidy, not 
only to incentivize the wide implementation of PCPs and to enhance the impact of this 
policy, but also to prevent the unwarranted use of subsidies, which are considered to have a 
harmful impact on the EU Internal market. According to the European Commission, subsidies 
lead to a skewed playing field (the exclusion from the market or the delayed reward of the 
most competitive and innovative firms) to the detriment of consumers’ welfare.  
In sections 1.7.3 and 5.4, I stressed the need for a clear conceptual distinction between the 
cases when PCP leads to the award of a public contract as opposed to granting a subsidy. I 
also advocated the need to simplify the conditions for non-applicability of the EU State aid 
rules, as alternative to the current ’market price’ criterion. 
In order to provide legal certainty and encourage the wide implementation of PCP by 
contracting authorities throughout the EU, a clear distinction should be made between PCP 
public contracts and PCP subsidies, according to the ‘end-user’ criterion which derives from 
the recently outlined ‘direct economic interest’ introduced by the Court of Justice of the EU 
in the Helmut Muller case. This should be clearly mentioned in the EU State aid rules regarding 
R&D and innovation, in addition to requirements regarding the competitive, transparent and 
fair nature of the award procedures. Whenever one of these conditions misses, and the PCP 
results in a subsidy, the EU State aid rules as codified in the Framework for State aid for R&D&I 
and GBER should be applicable. In these cases, cross-border collaborative PCPs could be 
justified on the basis of art.107(3)(b) TFEU. As part of the ongoing amendment of the State aid 
rules, lowering the financial threshold for the application of this exemption could be 
considered, next to explicit reference to PCP procedures. 
From a policy point of view, it should be clarified that PCP is a demand-side innovation policy 
instrument when the involved contracting authorit(y)ies (is)/are committed or guarantee to 
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purchase commercial volumes of the developed innovation. Of course, competition will 
need to be re-opened in accordance with the Procurement Directives. Whenever no 
commitment or guarantee of subsequent uptake is present, PCP should be defined as a 
supply-side instrument in respect of the envisaged innovation.  
In Chapter 2 I argued that the involvement of the end-users in the R&D trajectory and the 
early uptake of the developed innovations are crucial prerequisites for speeding up the 
commercialization of valuable research projects. As a consequence, catalytic PCPs do not 
contribute to achieving the aims of the PCP.  
Unclear relevance of PCP in supporting the development of service innovations 
The PCP guidance is not clear on the relevance of PCP for the development of services 
innovations. On the one hand, the PCP Communication talks about the role of PCP to assure 
the development of technological solutions to meet challenging societal needs.  On the 
other hand, the same policy documents indicate that the result of a PCP can be either an 
innovative product or service. This begs the question whether innovative services can/must 
be technological. 
Based on an analysis of relevant economic literature, Chapter 2 concluded that the process 
of innovation in service sectors remains insufficiently understood and that the European 
Commission believes there is insufficient proof that public R&D investments are the right 
incentives for service innovations. This is reflected in the approach adopted in the State aid 
area. In this area, the Framework for State aid for R&D&I establishes several minimum 
conditions for exempting national funding of organizational and process innovative activities 
from the obligation to pre-notify the aid to the European Commission. These minimum 
conditions refer to relation with the use and exploitation of ICT, degree of risk entailed by the 
project, delineation of the performed innovative activities and tangibility of the result 
(standard, business mode, methodology etc.).  
Within the current legal and policy framework, whenever innovative activities in service 
sectors qualify as R&D according to the Frascati Manual, PCP may be applied. Chapter 1 
concluded that the Frascati Manual lacks clarity on the concept of R&D for services 
innovations. The Manual proposes to use the same generic criteria to identify R&D in products 
and in services. As a consequence, identifying R&D in services often comes down to a 
subjective judgment regarding the presence of an appreciable element of novelty and the 
resolution of scientific and/or technological uncertainty. 
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I believe the European Commission should take a clear stand on the suitability of PCP to 
stimulate the development of service innovations. More specifically, it should adopt a similar 
approach to the definition of R&D in services innovations as it has done in the State aid area.  
Insufficient guidance on sharing IPR or alternative benefits  
As indicated in section 1.5.1 b, the European Commission’s guidance is missing on important 
aspects related to IPR sharing as well as on the possibilities to share alternative benefits. The 
documentary analysis of the national PCP-/SBIR-like initiatives in the Netherlands, UK and 
Belgium revealed that the guidance on these aspects in these national initiatives is also 
incomplete.  
Additional guidance would be beneficial on the following aspects related to patentable 
solutions: the arrangements needed to enforce parties’ obligations (such as time-limits for 
disclosure of the invention, consequences related to non-disclosure, reporting on application 
of the invention after the PCP procedure, dealing with background IPR etc.). Moreover, 
guidance should be provided on sharing IPR in the case of non-patentable solutions (such as 
copyrighted software) or on sharing alternative benefits (such as profits made during 
commercialization). 
Relevant guidance could be found in the US Bayh-Dole Act, which governs since 1980 the 
division of rights to inventions made by small businesses under government grants, contracts 
and cooperative agreements. 
Insufficient guidance on the concept of R&D (services)   
Chapter 1 concluded that the Frascati Manual is the most clear and complete source of 
definitions and explanations regarding the R&D concept. The EU has however not made any 
reference in the 2007 PCP Communication to the Frascati Manual, although the EU officially 
endorses it and although it is also used as guiding authority in the State aid area (in the 
Framework for State aid for R&D&I). 
Chapter 1 also concluded that the Frascati Manual lacks clarity on the concept of R&D in 
service innovations (already discussed above) and that it does not distinguish between the 
concepts of R&D services, R&D supplies (products) and R&D works as used by the EU.  
The European Commission should provide complementary guidance on these issues. Based 
on an analysis of the concepts of public works contracts, public supply contracts and public 
service contracts as defined in the Public Sector Directive, Chapter 1 concluded that PCP 
targets R&D projects which entail a large share of knowledge creation and are not very close 
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to commercialisation. When the value of the prototype and/or the value of building/installing 
the test object (prototype) is larger than the value of the R&D services, the contract will not 
qualify for a PCP procedure.  
In conclusion, the European Commission should provide additional guidance on the 
interpretation of the R&D concept, partly by reference to the Frascati Manual.   
6.2 What is the political context in which the PCP procurement was shaped 




Chapter 2 presented the political steps that led to the adoption of the PCP. It also outlined 
the current political support provided by the main EU institutions active in the innovation 
policy arena: the European Council (which gives the political impetus and support for certain 
action to stimulate innovation), the European Commission (which translates the European 
Council´s guidance into concrete activities) and the European Parliament (which has a say 
as co-legislator, in case legislation needs to be adopted).  
Chapter 2 also clarified the economic context in which the PCP emerged. This was governed 
by the worsening EU performance in the innovation area. The data published by the 
European Commission in the Innovation Union Scoreboards between 2001-2010 show that the 
gap between Europe on the one side, and the United States and Japan on the other, has 
consistently been widening along several dimensions of innovation. At the same time, the 
BRIC economies (Brazil, Russia, India and China) are quickly catching up and may overtake 
the EU in terms of key indicators of innovation performance, such as education, patents and 
investment in R&D. The statistics also show that despite similar levels of public R&D spending 
(to the US, Japan and China), the difference was substantial in private spending. The EU 
understood this as an indication that public R&D investments do not sufficiently incentivize 
private R&D investments. 
Against this background, the EU started since 2000 to embrace economic theories supporting 
the role of demand-side instruments in the innovation policy and began to pay particular 
attention to the use of public procurement. In 2005, pre-commercial procurement was 
identified as an important policy tool to incentivize increase private investments in R&D. 
Chapter 2 concluded that PCP is an important part of EU’s strategy to catalyze a 
technological revolution in order to cope with the numerous and enormous challenges of the 
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not so far-away future. All main EU institutions (European Council, European Commission and 
the European parliament) have expressed their support for PCP. 
However, the competences of the EU to adopt measures in the innovation area (and 
implicitly in relation to PCP) are limited. The European Commission may only guide Member 
States in defining their innovation policies (through drafting guidelines and specific 
timetables) and may only monitor and measure the amount and impact of their investments 
against quantitative and qualitative indicators and benchmarks. For the comparative 
assessment of the research and innovation performance of the 27 Member States and the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of their research and innovation systems, the Commission 
uses the innovation indicators of the Innovation Union Scoreboard.   
This approach leaves the European Commission with no direct enforcement mechanisms, yet 
it allows for evidence-based arguments to persuade and leverage peer pressure. 
Despite its limited competences, the European Commission has adopted important steps to 
encourage the up-take of PCP by individual contracting authorities in the EU, ranging from 
the funding of exchanges of knowledge and good practices up to the funding of concrete 
PCPs. Within the new funding instrument Horizon 2020, significant funds are reserved for the 
organizational and contractual costs related to collaborative cross-border PCPs.  
This initiative (Horizon 2020) has the potential to create (as attractors) leading examples in 
how a PCP should be conducted. On the other hand, such attractors have not yet been 
realized and neither have the reasons for such failure been established scientifically. This 
research focuses on legal contributions to these states of affairs and warns that PCP presents 
several features that are not suitable to achieve the desired impact as an innovation policy 
instrument (see next section).   
Economic prerequisites for effectiveness 
The policy expectations around PCP were built on the desire to emulate the success of the US 
SBIR and on the assumptions of several experts that such an approach would work equally 
well within the EU context. Designing the procedural details was left to the European 
Commission. It used the US SBIR as point of departure and adapted it to the EU legal 
framework. Particular attention was paid to coherence with the EU procurement rules and 
with the EU State aid rules. Less attention was paid to economic considerations that could 
ensure the achievement of PCP’s objectives (incentivize increased private investments in 
R&D, steer private R&D investments towards socially desirable innovations, improve the 
competitive position of EU firms in global markets).  
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In order to check whether the PCP has indeed the potential to live up to the policy 
expectations built around it, the second part of Chapter 2 analysed relevant economic 
theories/studies that underpin the main assumptions on which PCP is based. The following 
assumptions were used:  
- Innovation leads to (social) welfare; 
- R&D investment is a necessary pre-condition of innovation; 
- Venture capitalists underinvest in risky R&D projects;  
- Public needs can influence firms’ strategies for creativity and innovation; 
- PCPs is a suitable instrument to develop technological, as well as services innovations. 
Chapter 2 concluded that a successful PCP implementation needs intelligent, informed and 
demanding public customers/purchasers, who are the end-users of the envisaged 
innovations, who are willing to take the high risk of failure inherent to cutting-edge R&D 
projects and who are capable to offer a clear prospect for the adoption of the developed 
innovation. 
More specifically, the following conditions emerge as prerequisites for an effective 
implementation of PCP: 
1. the public R&D funding targets the most experimental and riskiest R&D projects  
2. the public R&D funding targets small companies, that experience difficulties in obtaining 
(sufficient amounts of) private capital for experimental/risky R&D projects;  
3. a high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure are accepted; 
4. competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process; 
5. the public purchaser is the technologically sophisticated end-user of the envisaged 
innovation; 
6. the public purchaser is willing to pay the premium price for the early use of the developed 
innovation and is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the developed 
innovation; 
7. when the public purchaser is not the end-user of the envisaged innovation, it is capable to 
convey the advanced needs of the private end-users to the innovator  and it is capable to 
adopt additional policy measures to stimulate the early up-take of the developed 
innovations by the private end-users (the case of the so-called catalytic PCP); 
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8. the adaptation of the product to larger (foreign/global) markets is not cumbersome; 
9. innovative technologies rather than innovative services are targeted; 
10. a continuous scrutiny/measurement of the impact of PCP is performed and lessons learnt 
are codified in guidance. 
6.3 How does PCP differ from the US SBIR and how can these differences 
impact PCP’s efficacy ? (Q3) 
Chapter 3 of this thesis showed that the adaptation of the US SBIR to the EU legal framework 
led to significant differences between PCP and the US counter-programme. These differences 
are related to:  
 the mandatory set-up of the US SBIR,  
 the flexibility embedded into the SBIR programme to tailor the size and timeline of 
awards to the concrete needs of the project, 
 the flexibility to adopt complementary support measures,  
 the possibility to purchase the SBIR results without reopening the contract to 
competition,  
 the restricted participation in the US SBIR to small companies,  
 periodic assessments. 
PCP as defined in the 2007 Communication is not mandatory and is not limited to 
participation by small companies who lack funding for the riskiest or most uncertain R&D 
projects. Moreover, the PCP Communication does not limit implementation to public end-
users who can potentially act as early adopters. According to the PCP Communication, EU 
procurement rules do not allow the direct purchase of the PCP results. As consequence, the 
EU initiative lacks important incentives (attractors) for contracting authorities to engage in 
PCPs. It consequently also lacks important prerequisites for effectively achieving its policy 
objectives.  
6.4 What is the state of implementation of PCP in the EU and how are the 
economic prerequisites for an effective deployment of PCP reflected into 
the available PCP(-like) initiatives ? (Q4) 
Chapter 4 showed that the most advanced national PCP-/SBIR-like initiatives in the 
Netherlands, UK and Belgium fail to implement the same attractors as the EU PCP. In addition, 
they do not embed sufficient incentives for experimentation, nor sufficient tolerance to 
failure. They do not allow project managers to tailor the size and timeline of the awards to the 
concrete needs of each project and do not appoint project managers with state-of-the-art 
technical knowledge.  
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Most importantly, they are grounded in national innovation policies. They aim to support 
national companies and to achieve this end they use legitimate mechanisms, such as 
national language requirements or restricted participation in market consultations preceding 
the PCP. The national policy aims are by themselves legitimate. However, due to this 
approach the national initiatives tend to protect national companies from foreign 
competition. They may thus waste public funds on solutions that already exist elsewhere, 
instead of driving national companies to advance the international state-of-the-art and gain 
global competitive advantages. As a consequence, it is doubtful that the national initiatives 
are capable to achieve their policy objectives. 
It became obvious by 2011, that individual contracting authorities were not engaging in 
PCPs. The European Commission realized that by 2011 there were practically no known 
examples of collaborative cross-border PCP projects.  
The studies evaluating the state of implementation of PCP identified the following reasons for 
the limited appeal of PCP to contracting authorities: 
- lack of technical knowledge;  
- contracting authorities’ aversion to risk, particularly when PCP(-like) initiatives are not 
institutionalized and are not mandated;  
- lack of clarity around the distinction between PCP and regular subsidies and the 
accompanying concerns regarding compliance with EU State aid rules;  
- reduced incentives for contracting authorities to engage in PCPs when direct 
purchase of the developed innovation is not allowed;  
- the complexity of a cross-border procedure (to find matching partners in other 
Member States, to define common requirements and to coordinate common 
procedures etc.). 
The European Commission has already undertaken steps to ease the difficulties encountered 
by contracting authorities in finding matching partners in other Member States (see section 
6.2). The Commission supported financially the formation of procurer groups and  networking 
activities related to PCP and since 2010, consortia of public authorities from around Europe 
received EC funding for the organizational costs of undertaking joint pre-commercial 
procurements. 
Moreover, the Commission has introduced into the new Procurement Directives a rule that 
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defines default provisions for cases of cross-border collaborations. These can also be applied 
in the case of pre-commercial procurement. 
Based on the analysis of the current national implementations of PCP, this thesis concluded 
that the EU efforts aimed at boosting investments in R&D through PCP have not proven 
successful. The EU continues (and even intensifies) these efforts – seemingly unaware of the 
reasons why these initiatives tend to fail in practice. It is therefore important that the 
European Commission performs a thorough evaluation of the effectiveness of its initiatives 
and acknowledges the reasons for their limited success. 
Based on this, the European Commission should provide additional guidance on the 
economic conditions for effective implementation of PCP(-like) initiatives. Although it cannot 
make them mandatory, as it lack competence to do so, it can potentially use them as 
framework for conducting the PCPs funded under Horizon 2020.  
As already mentioned previously, the European Commission should also clarify the concepts 
surrounding PCP and should replace the market price criterion with the end-user criterion next 
to requirements of fair and transparent competition. Arguably, facilitating the deployment of 
PCPs by contracting authorities with concrete and real operational needs will advance the 
EU innovation policy aims. Such contracting authorities will not seek to restrict competition to 
national companies, but will be focusing on objectively the best potential solutions. This will 
lead to the achievement of PCP’s objectives to support European companies to gain 
competitive advantages on global markets.  
6.5 How did the legal context shape and constrain the choices around the 
PCP features ? (Q5) 
6.5.1 Constraints posed by the WTO GPA 
The 2007 PCP Communication explains that direct purchase of a product developed through 
PCP is constrained by the WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). As already 
mentioned, the direct purchase of the PCP results is both an important incentive for 
contracting authorities to engage in PCPs and a prerequisite for an efficient use of demand 
in support of innovation. 
I concluded in Chapter 5 that the EU chose to exclude R&D services from the scope of the 
GPA, but did not exclude R&D supplies or works and neither other types of supplies. The US on 
the other hand, excluded set-asides for small businesses from the scope of the GPA. This 
reservation allows it not to open to competition from other GPA signatory parties the 
procurement of the innovative products developed during an R&D contract within the 
framework of the US SBIR programme.  
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This choice of the EU was arguably motivated by the desire to enhance competition within 
the Internal market and to prevent reliance of contracting authorities on industrial public 
policy to support national champions.  
The PCP Communication invokes the choices made within the GPA as the main reason for 
not allowing the direct purchase of the PCP results. However, the GPA offers the possibility to 
directly purchase the ‘first’ product or service resulting from an R&D contract without re-
opening the contract to competition (article XV(1)(e) GPA and article XIII(1)(f) of the newly 
amended GPA). Although the GPA does not restrict the freedom of the EU to regulate the 
area of procurement for its Member States, the fact that the EU chose to draft one set of rules 
applicable to both the EU and the GPA parties, turned the GPA into a reference framework 
for the EU Procurement Directives. 
In Chapter 5 I argued that first products cover operational products following the R&D phase. 
Phase 3 of the PCP as defined by the PCP Communication also covers the development of 
the same type of products. However, Phase 3 of the PCP does not provide for the purchase 
of those products by the contracting authority. It does not prohibit their purchase either. But 
whenever purchased within the framework of a PCP, the value of these first products 
together with the value of the prototypes should remain lower than the value of the R&D 
services. Otherwise, the PCP becomes an award covered by the EU Procurement Directives.  
In Chapter 5 I also argued that the GPA allows a contracting authority to directly purchase 
the PCP results (namely first products or services) despite the PCP requirement to locate the 
R&D activities within the EU, provided that the contracting engages in informal negotiations 
with all PCP finalists belonging to GPA state parties. This does not change the fact that a EU 
contracting authority would still breach the EU public procurement rules when procuring 
directly such results. This is due to the fact that the Procurement Directives adopted a stricter 
regime than allowed by the GPA and consequently does not provide this possibility. 
6.5.2 Constrains posed by the EU legal context 
Competence to regulate on issues of PCP 
This research underlined that the lack of mandatory set-asides for PCPs is potentially a missing 
incentive for its wide implementation. It showed that in the US, the SBIR has from the 
beginning been mandated by legislation and was placed under the coordination and 
supervision of one central authority, the Small Business Administration (SBA). This created a 




Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 concluded that the EU lacks competence to legislate mandatory 
set-asides for PCP or to impose minimum conditions for PCP-like national initiatives. Mandatory 
set-asides are thus in the EU left to the discretion of each Member State. It is questionable 
though that a coherent and eventually successful PCP programme for the whole EU will be 
attained if deployed separately by the EU Member States. It is doubtful that all Member 
States will voluntarily follow the recommendations of the EU in terms of conditions of 
implementation of PCP.  
At a national level, mandatory set-asides for PCP-like initiatives were adopted in the UK. The 
UK SBRI set minimum set-asides of 2,5% of the R&D budgets of the participating public 
agencies, but subsequently concluded that these public agencies found ways to circumvent 
the legislative obligations (e.g., by procuring public policy studies). The UK contracting 
authorities invoked the lack of understanding of this instrument as a reason for this behaviour. 
This leads to the conclusion that a legislative imposition of PCP is not sufficient. It should be 
accompanied by clear and comprehensive guidelines on its rationale and modes of 
implementation. 
Currently, EU’s initiative to fund collaborative PCPs by contracting authorities from different 
Member States is the only available means to the EU to bring coherency and bundle forces in 
this area. This research also suggested that clear guidelines regarding the concepts 
surrounding PCP and regarding its applicability conditions would enhance the 
implementation of PCPs and would create additional safeguards to shape good PCP 
practices.  
Procedural flexibility when conducting the PCP 
PCP is a procedure excluded from the scope of application of the EU Procurement Directive. 
In Chapter 1 I investigated the degree of procedural flexibility when conducting a PCP, in 
comparison to a negotiated procedure with prior publication, as defined by the Public Sector 
Directive. I concluded that contracting authorities who engage in a PCP procedure have 
limited procedural flexibility. This is potentially a missing incentive for contracting authorities to 
implement PCPs. 
Following the transposition of the new EU Procurement Directives, contracting authorities will 
have strong incentives to choose for the Innovation Partnership procedure, which allows 
increased procedural flexibility compared to the PCP. It allows a contracting authority to fund 
all the R&D costs as well as to directly purchase the results from one private partner. No 
restrictions are posed on the timeline of this partnership or on the applicability of the 
procedure. Although the proposed procurement rules indicate that the Innovation 
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Partnership procedure is applicable to contracts falling within the scope of the directives 
(including R&D service contract whose benefits and costs are shared between the 
contracting authority and the service provider), this is a theoretical distinction, as a 
contracting authority is not prohibited to bring an excluded contract (such as an R&D service 
contract with shared risks and benefits) within the scope of the directives and award it 
according to their provisions. 
In Chapter 5 I expressed concerns regarding the suitability of the Innovation Partnership 
procedure for promoting the shared innovation policy aims of the EU Member States. I 
criticized the procedure for its potential foreclosure of competition during long periods of 
time. I also criticized the choice not to limit the commercial purchase of the R&D results to the 
first products or services. I also concluded that insufficient safeguards have been put in place 
for preventing abuse. 
Constrains emanating from the EU procurement rules 
In Chapter 5, I analysed two of the main barriers to the wide implementation of PCP by 
individual contracting authorities: the obligation to conduct a separate competitive award in 
order to purchase the innovative solution targeted by the PCP competition, and the legal 
uncertainty regarding compliance with EU State aid rules. I also addressed the concern of 
contracting authorities (at least in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands) that a PCP 
finalist
1122
 might need to be excluded from a subsequent competitive procedure for the 
purchase of the solution targeted by PCP, due to the important knowledge benefits gained 
during the PCP. 
I underlined that these barriers weaken the potential positive impact of PCP as innovation 
policy instrument, not only because PCP is not widely applied, but because particularly 
individual contracting authorities that are potentially end-users and early adopters of the 
developed innovation, feel discouraged to use PCPs. Involvement of the end-user in the 
development of the innovation as well as its early adoption were identified as prerequisites for 
an effective deployment of PCP. Stimulating these authorities to adopt such an 
entrepreneurial and risk-taking attitude in the innovation field is crucial for achieving the 
desired policy aims.  
This research concluded that the EU Procurement Directives do not expressly allow the direct 
purchase of the first PCP results. It also concluded that the WTO GPA allowed more flexibility 
to this end than invoked by the European Commission in the PCP Communication.  
                                                          
1122 PCP finalist is an undertaking which completed successfully all the PCP stages. 
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Nevertheless, within the current and proposed rules, there is room for contracting authorities 
to require high levels of performance and functionality that may lead to the purchase of a 
PCP solution, provided that the procurement is not designed to fit the PCP innovative result. 
But the fact that the legal rules do not specifically mention this possibility constitutes an 
important source of uncertainty. This creates disincentives for the application of PCP. 
I argued in this research that the negotiated procedure without prior publication of a 
contract notice (articles 31(1)(b) of Directive 2004/18 and 40(3)(c) of Directive 2004/17) may 
under certain circumstances be used to directly purchase the results of a PCP procedure with 
only one PCP finalist. This is arguably the case when the innovative solution developed 
through PCP significantly advances on the levels of performance and functionality of the 
market.  
The proposed new Procurement Directives condition the use of  the negotiated procedure 
without prior publication of a contract notice upon proof that no ‘reasonable alternative or 
substitute’ exists and that ‘the absence of competition is not the result of an artificial 
narrowing down of the parameters of the procurement’. In Chapter 5 I questioned whether 
this new condition included in  article 32(2)(b) of the new Public Sector Directive and article 
50(c) of the new Utilities Directive mandates contracting authorities to lower the required 
level of performance or the amount of functionalities depending on the level of competition 
on the market.  
Based on an analysis of the concept of ‘reasonable alternatives or substitutes’ in EU 
jurisprudence and on an analysis of the reasonableness concept in the EU, as well as national 
and international jurisdictions, I concluded that the level of performance and functionality 
chosen by a contracting authority for the subject-matter of a public procurement should not 
be questioned beyond their potential to cover up protectionist practices. When it 
corresponds to the legitimate needs of the contracting authority, setting high levels of 
performance and functionality, cannot be considered ‘an artificial narrowing down of the 
parameters of the procurement’. 
A contracting authority is thus allowed to require that the procured solution achieve high 
levels of performance and functionality. Only when these levels are met by more than one 
solution available on the market, the contracting authority would not be allowed to rely on 
direct negotiations to procure the innovative solution developed through PCP.  
This research also clarified to what extent the advantages (in terms of knowledge and IPR) 
gained by a company during its participation in a PCP procedure must be neutralized by the 
contracting authority at the stage of the competitive award procedure. Chapter 5 
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concluded that a PCP finalist does not need to be excluded from a competitive procedure 
following the PCP. The obligation to level the playing field is limited to making all the 
necessary information available to the other tenderers, unless it is confidential or protected 
by IPR. Of course, this obligation includes defining all procurement requirements clearly and 
unambiguously. Under these conditions, a contracting authority is allowed to impose the 
same requirements for the desired product/service as it did in the preceding PCP procedure. 
The fact that only the PCP-finalist(s) can submit a compliant offer, does not entail a breach of 
any principle of public procurement law. 
The proposed Procurement Directives also introduce the Innovation Partnership procedure. It 
gives contracting authorities a legitimate mechanism to both support R&D and purchase the 
results thereof.  
I criticized in Chapter 5 this procedure for the potential lack of competition during the R&D 
stages. I also mentioned the problem introduced by the freedom to purchase the developed 
products long after their having been developed. Then, their commercialization need no 
longer depend on the contracting authority to act as a launching customer. 
Constrains emanating from the EU State aid rules  
Regarding the interplay with the State aid rules, Chapter 5 concluded that the ‘market price’ 
criterion developed in the PCP Communication constitutes a barrier to the implementation of 
PCPs due to its complexity and its susceptibility to abuse. Moreover, the ‘market price’ 
criterion is not coherent with the rationale behind the use of PCP as innovation policy 
instrument. Thus, if PCP is used to alleviate the difficulties of finding private investors for socially 
valuable R&D projects, the ‘market price’ criterion can arguably never be met (and de facto 
never is, as shown in the Member-State initiatives discussed).  
A suitable alternative to the ‘market price’ criterion is the adaptation of the State aid rules to 
expressly exclude the PCP procedure from their scope of application when the PCP contract 
is awarded in competition as prescribed by the 2007 PCP Communication and when the 
contracting authority is the end-user of the envisaged innovation. Such an approach is 
preferable for reasons of simplicity and legal certainty. 
6.6 How can the current legal and policy context be improved to stimulate 
the effective implementation of PCP ? (Q6)  
The conclusion of the research is that the current EU policy and legislative framework does 




The majority of the barriers to the wide and effective implementation of PCP lie both in the 
legal and in the public policy sphere. Some may be swiped away through additional 
guidance on the following topics: 
- the concept of R&D;  
- the economic prerequisites for an effective implementation of PCP; 
- the suitability of PCP to stimulate the development of services innovations;  
- the division of IPR; 
- under which circumstances the current EU Procurement Directives allow the use of a 
negotiated procedure without prior publication in order to purchase the solution developed 
by the only finalist of a preceding PCP procedure; 
- the new requirements introduced by the new Procurement Directives to use the negotiated 
procedure without prior publication, when no ‘reasonable alternatives or substitutes’ exist on 
the market and when ‘the absence of competition is not the result of an artificial narrowing 
down of the parameters of the procurement’; 
- the obligations imposed by the EU procurement rules to neutralize in a subsequent 
competitive award the inherent advantages  (in terms of knowledge and IPR) gained by a 
company during its participation in a PCP procedure; 
Other barriers, which are inherent to the EU context of PCP, such as the tendency of 
contracting authorities to support national companies (particularly in the case of catalytic 
PCPs) can only be avoided through clear legislative frameworks. A clear and simple 
distinction should be made between the circumstances when PCP leads to the award of a 
public contract or to granting a subsidy. The EU State aid rules should clarify that a public 
contract is awarded – as opposed to a subsidy - when the contracting authority is the end-
user of the envisaged innovation and when it applies fair and transparent competitive 
procedures.  In addition, safeguards should be tied to the Innovation Partnership procedure 
in order to prevent potential foreclosure of competition during long periods of time. These 
safeguards could refer to: maintaining competition during the R&D stage and restricting the 
timeline of the partnership (e.g. limit the commercial purchase following the R&D trajectory to 
first products). 
Finally, the monetary incentives provided under the current Horizon 2020, accompanied by 
European Commission’s coordination and supervision should be used as tools to incentivize 
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the wide implementation of the PCP and to create good practice. The analysis and 
recommendations in this dissertation must eventually be assessed politically, with the risk in 
mind that EU-policies have currently to live in a climate where they can harm rather than 
support the intrinsic motivation of Member States to participate in the Union. But this is beyond 
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Pre-commercial procurement – regulatory 
effectiveness ? 
Summary 
 This thesis is concerned with an initiative of the European Commission and a few 
European Union (‘EU’) Member States to stimulate through R&D procurement the private 
market to become more innovative. Since 2004, three Member States (the UK, the 
Netherlands and Belgium) have experimented with national versions of the Small Business 
Innovation Research (‘SBIR’) programme in the United States (‘US’). Their declared aim was to 
emulate the perceived success of the US in using R&D procurement to bring more innovations 
to the market and to enhance the competitive advantages of US firms in the global 
economy. The respective Member States did not question the effectiveness of public policy in 
the area of innovation. Neither did they investigate other or additional factors that potentially 
explain the more innovative character of the US economy. In reality, the Member States were 
motivated by the desire to fund their national companies and R&D procurement offered 
them an opportunity to circumvent the rigid EU State aid rules. Their initiatives did not remain 
unnoticed by the European Commission, whose main role is to foreclose discriminatory 
behaviour in the EU Internal market and wasteful subsidy races among the EU Member States. 
In response to national SBIR-‘like’ initiatives, the European Commission outlined in 2007 the 
legal conditions for the use of public procurement of R&D services (or ‘pre-commercial 
procurement’) by public agencies in the EU Member States. The Commission used the only 
soft-law instrument at its disposal, an Interpretative Communication. An Interpretative 
Communication is meant to explain the legal rules as they are stated in legislation and 
interpreted by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Commission used the current 
procurement and State aid rules to draw its version of pre-commercial procurement, that can 
serve shared EU goals. 
 The Commission appeared less preoccupied with justifying government intervention for 
innovation or with identifying success indicators for pre-commercial procurement. The 
immediate goal seemed to be to foreclose further discriminatory behaviour by national 
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innovation agencies.  
 In 2007, pre-commercial procurement became one of the new instruments of EU’s 
innovation policy. It was supposed to complement the existing innovation policy, based 
particularly on supply-side subsidies. Pre-commercial procurement was meant to make 
private innovation efforts more responsive to public, shared problems such as dealing with 
climate change, ensuring qualitative and affordable health care in the face of an ageing 
population, coping with security threats etc. It was also meant to make use of the collective 
strength of EU Member States in order to strengthen the competitive advantages of EU 
companies in a non-discriminatory manner. 
 To this very moment though, the few implementations of pre-commercial procurement 
have not proven their effectiveness. The EU still lags behind its main competitors in important 
innovation indicators. 
 The primary objective of this thesis was to examine whether the legal and policy 
framework in the EU represents an example of regulatory effectiveness or rather creates 
barriers to the wide and effective implementation of pre-commercial procurement. 
 The research starts from the main assumption that pre-commercial procurement has the 
potential to incentivize increased private investments in desired innovations. This assumption 
lies behind the policy-makers’ decision to employ this innovation policy instrument in the EU. 
In Chapter 2 I found support for this assumption in numerous economic studies.  
 But economists do not unanimously agree on the usefulness of government intervention in 
support of innovation. Various highly regarded economists point out that it is not possible to 
predict or even determine in hindsight with scientific exactness whether a certain public 
policy has triggered innovation. Moreover, numerous factors have an impact on 
technological evolution besides public policy. Economists have so far not met the challenge 
to identify a formal set of such factors. Complexity theories explain that it is practically 
impossible to capture the knowledge of the political, social, technological and economic 
variables that can potentially influence the working of a public policy in the real world, 
particularly on the long term. Even if we had the needed information, due to the 
‘computational complexity of the economy’, we would not be able to predict the future 
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before it actually happened. Under such circumstances, policy making becomes a case of 
decision-making in situations characterised by imperfect information and by uncertainty. In 
this context, public innovation policy should be based on a mix of theory, measurement, 
heuristics and participatory decision-making. 
 Based on the analysis of those economic studies that consider public R&D funding from 
the demand side justified, I further identified several pre-conditions for an effective 
implementation of pre-commercial procurement.  
 In Chapter 3, I concluded that the US SBIR embeds most of these pre-conditions. I based 
this conclusion on an analysis of the programme’s features and on an overview of the 
evaluations performed so far. I identified several evaluation studies that have either been 
commissioned by the US government or have been conducted independently by economy 
researchers. The performed evaluation studies are overall positive regarding the positive 
economic impact of the US SBIR. The strengths of the SBIR program or the improvements 
suggested by these studies match the pre-conditions identified in Chapter 2. These pre-
conditions are: 
 1. public R&D funding targets the most experimental and riskiest R&D projects;  
 2. public R&D funding targets small companies, that experience difficulties in obtaining 
(sufficient amounts of) private capital for experimental/risky R&D projects;  
 3. a high degree of experimentation and tolerance to failure are accepted; 
 4. competition is maintained throughout the whole innovation process; 
 5. the public purchaser is the technologically sophisticated end-user of the envisaged 
innovation; 
 6. the public purchaser is willing to pay the premium price for the early use of the 
developed innovation and is capable to offer a sufficiently sizeable market for the 
developed innovation; 
 7. when the public purchaser is not the end-user of the envisaged innovation, it is 
capable to convey the advanced needs of the private end-users to the innovator  and it is 
capable to adopt additional policy measures to stimulate the early up-take of the 
developed innovations by the private end-users (the case of the so-called catalytic PCP); 
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 8. adaptation of the product to larger (foreign/global) markets is not cumbersome; 
 9. innovative technologies rather than innovative services are targeted; 
 10. a continuous scrutiny/measurement of the impact of PCP is performed and lessons 
learnt are codified in guidance. 
 I further investigated in Chapter 4 whether the instances of national implementations in 
the UK, the Netherlands and Belgium comply with the identified pre-conditions for an 
effective implementation of pre-commercial procurement. To this end, I performed a 
documentary analysis of all call for proposals published by the 3 national agencies by 
January 2014. I analysed these documents on several effectiveness criteria, as identified in 
Chapter 2: (1) the existence of a public end-customer, (2) targeting technological 
innovations, (3) targeting high-risk or uncertain R&D. I have chosen these 3 criteria from the list 
of criteria in Chapter 2, based on their relevance for the type of information available in the 
SBIR calls.  
 I concluded that all three national programmes miss important prerequisites for an 
effective implementation of R&D procurement. Due to the centralised set-up and voluntary 
character, they depend on the promotion efforts of the coordinating agency and are biased 
towards less risky R&D projects; they often disregard the need for a thorough analysis of state-
of-the-art in the targeted technological field; despite being labelled as demand-side policy 
instruments, these programmes disregard, particularly in the Netherlands and in Belgium, the 
involvement of the end-customers and of the end-users. Moreover, all three programmes lack 
flexibility in adapting the timeline and amount of funding to the needs of each project. In 
view of the planned evaluation of all 3 programmes for 2014, I pointed out that there is a real 
chance that they will be discontinued.  
 I also concluded that by 2011 there were no examples of collaborative cross-border PCP 
projects as envisaged by the European Commission in its 2007 Communication. Based on 
various studies commissioned by the EU to evaluate the state of implementation of PCP, I 
concluded that the main barriers to the wide implementation of this policy instrument are: 
 1) lack of technical knowledge; 
 2) risk aversion; 
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 3) lack of clarity around the distinction between PCP and regular subsidies and the 
accompanying concerns regarding compliance with EU State aid rules;  
 4) the fact that subsequent direct purchase of the developed innovation is not allowed;  
 5) organisational difficulties in cross-border projects. 
 In the following Chapter 5, I focused on the legal origin of barriers 3) and 4). I pointed out 
that these barriers have a negative impact on the wide and effective implementation of pre-
commercial procurement. I argued that the Government Procurement Agreement (‘GPA’) of 
the World Trade Organisation (‘WTO’) allows more flexibility to purchase the PCP solutions 
than claimed by the European Commission. Moreover, the chances of a challenge by a GPA 
party are so remote, that one can only conclude that the European Commission is using the 
GPA legal framework as an excuse to foreclose discriminatory ‘PCP-like’ initiatives.   
 In Chapter 5, I also outlined additional legal grounds for the direct purchase of PCP 
solutions. I concluded that a contracting authority may directly purchase the PCP solution - 
through a negotiated procedure without prior publication of a call for proposals - whenever 
a contracting authority is able to demonstrate that the PCP solution performs certain 
functionalities and achieves certain levels of performance which are not met by other 
products on the market. This would be the case when the PCP solution significantly advances 
state-of-the-art and only one company finalises Phase 3 of the PCP procedure. This 
conclusion stands under both the current and the newly adopted legal regime for public 
procurement in the EU. The newly adopted Public Procurement Directives, due to be 
transposed into national legislation by the EU Member States by the 18th of April 2016, 
introduce another important novelty, the Innovation Partnership procedure. This procedure 
presents the advantage that PCP solutions may be directly purchased by the funding 
contracting authority. Moreover, the funding agency is not required to prove that a market 
price is paid for the R&D contract, in order to escape the applicability of the rigid EU State aid 
rules. However, the Innovation Partnership procedure presents serious shortcomings that 
jeopardise its potential positive impact on innovation. The main shortcomings regard: 1) the 
potential lack of competitive pressure during the R&D stages; and 2) the possibility to 
purchase the developed products long after the products have been developed and do not 
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depend on the contracting agency to act as early adopter. The failure to embed safeguards 
against abusive use will probably reduce the effectiveness of Innovation Partnerships in 
achieving EU’s innovation policy objectives.    
 In the final part of Chapter 5, I criticised the choice of the 2007 PCP Communication to 
require contracting authorities to prove that they paid a ‘market price’ for the pre-
commercial procurement, in order to escape the applicability of the EU State aid rules. I 
argued that the ‘market price’ proof is very difficult to provide, if not impossible. In practice, 
the companies bidding for a PCP are required to indicate which price discount they offer for 
retaining the IP ownership of the developed solution. This indication is considered sufficient 
proof of compliance with the ‘market price’ criterion. No control mechanisms are embodied 
in the award process. Such an approach deprives this criterion of any practical meaning. It is 
moreover, prone to abuse by government agencies who may grant illegal subsidies to 
national companies. I recommended in both Chapter 1 and Chapter 5 to drop the confusing 
dichotomy between PCP with or without a State aid element. Instead, I suggest to clarify that 
PCP is an instrument that can either lead to awarding public contracts or to granting 
subsidies, based on the ‘direct economic interest’ criterion, advanced by the Court of Justice 
of the European Union in the Helmut case. Increased clarity surrounding the PCP concept 
would stimulate its wider and more effective implementation.  
 In accordance with the ‘direct economic interest’ criterion, a public contract is awarded 
through PCP, when the involved contracting authority is the end-user of the envisaged 
innovation and is committed or guarantees to purchase commercial volumes of the 
developed innovation. In such a case the procurement should be exempted from the 
applicability of the EU State aid rules, provided that additional requirements such as the 
competitive nature of the PCP award are also fulfilled.  
 When private entities are the end-users of the envisaged solution and the contracting 
authority pursues only a public goal of indirect economic interest, PCP would result in 
granting a subsidy and would be subject to the EU State aid rules.  
 Finally, the research concludes that the current EU policy and legislative framework does 
not optimally support the effective and wide implementation of pre-commercial 
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procurement. The barriers to the wide and effective implementation of PCP lie both in the 
legal and the public policy sphere. They can be swiped away through additional guidance 














Pre-commercieel aanbesteden - doeltreffend 




 Dit proefschrift betreft het initiatief van de Europese Commissie en van een aantal EU-
lidstaten om door middel van aanbestedingen van R&D diensten bedrijven te stimuleren om 
innovatieve oplossingen te vinden voor publieke problemen gerelateerd aan 
klimaatverandering, vergrijzing, veiligheid etc. Sinds 2004 hebben Nederland, het Verenigde 
Koningrijk en België programma’s opgezet naar het voorbeeld van het Small Business 
Innovation Research (‘SBIR’) programma in de Verenigde Staten (‘VS’). De drie lidstaten 
hadden de bedoeling om het vermeende succes van het VS-programma te evenaren. De 
lidstaten hebben de efficiëntie van dit overheidsingrijpen echter niet onderzocht. Ze hebben 
ook niet uitgezocht of andere additionele factoren de reden zijn van het innovatieve 
karakter van de VS-economie. In de praktijk hebben  de drie lidstaten de kans aangegrepen 
om hun nationale bedrijven te financieren ondanks de strikte EU- staatssteunregels. Hun 
initiatieven zijn niet aan de aandacht van de Europese Commissie ontsnapt. Om de goede 
werking van de Europese Interne markt te waarborgen, heeft de Europese Commissie in een 
Interpretatieve Mededeling uitgelegd hoe de aanbestedings- en staatssteunregels de 
initiatieven van de lidstaten beperken. De Commissie heeft de juridische kaders gebruikt om 
een eigen gewenste versie van R&D aanbestedingen, ‘pre-commercieel aanbesteden’ (Pre 
Commercial Procurement, afgekort PCP) aan te bevelen. Pre-commerciële aanbestedingen 
zouden naar de mening van de Commissie ingezet moeten worden door aanbestedende 
diensten uit verschillende EU-lidstaten om innovatieve oplossingen voor gezamenlijke 
uitdagingen te vinden.  
 De richtlijnen van de Europese Commissie omtrent pre-commercieel aanbesteden zijn 
dus bedoeld om discriminatoir gedrag van de EU-lidstaten tegen te gaan. Ze zijn minder 
gericht op de economische efficiëntie van dit beleidsinstrument. 
 Niettemin is pre-commercieel aanbesteden sinds 2007 een vast onderdeel geworden van 
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het EU- innovatiebeleid,  als een aanvulling op de bestaande beleidsinstrumenten, die vooral 
gericht waren op het verstrekken van R&D subsidies vanuit de aanbodzijde. Pre-commercieel 
aanbesteden werd gezien als het ontbrekende instrument dat additionele private R&D 
investeringen gericht op het oplossen van publieke problemen zou stimuleren. Het werd ook 
beschouwd als een geschikt instrument om de gezamenlijke krachten van de verschillende 
EU-lidstaten in te zetten om de concurrentievoordelen van EU-bedrijven in de 
wereldeconomie te versterken. 
 Ondanks de verwachtingen van de beleidsmakers hebben de nationale- en EU-
implementaties van pre-commercieel aanbesteden hun effectiviteit niet bewezen. De EU 
loopt nog steeds op een aantal belangrijke innovatie-indicatoren achter vergeleken met de 
belangrijkste concurrerende landen, zoals de VS en Japan. 
 Het hoofddoel van dit proefschrift was om uit te zoeken of de juridische- en beleidskaders 
op EU-niveau geschikt zijn om de brede en effectieve implementatie van pre-commercieel 
aanbesteden te bevorderen.  
 Het proefschrift is gebaseerd op de aanname dat pre-commercieel aanbesteden meer 
innovatieve oplossingen voor de publieke problemen kan bieden en tegelijk 
concurrentievoordelen voor Europese bedrijven kan betekenen. Deze aanname onderbouwt 
de keuze van beleidsmakers voor dit beleidsinstrument. In Hoofdstuk 2 heb ik steun voor deze 
aanname gevonden in verschillende economische studies. 
 Maar niet alle economen zijn het eens  over het nut van overheidsingrijpen om de 
innovatie te bevorderen. Verschillende hoog aangeschreven economen zijn van mening dat 
het niet mogelijk is te voorspellen, of zelf achteraf met wetenschappelijke precisie vast te 
stellen, of een bepaalde overheidsactie tot innovatie heeft geleid. Bovendien zijn er veel 
andere factoren behalve het overheidsbeleid die invloed hebben op technologische 
vooruitgang. Economen zijn tot op heden niet in staat gebleken om deze factoren te 
identificeren. Economische theorieën over complexe systemen leggen uit dat het praktisch 
onmogelijk is om voldoende kennis te vergaren over de politieke, sociale, technologische en 
economische factoren die, vooral op de lange termijn, van invloed zijn op de werking van 
een overheidsbeleid in de echte wereld. Zelfs als alle benodigde informatie beschikbaar zou 
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zijn, zouden wij niet in staat zijn om de toekomst te voorspellen voordat deze daadwerkelijk 
zou gebeuren, vanwege de ‘rekenkundige complexiteit van de economie’. Daardoor wordt 
publiek beleid een kwestie van besluitneming op basis van imperfecte informatie en 
onzekerheid. Onder deze omstandigheden adviseren economen om publiek beleid te 
baseren op een mix van theorie, meting, heuristiek en democratische besluitvorming. 
 Op basis van de analyse van economische studies van R&D aanbestedingen, heb ik 
verder een aantal voorwaarden geïdentificeerd in Hoofdstuk 2, voor de efficiënte 
implementatie van pre-commercieel aanbesteden. 
 In Hoofdstuk 3 heb ik geconcludeerd dat het SBIR programma van de VS aan de meeste 
van deze voorwaarden voldoet. In ben tot deze conclusie gekomen op basis van een 
analyse van de eigenschappen van dit SBIR programma, en op basis van de tot heden 
uitgevoerde evaluatiestudies. De evaluatiestudies die ik heb geanalyseerd zijn zowel door de 
overheid als door onafhankelijke academische instellingen uitgevoerd. Zij geven een 
algemeen positief beeld weer over de economische impact van dit programma.  
 Ik heb verder in Hoofdstuk 4 uitgezocht of de nationale implementaties van pre-
commercieel aanbesteden in Nederland, het Verenigde Koningrijk en België, voldoen aan 
de bovengenoemde voorwaarden voor effectiviteit. Hiervoor, heb ik alle 
aanbestedingsdocumenten geanalyseerd die door de drie nationale organisaties op hun 
website waren gepubliceerd tot januari 2014. Ik heb deze documenten onderzocht op drie 
effectivitietscriteria: 1) was de aanbestedende dienst de eindgebruiker van de ontwikkelde 
innovatie; 2) had de beoogde innovatie een technologische karakter; en 3) waren risicovolle 
R&D projecten gefinancierd. Ik heb deze drie criteria uit de lijst van Hoofdstuk 2 gekozen 
vanwege hun relevantie voor de beschikbare aanbestedingsdocumenten. 
 Mijn conclusie was dat alle drie nationale programma’s belangrijke voorwaarden voor 
effectiviteit missen. Vanwege de gecentraliseerde opzet en het vrijwillige karakter zijn ze 
afhankelijk van de capaciteit van het implementerende innovatie-agentschap bij het erbij 
betrekken van  aanbestedende diensten. Dit leidt ertoe dat weinig risicovolle R&D projecten 
worden gefinancierd, dat niet gecontroleerd wordt of de projecten daadwerkelijk de 
huidige stand van de techniek bevorderen, en dat de eindgebruikers weinig of niet bij het 
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project betrokken worden. Bovendien bieden de drie programma’s geen flexibiliteit bij het 
fine tunen van de tijdlijn en de hoeveelheid financiering aan de behoefte van elk individueel 
project. Alle drie programma’s worden in 2014 geëvalueerd. Gezien de bovengenoemde 
tekortkomingen lijkt  hun stopzetting een reëel scenario. 
 Ik heb in dit proefschrift ook geconcludeerd dat er tot 2011 geen voorbeelden waren van 
grensoverschrijdende PCP-projecten zoals die zijn beschreven door de Europese Commissie 
in haar 2007 Mededeling. Op basis van de verschillende onderzoeken naar de status van 
implementatie van PCP, heb ik geconcludeerd dat de belangrijkste belemmeringen die 
aanbestedende diensten tegenhouden om PCP-projecten te implementeren, zijn: 
 1) gebrek aan technologische kennis; 
 2) risicomijdende houding; 
 3) zorgen over naleving van staatssteunregels; 
 4) het feit dat directe inkoop van de voortvloeiende innovatie niet toegestaan is; 
 5) organisatorische uitdagingen in grensoverschrijdende projecten. 
 In het volgende Hoofdstuk 5 heb ik de juridische oorsprong van belemmeringen 3) en 4) 
geanalyseerd. Ik heb geconcludeerd dat deze belemmeringen een negatieve impact 
hebben op de brede en effectieve implementatie van pre-commercieel aanbesteden. Ik 
heb betoogd dat de Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) van de Wereld Handel 
Organisatie (WTO) meer flexibiliteit biedt om de PCP-innovaties direct in te kopen dan de 
Europese Commissie beweert. Bovendien is de kans van een klacht bij de WTO-rechter uiterst 
gering. Dat leidt tot de conclusie dat de Europese Commissie de juridische kaders van de 
GPA als excuus gebruikt om discriminatoire ‘PCP-type’ programma’s tegen te houden. 
 In Hoofdstuk 5 heb ik ook een overzicht gemaakt van de wettelijke gronden die het direct 
inkopen van de PCP-oplossingen rechtvaardigen. Mijn conclusie was dat aanbestedende 
diensten een PCP-oplossing door middel van onderhandelingen zonder voorafgaande 
bekendmaking mogen inkopen wanneer zij kunnen bewijzen dat de PCP-oplossing over een 
unieke functionaliteiten en prestatieniveau beschikt. Dit zou het geval zijn wanneer de PCP-
oplossing de huidige stand van techniek aanzienlijk bevordert en wanneer slechts een partij 
de PCP-procedure afrondt. Dezelfde conclusie geldt zowel voor het huidige als voor het 
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recent aangenomen EU-regime voor aanbestedingen. De nieuwe aanbestedingsrichtlijnen, 
die op 18 april 2016 in de nationale wetgeving van de lidstaten dienen te zijn 
geïmplementeerd, introduceren een andere belangrijke noviteit, te weten het innovatie 
partnerschap. Deze nieuwe procedure biedt het voordeel dat de uit de PCP voortvloeiende 
oplossingen direct door de aanbestedende dienst ingekocht kunnen worden. Bovendien 
hoeft de financierende overheidsinstelling niet te bewijzen dat zij de marktprijs betaalt voor 
de uitgevoerde R&D diensten, om de toepassing van de EU-staatssteunregels te vermijden. 
Maar de nieuwe procedure incorporeert ernstige tekortkomingen die een eventuele 
positieve impact op innovatie in gedrang brengen. Ten eerste is competitie gedurende het 
innovatie partnerschap niet een vereiste. Ten tweede mag een aanbestedende dienst de 
innovatieve uitkomst van het partnerschap direct inkopen lang nadat de commercialisatie 
hiervan niet meer afhankelijk is van de eerste gebruikers. Het gebrek aan waarborgen tegen 
misbruik van deze procedure plaatst serieuze vraagtekens bij haar potentie om innovatie te 
bevorderen. 
 In het laatste deel van Hoofdstuk 5 heb ik de keuze van de Europese Commissie in haar 
2007 Mededeling voor het marktprijscriterium bekritiseerd.  Ik heb betoogd dat het moeilijk, zo 
niet onmogelijk, is de marktprijs voor de R&D diensten te berekenen door rekening te houden 
met de huidige waarde van de intellectuele eigendomsrechten die de leverancier behoudt. 
In de praktijk, worden PCP-leveranciers gevraagd om een prijskorting in hun offertes aan te 
geven voor het behouden van de intellectuele eigendomsrechten op de ontwikkelde 
oplossingen. Geen controle van deze indicatie wordt vereist. Deze aanpak ontneemt het 
marktprijscriterium alle praktische betekenis. Bovendien biedt deze aanpak de mogelijkheid 
aan innovatie-agentschappen om illegale subsidies te verstrekken. Ik heb in  Hoofdstuk 1 en 
in Hoofdstuk 5 betoogd dat de dichotomie tussen PCP met een staatssteunelement en PCP 
zonder een staatssteunelement verwarrend is. In plaats hiervan beveel ik aan om te 
verduidelijken dat PCP een instrument is dat tot het gunnen van een publiek contract kan 
leiden waarop de staatssteunregels niet van toepassing zijn, of tot het verstrekken van een 
subsidie waarop de staatssteunregels wel van toepassing zijn. De scheidslijn tussen de twee 
gevallen kan het ‘direct economisch belang’ van de aanbestedende dienst zijn, zoals 
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uitgelegd door het Hof van Justitie van de EU in de Helmutzaak. Een duidelijke verhouding 
tussen R&D publieke contracten en R&D subsidies kan aanbestedende diensten stimuleren 
om PCP vaker toe te passen. 
 Volgens het criterium van ‘direct economisch belang’ wordt via PCP een publiek 
contract gegund wanneer de aanbestedende dienst de eindgebruiker van de ontwikkelde 
innovatie is en wanneer hij gecommitteerd is om commerciële hoeveelheden in te kopen. 
Een additionele voorwaarde is dat de aanbesteding in competitie plaatsvindt. In dit geval 
zijn de staatssteunregels niet van toepassing.   
 Wanneer private consumenten de eindgebruikers van de innovatie zijn en de 
aanbestedende dienst slechts een publiek belang van indirect economisch belang beoogd 
met het financieren van de PCP, zal PCP tot het verstrekken van een subsidie leiden. In dit 
geval zouden de EU staatssteunregels van toepassing zijn. 
 Tot slot heb ik in dit proefschrift geconcludeerd dat het huidige EU-beleid en wettelijk 
kader niet optimaal zijn als het gaat om het  effectief en breed implementeren van PCP te 
stimuleren. De belemmeringen voor de effectieve en brede implementatie van PCP liggen 
vooral in de juridische- en  beleidssfeer.  Zij kunnen weggenomen worden door middel van 









I would like to thank my supervisor prof. Aernout Schmidt for his academic guidance 
throughout these years. He pushed me to look beyond the narrow borders of the legal field. I 
learned from him to be an objective researcher and to approach new perspectives on the 
topic. 
A special thanks to my employer Stephan Corvers, who gave me the opportunity to do this 
research. He believed in me at a time when I just started learning about public procurement 
law. He never hesitated to share his valuable insights on the topic and to guide me in finding 
the needed expertise and knowledge. He offered me a great opportunity for which I am very 
grateful. 
But I would like to dedicate this work to my family: to my supportive husband Bas and to my 
two beautiful daughters Eliza and Iris, who gave me the strength to keep going. To my sweet 














Curriculum Vitae  
 I was born in Romania on 11 October 1978. After obtaining my Bachelor Degree in Law in 
Bucharest in 2001, I worked as company lawyer at Marsat SA. In 2006 I continued my legal 
studies at the University of Amsterdam in the Netherlands. I graduated with a LLM degree in 
‘International and European Law’ in 2007. Towards the end of the Master programme, I 
started an internship at the Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law. I was 
subsequently offered a permanent position as legal officer. In this position I did research on 
various topics of private and public international law. I discovered my passion for research. 
When the opportunity to initiate a research career came along, I embraced it. I joined in 
2008 the T.M.C Asser Institute in the Hague, as PhD researcher.  
 A year later, in 2009, I realised how important for my research it was to gain practical 
insights into the field of public procurement law. That is why I decided to join Corvers 
Procurement Services BV as legal procurement consultant. I continued my PhD research at 
eLaw@Leiden at Leiden University. In this new position I provided legal advice on a wide 
range of procurement aspects, involving innovation and sustainability. I also participated as 
legal expert in EU funded research projects related to sustainability and innovation aspects in 
public procurement. In 2013 I became an EU independent expert on pre-commercial 
procurement.  
 With regard to these topics, I regularly published and gave presentations. In 2009 and 
2010 I continued to enrich my knowledge of public procurement law. I followed specialisation 
courses in the area of European and International Procurement Law in the US and the 
Netherlands. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
